欧伦斯是美中关系全国委员会会长

周建成：今年上午在卡特中心，您用中文俘获了听众的心。因为您非常自谦地形容自己为“小土豆”，这令我不禁端坐倾听。当然这个单词用英文表达的意思是指……

欧伦斯：小人物。

周：作为一名所谓的“小人物”，您在美国国务院法律顾问办公室开启了您的职业生涯，虽然这样形容自己的人从来都不是什么小人物。请您谈谈当时的生活，以及是什么样的机遇让您接触到了中国？

欧伦斯：一切都源于我的家庭。我的母亲是移居美国的移民。我的祖父母也是移居美国的移民。在我成长的家庭，我们被教导如果不是因为美国政府和美国人民，我们压根不会存在，我们会在欧洲消亡。我的家人是来自欧洲的犹太移民，他们很可能死于纳粹魔爪，或俄罗斯大屠杀。因此他们会说，我的兄弟、姐妹和我应该以服务来回报美国人民。所以我在成长过程中一直梦想去西点军校读书。但越南战争爆发了，而我觉得这并非我想要追寻的道路，当时的我极其反战。相反，我到哈佛读了本科。然后在1970年4月30日，尼克松总统宣布入侵柬埔寨，这是美国把越战从越南扩大到柬埔寨的战略。哈佛爆发了激烈的抗议活动，以至于学校不得不停课。所以在哈佛的最后一天，我找到了一位受人尊敬的教授，告诉他我想了解为什么美国政府这样的“好人”却要做发动越南战争这样的坏事。我想学习越南语。这位教授说：“史蒂夫，如果你真的想要了解亚洲和这个世界正在发生些什么，你应该学习中文。”说完这些，他转身准备离开，但随即又转过身来看着我，并说：“顺便一提，如果你想学习中文，我会帮你申请一份奖学金。明天到我办公室来。”我们的整个对话不超过60秒。第二天，我来到他的办公室，填了一张国防外语补助金申请表。大约三周后，我得到了这份补助金，开始学习中文。因此，这段不超过60秒的对话开启了我与中国一生的羁绊。大学毕业后，我决定去台湾提高自己的中文，在那里我坚持15个月只讲中文。随后我回到哈佛法学院学习。毕业后，我加入了美国国务院。大约一年后，国务院发觉在他们的法律顾问办公室有一个会说中文的律师。因此我被派往帮助筹备与中国建交的工作小组。卡特总统很早就认定了，美国将与中国建立外交关系。我当时所在的团队，这正是最有趣的部分以及为什么我称自己为“小土豆”，拥有很多将军，却没有几个小兵。因此作为仅有的几个小兵之一的我才有机会去做一些对于一个27、28岁的年轻人来说非比寻常的工作。

周：您认为为什么您的教授告诉您中文是了解整个亚洲大陆的窗口？

欧伦斯：这是因为亚洲的古代史在很大程度上是用中文书写的。他给了我一个了解亚洲的平台，而事实证明他的选择是正确的。顺便一提，他还说过：“这场战争结束后，中文或许也会派上用场。” 这句话令人难以置信地先知先觉！

周：那是在上世纪70年代早期？

欧伦斯：1970年4月30日是美国入侵柬埔寨的日子。正是因为战争扩大，所以我非常清楚地记得这个日子。包括我在5月1日与那位哈佛教授的对话，伍德赛德教授。

周：所以几乎恰好在那场对话发生九年后，在这位教授改变了你人生几乎十年后，邓小平出访美国。他在1979年1月底会见卡特总统时，他们谈到了战争，包括柬埔寨和越南，还包括中国、日本和二战。他们谈论这些的目的是确保与中国恢复邦交后他们不会为两国之间的任何战争承担责任。是这样么？

欧伦斯：随着时间的流逝，我们忘记了当时美中关系的基础是反苏联盟，对于中国和美国而言，存亡威胁都是苏联。而尼克松在1972年开启，随后卡特在1979年1月1日与中国建立外交关系的原因就是巩固反苏联盟，他们认为这将防止战争。

周：您曾谈到两国政府令事态回归正轨的能力。眼下两国关系正处于一个非常棘手的状态。当然，我们无法断言这仅仅是现任政府的问题。究竟是什么样的暗流令这两国从欢庆共同胜利走到了今天的境地，也就是吉米·卡特说的“一场现代冷战”并非难以想象？

