11月7日，全球瞩目的两岸领导人首次会面在新加坡举行。在这次习马会上，双方都表达了对2016年可能当选执政的民进党能否维持两岸现状的担忧，并提出了预警。两岸领导人为管控可能出现的陈水扁式危机，特意强调了“九二共识”的重要性。

习马会上，熟悉两岸政治运作方式的习近平，用两岸中国人都熟悉的方式向至今对“九二共识”不表明态度的民进党人喊话。习近平非常恳切地表示，这次习马会就是为了不让历史的悲剧重演，不让两岸关系和平发展的成果得而复失。习近平在与马英九交换意见时，表达了对民进党务实开放的态度。他强调，希望台湾各党派各团体能正视“九二共识”，无论哪个党派和团体，不论其过去主张过什么，只要承认“九二共识”的历史事实，认同其核心意涵，我们都愿意同其交往。习近平这一不带任何偏见的表态，就是希望民进党为了亚太地区尤其是台海地区的和平稳定认同“九二共识”。

其实，今年3月4日，习近平在看望参加全国政协会议的委员时就强调了“九二共识”在两岸和平发展中不可替代的重要作用。他提出，如果“九二共识”的共同政治基础遭到破坏，两岸互信将不复存在，两岸关系就要回到动荡不安的老路上去。习近平提出这一警告的目的，是希望民进党能够正面回应“九二共识”，但是这一警告并没有引起民进党人的重视。习近平不希望两岸关系和平发展中断，不希望台海地区动荡不安，才一再重申两岸关系的这个关键词。问题是，不认同或者回避“九二共识”可能造成台海危机吗？

 同样熟悉两岸政治运作、熟悉台湾政坛规则的马英九也一再对民进党不承认、回避“九二共识”表示了强烈的忧虑、不安和警告。熟悉蔡英文性格并深知美国在亚太地区利益的马英九，在习马会前一再提醒蔡英文不要妄图通过回避“九二共识”而收获两岸关系和平发展的成果。蔡英文不仅不听，而且姑息民进党籍台南市长赖清德公开鼓吹“台独”观点，挑衅大陆。很清楚，蔡英文一直否认“九二共识”的存在，并保留了未来进一步挑战两岸底限的弹性空间。2000年当选执政的陈水扁曾经一度松口承认“九二共识”，但立即被时任陆委会主委的蔡英文否定。这也是后来陈水扁铤而走险，导致两岸关系危机、严重危及台海地区安全的最初始原因。

蔡英文否认“九二共识”的立场从来没有改变过。尽管现在蔡英文说维持现状，但对于“九二共识”这个议题，一直回避回答。马英九深知，维持和加强台海稳定符合包括美国在内的世界上诸多国家和地区的利益，要实现这一目标，最核心的问题就是承认“九二共识”而非否认或回避“九二共识”。因此，今年4月份视察陆委会时，他对“九二共识”作了系统的阐述。但是，马英九的这一积极行为依然被民进党以种种方式否定。民进党候选人蔡英文及民进党团队基本上对马英九视而不见，认为他不过是个“看守总统”，要让他在任期最后阶段一事无成。马英九在穷尽各种警告方式之后，仍然无法阻止民进党暗中搞“台独”,制造“两个中国”或者“一中一台”的行为，也无法在“总统”任上更好地行使与两岸问题有关的职权。为了稳定和促进两岸和平及地区稳定，马英九与习近平会面，并重点强调了“九二共识”。这种情况下的保证与再保证，是为了提醒台湾选民，一个不支持“九二共识”或者其他形式的“一个中国”的台北政府，将会遭遇两岸关系的各种挫折，甚至和平发展的中断。

习马会后，蔡英文一方面提出自己当选后也想与大陆领导人进行“习蔡会”，尽管她明确知道大陆领导人不可能跟坚持“台独”观点的台湾方面领导人会面；另一方面，积极煽动选民让所谓不能捍卫台湾的国民党下台。蔡英文的这些表态显示了她纯熟的选举技巧。不过，马英九在习马会上的表态非常谨慎，他通过重申“九二共识”表达了对民进党一旦上台执政可能造成危机的深深忧虑。习马会过程中，马英九一直在重复既有的观点。会后，民进党指责马英九卖台。但事实上，尽管民进党有表达意见的权利，但从习马会中马英九的表现看，并没有伤害台湾人民尊严的任何言行出现。民进党的这种指责，确实是在变相地煽动台湾民众，力图在选举中获得“总统”职位和多数立法席位。早在2000年和2004年，民进党就遗憾没能在获得“总统”职位的同时，获取绝大多数的立法席位。因为一旦两个选举都获胜，他们就可以全面执政，就可以走“法理台独”之路，实现“台湾独立”。国民党主席朱立伦对民进党过分指责国民党的行为表示愤怒。他说，民进党的特色就是，它做的就是对的，别人做的就是错的。朱立伦同时表示，习马会对两岸是有正面帮助的，请民进党不要逢中必反。

习马会对“九二共识”维持台海和平与稳定的作用有充分的共识：“九二共识”是两岸关系和平发展的一部分，维持现状就要承认“九二共识”。这为未来的两岸关系明确了方向。这表明，现任两岸领导人在维持现状的定义上具有高度的一致性。下一届台湾当局领导人只要认同“九二共识”，台海地区的和平稳定就将继续；不认同“九二共识”，就是公开挑衅两岸关系，就必然迫使大陆采取回击行动。勿谓言之不预也！

On Nov 7, President Xi Jinping and Taiwan leader Ma Ying-jeou met for the first time in Singapore, amid worldwide attention. During the meeting, both sides expressed concern about the prospect that the cross-Strait status quo may be interrupted should the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) get elected to office in the upcoming 2016 election in Taiwan. With this in mind, the two leaders emphasized the importance of the 1992 Consensus with a view to forestall any new disruption in cross-Strait ties like that caused by the former DPP leader Chen Sui-bien.

