2018年12月30日，不包括美国的新版跨太平洋伙伴关系协定——全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（CPTPP）正式生效。同时，日欧经济伙伴关系协定（EPA）也得到双方议会批准，并将于2019年2月生效。如此，日本主导的东西双向自贸阵地已经筑成，其目的是抵制美国的贸易保护主义，因此备受中国等各方瞩目。

从经济规模看，CPTPP和日欧EPA的GDP各为11.38万亿美元和24.84万亿美元，合计达36.22万亿美元，约占全球四成，可谓举足轻重。从区内贸易看，日本对CPTPP的进出口占比为14%，对欧盟为12%，二者合计达26%。显然，两大贸易圈的形成为日企提供了重大商机。

在美国对全球发起贸易摩擦，特别是美中贸易摩擦激化的背景下，这两大贸易圈成为阻止贸易保护主义蔓延的工具。但是，其本应具有的贸易扩大效果，以及为企业创造商机的初衷，乃至主导国际规则的功能，都被严重削弱了。

首先，没有美国的TPP难有“区域原产地”效果。CPTPP冻结“关键条款”使之质量下降，功能退化，区域影响力减弱。美国的退出意味着占TPP高达60%、规模20.41万亿美元的GDP退出，导致CPTPP的经济规模占全球比重从40%锐减至13.2%，贸易占比也降至14%。昔日美国主张的高标准“市场准入”、“边境措施”及高质量“境内制度”全面退化，无力主导新的国际经济秩序。这种地理分散型自贸协定因为美国的退出而丢了主心骨，只剩下“地理分散”，无法形成“区域原产地”，贸易扩大效果大打折扣，不再具备主导亚太区域秩序的功能。

其次，日欧EPA因回避非关税壁垒，仅在关税上达成有限妥协，其本应具有的“发达国家高标准”降格，呈现被摊薄的自由贸易协定（FTA）特征。欧盟在贸易投资领域有独自的“欧盟指令”，包括质量认定、安全标准、燃油标准甚至会计制度等，与美国形成完全不同的体系。日欧谈判过程中，欧盟希望以“欧盟指令”为主导，敦促日本削减非关税壁垒，扩大市场准入范围。特朗普掀起贸易摩擦，迫使日欧放弃高标准、高质量，转而争时间抢速度，以期在与美国举行双边谈判前达成框架协议，构建对美谈判阵地。这种“FTA阵地争夺战”成为日美欧争夺国际经济秩序主导权的序幕。但为了争夺阵地，双方争降标准，反而忽略了框架协议应有的功能，因此难以抵挡美国的高标准规则攻势。

第三，在关键的领域和行业中，废止关税期限过长，这使日本主导的两大框架缺乏魅力。例如，日本牛肉进口关税从38.5%降到9%需要16年，出口到越南的汽车关税从70%降到零需要10年到13年。日本葡萄酒进口关税需要８年才能从15%（或每升125日元）降到零，日本对加拿大出口的汽车关税要到第五个年头才能从6.1%降到零。农业和汽车是日本谈判FTA的两大重点领域，保护农业是日本谈判FTA的重大任务，这也致使日本的零关税覆盖率达不到发展中国家水平。WTO的例外条款规定，发达国家谈判FTA时必须使“所有贸易领域”实行“零关税”，而发展中国家则可有所保留。日本在CPTPP和日欧EPA框架协议中都没有达到WTO规定的水平。显然，低水平低质量的框架协议很难主导地区合作规则，更难主导国际秩序。

按计划，美日贸易谈判将在2019年1月举行。美国明确表示在农业领域不会接受日本预设的标准。美国可能沿用美加墨贸易协定方式，要求日本接受“汇率条款”、“数量目标”甚至“毒丸条款”。显然，低水平低质量的CPTPP和日欧EPA无法抵挡美国的攻势。

实际上，中美两国都是日本最大出口市场，旗鼓相当。若要在贸易战上制衡美国，不借助中国来建立战略纵深很难奏效。东亚金融危机后，“东盟+中日韩”（10+3）模式成为东亚地区合作的主渠道。如今，中日韩贸易已超过中美贸易，中国东盟贸易总额也接近中美贸易，中国和东盟成为日本最大“直接投资收益地”。东亚经济、产业、贸易和投资结构已发生历史性变化。中国在国际上申请的专利数量连续七年世界第一，中、印、东盟人口约占世界的45%。今后，问题显然不是东亚要不要加入到日本主导的CPTPP中，而是日本如何找到回归东亚合作的路径。

The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP11, without the United States) took effect on December 30, 2018, while the Japan-European Union Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) was also ratified by the legislatures of the two parties and will go into effect in February 2019. Then, a Japan-led, two-pronged free trade pattern will take shape, which is expected to counterbalance United States trade protectionism.