欧伦斯：这里存在多种因素，包括美国的变化导致我们为发生在本国的问题寻找原因，包括中国的政策强化了部分想要将双边关系描述成战略竞争对手的美国人的立场。因此，这是两国政府的所作所为共同导致的结果。在这个时代最令人担忧的是，问题远不止政府这么简单。在美国，此前作为建设性美中关系支持者的学界、智库、企业现在都改弦更张。当中国学生被拒签，每个人，智库、学术机构和商界，都应当抗议，因为这最终会伤害美国。这对美国有害无益。这不仅对美中关系有害无益，也对美国这样一个矗立于教育之巅的明亮光辉之城有害无益。虽然人们正在发起抗议，但抗议的强度和规模都低于预期，因为中国的很多政策已经令那些曾经支持建设性双边关系的人们对中国感到失望。

周：当您往来奔走，游说业界，无论是商界、学界还是政界时，他们怎么看？

欧伦斯：作为美中关系压舱石的商界已经厌倦了听中国说一些根本不会兑现的承诺。你也在今天的会场上听到中国如何在加入WTO后17年依然不履行承诺。你听到了（美中贸易全国委员会主席）克雷格·艾伦谈到他们将尽快遵守的政府采购协议。17年可不是什么尽快。已经越来越迟了。我们听说很多承诺最终都没有兑现。作为一个无可救药的乐观派 ，作为一个过去40年见证了诸多变化的人，我依然相信这些承诺终将被兑现。但现在美国商界中弥漫着一股巨大的挫败感，而这种挫败感的表现就是商界在美中关系议题上不再像以往那样立场坚定。而由于中国对教育领域的压制，由于中国拒绝给曾经批评过中国的美国学者签发签证，由于中国政府时常试图影响美国的学术讨论，这些都令曾强力支持美中关系的美国学界开始走向分裂。依然有美国学者支持美中建设性关系，但也有很多人选择不再发声。很多人相信我们应当拥有对等政策，如果中国政府禁止美国的某些做法，那么美国也应以其人之道还施彼身。因此，如果美国政府，如果美国新闻署想要在全中国不同的大学开设“美国角”，他们无法做到。但中国在美国开设了超过100家孔子学院，因此美国学界就会说：“我们应当实施对等原则。如果中国不允许美国人开设'美国角'，那么美国也不应允许中国开设孔子学院。”美国记者认为他们在中国遭受了不公待遇。如果每次一位美国记者被公安邀请去喝茶，我就可以得到1美元，那么我将变得比现在有钱得多，因为这种事情太过频繁。中国对于外国记者工作的干涉非同寻常。这导致美国政府现在要求中国CCTV和新华社注册为外国代理人。风险在于这将成为对等限制，而这是极具破坏力的。但这些曾支持美中进行建设性接触的业界已经不再支持这种方式了。智库的情况与学界相似。他们厌倦了会议被迫取消。他们厌倦了用英文编撰的报告被翻译成中文，而且翻译的还不准确。因此，智库也不再像以往那样是美中关系的强力支持者了。这些政策很糟糕，并不符合中国自身的利益。但美国现在欠缺的是将这些政策放置到合适的语境中去理解。中国正在寻求取代美国成为世界头号大国么？答案是中国显然不这么想。中国政府关注的是维护国内稳定和自身政权，这并非意味着取代美国成为世界头号大国。中国的历史、文化和当前的问题决定了中国未来50年要做的事。但问题是，美中两国曾经的美中建设性关系支持者们现在不再是支持者了。

周：听了您的所感所想，过去40年的一个重要标志就是信任、远见以及做出历史性决断的勇气与果敢，正如邓小平和卡特在1978年12月和1979年1月所展示出来的那样。那么现在有哪些拥有影响力的合适人选？我不是指总统，而是可以施加影响的社会团体？如果像您所言他们也备感挫败，那么他们感到挫败的原因也是同样么？

欧伦斯：我一直都相信美国政府。多年来我一直认为美国政府高层中缺乏中国专家。在整个中国政府中，你能找到曾经在美国学习的人。他们通常非常了解美国。一些人用英文同我交流，一些人用中文同我交流，但他们都拥有在美国学习生活的经历。现在美国政府高层中，除了赵小兰，还有谁真正懂中国？赵小兰是中国人，她出生在台湾，她会说流利的中文，但她的职责所在并非中国。在奥巴马政府期间我曾这样觉得。（中国驻美国大使）崔天凯能用英文与美国人民交流，也非常了解美国。他是建设性接触的一个中坚力量。我觉得要想在中国找到一个能够同中国人民用中文交流、表达观点的美国人，我们只能在前辈中国通中寻找。

