由于充斥着裙带关系和派系斗争，中国精英政治长期以来一直被看成是变幻不定的游戏，政治不稳定、不确定的阴影从来未曾远离。虽然过去30年来，中国领导层一直努力将制度规范纳入其精英选拔过程，但人们始终担心这个新生制度性机制的有效性和持久性。不过，中国政治的观察家们是不是过于吹毛求疵，忽视了精英招募中重要的制度性进步了呢？已经宣布的相关条例，究竟在多大程度上得到了切实执行？在这一过程当中，制度限制和政治障碍到底是什么？

对少数民族干部的选拔是很好的研究案例，它有益地揭示了这个问题。中国是一个以汉族为主体的多民族国家，中国共产党早就意识到，把少数民族干部纳入党和国家精英，即可以用来作宣传，也可以让少数民族群体觉得这个体制能给他们提供进阶机会。1949年中华人民共和国成立以来，几代中共领导人一直都在努力招募培养少数民族干部。虽然多年来下发了多个关于选拔少数民族干部的指导方针和指示，但直到1984年全国人大通过《中华人民共和国民族区域自治法》,这套体系才正式制度化。

自治法规定，所有少数民族自治区地方政府（从乡镇级到省级）的最高职务都应该由具有区内主要少数民族背景的领导干部担任。地方政府负责人仅次于党委书记，拥有重要的决策权和区内事务管理权。中国有155个少数民族自治地方，其中包括5个省级区，30个州，120个县。据中国政府的资料，目前这些地方的政府负责人均不是汉族。实际上，自治法实施以来，这一特殊的制度规定在省一级从未破例。而且，在2002年对自治法的修正中，对中国政治制度当中的民族区域自治制度的定义从“重要”改成了“基本”，突显了少数民族干部选拔过程的稳步制度化。

在中国政治高层，挑选少数民族领导人更多靠的是非正式标准，而不是显性规则。在1987年十三大以来组成的六届中共中央委员会当中，尽管没有明文规定少数民族在这个最高领导层的应占比例，但少数民族委员始终占10-11%（包括正式委员和候补委员）。而且这一比例几乎比前五届高出近一倍，这说明，中共更加重视要在重要机构内保持少数民族稳定的代表性。不过，中央委员会的绝大多数少数民族成员都只是候补委员。例如，第十八届中央委员会中，少数民族正式委员只有10人（占4.9%），过去30年里，只有一位少数民族（回族）领导人回良玉是政治局委员。

在国务院，国家民族事务委员会主任一直由少数民族干部担任。通常，还会有至少一位少数民族领导出任国务委员或副总理，如司马义•艾买提1993年至2003年任国务委员，回良玉2003年至2013年任副总理，戴秉国2008年至2013年任国务委员，杨晶2013年至今任国务委员。

当然，中共领导层并没有让少数民族人士参与它的国家事务最终决策。少数民族领导人从未进入过中国事实上的权力核心——政治局常务委员会。在五个少数民族自治区，区委书记这个最高职位30年来一直由汉人担任。在不是由少数民族自治的省里，少数民族干部做党委书记也不多见，最近30年来仅有的三个例外是前江苏省委书记回良玉、前贵州省委书记石宗源和现任吉林省委书记巴音朝鲁。

分析人士通常借人际关系、派系身份等因素，来评估一位领导人的晋升前景。结合传统做法和对制度规范的理解，我们能够识别出领导层中的一些后起之秀。现在的中共中央委员会少数民族委员当中，蒙古族干部杨晶（1955年生）和维吾尔族干部努尔•白克力（1961年生）由于有大量领导经验，有可能成为下届政治局委员的人选。

杨晶现任中共中央书记处书记、国务委员（兼国务院秘书长）。他在党和政府国家一级机构中同时担任关键的管理职务，这在少数民族领导人中是罕见的。杨晶是内蒙古准格尔旗人，事业起步于他所在自治区的共青团，1993年他任共青团内蒙古自治区委书记。因此，杨晶也被视为团派的上升期领导人。2004年到2008年，杨晶担任内蒙古自治区政府主席。之后他调到北京，出任国家民族事务委员会主任。由于他的少数民族身份和团派背景，杨晶迅速升到了现在的位置。

与杨晶相仿，巴音朝鲁的晋升也主要通过共青团系统。担任共青团内蒙古自治区委书记后不久，巴音朝鲁于1993年被提拔为共青团中央书记处书记，在后来的几年当中他与当时主管共青团中央书记处的李克强一起工作。2001年，巴音朝鲁调到浙江，比习近平到浙江早了一年。在浙江，他任副省长（2001-2003年)、浙江省委常委、宁波市委书记（2003-2010年）。之后他又调到吉林担任多个领导任务，并于2014年正式出任吉林省委书记。巴音朝鲁目前是唯一任省委书记的少数民族干部。作为一个有大量地方经验、与习近平和李克强有密切工作关系的少数民族干部，巴音朝鲁显然很有机会继续晋升。

