2025年8月15日，外交部长王毅与泰国外交部长玛里共同主持了在云南省安宁市的澜沧江-湄公河合作第十次外长会。

东南亚大陆地区针对网络赌博与诈骗活动开展的大规模严打行动，凸显了澜沧江-湄公河合作等区域合作平台的重要性。2017年在昆明成立的“澜湄综合执法安全合作中心”，为情报共享与联合行动提供了便利。这一机制有力支持了当前打击跨国有组织犯罪集团的行动，例如今年2月初中、缅、泰三国联合打击妙瓦底地区的电诈园区。但是，澜湄合作的价值远不止于打击跨境犯罪。

东盟湄公河次区域已有多个对话伙伴发起各类合作倡议。美国于2009年发起“湄公河下游倡议”，并于2020年升级为“湄公河-美国伙伴关系”；日本于2016年推出“日本-湄公河互联互通倡议”；韩国2011年建立“韩国-湄公河伙伴关系”，并于2020年完成机制升级。其中，中国与柬埔寨、老挝、缅甸、泰国、越南等湄公河沿岸五国共同参与的澜湄合作，是最具活力的机制之一。

经济与安全双轮驱动睦邻外交

除定期举行高层及工作组级别的官方会议外，澜湄合作的合作领域也持续拓展。从跨境水资源管理、安全与执法，到农业、跨境旅游、地方政府结对、创新及青年交流，自2016年三亚首次领导人会议以来，澜湄合作已取得长足发展。未来十年，随着互联互通水平提升、贸易投资重新定向、供应链联动加强、绿色能源转型及产业升级，双方战略与经济互动将进一步深化。

澜湄合作体现了中国对周边外交的高度重视。地理、安全与经济因素共同影响着中国与南部周边国家的关系。越南和泰国是“中国+1”战略的最大受益者之一，在该战略下，中资及外资企业将生产与供应链向中国以外地区延伸，以降低风险、提升韧性。湄公河国家通过公路和铁路，为中国西南内陆省份打通出海通道，推动了中国能源与贸易路线多元化。昆明-皎漂油气管道以及分别连接云南昆明与老挝万象、越南海防的铁路便是典型范例。计划今年竣工、连接广西腹地与北部湾的平陆运河同样意义重大。北部湾地处中国南部沿海越南北部之间，这条新水道有望显著促进跨境商业往来。

除经济领域外，中国与该次区域的和平稳定息息相关。中国与澜湄合作成员国缅甸、越南、老挝拥有漫长的共同边界，上述国家一旦出现动荡，风险便可能外溢至云南等中国南方省份。因此，中国积极斡旋缅甸政府与各少数民族地方武装停火、推动柬泰对话也就不足为奇。去年10月，德昂民族解放军与缅甸政府在昆明谈判后，撤出多处阵地。12月29日，中、柬、泰三国外长在云南玉溪举行会晤，以巩固脆弱的停火成果、防止冲突再起并逐步重建互信。12月15日，中、缅、泰三国警方在泰缅边境展开首次联合行动，打击跨国诈骗中心。上月，柬埔寨将一名据称是诈骗集团头目的人物遣返中国。打击有组织的跨国犯罪集团、遣返人口贩卖受害者、引渡犯罪头目接受审判，日益成为澜湄合作的重要内容。

绿色能源合作及对东盟海洋国家的借鉴意义

新能源是澜湄合作成员国的另一个重要契合点。除澜沧江-湄公河干支流蕴藏的丰富水电资源外，该次区域还拥有大量尚未开发的风能与太阳能潜力。六国均制定了雄心勃勃的清洁能源目标，加快向更可持续、本地化电力转型将降低对进口化石燃料的依赖，提升能源安全与能源主权。这将为实现联合国可持续发展目标中“经济适用的清洁能源（目标7）”与“气候行动（目标13）”作出重要贡献。该领域合作还将推动区域能源的相互依存，被誉为“东南亚蓄电池”的老挝等能源富余国可向泰国、越南等需求较高的邻国出口电力。事实上，老挝正成为世界人均水电出口量最大的国家之一。