周：您曾说您正是因为自身的语言能力而被发掘和提拔的。

欧伦斯：嗯，在当时的美国政府里，没有其他会说中文的律师了。

周：您认为现在有更多这样的人么？

欧伦斯：不，我觉得没有。

周：一些人会说，这与大批中国学生远赴美国求学类似，因为美国向中国敞开了教育大门，让这些学生不仅事业有成，生活上也收获良多。美国学生在中国的情况也是如此么？

欧伦斯：在中国的美国学生人数要少得多。我们现在有35万中国学生在美国学习，但在中国学习的美国学生只有2万。

周：为什么会出现这种情况？是因为美国学生对中国不感兴趣，还是中国不够开放？

欧伦斯：中国学生来美国学习不是为了促进美中关系。他们来美国是因为美国拥有世界上最先进的教育体系，而对于中国人来说学习英语是他们的生存根本。但对于美国人而言，学习中文却并非如此。对于他们来说，远赴中国学习通常比较困难。我接触过的一个项目在这方面就做得非常出色，清华大学的苏世民学者项目。这个项目不仅招收美国人，还有英国人、法国人、日本人以及来自世界各地的学子，他们通过这个项目到中国的清华大学学习一年。他们是未来的领袖，我们将给予他们在中国生活的全部经验。他们不会成为中国学者，但他们至少会对这里正在发生的事情拥有一些了解。这有点像英国的罗德奖学金项目。这个项目已经拥有超过100年的历史。美国人远赴英国学习，加深了对英国的了解，回到美国后，他们成为各行各业的领袖。

周：我想以一个乐观的调子结束今天的采访，因为乐观主义是前进路上的必备情绪。您曾谈到当下的事态发展令您深感担忧，但让我们把眼光放长远。您在最开始谈到了战争与冲突。自从1979年中国和美国决定恢复邦交之后，没有一名美国士兵在东亚的战场上牺牲。这种观点会给我们何种基础向前推进中美关系，我们又该如何在其他议题上应用这种观点？

欧伦斯：美国已经忘记了直到1979年亚洲是何等动荡不安，又有多少美国人在这里丢掉性命。所有攻击美中建交、攻击美国对华实施接触政策的人们都未指出美国人从此在亚洲不再丢掉性命 。这可不是什么小事。我于1972年前往亚洲，当时在越南每天都有美国士兵死去。妖魔化中国的代价并未被完全认清，中国追随美国这种政策的代价在中国也并未被彻底认清。我之所以大谈特谈气候变化的原因就在于超级飓风“桑迪”冲击了我的家，所以我认识到气候变化对纽约市的影响。我看到上海坐落在长江河岸，海拔也并不高。因此气候变化将带来毁灭性的影响，引发种种事故，如果这个地域遭到飓风袭击，这就需要各国政府携起手来。流行病的防控也是一样，无论是新型SARS还是新型埃博拉病毒。总会发生一些事件需要美中两国携手合作。你无法预测未来将会发生什么，但该来的总会来。或者会爆发一场恐怖袭击，要求美国和中国必须协同合作，或者一场日益恶化的经济危机，让美国或中国人意识到我们需要合作。最终，进行这种妖魔化的不是大多数美国人，也不是大多数中国人，而是一小撮人，他们相信这符合他们的国家利益。我不会质疑他们的信仰。我只是认为这从根本上是错的。我每天都会搭乘纽约地铁，我会观察思考为什么地铁再也无法发挥作用。这是因为我们作为一个国家，作为纽约市市民，作为纽约州州民，未能对其进行投资。这部分是由于我们在军事开支上花费了7000亿美元，而军事开支对于提升社会的基础设施建设毫无益处。因此人们将逐渐意识到，他们将最终告诉他们的政府，我们不能继续在这条路上走下去了。我们需要追寻一条合作之路。终有一天，这将到来。我无法告诉你下个月或明年，事情就会朝着这个方向发展，但我可以肯定的是这终将会发生，因为最终美中两国的人民将告诉他们的政府我们应当怎么做。自1972年接待访美的中国乒乓球队后，美中关系全国委员会一直致力于促进美中两国间的人员交流，我们深知这些纽带更加强韧，这些纽带将把两国联结到一起。因此，这就是为什么说到底我是一个乐观派。

