今年1月26日，中国国务院公布的《中国的北极政策》白皮书引发了世界对于中国在北极地区虽处萌芽状态但快速增长的角色与利益的广泛关注。中国对于北极地区的看法在过去十年中变得愈加具有战略性。虽然白皮书中的大部分信息并非首次披露，但如“极地丝绸之路”等倡议却预示着中国在北极地区的政治和经济活动或将迎来一波高潮。而对于中国北极白皮书的反应则是褒贬不一。虽然很多国家私下或公开都对中国的意图表现出焦虑情绪，但一些北极国家——尤其是俄罗斯——对于“极地丝绸之路”的支持极大地增强了中国的信心和取得进展的几率。

中国在北极地区的意图一直是讨论的焦点。如果说白皮书可以为我们提供任何指导意义，那就是中国当前在北极地区的优先事项似乎是重点关注三个领域。在商业利益方面，白皮书强调探索自然资源和发展北极船运航线。在全球挑战领域，中国将重点放在了北极地区的气候变化、环境恶化和可持续发展。北极地区在中国被视为发挥全球治理角色的试验田，而全球治理可以帮助中国令其声音和利益最大化。为了确保中国在北极事务上的合法声音与角色，中国已经出台了一系列政策倡议，包括促进科学研究、推动关注北极事务的多边论坛，包括北极理事会，加强与有意愿的北极国家的政治经济双边协商合作，寻求与当地人的商业合作，以及提高关于北极的政策研究水平。

值得指出的是，贯穿整篇北极白皮书中，军事安全议题完全没有被提及。基于中国过往及当下关于北极的军事——尤其是海军——研究，我们不应认定北极地区的军事议题不是问题。例如，过去五年，中国海军指挥学院和中国海军研究院已经在国家社会科学基金的资助下完成了三个关于北极的研究项目。其中之一是关于在北极地区建立一个供给基地，另外两个是关于北极地区的船运航线。可以肯定的是中国可能已经在社科基金资助外进行了更多研究。然而，北极白皮书对于这一话题的完全回避极有可能暗示着中国不愿引发外界对于其在北极地区刚刚处于萌芽状态的战略产生过多的关注。这同时意味着通过投资与合作等软性方式来打开极地地区大门是中国当下最重要的议程。

长期以来，中国一直在应在北极地区扮演何种角色上遭受着身份认同危机。北极白皮书将中国称为北极地区不可或缺的一份子、北极事务的关键利益相关方，并指出中国在北极地区拥有关键国家利益。然而，中国不遗余力地证明自己在北极地区拥有一席之地的同时，也揭示出中国这个非北极国家精心策划出来的一种身份认同方式。中国深知自己并非一个北极国家，在北极地区也不拥有领土或海域。因此，它至多能称得上是一个“近北极国家”。这一事实极大地限制了中国在北极地区获利的能力。它同时决定了中国必须寻求与北极国家以及其他国际和地区机构进行合作以对政策和结果施加影响。

这严重制约了对中国在北极地区野心和行为方式的评估。中国的确对这一地区充满野心，鉴于北极地区作为全球公共领域的特殊属性，中国不会放弃任何机会对其潜在或正当利益宣示主权。一旦拥有机会，中国将尽最大努力对北极叙事施加影响以期扩大其影响力和利益。然而，需要指出的是，在现阶段，中国的很多利益依然只是前景而已，因此很可能会经历不断的调整与变化。

北极白皮书在确认中国早已推行的很多北极政策上发挥了关键作用，如科学外交，它同时揭示了中国野心的优先事项。以北极地区船运航线发展为基础建立“极地丝绸之路”的提议引发了北极观察者的广泛关注。中国一直在探讨将极地地区包括在“一带一路”倡议中，但是北极白皮书是首个正式对此进行公布的政府声明。

“极地丝绸之路”的逻辑遵循中国“一带一路”倡议的整体理念。这些地区基础设施匮乏，需要资金和技术来增强经济连通，并发挥北极地区的潜在实力。利用基础设施，尤其是针对基础设施建设的融资，来向不熟悉甚至是不友好的地区推进，这已经成为了中国的一种行为方式。在北极地区开发船运航线正是建立经济连通项目的一环，而连通性是“一带一路”倡议的关键特色/优先事项。

虽然国际社会对中国在北极地区的“宣言”还存在诸多怀疑与担忧，但一些北极国家已经对此表示欢迎。如果没有一个或多个关键北极国家对该提议的支持，中国将很难提出一个如此重大的项目。俄罗斯一直是中国建立“极地丝绸之路”倡议的关键因素。中国国家主席习近平在2017年7月与俄罗斯总理梅德韦杰夫的会见中首次提出了这一项目。鉴于习近平领导下的中国和普京领导下的俄罗斯日益紧密的双边关系，俄罗斯意图引入中国投资来开采其位于远北地区的能源资源并建设东北船运航线，这条航线号称是连接东北亚和西欧的最短海上交通路线。对北极国家实施“分而治之”已经成为了中国北极政策的关键组成部分之一。中国正在积极向冰岛和格陵兰岛伸出橄榄枝，通过提供中国援助和资金来寻求这些国家对中国开展北极活动的支持。而拥有诸如俄罗斯这样关键北极国家的支持，对于中国实现其更为复杂、雄心勃勃的野心——“极地丝绸之路”而言，是不可或缺的。

The release of China's Arctic White Paper in late January brought broad attention to China's somewhat nascent but rapidly expanding role and interests in the Arctic region. China's perception of the Arctic has been increasingly strategic in the past decade. Even though most of the information in the White Paper is not new, initiatives such as the Polar Silk Road could indicate a coming surge in China's political and economic endeavors in the Arctic. The reception of China's declaration on the Arctic has been mixed. While many countries are secretly or openly anxious about China's intentions, the support from some Arctic countries, especially Russia, on the Polar Silk Road greatly boosts China's confidence and chance of progress.