开发太阳能与风能可丰富澜湄国家绿色能源结构，缓解湄公河水量季节性变化对水力发电的影响，尤其是在气候变化导致的持续干旱期间。湄公河国家拥有东南亚地区规模领先的可再生能源电站并非偶然：越南2400兆瓦的山罗水电站与450兆瓦的忠南太阳能发电厂均为东盟规模最大，老挝去年投运的600兆瓦“季风”风电项目也是东盟最大的。

中国是澜湄国家绿色能源转型的重要合作伙伴。在可再生能源装机容量以及从太阳能板、风力发电机到储能及电动汽车电池等新能源技术生产方面，中国均居全球领先地位。晶科能源等中国光伏企业已在其他澜湄国家设厂。越南车企VinFast与总部位于合肥的电池企业国轩高科等中国企业合作，实现了电动汽车生产的跨越式发展。电动汽车巨头比亚迪已同其他中国车企一道在泰国建厂。“绿色丝绸之路”与“全球发展倡议”可为澜湄合作提供更广阔支撑，深化光伏、风电场、电网及电动汽车充电网络等绿色能源基础设施建设的合作。澜湄合作可推动中国资本、技术、经验与专业知识向东盟大陆国家流动，助力当地制造业升级。

澜湄合作的意义不仅限于东盟大陆国家。湄公河灌溉使泰国、越南成为稻米生产大国，而印尼、菲律宾等东盟成员国是其主要出口市场。老挝-泰国-马来西亚-新加坡输电线路可成为东盟电网的核心。VinFast的电动出租车已行驶在马尼拉及其他东盟国家首都街头。澜湄合作的稳步推进，可为东盟另一个次区域组织——文莱、印尼、马来西亚、菲律宾东盟东部增长区（BIMP-EAGA）——提供借鉴。BIMP-EAGA首届部长级会议于1994年在菲律宾达沃市举行，澜湄合作可为这一海洋次区域组织提供宝贵经验。

（本文基于作者去年12月29-30日在中国国际问题研究院与西南政法大学共同主办的“第八届全球湄公河研究中心智库论坛”上的发言整理。）

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi co-chairs the 10th Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers' Meeting with Thai Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa in Anning, southwest China's Yunnan province, on Aug 15, 2025.

Sweeping crackdowns on online gambling and fraud activities in mainland Southeast Asia highlight the importance of regional cooperation platforms such as the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC). LMC's Integrated Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation Center, established in Kunming in 2017, facilitates intelligence sharing and joint operations. This contributes to the ongoing campaign against transnational organized syndicates, such as the joint Myanmar-Thailand-China action against scam parks in the Myawaddy area in early February. But LMC's value goes beyond busting cross-border crimes.

There are many initiatives launched by various dialogue partners in ASEAN's Mekong subregion. The United States launched the Lower Mekong Initiative in 2009, which was upgraded to the Mekong-U.S. Partnership in 2020. The Japan-Mekong Connectivity Initiative was launched in 2016. The Korea-Mekong Partnership was established in 2011 and elevated in 2020. Of these, the LMC between China and the five riparian Mekong states – Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam – is one of the most dynamic.

Economics and security drive neighborhood diplomacy

Aside from the regularity of high-level and working-group-level official meetings, LMC also expanded to cover broader areas of cooperation. From transboundary water resource management, security and law enforcement to agriculture, cross-border tourism, local government twinning arrangements, innovation, and youth exchanges, LMC has come a long way from its first leaders' meeting in Sanya in 2016. The next decade may feature a deepening of strategic and economic interaction owing to greater connectivity, redirected trade and investment, supply chain linkages, green energy transition, and industrial upgrading.

LMC shows the importance attached by China to neighborhood diplomacy. Geography, security, and economics influenced Beijing's ties with its southern periphery. Vietnam and Thailand are among the biggest beneficiaries of the China+1 strategy, wherein Chinese and foreign firms expand production and supply chains beyond China to mitigate risks and improve resilience. Mekong countries provide China's landlocked southwestern provinces access to the sea via road and rail, diversifying China's energy and trade routes. The Kunming-Kyaukphyu oil and gas pipeline and railways connecting Yunnan's capital Kunming with Vientiane and Haiphong, respectively, are key examples. The Pinglu Canal, linking Guangxi's hinterland with the Beibu Gulf due for completion this year, is another case in point. The gulf lies between coastal southern China and northern Vietnam, so the new waterway is expected to boost cross-border commerce.