周：我只是希望，当您谈到在抗击流行病、扭转贸易战负面影响、应对恐怖主义或抵御气候变化等领域分享数据时，人们不会意识到的太晚。

欧伦斯：遗憾的是，我觉得我们现在需要一场危机来让两国再次携手合作。眼下，让人们相信美中对抗对于社会而言代价巨大是非常困难的。搭乘地铁的时候我正在读《国防战略》报告，我观察了一下周围的人们，令我难过的是这些通勤路上的人们正在为这个糟糕的战略付出代价，而他们并不自知。

周：史蒂夫·欧伦斯，非常感谢您将这些置于人民的语境下，一个很多人面临挣扎的语境下。

您可以在此（链接）收听周建成与欧伦斯的对话。

Stephen Orlins is President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations

JAMES CHAU: You captivated the audience this morning at the Carter Center with your Chinese, and you made me sit up because you very self-deprecatingly described yourself as xiao tudou [小土豆] which of course in English means…

STEPHEN ORLINS: Small potato.

JC: You started life as a so-called “small potato” – though people who describe themselves as such never really are – in the legal department at the U.S. State Department. Tell me about life then and what brought you into contact with China?

SO: It started with my family. My mother was an immigrant to the United States. My paternal grandparents were immigrants to the United States. I grew up in a family where we were taught that, but for the American government and the American people, we wouldn't exist, we would have perished in Europe. They were European immigrants and Jewish immigrants, and they would have died under the Nazis, or in a Russian pogrom. My parents said that my brother, sister and I owed a debt of service to the American people, and I grew up thinking that I would go to West Point. But the war in Vietnam intervened and I decided that wasn't the route I wanted to take – I was very anti-war – and instead, I ended up going to Harvard College. Then, on April 30th, 1970, President Nixon announced the invasion of Cambodia, the extension of the American war in Vietnam to Cambodia. Harvard erupted in protest so terrible that the school ended up canceling classes. So, on the last day I was at Harvard, I went to a respected professor and said I wanted to understand why good people – the American government – do bad things like the war in Vietnam, and that I wanted to study Vietnamese. He said, “Steve, if you really want to understand Asia and what's going on, you should study Chinese”. He turned to go away, but then turned back, looked at me, and said, “By the way, if you want to study Chinese, I'll get you a fellowship. Come to my office tomorrow”. This entire conversation lasted less than 60 seconds. I went to his office the next day, filled out a form for a National Defense Foreign Language grant, which I was then given about three weeks later to start the study of Chinese. This less than 60-second conversation began a life-long relationship with China. When I graduated college, I decided to perfect my Chinese by going to Taiwan, where I only spoke Chinese for about 15 months. Then I went to Harvard Law School. When I graduated law school, I joined the U.S. State Department, who discovered after about a year that they had this Chinese speaking lawyer in the legal advisor's office. I was then put on the team that was going to help establish diplomatic relations with China, which President Carter early-on decided we were going to do. I was put on a team where, interestingly, and why I call myself a xiao tudou, there were a lot of chiefs and very few Indians. So as one of the few Indians, I got to do things which for a 27, 28-year old, were truly extraordinary.

JC: Why do you think your professor gave you the language of Chinese as a vista to understanding an entire continent?

SO: Because the ancient history of Asia was substantially written in Chinese, and so he was giving me a platform to understand Asia, which turned out to be true. He also, by the way, added, “Maybe Chinese might be useful after this war is over” – which was incredibly prophetic!

JC: This was the early 1970's?

SO: It was 1970. April 30th was the invasion of Cambodia, a date I remember with incredible clarity because of the expansion of the war. And then May 1st was the conversation I had with the Harvard professor, Professor Woodside.

JC: So almost exactly nine years after that conversation, almost an entire decade after your professor transformed your life, Deng Xiaoping went to the United States. When he met with Jimmy Carter in late January 1979, they talked about war, including Cambodia and Vietnam, and also China, Japan, and World War Two. They talked about it so that they would ensure that, in normalizing the Chinese relationship, they would not be responsible for any wars between them. Is that correct?

SO: We forget over time that the original basis for the U.S.-China relationship was an anti-Soviet alliance. The existential threat to both China and the United States was the Soviet Union, and the reason Nixon opened in 1972 and then Carter established diplomatic relations on January 1st, 1979, was to cement the anti-Soviet alliance, which would in their view prevent war.

