国共高层领导人互动已经成为两党的惯例。政党沟通，形成意向和民意基础，再由两岸双方具体推进和平发展，稳定台海局势，已经成为这两个具有“九二共识”共同政治基础的政党的品牌。国共两党的高层沟通与国共论坛行有经年，成为两岸关系发展的发动机。“习洪会”是十八届六中全会以后作为中共中央领导核心的习近平总书记阐述大陆对台政策，也是中国国民党首次彻底沦为在野党、民进党首次全面执政之后的第一次国共领导人会面，具有强调底线、摸索新局的重要意义。

首先，“习洪会”明确了两岸关系的性质和底线。“九二共识”表明两岸关系的性质，是两岸是否属于一个国家这个关键问题的试金石。蔡英文上台后，拒不承认“九二共识”，单方面破坏过去8年来形成的两岸关系和平发展的现状，导致两岸关系进入冷对抗时期。蔡英文当局用时间换空间，妄图借助两岸的“冷”实现“台湾内部的国家正常化”，用“释宪台独”等方式实现“台湾法理独立”。当前，大陆在台湾岛内没有抓手，没法以直接影响台湾民意的方式改变岛内的民意格局。但是，台湾与大陆在宪法和法律上属于一个中国的事实毋庸置疑，因此，通过国共领导人会面的方式阐述大陆维护国家主权领土完整的决心决不动摇，阐述遏制“台独”的决心决不动摇，阐述决不让国家分裂的历史悲剧重演具有强烈的指标意义。这就意味着，尽管大陆无法直接影响台湾“法理台独”的进程，但是一定有办法遏制“法理台独”的结果。这也意味着，大陆在一个中国原则上的底线旗帜鲜明，这一政治底线和法理底线不可能动摇。

其次，“习洪会”是国民党内两岸路线斗争的试金石。国民党作为台湾岛内曾经的第一大党，其党内路线和未来走向直接牵涉到两岸关系的未来。一个“独台”并与“台独”合流的国民党只能让两岸僵局进一步冷却甚至使得两岸关系走向更不可知的未来；一个继续高举“九二共识”大旗并具有国家统一目标的国民党则会成为两岸关系冷对抗时期的缓冲剂和重要沟通渠道。从“九合一”惨败到“二合一”彻底在野，国民党内斗不止，两岸路线自然也是党内斗争不可或缺的内容。洪秀柱以明朗的国家统一观在国民党内独树一帜。此次“习洪会”，洪秀柱完整阐述国民党和平政纲，明确深化“九二共识”，积极探讨以和平协议结束两岸敌对状态的可能性，并力图使国民党扮演推动两岸和平制度化的角色的表态，到底在国民党内如何发酵，国民党内斗的结果到底如何，洪秀柱回台之后党内政治地位如何，都是观察国民党未来走向的指标。

第三，“习洪会”是摸索两岸新局的尝试。当前，蔡英文依美日抗大陆，美国从人员配置到两岸议题，与蔡英文当局的关系甚密，甚至出现为民共寻求新共识的迫切愿望和积极行动。而国民党则首次完全在野，国民党在台湾政治生活中的地位处于有史以来的最低地位。尽管国民党作为最大的在野党依然活跃在台湾政治舞台上，尽管国民党对台湾当局、台湾民意代表部门、台湾裁判部门还有一些发言权，但是它已经失去了掣肘民进党的作用。加之，台湾当局采用“转型正义”、“不当党产条例”等方式遏住国民党的财政、波及国民党的合法性，国民党对台湾的政治影响力处于空前的低潮。在这种情况下，如何既不与拒不承认“九二共识”的台湾当局进行官方接触，不与拥有“台独党纲”的民进党进行党对党交流，又对岛内坚持“九二共识”的政治力量和民众有所表示，就需要摸索出一条新道路。“习洪会”释放了大陆方面继续以“九二共识”和两岸同属一中的核心意涵作为推动两岸关系交流互动底线的信号，表达了摸索两岸新局的尝试。

“习洪会”是目前两岸关系和平发展充满挑战和变数情况下两岸关系的重要事件，国共关系的巩固和发展，国民党内部认同“九二共识”力量的稳定是两岸关系和平稳定的重要因素。这一历史事件在当前两岸冷对抗的特殊情势下所起到的作用不容低估，因为，历史事件不但具有即时性，而且具有历时性（diachronic），它可能是未来两岸探索新局的开端。

Interaction between leaders of CPC and KMT has already become a convention between the two parties. Public opinion has welcomed such communications and formed a basis for the two sides across the Taiwan Straits to promote peace and development and stabilize cross-Strait relations. This has become the brand of these two political parties, both of which uphold the 1992 Consensus. The high-level exchanges and the CPC-KMT forum have powered the development of cross-Strait relations. The meeting between KMT Chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu and CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping was the first meeting between leaders of the two parties since the DPP took power and the KMT became the opposition. Xi took the opportunity to elaborate the mainland's policy towards Taiwan. He emphasized the bottom line of the mainland and attempted to explore new aspects of cross-Strait relations.