Beyond economics, China has a deep stake in the subregion's peace and order. It shares a long contiguous border with LMC states Myanmar, Vietnam, and Laos. Hence, any instability in these countries can spill over across China's southern provinces, such as Yunnan. Hence, it is no surprise that China has actively brokered ceasefires between Myanmar's government and various ethnic rebel armies. It also promoted dialogue between Cambodia and Thailand. Last October, Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) rebels withdrew from several positions after negotiations with Naypyidaw in Kunming. Last December 29, the foreign ministers of Cambodia, Thailand, and China met in Yuxi, Yunnan province, to consolidate a fragile armistice, prevent a resumption of hostilities, and gradually rebuild trust. Last December 15, police from China, Myanmar, and Thailand conducted their first joint operation against transnational fraud hubs in the Thai-Myanmar border. Last month, Cambodia repatriated to China an alleged scam mastermind. Dismantling organized cross-border syndicates, repatriating trafficking victims, and extraditing crime bosses for prosecution are growing aspects of LMC cooperation.

Cooperation on green energy and inspiration for maritime ASEAN

New energy is another strong area of confluence for LMC members. Beyond the vast hydropower generated from the Lancang-Mekong River and its tributaries, the subregion also has much untapped wind and solar energy potentials. The six countries have ambitious clean energy targets. Accelerating their transition to more sustainable and locally-sourced power will reduce their reliance on imported fossil fuels, enhancing their energy security and sovereignty. This is a major contribution to achieving United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for affordable and clean energy (SDG 7) and climate action (SDG 13). Collaboration in this field also spurs regional energy interdependence, with surplus energy producers like Laos, dubbed Southeast Asia's battery, exporting energy to neighbors with higher demand, such as Thailand and Vietnam. Laos, in fact, is emerging as one of the world's largest exporters of hydropower per capita.

Tapping the power of the sun and wind can broaden the green energy portfolio of LMC states. This can mitigate the impact of seasonal variability of the Mekong river's water volume on hydropower generation, especially during prolonged dry spells brought by climate change. It is no coincidence that Mekong countries host some of the region's largest renewable power plants. Vietnam's 2400MW Son La Hydropower Plant and 450 MW Trung Nam Solar Farm are ASEAN's biggest. Laos' 600MW Monsoon Wind Farm, which opened last year, is also ASEAN's largest.

China is a major partner in LMC's green energy transition. It is a global leader in renewables in terms of installed capacity and production of new energy technologies from solar panels and wind turbines to energy storage and batteries for electric vehicles. Some Chinese photovoltaic cell makers, such as Jinko Solar, have established factories in other LMC countries. Partnership with Chinese firms, like Hefei-based battery producer Gotion, allowed Vietnamese carmaker VinFast to leapfrog into electric vehicle production. EV giant BYD has opened a factory in Thailand, along with other Chinese automakers. The Green Silk Road and Global Development Initiative can provide broader anchors for LMC, deepening cooperation in building green energy infrastructure from solar and wind farms to grid and electric battery charging network. LMC can facilitate the flow of Chinese capital, technology, practices, and know-how to upgrade manufacturing in mainland ASEAN countries.

LMC's significance goes beyond mainland ASEAN. Mekong River irrigation has made Thailand and Vietnam powerhouse rice producers, with fellow ASEAN members Indonesia and the Philippines among the major markets. The Laos-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore transmission line can form the nucleus of the ASEAN Power Grid. VinFast's EV taxi fleet is already plying the streets of Manila and other ASEAN capitals. Indeed, the steady progress of LMC can offer lessons for the other sub-regional organization in ASEAN – the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area. BIMP-EAGA's first ministerial meeting was hosted in Davao City in 1994. LMC may provide valuable lessons to its maritime subregional counterpart.

*This piece draws from the author's participation in the 8th Think Tank Forum of Global Center for Mekong Studies held in Chongqing last December 29-30, 2025. The event was organized by the China Institute of International Studies and Southwest University of Political Science and Law.