JC: You've talked about the capacity of both governments to set things back on track. The relationship is at a very tricky stage, and surely we can't say it's just about the current administration. What's been the undercurrent that has brought these two countries from celebration, to the point where Jimmy Carter says a “modern Cold War” is not inconceivable?

SO: Numerous factors: from changes in the U.S. which lead us to look for a cause for the problems here, to Chinese policies that have strengthened those in the United States who want to characterize the relationship as strategic rivals. It's a combination of what both governments have done. What's most troubling in this era is that it's much deeper than governments. In the United States, academics, think-tanks, and businesses that formerly were supporters of constructive U.S.-China relations are not today. When Chinese students are denied visas, everyone- think tanks, academic institutions, the business community- should protest, because ultimately that decision is terrible for the United States. It's not just bad for U.S.-China relations, it's bad for America as the bright shining city on the hill of education. People are protesting, but it's not in the strength and numbers you expect, because many Chinese policies have made those who formally supported constructive relations unhappy with China.

JC: When you go out and speak to these communities, whether it be business, academic, or political, what do they say?

SO: The business community, which was really the ballast for the U.S.-China relationship, is tired of hearing promises which are not implemented from China. You heard today talk about China's entry into the WTO and how 17 years later commitments are not fulfilled. You heard Craig Allen [President of the U.S.-China Business Council] talk about the government procurement agreement that they would adhere to as soon as possible. Seventeen years is not as soon as possible. It's getting late. We hear many commitments which ultimately are not implemented. As an eternal optimist, somebody who's seen the changes that I've seen in 40 years, I still believe that a lot of the promises that are made will ultimately be implemented. But there's great frustration in the business community. That's reflected in them not taking as strong a stand as they would have on issues relating to the U.S.-China relationship. The crackdowns on education in China, denying visas to academics from the United States who have written negatively about China, the Chinese government at times trying to influence academic discussions in the United States, has all caused the U.S. academic community, which used to be so strong in its support, to become divided. There still are those who support constructive relations, but there are many who don't speak out. There are many who believe we should have reciprocal policies, where if the Chinese don't allow something, then the U.S. shouldn't allow something. If the U.S. government wants to set up “America corners” in different Chinese universities around China, they're not able to do that. But China has over 100 Confucius Institutes in the United States. So academics say, “Let's have it be reciprocal, so if China doesn't allow America to do it, then America should prevent China from doing it”. American journalists believe that they are not treated well in China. If I had a dollar for every time an American journalist is invited to have tea with public security, I would have a lot more money than I do, because it's done far too often. The interference in foreign journalists' work in China is substantial. So that's led the U.S. government now to require CCTV and Xinhua to register as foreign agents. The risk is that these are then going to become reciprocal restrictions, which is extremely damaging. These U.S. communities, which formerly supported constructive engagement, aren't now. What I said about academics applies to think-tanks. They get tired of having conferences canceled. They get tired of having things they write in English translated into Chinese and not translated accurately. So, they are no longer as strong a supporter as they were. These policies are not good. They are not in China's own interests. But what's lacking in the U.S. is putting those policies in context. Is China seeking to replace the United States as the world's leading power? The answer is, it's really not. The Chinese government is interested in maintaining stability in China and maintaining their power, which does not mean replacing America as the number one power in the world. Chinese history, culture, and current problems dictate what they're going to do for the coming 50 years. But the problem is that the constituencies on both sides who were supporters before are not supporters today.

JC: One of the hallmarks of the 40 years, bearing in mind everything that you just said, has been trust, far-sightedness, and the bravery and courage required to make historic decisions as these two men did in December 1978 and leading into January 1st, 1979. Are there the right people in positions of influence right now? And I'm not saying presidents, but communities who are able to do that. Is there the same incentive, if they feel discouraged as you said?

SO: I always believe in the United States government. And I have believed for many years that we don't have sufficient China expertise at senior levels. You can go through the Chinese government and find people who have studied in the United States. They actually know the United States pretty well. Some of them talk to me in English, some of them talk to me in Chinese, but there is this experience. Except for Elaine Chao today, who in senior levels of the U.S. government really knows China? Elaine is Chinese, born in Taiwan, she speaks fluent Chinese, but her responsibility is not China. I felt that in the Obama administration too. [China's Ambassador to the U.S.] Cui Tiankai can communicate to the American people in English and understands America extremely well. He becomes a force for constructive engagement. You have to go pretty far back to find the equivalent American in China who can speak to the Chinese people in Chinese and convey what is going on.

