面对全球人工智能挑战，中美合作尤为重要。                 —— 美国前国务卿亨利·基辛格

人工智能（AI）已成为中美两国重要的竞争领域，这使得原本错综复杂的双边关系更加复杂。随着特朗普重返白宫，理论派和实践派对中美人工智能治理的未来持有不同看法。

一种乐观的看法认为，尽管特朗普团队中不乏对华强硬派和“鹰派”，但他们的精力主要集中在经济和军事领域。在人工智能安全问题上，由于特朗普政府更加关注其产业发展，倾向于将安全风险问题简单化，因此相信“中国可以与特朗普进行坦诚对话”。此外，美国联邦政府与中国在人工智能治理方面也保持着合作。例如，2023年11月，习近平主席与拜登总统在旧金山会晤时，双方同意建立中美人工智能政府间对话机制。2024年5月14日，首次对话在瑞士日内瓦成功举行，向外界传递出中美加强全球人工智能治理合作的积极信号。

一种较为悲观的观点则认为，中美围绕人工智能的谈判只是做样子，并未触及治理的实质。两国合作仍处在十字路口。随着特朗普重返白宫，共和党将延续以往做法，在芯片、半导体等尖端技术领域对中国进行打压。中国也将采取反制措施，从而使两国在人工智能治理方面合作的可能性变得微乎其微。特朗普上任后还宣布将任命一位人工智能官员，主要负责人工智能政策、国家安全和产业发展，强调在人工智能领域与中国进行全面竞争。

事实上，这两种观点可能要么过于悲观，要么过于乐观。一方面，抑制中国在人工智能领域的崛起已成为美国两党共识，但中国也在不断积累实践经验和战略准备。拜登政府大力遏制中国人工智能产业，如斥资530亿美元推出《芯片法案》，用于扶持美国半导体产业。相比之下，特朗普政府开始专注于对外国人工智能芯片制造商征收高额关税，而非提供国内补贴，以此振兴美国半导体产业。这种做法可能促使台积电、三星等公司转向规模更大、更开放的中国市场。此外，特朗普指责台湾“窃取”美国半导体业务，并要求其支付更多安全费用的立场，可能导致美台在半导体领域关系紧张。鉴于台湾在先进人工智能芯片生产中的关键作用，这反而有利于中国。另一方面，对中美人工智能治理的乐观情绪也不合理。两国都认识到，控制人工智能技术意味着重塑全球秩序，失去人工智能发展的战略窗口意味着丧失竞争优势。因此，人工智能领域的紧张局势仍将是大范围且激烈的。

随着特朗普重返白宫，两国争夺新兴人工智能技术领域主导权的趋势愈演愈烈，并将持续下去。中美人工智能治理将面临新的问题和挑战。结合“囚徒困境”理论，中美人工智能治理困境主要表现为二阶困境（见图1）。

图1：中美人工智能治理的“囚徒困境”

首先的困境是，美国的人工智能政策已从“踩刹车”转向“猛踩油门”，优先考虑国家利益，这可能损害中国等国的利益。这就是博弈论中的一阶困境：个体追求自身利益最大化的决策可能损害集体利益。拜登政府强调人工智能治理和监管，特朗普则侧重于放松管制和快速发展人工智能。特朗普已经撤销了拜登2023年关于人工智能的行政命令，该命令旨在解决隐私和安全等风险，而特朗普认为过度监管扼杀创新，削弱美国的竞争力。

相比之下，中国的人工智能政策始终重视发展而非治理，是采取“先发展，后治理”的策略。拜登执政时期的“异步异调”竞争转为特朗普执政时期的“同步同调”竞争，意味着两国可能在自动驾驶和物联网等人工智能领域展开激烈的直接竞争。因此，两国可能淡化人工智能治理，采取放任自流的策略。这种策略虽然有利于创新，但可能忽视关键的监管问题，这将加剧人工智能领域的竞争，减少治理方面的投入。

