近期，中美两国领导人同意将构建“建设性战略稳定关系”作为中美关系新定位，引发美国战略界广泛讨论。笔者与美方学者交流后发现，一些学者对此表示欢迎，认为稳定本身符合双方利益，但也有质疑声音认为这一框架本质上是中国为美国设置的“战略陷阱”，目的是为中国争取发展时间。还有人认为，“战略稳定”本是冷战时期核威慑领域的概念，不应被用于指导中美关系。更有人怀疑这一框架能否长期维持。

这些讨论反映出美国战略界对未来中美关系走向的深层焦虑。然而，如果将目光放得更长远一些便会发现，真正值得思考的问题并非“建设性战略稳定”是否完美，而是经历十余年的摩擦、竞争与危机之后，中美是否找到了一种比单纯强调竞争更符合现实需要的关系框架。

首先，应当看到，中美就这一框架达成共识来之不易。过去十多年，中美双方尝试过不同的关系定位。特朗普第一任期以来，“战略竞争”逐渐成为美国对华政策主导叙事。竞争固然反映了两国关系中的部分现实因素，但它并没有回答更关键的问题：用竞争定义中美关系是否妥当？又应当如何管理两国关系中的竞争面？

实践证明，当竞争逐渐扩展至经贸、科技、投资、供应链、教育、人文交流乃至意识形态领域时，仅仅强调竞争本身并不能带来稳定，反而容易导致误判与对抗风险不断上升。

拜登政府提出的“竞争、合作与对抗”框架则试图在竞争之外保留合作空间。但从实际效果来看，竞争不断扩大，而合作空间持续受到挤压。“负责任地管理竞争”更多停留在政策目标层面，而未能真正成为指导双边关系运行的稳定框架。

正是在这一背景下，中美双方开始寻找新的战略定位。与其说“建设性战略稳定”是一项全新的发明，不如说它是过去几年双方不断摸索之后形成的一种现实选择。

其次，将这一框架视为中国单方面的胜利或美国单方面的让步，并不符合事实。事实上，“战略稳定”并非中国独有的话语体系。值得注意的是，美国国务卿鲁比奥本人此前就曾公开使用“战略稳定”来描述当前中美关系，并表示双方已经达到一种“战略稳定”状态。美国官方表态中也多次出现“稳定”“建设性关系”等表述。这意味着，“稳定”并非中国强加给美国的概念，而是双方在长期互动过程中逐渐形成的共识。

从概念演变过程看，这实际上体现了双方的相互调适。中国强调“建设性”，美国强调“互惠”“平等”，最终形成的表述并非任何一方的原封不动版本，而是双方协商的结果。

更重要的是，这一过程反映出双方思维的相互靠近。长期以来，中国更倾向于先确立战略定位，再推动具体合作。中国认为，大国关系首先需要回答“双方究竟是什么关系”的问题，然后才能讨论具体议题。而美国则恰恰相反。华盛顿长期认为，双方应当先在具体领域取得成果，通过合作积累信任，再逐步形成更大的战略框架。

过去几年，中美关系之所以反复陷入僵局，一个重要原因就在于双方始终坚持各自逻辑。然而从最近一系列互动来看，双方都开始适度调整自身偏好。一方面，中方接受在经贸、投资、市场准入等具体领域取得实际成果；另一方面，美方也接受首先建立战略框架的重要性。近期双方不仅讨论战略稳定，也推动经贸、投资、供应链、芬太尼等具体议题取得进展。中美两国未来还可能围绕延长贸易休战、开放市场、加强投资、调整出口管制政策以及鼓励人员往来等议题取得更多成果。从这个意义上说，“建设性战略稳定”不是任何一方压倒另一方的结果，而是双方共同调整后的产物。

第三，对于“战略稳定”概念的理解，也不应停留在冷战时期的核威慑逻辑。一些美国学者认为，“战略稳定”只能用于描述核大国之间的相互确保摧毁关系，因此不适合作为中美关系总体框架。这种理解实际上过于狭隘。不可否认，“战略稳定”最初确实产生于核军控领域，但随着国际关系的发展，作为指导中美关系的“战略稳定”早已超出核问题本身，而更强调两个大国在战略层面的稳定关系。今天影响中美关系稳定的因素远不只是核武器，台湾问题、科技竞争、人工智能、网络安全、供应链安全、投资限制、经贸摩擦乃至地区热点问题，都可能成为新的风险源。如果不稳定来自多个领域，那么稳定也必须具有更广泛的内涵。