JC: You said that you were noticed and hand-selected because of your linguistic abilities?

SO: Well, there were no other Chinese-speaking lawyers in the United States government.

JC: Do you think there are many more today?

SO: No, I think not.

JC: Some people would look and say that it is similar to how Chinese students have come to the United States in droves as the U.S. has opened up its educational gateway and allowed them to truly flourish, not only in their careers but also in their lives, but can the same been said of the reverse?

SO: It's much smaller. Whereas we have 350,000 Chinese students here in the United States, we have 20,000 American students in China.

JC: And why is that? Is that due to lack of interest or a lack of openness?

SO: The Chinese students are not coming here to work on U.S.-China relations. They're coming here because we have the best university system in the world, and learning English for Chinese is fundamental to their existence. Whereas for an American, learning in Chinese is not fundamental. So, for them to go to China and study is often difficult. One program I've been associated with that has been fabulous in that regard is the Schwarzman Scholars program in Tsinghua University, which is bringing not only Americans but Brits, French, Japanese, and students from all over the world to China to study at Tsinghua for year. These are future leaders, and we will give them all the experience of having lived in China. They won't be China's scholars, but they will at least have some knowledge of what has gone on, similar to the Rhodes Scholarship in England, which has been around for 100 years. The Americans that have gone there and have understood the UK, and have come back to the United States in leadership positions has been fantastic.

JC: I want to end on an optimistic note, because optimism must be a necessary emotion in order to find a way forward. You've talked about being deeply troubled by the current course, but let's take the long-term view of this. You started off by talking about war and conflict. There have been no battlefield in which American soldiers have lost their lives in East Asia since the normalization of the U.S.-China relationship in 1979. What foundation does that give us going forward, and how should we apply it for other issues?

SO: We've lost sight in the United States of how tumultuous Asia was up until 1979, and the number of deaths of Americans. None of the people attacking the establishment of diplomatic relations, attacking the policy of engagement that the United States has had, point out that Americans stopped dying. That's a huge deal. I went to Asia in '72 when Americans were dying by the day in Vietnam. The cost of demonization of China is not fully recognized in the U.S., and the cost of the kind of policies that China is following towards the United States are not fully recognized in China. The reason I talk so much about climate change is that I was flooded out of my home during Superstorm Sandy, and I saw what climate change did to New York City. I see that Shanghai sits on the banks of the Yangtze River, and not very much above it. Climate change is going to have a devastating effect, and there will be some incident that's going to require governments to get together. The same is true of pandemics, whether it's a new SARS or a new Ebola or something else. There's going to be an event which requires the United States and China to work together. You can't predict what it's going to be, but it's going to come. Or there will be a terrorist incident that requires joint cooperation, or the economic crisis will deteriorate so much that the people in the United States or in China will recognize that we need to cooperate. Ultimately, this demonization is not coming from the majority of Americans and it's not from the majority of Chinese. It's a small group that believes that this is in the national interest. I believe it is fundamentally wrong. I take the New York subway every day, and I watch how it doesn't work. It doesn't work anymore because we as a country, we as citizens of New York City, of New York state, have failed to invest. And that in part is because we spend $700 billion on military expenditures which have no benefit to the infrastructure of society. People are going to recognize that, and they're going to ultimately tell the government that we can't go down this path, we need to go down a path of cooperation. That will happen one day. I can't tell you if it's going to happen next month or next year, but I'm sure it will happen. Having worked on people-to-people exchanges between the United States and China since the Committee hosted the Chinese ping pong team in 1972, we know that those bonds are strong and they're going to pull the two countries together. So that's why in the end I'm an optimist.

JC: I hope that, when you talk about sharing data on a health pandemic, or reversing the effects of the trade war, or addressing terrorism or climate change, that it won't be too late when this realization happens?

SO: Sadly, I think it will require a crisis to pull us back together. Right now, it's very tough to persuade people that this confrontation has enormous cost to society. I was reading the National Defense Strategy when I was on the subway, and I looked around at the people around me, and it saddened me because these people, who are just going to their everyday jobs, are paying the price for this bad strategy, they just don't know it.

James Chau: Steve Orlins, thank you very much for putting this into a context of people, and the struggles that many face today.

You can listen to this conversation with James Chau and Stephen Orlins.