 President Xi said the meeting was essential to prevent that historical tragedy from repeating itself, and to prevent the fruits from peaceful development of cross-Strait ties from being lost again. This is a direct and sincere appeal, in a sense, to the DPP, which has been ambiguous about its stance on the 1992 Consensus. Furthermore, Xi adopted an open and pragmatic approach to the DPP. During the meeting with Ma, Xi emphasized his hope that all political parties and social organizations would accept and adhere to the 1992 Consensus. No matter what their past political propositions may be, as long as they recognize the historical facts of the 1992 Consensus, uphold its core content, China is ready to engage with them. Through this open-handed outreach, the Chinese president is appealing to the DPP to uphold the 1992 Consensus in the interest of peace and stability of the region, in particular across the Strait.

Back in March, Xi stressed the indispensable role of the 1992 Consensus in cross-Strait peace and development during a meeting with CPPCC members. He pointed out that, if the common political foundation enshrined in the 1992 Consensus should be eroded, the mutual trust across the Strait will evaporate, and cross-Strait relations will be drawn back to the old path of turbulence. The warning was meant to appeal to the DPP, but the message has so far gone unheeded by the DPP. Xi reiterated the message because no one wants to see disruption in cross-Strait relations, or turbulence in the region. Some may dare to ask: If the DPP dismisses or goes against the 1992 Consensus, will tensions flare up across the Strait?

Ma Ying-jeou is well versed in the political intricacies of Taiwan, and is familiar with the temperament of DPP leader Tsai Ing-wen, not to mention the US' high stakes in the Asia Pacific region. He has expressed unequivocally the concerns of bypassing or even denying the 1992 Consensus, and cautioned Ms Tsai against the illusion of maintaining peace and development in cross-Strait relations while bypassing the 1992 Consensus. His word of caution fell on deaf ears. On the contrary, she gave tacit support to Lai Ching-te, DPP member and mayor of Tainan, who has been advocating “Taiwan independence” in an unveiled challenge to Beijing. Tsai, by denying the existence of the 1992 Consensus, is apparently setting the stage for challenging the ultimate bottom line of cross-Strait relations, at least as a future option. Back in 2000, Chen Sui-bien loosened up on his stance and recognized the 1992 Consensus, which was met with strong opposition from Tsai, then the chair of the Mainland Affairs Council. Later, Chen hardened his stance on cross-Strait relations, which severely imperiled cross-Strait relations and undermined the peace and stability of the region.

In spite of her claimed desire to preserve the status quo, Tsai has been circumventing the 1992 Consensus, and her stance on denying that understanding remains unchanged, while Ma is conscious that preserving the status quo serves the interests of the US and other countries in the region. Ma made the case for this position during his visit to the Mainland Affairs Council in April this year, yet to no avail, as the DPP led by Tsai practically has written off Ma as a “caretaker president”, and is determined to make Ma a lame duck during his remaining term. Ma cannot stop the DPP from pushing for “Taiwan independence” under the table, or creating “two Chinas” or “One China, One Taiwan”, nor can Ma enforce his propositions for cross-Strait relations during his tenure. In order to promote the peace and stability of the region, Ma reiterated the 1992 Consensus during the meeting with President Xi. Ma's repeated assurance of adhering to the 1992 Consensus is meant as a reminder to the people in Taiwan that an administration turning its back on the agreement or pushing for Taiwan independence will rock the boat and even derail the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.

After the Xi-Ma meeting, Tsai claimed that she would be willing to meet with the mainland leader, but she knows very well that mainland leaders will never meet with pro-independence officials from Taiwan. In the meanwhile, she is leading the campaign against the Kuomingtang (KMT) on the grounds that the party is unable to defend Taiwan. Admittedly, Tsai is a seasoned politician and an adept campaigner.To his credit, Ma conducted himself with propriety at the Xi meeting, and his reaffirmation of the 1992 Consensus indicates his deep concerns about the prospects of DPP leadership it the party wins in 2016. The DPP then accused Ma of “selling out” Taiwan, which is untenable as Ma didn't say or do anything that may compromise the dignity of the people of Taiwan. The misguided accusation is a veiled attempt to manipulate public opinion against the KMT so as to gain ground in the “parliamentary and presidential elections”. Back in 2000 and 2004, to its regret, the DPP failed to win a parliamentary majority though they carried the day at the “presidential election”. If the DPP has won both, its leaders would have embarked on “de jure independence”, which they see as eventually leading to full independence of Taiwan. Eric Chu, the chairman of the KMT, scorned the DPP's indiscriminate allegations against the KMT as a “DPP is always right, others are always wrong” philosophy. Chu also said that the Xi-Ma meeting is a positive development, and appealed to the DPP to reconsider its “anything but P.R.C.” policy.

In sum, the Xi-Ma meeting reaffirmed the fundamentally important role of the 1992 Consensus in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, including that it underpins the status quo of peace and development. It provides guidance to the future development of cross-Strait relations. Also, it indicates a high level of consensus between the incumbent leaders of both sides of the Strait. As long as the next leadership of Taiwan upholds the 1992 Consensus, the peace and stability in the area will be maintained. Any attempt to the contrary constitutes a blatant challenge to cross-Strait relations, and it will definitely be met with counteractions from the mainland.