习近平与朱立伦在5月初举行的会晤明确表达了国共两党、两岸双方对“九二共识”作为两岸关系和平发展政治基础的高度认同。习近平总书记对两岸关系的论述表明，任何明示或默示反对“九二共识”的台湾政党都不可能收获和平发展的成果。如果没有对“九二共识”的明确表态，台湾海峡就可能面临着动荡不安的未来。

一、“九二共识”是太平洋两岸和海峡两岸利益最大化的政治符号

习近平总书记提出“九二共识”是两岸关系之锚的论述，表明大陆认为“九二共识”是两岸关系和平发展最重要的政治符号。他在诸多场合表达了“九二共识”在两岸关系中的重要性。朱立伦在担任国民党主席后，也明确了表达了“九二共识”是两岸和平发展政治基础的观点。在习朱会上，朱立伦更是将共识的内容清晰化，表达了国民党对这个政治符号的传承和充分重视。

习朱会上，国共两党领导人的表态说明，两党对“九二共识”有着高度认同，这也释放出海峡两岸两支主要的政治力量对在“九二共识”基础上坚定推动两岸关系、维护台海和平的清晰信号。毕竟，“九二共识”是太平洋两岸、海峡两岸均认可的重要共识，是海峡两岸得以求同存异、妥协前行的重要政治符号。在这个政治符号下，太平洋两岸、海峡两岸的最大利益均可以维持和拓展。没有这个政治符号，或者对这个政治符号不作清晰表态，两岸关系就很难有稳定的和平发展。如果这样，各方的利益均有可能受到损失。

二、“九二共识”是两岸当局、国共两党的共识

由于习朱会是两岸执政党领导人的会面，所表达的自然是两个执政党的态度。这次会晤说明，两岸执政党对“九二共识”有着高度的认同。之前，两党在南京举行的两岸关系和平发展共同愿景发布十周年纪念活动更是以政党名义昭示“九二共识”与和平发展的关系。

台湾当局对“九二共识”的态度也是明确的。朱立伦访问大陆之前，台湾地区领导人马英九在视导陆委会时发表讲话，确认“九二共识”是两岸当局的共识。朱立伦访问大陆之后，马英九举办“九二共识”展览，展出相关历史文件和图片，用史实说明共识确实存在，而且是两岸关系发展的关键。

三、“九二共识”是两岸和平发展现状的重要组成部分

2000年，坚持“台独”的民进党上台，两岸两会的谈判因而中断。七年前，陈水扁推动法理台独，致使两岸关系进入高危期。2008年，坚持“九二共识”的国民党当选执政，两岸用共识的方式达成了一个中国问题的妥协与共识，形成两岸关系和平发展的局面。习朱会之后，马英九督促蔡英文在“九二共识”问题上表态，并表明未来无论谁当选，都应该在共识基础上发展两岸关系。事实表明，两岸关系和平发展的成果并非理所当然，它是建立在“九二共识”基础上的。要维持两岸关系现状，必须对“九二共识”作出明确的表态。

两岸执政党和两岸当局之所以如此，是因为民进党一厢情愿的想法将可能破坏两岸关系和平发展的现状，给台海带来不稳定因素。民进党至今沉醉在“太阳花”学运后“九合一”选举的美梦中，认为只要回避“九二共识”，宣示继续两岸和平发展，就能收割两岸关系和平发展的成果。最重要的原因还在于，蔡英文作为陈水扁执政时期执掌两岸关系的主要成员，对陈水扁时期的两岸政策具有主要责任。她带领着一批陈水扁执政团队的主要成员参与竞选，而且一直不表明对“九二共识”的态度，这难免造成两岸执政当局和执政党的忧虑。更何况，蔡英文不明确对“九二共识”的表态，表明她不愿意将手中的牌摊给美国人看，暗含着跟美国和大陆平起平坐、讨价还价的余地。因此，要表明维持现状，就要全面阐述她对两岸现状的理解，包括对“九二共识”的态度。

两岸执政党和两岸当局对未来两年关系能否维持和平发展都表示担忧，这充分说明了两岸执政的中国人对蔡英文当选可能破坏和平发展现状的担忧。如果蔡英文访美时不能在“九二共识”问题上作明确表态，习近平主席下半年访美时就存在着用一定篇幅跟美国领导人探讨相关问题的可能性，这也意味着，中美两国的其他问题可能会因为台湾问题被延宕。

The meeting in early May between Xi Jinping and Eric Chu, leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Kuomintang (KMT) respectively, clearly reflected the two parties' recognition of the 1992 Consensus as the political basis for peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. Xi's statement on cross-Straits relations showed that any Taiwanese party that explicitly or implicitly opposes the 1992 Consensus is not likely to yield the fruit of peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. Without a clear stance on the 1992 Consensus, the future of the Taiwan Straits may be fraught with disturbances.