In terms of economic size, the GDP of TPP11 and Japan-EU EPA stood at $11.38 trillion and $24.84 trillion, respectively, with the combined amount accounting for about 40% of the global total. And in terms of trade, Japan's trade with TPP11 countries and the EU accounted for 14% and 12% of its total trade. It's obvious that the development of the two trade circles offers enormous business opportunities for Japanese companies.

Amid global trade tensions initiated by the United States, particularly escalating trade friction between China and the United States, the two trade circles play the role of preventing any excessive spread of trade protectionism, but their inherent functions in promoting trade and creating business opportunities are significantly weakened.

First, TPP11, with the exit of the United States, could hardly achieve the anticipated result. Due to “suspended provisions”, declining quality and diluted functions, TPP11 will have a weakened regional influence. The withdrawal of the United States from TPP meant the absence of an economy valued at $20.41 trillion, accounting for 60% of TPP11's total size, and meant that the proportion of TPP11's economy to the global total dropped from 40% to 13.2%. The high-standard market access, border measures, and high-quality domestic procedures, which used to be strongly advocated by Japan and the United States, were watered down and could no longer dominate and reshape the global economic order. The FTA model, with extensive geographical distribution, lost its leading player with the exit of the United States, and could not form a region of origin. Under such circumstances, its functions in promoting trade were greatly reduced, and it could not play a dominant role in the order in the Asia-Pacific region.

Second, the fact that the Japan-EU EPA dodged non-tariff barriers and reached limited concessions on trade tariffs resulted in a lowered standard for the deal among the developed nations, and the EPA therefore is no more than a diluted free trade agreement. The EU has its unique directives on trade and investment, including quality accreditation, safety standards, fuel standards, and accounting systems, which are different from that of the United States. During the Japan-EU negotiations, the EU hoped to adopt the EU directives and urged Japan to reduce non-tariff barriers and broaden the scope of market access. After President Donald Trump started global trade tensions and friction, Japan and the EU had to sacrifice high standards and high quality for faster conclusion of the EPA, hoping to reach a framework deal before bilateral negotiations with the United States and to form a new front for negotiations with the United States. The battle for a united front from FTA talks had become a prelude to the fight for leadership in the global economic order among Japan, the United States, and the EU. In order to win, however, the two sides raced to lower the standards for deals, chose to ignore the functions of such framework pacts, and were therefore vulnerable to pressure from the high-standard rules of the United States.

Third, the excessively long time-frame for tariff abolishment in some sectors and industries weakened the attraction of the two Japan-dominated framework pacts. For instance, it would take 16 years for Japan to lower beef import tariff rates from 38.5% to 9%, and 10-13 years for tariff rates for auto exports to Vietnam to drop from 70% to zero. It would also take eight years for Japan's wine import tariffs to drop to zero from 15% (or 125 Japanese yen per liter); and for auto exports to Canada, tariffs would drop to zero from 6.1% only from the sixth year. Agriculture and automobiles are the two important industries in Japan's FTA talks. Agricultural protection is one of the significant tasks for Japan in its FTA talks with other economies, and this is also one of the reasons why the coverage of zero tariffs could not meet the standards of the developed nations. The WTO exception clauses stipulate that developed nations, in conducting FTA talks, must apply zero tariffs to all trade sectors, while developing nations could have some reservations. In both TPP11 and Japan-EU EPA framework agreements, Japan failed to satisfy the WTO standards. The low-standard and low-quality framework agreements could hardly dominate regional cooperation, let alone international order.

The United States and Japan, as planned, are expected to hold trade talks from January 2019. The United States had explicitly indicated that it would not accept the TPP standards in the agricultural sector. The United States may continue to apply the USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement) approach, and demand Japan accept the exchange rate clause, quantity goals or even the poison pill clauses. It's apparent that the low-standard and low-quality TPP11 and Japan-EU EPA could hardly resist offensives from the United States.

China and the United States are the largest export markets for Japan. If Japan wants to counterbalance the United States in terms of trade, it would be mission impossible if it does not seek strategic cooperation with China. After the financial crisis, the ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea (10+3) model has become the main channel for East Asian regional cooperation. Trade among China, Japan, and South Korea has exceeded China-United States trade, and trade between China and ASEAN is also nearing the trade value between China and the United States. China and the ASEAN have become the largest destinations of Japan's foreign direct investment. In East Asia, the economy, industry, trade, and investment structures have undergone unprecedented and historic changes. China has made the most international patent applications in the world for seven consecutive years, and the population of China, India, and ASEAN now accounts for 45% of the global total. So, in the future, it's not a question whether or not East Asia should join the Japan-dominated TPP11, but a question of whether and how Japan could return to the path of cooperation with East Asia.