First, he clarified that the 1992 consensus is about the nature of cross-Strait relationship and serves as the touchstone of whether the two sides belong to one country. Tsai Ying-wen, the new Taiwan leader, refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus and has unilaterally disrupted cross-Strait peace and development, a status quo that has developed in the past eight years, driving cross-Strait relations into an age of cold confrontation. Tsai wants to seize the time of relationship cooling down to achieve 'state normalization within Taiwan' and 'jurisprudential independence' by way of 'constitutional interpretation'. At present, the mainland is not able to directly influence and thus change public opinion in Taiwan. However, it is an undeniable fact that Taiwan and the mainland belong, constitutionally and legally, to one China. It is therefore strongly symbolic to reiterate the unshakable determination of the mainland to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity, to contain 'Taiwan independence' and to prevent the historical tragedy of secession. To put it straight, although the mainland cannot directly influence Taiwan's jurisprudential independence process, it vows to be resourceful in dealing with the result. The one-China principle constitutes the inviolate political and jurisprudential bottom line for the mainland.

Second, the Xi-Hung meeting was a touchstone for the struggle between two camps on cross-Strait relations within the KMT. The KMT used to be the largest political party in Taiwan, and its program and orientation have a direct bearing on the future of cross-Strait relations. A KMT that favors an 'independent Taiwan' and converges with 'pro-independence forces in Taiwan' will only further chill the cross-Strait relationship and steer it to a more unknowable future. On the other hand, a KMT that holds high the banner of the 1992 Consensus and the objective of national reunification will serve as a buffering agent and an important communication channel during a period of cold confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. From the crushing defeat to being driven out of the ruling position, the KMT went through incessant infighting, with cross-Strait relations a point in dispute. Hung plowed her own furrow with forthright support for national reunification. During her meeting with Xi, Hung gave a complete elaboration of the KMT's 'peace platform', clearly deepening the 1992 Consensus, actively exploring the possibility of a peace agreement between the two sides, and steering the KMT to contribute to institutionalizing peace across the Taiwan Straits. How will these statements brew within KMT? What will be the result of KMT infighting? What will be Hung's political status within her party after going back to Taiwan? Answers to these questions will testify to the future orientation of KMT.

Third, the Xi-Hung meeting was an attempt to explore new prospects for cross-Strait relations. At present, Tsai Ing-wen relied on the US and Japan to counter the mainland. From staffing to agenda setting, the US is on intimate terms with the Tsai regime, even urging active moves to find new consensus for DPP and CPC. On the other hand, the KMT is for the first time completely out of power and trying to adapt to its lowest position in Taiwan's political life since its founding. Although the party remains politically active as the largest opposition force and still has some voice in the three branches of government, it is no longer able to hold back the DPP. Furthermore, the Taiwan authorities have used 'transitional justice' and 'improper party assets regulations' to contain the KMT's finances, which produced spillovers to questions about KMT legitimacy, resulting in unprecedentedly low political influence for the party. In this situation, the mainland must explore a new path to continue rejecting official contact with the Taiwan authorities that have refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus, avoiding inter-party exchanges with a DPP that has a Taiwan independence clause and showing some kindness to the political forces still insisting on the 1992 Consensus and people in Taiwan. The Xi-Hung meeting thus signaled that the mainland will continue using the 1992 Consensus and its core content, i.e., both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one China, as the bottom line of cross-Strait exchanges and interaction — while seeking new ways to develop cross-Strait relations.

The meeting is an important event at a time where the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations faces challenges and uncertainties. The role of this historical event in the special situation of cross-Strait cold confrontation must not be underestimated because historical events are not only instantaneous but also diachronic. Consolidation and development of KMT-CPC ties and stability of forces recognizing the 1992 Consensus within KMT are important factors for cross-Strait relations to enjoy peace and continuity.