1. The 1992 Consensus is a political symbol for maximized interests across the Pacific Ocean and across the Taiwan Straits.

Xi has reiterated the importance of the 1992 Consensus, which he often describes as the anchor of cross-Straits relations. This shows that the mainland regards the 1992 Consensus as the most important political symbol for cross-Straits peaceful development. Chu, after assuming office as KMT chairman, also explicitly referred to the 1992 Consensus as the political basis for peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.

During his recent meeting with Xi, Chu took a further step to clarify the content of 1992 Consensus, demonstrating the KMT's recognition of and emphasis on this political symbol.The endorsement of the 1992 Consensus as shown at the Xi-Chu meeting also sent a clear signal about the strong determination of the two main political forces to push forward cross-Straits relations and maintain peace across the Taiwan Straits on the basis of the 1992 Consensus.

2. The 1992 Consensus is the consensus of the two authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and the consensus of the CPC and the KMT.

As Xi and Chu are leaders of the governing parties on two sides of the Taiwan Straits, their stance invariably represents that of the two parties. Their meeting points to the two parties' recognition of the 1992 Consensus. At an earlier commemorative event marking the 10th anniversary of the release of the Common Vision for Cross-Straits Peaceful Development held in Nanjing, the two parties publicly declared the correlation between the 1992 Consensus and peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.

The attitude of the Taiwan authorities toward the 1992 Consensus is crystal-clear. Before Chu's visit to the mainland, Ma Ying-jeou, the current leader of Taiwan, confirmed that the 1992 Consensus is the consensus of the authorities across the Taiwan Straits. After Chu's mainland visit, Ma organized an exhibition on the 1992 Consensus. With historical documents and photos, the exhibition highlighted the realistic relevance of the 1992 Consensus, and illustrated its key role in promoting cross-Straits relations.

3. The 1992 Consensus is an important component of cross-Straits peaceful development.

In 2000, when the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took office, the cross-Straits negotiations had to be suspended. Seven years ago, Chen Shui-bian pushed for the so-called “de jure Taiwan independence”, bringing cross-Straits relations onto a high-risk track. Since 2008 when the Kuomintang, a party that recognizes the 1992 Consensus, took office, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits have reached compromises and consensus on the “one-China” position and ushered in a period of peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. After the meeting between Xi and Chu, Ma urged Tsai Ing-wen, the chair of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to make a statement on the 1992 Consensus and pledge to develop cross-Straits relations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. Experience shows that no one should take peaceful development of cross-Straits relations for granted. It must be based on the 1992 Consensus. To maintain the status quo of cross-Straits relations, a clear-cut stance on the 1992 Consensus must be articulated.

The DPP, however, maintains that so long as it declares its intention of promoting cross-Straits peaceful development, it will stand to yield the fruit of development even if it evades the 1992 Consensus. As a matter of fact, such thought on the part of the DPP would only result in compromising the current state of peaceful development across the Taiwan Straits and bringing instability to the region. As a key member of Chen Shui-bian's “cabinet” in charge of cross-Straits relations, Tsai Ing-wen should be held accountable for the damaging results of Chen's cross-Straits policies. Her reluctance to articulate her position on the 1992 Consensus gives the authorities and governing parties on both sides of the Straits ample reasons for concern. Her reluctance also implies her intention of concealing some of her negotiating chips to gain some leverage so that she can bargain as equal partner with the mainland and the US.

The governing parties and authorities across the Taiwan Straits are both worried about whether peaceful development will continue to prevail in cross-Straits relations in the coming two years. This bears full testimony to the concern of the leaders on both sides over the possible damage that Tsai Ing-wen's election may cause to the current peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. If Tsai falls short of making a clear statement on the 1992 Consensus during her visit to the US later this year, it is likely that Xi would devote some time discussing this issue with the US leader. And that means other issues in China-US relations may be stalled because of the Taiwan question.