当中美之间的竞争和互不信任阻碍了人工智能的合作治理，就会出现二阶困境。按照囚徒困境理论，这种情况下，个体在寻求自身利益最大化的同时，也必须考虑他人的反应和策略，而这种动态会造成一种循环困境：即使双方都认识到合作有利于集体，但由于信任和互动不足，有效合作受到阻碍，最终损害全球利益。人工智能的风险无处不在，影响着所有国家，因此需要全球合作才能实现有效治理。然而，如果中美两国继续陷入互不信任引发的治理困境，就会破坏全球人工智能体系的稳定。尽管互联网和智能技术促进了开放包容，“阵营对抗”和冷战思维仍有可能蔓延到人工智能领域。正如一些学者所言，这可能导致“平行世界”的出现，即美国和中国各自领导一套互不相干的人工智能系统。这种分裂将阻碍科学进步和经济增长，最终导致双输，正如谚语所说——“持枪对决没有赢家”。

为了解决中美人工智能治理的二阶困境，两国必须建立一种交易性“战略稳定对话”机制。首先，双方需要明确人工智能治理的共同利益，例如经济振兴、政绩和长期战略目标。网络安全对话等过往的失败经验凸显了相互理解、避免以自我为中心的谈判的重要性。其次，相互尊重和公平贸易的契约精神至关重要。尽管竞争激烈，但两国优势互补：中国在人工智能应用领域表现出色，美国在研发领域处于领先地位。这种共生关系可以促进合作而非零和竞争。第三，双方应保持“错位竞争”而非共振竞争，在确保谈判透明度的同时，充分发挥各自优势。例如，中国在人工智能专利申请方面领先，美国在人工智能模型方面占据主导地位。最后，即使在双边关系紧张的情况下，对话机制也必须保持开放。冷战时期美苏核对话的经验告诉我们，持续沟通可以增进理解并最终达成协议，哪怕双方没有立即建立起信任。渐进的小措施，也可以为人工智能治理过程中的大规模合作铺平道路。

In the face of global challenges in AI, cooperation between China and the United States is particularly important.                                                                     —— Henry Kissinger, Former Secretary of State, USA

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a major arena of competition between China and the United States, further complicating the already complex bilateral relationship. With Trump's return to the White House, theorists and practitioners hold divergent perspectives on the future of China-U.S. AI governance.

One optimistic view suggests that although Trump's team includes some hardliners and "hawks" on China, their focus primarily lies in the economic and military sectors. On AI security issues, it's believed that "China can have an honest dialogue with Trump" because his administration is more concerned with industrial development of AI and tends to simplify security risk issues. Also, the current U.S. federal government maintains cooperative AI governance projects with China. For instance, in November 2023, during the meeting held between President Xi Jinping and President Biden in San Francisco, both sides agreed to establish a China-U.S. AI government dialogue. The first dialogue successfully took place in Geneva, Switzerland, on May 14, 2024, sending a positive signal to the outside world about China-U.S. cooperation to strengthen global AI governance.

The other, more pessimistic view argues that China-U.S. negotiations surrounding AI are merely for performance and don't touch on the substance of AI governance. The cooperation between the two countries remains at a crossroads. With Trump's return to the White House, the Republicans will continue their previous practices, suppressing China in areas of advanced technology like chips and semiconductors. China will also adopt retaliatory measures in response, making China-U.S. cooperation on AI governance potentially minimal. After taking office, Trump also announced that he would appoint an AI czar, mainly responsible for AI policy, national security, and industrial development, emphasizing comprehensive competition with China in the AI field.

In reality, both perspectives may be overly pessimistic or optimistic. On one hand, suppressing China's rise in AI has become a bipartisan consensus in the U.S., but China has accumulated practical experience and strategic preparedness. The Biden administration aggressively contained China's AI industry, exemplified by the $53 billion "Chip Act" to bolster the U.S. semiconductor sector. In contrast, the Trump administration has begun focusing on revitalizing the U.S. semiconductor industry through high tariffs on foreign AI chip manufacturers rather than domestic subsidies. This approach could drive companies like TSMC and Samsung to shift toward China's larger, more open market. Additionally, Trump's stance on Taiwan, accusing it of "stealing" U.S. semiconductor business and demanding more security payments, may strain U.S.-Taiwan semiconductor relations, benefiting China given Taiwan's critical role in advanced AI chip production. On the other hand, optimism about China-U.S. AI governance is unwarranted. Both sides recognize that controlling AI technology means reshaping the global order, and losing the strategic window in AI development would mean losing competitive dominance. Thus, tensions in the AI field will remain comprehensive and intense.