努尔•白克力现任国家能源局长和国家发改委副主任，是部级干部中为数不多的年轻干部（1960年以后出生）之一。努尔•白克力出生在新疆博乐，维吾尔族，他的主要工作经历是在家乡自治区，先是在新疆大学党委，后成为乌鲁木齐市市长（1998-2000年）。2008年，47岁的努尔•白克力出任新疆维吾尔自治区主席。任新疆第二把手六年之后，努尔•白克力调任现在的中央级职务。他的任命值得注意，因为这是第一次由一位少数民族干部来领导国家至关重要的经济机构。

对少数民族领导人任用模式的简单回顾，清楚地说明了制度规范对少数民族精英选拔的作用。这些制度规范为各级管理层当中少数民族干部代表性的稳定提供了一个框架。上面讨论到的三位少数民族干部后起之秀，他们在所在自治区建立事业时，都得益于这种制度安排。但他们的情况也证明，人际关系和派系政治仍然发挥着重要作用，特别是晋升顶层领导岗位的时候。

即将召开的十九大将进一步揭示，制度化会在多大程度上增加少数民族在中国精英政治中的代表性。从观察中国领导层政治的这一特点，我们开始对重要途径有所感知，透过这种途径，大量的制度规范在塑造着中国的精英招募。这些进展无疑将更广泛地影响中国的政治，因此，它们会继续是我们关注与分析的重点。

Fraught with patron-client ties and factional infighting, Chinese elite politics has long been perceived as an ever-changing game, with the shadows of political instability and uncertainty never looming far off. Though the Chinese leadership has labored over the past three decades to instill rules and norms into its elite selection process, concerns have persisted over the effectiveness and durability of these nascent institutional mechanisms. But have observers of Chinese politics been too cynical, overlooking important institutional developments in how elites are recruited? To what extent have proclaimed regulations actually been implemented? What institutional limitations and political barriers stand in the way?

The selection of ethnic minority leaders provides a good case study that sheds valuable light on these questions. China is a multiethnic country that is dominated by Han, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long recognized the value of including ethnic minority cadres among party-state elites, both for propaganda purposes and to inspire minority groups to view the system as affording opportunities for their own advancement. Recruiting and training ethnic minority cadres has been a continuous effort across different generations of CCP leaders, going back to the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. While multiple sets of guidelines and instructions regarding the selection of ethnic minority leaders have circulated over the years, the system was not formally institutionalized until 1984, when the National People's Congress (NPC) passed the Law of Ethnic Minority Autonomous Areas of the People's Republic of China.

The Law stipulates that the top post in the local government in all ethnic minority autonomous areas (from the township level to the provincial level) should be held by a leader from the same ethnic minority background as the majority of citizens in that area. Second only to the party secretary, the head of a local government has significant power over decision-making and the management of regional affairs. China has 155 ethnic minority autonomous areas, including 5 provincial-level regions, 30 prefectures, and 120 counties. According to the Chinese government, currently all of the heads of the local governments in these areas are non-Han. In fact, since the installation of the Law, this particular institutional rule has never been violated at the provincial level. Furthermore, revisions to the Law in 2002 reclassified the system of regional ethnic autonomy from a Chinese political institution that was “important” (重要) to one that is “fundamental” (基本), underlining the steady institutionalization of the process for selecting ethnic minority leaders.

At the top echelon of China's politics, the selection of ethnic minority leaders is bound more by informal norms than explicit rules. In the six CCP Central Committees that have formed since the 13th Party Congress in 1987, ethnic minorities have consistently constituted around 10 to 11 percent of the membership (including both full members and alternate members), even though no regulation has been openly promulgated on the representation of ethnic minorities at this highest level of leadership. Furthermore, this proportion is almost double the average of the five prior congresses, illustrating the CCP's increased attention to maintaining a stable ethnic minority presence in this important body. Nevertheless, most of the ethnic minority leaders on the Central Committee are alternate members. For example, only 10 full members (4.9%) of the 18th Central Committee are ethnic minorities. Over the past three decades, only one minority leader, Hui Liangyu (回良玉), a Hui, has served as a Politburo member.