因此，“建设性战略稳定”并不是将冷战时期的核稳定概念简单移植到当代中美关系，而是试图构建一种更广义的稳定状态：双方保持战略沟通，避免误判升级，维持危机管控机制；确保竞争保持在可控范围之内，并努力为必要合作创造空间。

最后，对于这一框架能否长期维持的问题，或许本身就问错了方向。没有任何一个国际关系框架能够永久有效，无论是美国在冷战时期的缓和政策，还是后冷战时期的接触战略，都有其历史局限性。真正的问题不在于这一框架是否能够持续十年、二十年，而在于它是否比现有替代方案更好。

过去十余年的经验已经表明，不断扩大的竞争并没有带来更多信任，越来越多的限制措施也没有消除双方的相互依赖，频繁出现的危机更没有增强战略互信。相反，它们往往制造新的不确定性，并增加误判风险。

因此，稳定从来不是单方面的收益，而是双边关系中的公共产品。评价“建设性战略稳定”的标准，不应是它能否解决所有问题，而应是它能否为两国创造一个更可预测、更可管理的关系环境。一些美国评论人士担心，中国会利用稳定争取时间发展自身实力，但如果稳定真的为中国提供了发展空间，那么同样也为美国争取了调整政策、增强竞争力、修复同盟关系以及推进国内改革的时间。归根结底，中美关系的未来不可能建立在任何一方“战胜”另一方的基础之上。

对于华盛顿而言，与其纠结“建设性战略稳定”究竟是谁先提出的概念、到底是不是中国给美国设下的“战略陷阱”，不如认真思考如何利用当前来之不易的稳定窗口期，推动更多具体成果和机制建设。因为任何战略框架的价值，最终都不在于概念本身，而在于它能否为两国关系创造更加稳定、可预期和建设性的未来。

Recently, the presidents of China and the United States agreed to define the building of “a constructive relationship of strategic stability” as a new positioning for China-U.S. relations. It has sparked extensive discussion in the American strategic community.In my exchanges with American scholars, I found that some welcome the idea, believing that stability serves the interests of both sides. But there are also skeptical voices. Some argue that the framework is essentially a strategic trap set by China for the United States and is designed to buy China more time for development. Others believe that strategic stability is a concept rooted in Cold War nuclear deterrence and should not be used to guide China-U.S. relations now. Still others question whether such a framework can endure over the long term.

These debates reflect a deeper anxiety within the American strategic community about the future direction of China-U.S. relations. Yet from a longer-term perspective, the real question is not whether constructive strategic stability is perfect, but whether, after more than a decade of friction, competition and crises, China and the United States have found a framework that better meets the needs of reality than one that is defined merely by competition.

First, it should be recognized that reaching consensus on this framework was no easy task. Over the past decade or more, China and the U.S. have experimented with different ways of defining their relationship. Since the first Trump administration, strategic competition has gradually become the dominant narrative in U.S. policy toward China. Competition does reflect part of the reality of bilateral relations, but it does not answer the more important questions: Is it appropriate to define China-U.S. relations through competition? And how should the competitive side of the relationship be managed?

Experience has shown that when competition expands into trade, technology, investment, supply chains, education, people-to-people exchanges and even ideology, emphasizing competition alone does not bring stability. Instead, it can easily increase the risks of misperception and confrontation.

The Biden administration's framework—described as “competition, cooperation, and confrontation”—attempted to preserve room for cooperation alongside competition. But in practice, competition kept expanding while the space for cooperation was continuously squeezed. Responsibly managing competition remained more of a policy objective than a stable framework for guiding the operation of bilateral relations.

It is against this backdrop that China and the United States began searching for a new strategic positioning. Rather than seeing constructive strategic stability as an entirely new invention, it should be understood as a realistic choice formed through years of exploration by both sides.

Second, it does not accord with the facts to regard the new framework as either a unilateral victory for China or a unilateral concession by the United States. In fact, strategic stability is not an expression unique to China. It is worth noting that U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had previously used the term to describe the current state of China-U.S. relations, saying that the two sides had reached a state of strategic stability. Official U.S. statements have also repeatedly used the terms “stability” and “constructive.” This suggests that stability is not a concept imposed by China on the United States but rather a consensus gradually formed through long-term interaction.