China's intentions in the Arctic region have always been a focal point of debate. If the White Paper serves as a guideline, China's current priorities in the Arctic seem to be focused on three areas. In terms of commercial interests, the paper emphasizes the exploration of natural resources and the development of the Arctic shipping lane. In terms of global challenges, China is focused on climate change, environmental degradation and sustainable development in relation to the Arctic. The Arctic is identified in China as a platform to experiment with China's role in global governance that maximizes China's voice and interests. To ensure China's legitimate voice and role in Arctic affairs, China has adopted a series of policy initiatives, including enhancing scientific research, promoting the role of multilateral fora on Arctic affairs, including but also beyond the Arctic Council, enhancing political and economic bilateral coordination and cooperation with willing Arctic states, pursuing commercial cooperation with local indigenous peoples, and improving policy studies related to the Arctic.

It is worth pointing out that throughout the White Paper, the issue of military security is completely left out. Based on China's past and current military—especially navy— research on the Arctic, it would be wrong to assume that the military aspects of the Arctic are not an issue. For example, in the past five years, the Naval Command College and Naval Research Institute of China have conducted three Arctic research projects under the National Social Science Research Fund. One of them is on the establishment of a supply base in the Arctic and the other two are about the Arctic shipping lane. It is safe to assume that more projects have been conducted outside the National Social Science Research Fund. However, the complete evasion of this topic in the paper most likely suggests China's unwillingness to raise too much attention to its nascent strategy on the Arctic, and indicates that soft approaches through investment and cooperation are high on China's agenda to open the door to the polar region.

For a long time, China has suffered from an identity crisis over its role in the Arctic. The Arctic White Paper names China as an integral player and a key stakeholder in the Arctic's affairs and identifies key Chinese national interests in the Arctic. However, China's exhaustive efforts to justify its role in the Arctic also reveal a carefully calibrated approach due to China's non-Arctic state identity. China understands that it is not an Arctic state and does not possess land or maritime territory in the Arctic. Therefore, the most the country could claim is that China is a “near Arctic state.” That fact significantly limits China's ability to poach in the Arctic region. It also determines that China has to seek cooperation with Arctic states and other international as well as local entities to shape policies and outcomes.

This calls for serious qualifications in evaluating China's ambition and approaches to the Arctic. China is indeed ambitious and will not neglect any opportunity to claim what it could potentially and legitimately be entitled to, given the Arctic's special nature as global commons. Given the opportunity, China will maximize its efforts to shape the discourse on the Arctic to expand China's influence and interests. However, it should be pointed out that at this stage, many of the Chinese interests remain prospects and are therefore subject to constant adaptations and changes.

The Arctic White Paper plays a key role in confirming many of the Arctic policies that China has been pursuing, such as science diplomacy, and illustrating the priorities of China's ambition. The proposal to build a Polar Silk Road based on the development of the Arctic shipping route has caught the broadest attention from Arctic observers. Including the polar region in China's Belt and Road Initiative had been in discussion for some time, but the White Paper is the first formal government statement to announce its inclusion.

The logic of the Polar Silk Road follows China's overall rationale on the Belt and Road Initiative. There is a lack of infrastructure and a need for financing and technologies to increase the economic connectivity and potential of the Arctic region. To use infrastructure, especially financing, as a way of pushing into an unfamiliar or unfriendly domain has become a pattern for China. The focus on the Arctic shipping lane falls under the mandate of building connectivity projects, the key feature/priority of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Despite wide international suspicion and concern about China's “declaration” on the Arctic, some Arctic states have been more welcoming. Without one or more key Arctic states' embrace of the proposal, it would have been difficult and awkward for China to introduce such a major proposal. Russia has been a key factor in China's proposal to build the Polar Silk Road. Chinese President Xi Jinping first raised the project with Russian Prime Minister Medvedev in July 2017. In the broader context of warm ties between China and Russia under Presidents Xi and Putin, Russia has its eyes on Chinese investment in energy stakes in its Far North as well as the northeast shipping route, which presumably is the shortest sea lane of communications between Northeast Asia and Western Europe. To “divide and conquer” the Arctic states has been a key element of China's Arctic policy. China has actively reached out to Iceland and Greenland, soliciting their support of China's Arctic endeavor in exchange for Chinese assistance and financing. However, having the backing of a major Arctic state such as Russia is indispensable to China's more intricate and ambitious agenda, the Polar Silk Road.