In the State Council, the directorship of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission has always been held by an ethnic minority leader. There has usually been at least one ethnic minority leader serving as a state councilor or a vice premier: for example, Ismail Amat (司马义·艾买提) as state councilor from 1993 to 2003, Hui Liangyu as vice premier from 2003 to 2013, Dai Bingguo (戴秉国) as state councilor from 2008 to 2013, and Yang Jing (杨晶) as state councilor from 2013 to present.

The CCP leadership, of course, does not place ethnic representation above its own ultimate decision-making power in state affairs. Ethnic minority leaders have never made it onto the Politburo Standing Committee, the de facto nexus of power in China. For the five ethnic minority autonomous provinces, the region's top post of provincial party secretary has always been given to a Han Chinese throughout the past 30 years. It is also rare for an ethnic minority leader to become party secretary of a non-ethnic minority autonomous province. The only three exceptions in recent decades are Hui Liangyu, the former party secretary of Jiangsu; Shi Zongyuan (石宗源), the former party secretary of Guizhou; and Bayanqolu (巴音朝鲁), the current party secretary of Jilin.

Analysts generally rely on factors like personal ties and factional identity to assess a leader's promotional prospects. By combining an understanding of the rules and norms with these traditional aspects, we can better identify some rising stars in the leadership. Among the ethnic minority members of the current Central Committee of the CCP, two Mongolian leaders—Yang Jing (b. 1953) and Bayanqolu (b. 1955)—and one Uighur leader, Nur Bekri (努尔 · 白克力, b. 1961), are likely candidates for the next Politburo, given their broad leadership experience.

Yang Jing now serves as a member of the CCP Central Secretariat and as a state councilor (and, concurrently, secretary general of the State Council). His is the rare case of an ethnic minority leader concurrently holding key administrative positions at the national level in both the party organ and the state. A native of Jungar Banner, Inner Mongolia, Yang began his career in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) in his native autonomous region and became secretary of the Inner Mongolia CCYL Committee in 1993. Yang's time in this role coincided with Li Keqiang's tenure as first secretary of the 13th CCYL Central Committee. As a result, Yang is also viewed as a rising tuanpai leader. From 2004 to 2008, Yang served as head of the Inner Mongolia Ethnic Minority Autonomous Region. He was then transferred to Beijing to become director of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission. With his ethnic minority identity and tuanpai background, Yang quickly rose up the ranks to his current position.

Similar to Yang Jing, Bayanqolu also accelerated his career mainly through the CCYL system. After serving briefly as secretary of the Inner Mongolia CCYL Committee, Bayanqolu was promoted in 1993 to the CCYL Secretariat, where he spent the next few years working alongside Li Keqiang, who was in charge of the CCYL Secretariat. In 2001, Bayanqolu was transferred to Zhejiang, one year before Xi Jinping's arrival there. In Zhejiang, he served as vice-governor (2001-2003), standing member of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee, and secretary of Ningbo City (2003-2010). He then was transferred to Jilin for various leadership roles and officially became the party secretary of Jilin in 2014. Bayanqolu is the only ethnic minority leader who currently serves as a provincial party secretary. As an ethnic minority leader with broad regional experience and a close working relationship with both Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, Bayanqolu apparently has a good chance for further promotion.

Nur Bekri, currently the director of the National Energy Administration and a deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), is one of only a few young leaders (those born after 1960) at the ministerial level. As a Uighur born in Bole, Xinjiang, Nur advanced most of his career in his native autonomous region, first working in the Party Committee of Xinjiang University, then as mayor of Urumqi (1998-2000). In 2008, when he was only 47, Nur became governor of the Xinjiang Ethnic Minority Autonomous Region. After serving as the second in command in Xinjiang for six years, Nur was transferred to his current roles at the central level. Nur's appointment was notable in the sense that it was the first time that an ethnic minority leader had been tapped to lead a key national economic agency.

This brief review of the appointment patterns of ethnic minority leaders clearly indicates how institutional rules and norms factor into the selection of ethnic elites. These rules and norms provide a framework for the stable representation of ethnic minority leaders at different levels of governance. The three rising ethnic minority leaders discussed above all benefited from this institutional arrangement when they started building their careers in their native autonomous regions. However, their cases also demonstrate how personal ties and factional politics continue to play a significant role, especially in promotions to top leadership posts.

The upcoming 19th Party Congress will further reveal the extent to which institutionalization is increasing ethnic representation in China's elite politics. By observing this particular aspect of Chinese leadership politics, we can begin to perceive the important ways in which a wider array of rules and norms are shaping elite recruitment in China. As these developments will undoubtedly influence Chinese politics more broadly, they should continue to be a focus of attention and analysis.