Viewed through the evolution of the concept, this in fact reflects mutual adjustment. China emphasizes “constructiveness,” while the United States stresses “reciprocity” and “fairness.” The final formulation is not the unchanged version of either side, but the result of negotiation between the two.

More important, this process reflects a convergence in the thinking of both sides. For a long time, China has tended to favor establishing a strategic position first and then promoting specific cooperation. In China's view, relations between major countries must start with the overall kind of relationship the two sides have before specific issues can be discussed. The United States has often taken the opposite approach. Washington has long believed that the two sides should first achieve results in specific areas, accumulate trust through cooperation and then gradually form a broader strategic framework.

One important reason China-U.S. relations repeatedly fell into deadlock over the past few years was that both sides insisted on their own logic. Yet judging from a series of recent interactions, both sides have begun to moderately adjust their preferences. On one hand, China has accepted the need to achieve concrete outcomes in specific areas such as trade, investment and market access. On the other, the United States has accepted the importance of first establishing a strategic framework.Recently, the two sides have not only discussed strategic stability but also promoted progress on specific issues such as trade, investment, supply chains and fentanyl. In the future, China and the United States may also achieve more on issues such as extending the trade truce, opening markets, strengthening investment, adjusting export control policies and encouraging people-to-people exchanges. In this sense, “constructive strategic stability” is not the result of one side prevailing over the other but the product of mutual adjustment.

Third, the concept of “strategic stability” should not be understood only through the logic of Cold War nuclear deterrence. Some American scholars argue that strategic stability can only be used to describe a relationship of mutually assured destruction between nuclear powers, and is therefore unsuitable as an overall framework for China-U.S. relations.This understanding is too narrow. It is undeniable that strategic stability originally emerged in the field of nuclear arms control. But with the evolution of international relations, strategic stability as a guiding concept for China-U.S. relations has long gone beyond the nuclear issue itself. It now places greater emphasis on a stable strategic relationship between two major powers.Today, the factors affecting the stability of China-U.S. relations are far from limited to nuclear weapons. The Taiwan question, technological competition, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, supply-chain security, investment restrictions, trade and economic frictions and regional hot spot issues may all become new sources of risk. If instability arises from multiple domains, stability must also have a broader meaning.

Therefore, constructive strategic stability is not a simple transplantation of the Cold War concept of nuclear stability into contemporary China-U.S. relations. Rather, it seeks to build a broader form of stability: maintaining strategic communication, avoiding the escalation of misperceptions, preserving crisis-management mechanisms, ensuring that competition remains within manageable limits and working to create space for necessary cooperation.

Finally, when it comes to whether this framework can be sustained over the long term, perhaps the question itself is framed in the wrong way. No framework in international relations can remain effective forever. Whether it was the U.S. policy of detente during the Cold War or the engagement strategy after the Cold War, each had its own historical limitations. The real question is not whether this framework can last 10 or 20 years but whether it is better than the existing alternatives.

The experience of the past decade or so has shown that expanding competition has not generated more trust, increasing restrictions have not eliminated interdependence between the two sides and frequent crises have not strengthened strategic confidence. On the contrary, they have often created new uncertainty and increased the risk of miscalculation. Stability, therefore, is never a benefit for one side alone; it is a public good in bilateral relations.

The standard for evaluating constructive strategic stability should not be whether it can solve all problems but whether it can create a more predictable and manageable environment for the two countries. Some American commentators worry that China will use stability to buy time to develop its own strength. But if stability truly gives China room for development, it also gives the United States time to adjust its policies, enhance its competitiveness, repair its alliances and advance domestic reforms. Ultimately, the future of China-U.S. relations cannot be built on the basis of either side “defeating” the other.

For Washington, instead of dwelling on who first proposed the concept of constructive strategic stability or the question of whether it is a strategic trap set by China for the United States, it would be more useful to think seriously about how to make use of this hard-won window of stability to promote more concrete outcomes and build more mechanisms. After all, the value of any strategic framework lies not in the concept itself, but in whether it can create a more stable, predictable and constructive future for relations between the two countries.