With Trump's return to the White House, the trend of the two countries vying for dominance in emerging AI technologies has intensified and will continue to do so, and there will be some new issues and challenges in China-U.S. AI governance. In combination with the "Prisoner's Dilemma” theory, the dilemma of China-U.S. AI governance mainly manifests as a second-order dilemma (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: The "Prisoner's Dilemma" of China-U.S. AI Governance

The first-order dilemma is that the U.S. AI policy has shifted from "hitting the brakes" to "stepping on the gas," prioritizing national interests at the potential expense of China and others. This reflects a first-order dilemma in game theory, where individual decisions to maximize self-interest can harm collective interests. While the Biden administration emphasized AI governance and regulation, Trump's approach focuses on deregulation and rapid AI development. Trump has already rescinded Biden's 2023 executive order on AI, which aimed to address risks like privacy and security, arguing that overregulation stifles innovation and disadvantages U.S. competitiveness.

In contrast, China's AI policy has consistently prioritized development over governance, adopting a "development first, governance later" approach. This shift from "asynchronous and heterotonic" competition under Biden to "synchronous and homotonic" competition under Trump means both nations may engage in direct, intense competition in AI sectors like autonomous driving and IoT. Consequently, both countries may downplay AI governance, adopting a laissez-faire strategy that fuels innovation but risks neglecting critical regulatory concerns, leading to heightened AI rivalry and reduced investment in governance.

The second-order dilemma arises as competition and mutual distrust between China and the United States hinder cooperative AI governance. Drawing from the prisoner's dilemma theory, this scenario highlights how individuals, while seeking to maximize their own interests, must also account for the reactions and strategies of others. This dynamic can create a cyclical dilemma: even if both parties recognize that cooperation would benefit the collective, the lack of trust and interaction prevents effective collaboration, ultimately harming global interests. AI risks are pervasive and affect all nations, necessitating global cooperation for effective governance. However, if China and the U.S. remain trapped in a governance dilemma fueled by distrust, it could destabilize the global AI system. Despite the internet and intelligent technologies promoting openness and inclusiveness, "camp confrontation" and Cold War mentalities risk spilling into the AI domain. This could result in the emergence of "parallel worlds," as some scholars suggest, where the U.S. and China lead separate, isolated AI systems. Such fragmentation would hinder scientific progress and economic growth, ultimately leading to a lose-lose outcome, akin to the adage, "There are no winners in a gunfight."

To address the second-order dilemma in China-U.S. AI governance, both nations must establish a transactional "strategic stability dialogue" mechanism. First, they need to identify shared interests in AI governance, such as economic revitalization, political achievements, and long-term strategic goals. Past failures, like the cybersecurity dialogue, highlight the importance of mutual understanding and avoiding self-centered negotiations. Second, a contract spirit of mutual respect and fair trade is essential. Both countries, despite fierce competition, share complementary strengths—China excels in AI applications, while the U.S. leads in research and development. This symbiotic relationship can foster cooperation rather than zero-sum competition. Third, they should maintain "dislocated competition" rather than resonating competition, leveraging their respective advantages while ensuring transparency in negotiations. For instance, China leads in AI patent applications, while the U.S. dominates in AI models. Finally, dialogue mechanisms must remain open, even amid bilateral tensions. Drawing lessons from Cold War-era U.S.-Soviet nuclear dialogues, sustained communication can build understanding and eventually lead to agreements, even without immediate trust. Small, incremental steps can pave the way for larger collaborations in AI governance.