贸易战对全球贸易格局与全球价值链的重构，意味着经济全球化将进入一个新阶段。中美贸易战爆发一年多来，双方都受到了贸易战的深层影响。数据显示，被加征关税的中国商品对美出口量下降14%，贸易额减少180亿美元，占中国全年对美出口额的3%。美国对华出口则缩水38%，贸易额减少230亿美元，约占美国全年对华出口额的15%。

贸易战如何影响全球价值链和产业分工格局？无外乎有两大重要机制：一是中美双方可以通过产业转移，来规避加征关税对成本的冲击；二是通过直接减少双边贸易规模来降低增量风险。前者可能导致中国的部分产业向其他国家转移，后一个冲击则是全球贸易收缩和经济紧缩效应。长期而言，贸易战不仅会从总量上，同时也从结构上改变全球贸易和产业分工格局，进一步加剧各国在价值链上的竞争。

当前，全球新一轮制造业转移已经开启，并可能持续数年，这一迹象从中美两国数据上看尤其明显。从中国出口结构来看，今年上半年，对美出口的下滑主要由对欧盟、东盟、墨西哥以及台湾地区的出口上升所替代。而从美国进口结构来看，对中国进口的下滑主要由从欧盟、墨西哥、越南、韩国等国以及台湾地区的进口上升所替代。这其中部分来自于转口贸易，但很大一部分是产业外移的结构性因素导致。

根据越南官方数据，在对越新增直接投资的51个国家地区中，中国位居榜首，投资额占比达24.6%。中国也连续3年成为马来西亚制造业最大外资来源地。据马来西亚投资发展局数据，2016-2018年投向马来西亚制造业的中国投资分别为47亿、39亿、197亿林吉特，占当年获批外国直接投资的17.2%、18.1%、34%。东南亚正成为劳动密集型产业重点转入地。与此同时，中国产业也在做战略性调整和长期布局，特别是高新技术领域和研发领域的投资不断加强。2018年中国高科技产品进出口总额占到对外贸易总额的30.7%。而今年前5个月，尽管广东制造业民间投资同比下降10%，传统制造业面临9%至40%不等的下滑，但高技术产业投资同比逆势增长了1.8%，体现出产业板块重构和“升级化”趋势。

可以预见，无论中美贸易摩擦是否持续，全球制造业产业链的重新配置、不同区域之间的产业板块重构等趋势都不可逆转，这将深刻改变国家之间贸易与产业分工的联系。

一是全球价值链贸易强度有所降低。近年来，虽然跨境贸易绝对值仍在增长，但在全球商品产出中的占比不断下降。麦肯锡报告显示，2007-2017年间，商品货物总额在全球价值链总产出中的占比从28.1%降至22.5%。在最复杂、贸易属性最强的价值链中，贸易强度的下滑尤其明显。

二是全球三大价值链区域性属性增强，全球化属性趋于减弱。2018年以来，全球范围内先后有CPTPP（全面进步的跨太平洋伙伴关系协定）、EPA（日欧经济合作协定）、USMCA（美加墨贸易协定）以及欧盟与南方共同市场等超大自贸协定签署，区域属性更为凸显。根据WTO 的RTADatabase统计，截至2019年6月，向WTO 报备的总有效RTA（区域贸易安排）数量达474个。这些超大型RTA有以下突出特征：

一是中心国特征明显。尽管不同RTA 在内容方面有很大差异，但中心成员与其他成员签订的RTA 在某些条款规定方面具有很强的相似性，并由此形成了由中心成员国主导的不同模板。

二是RTA成为对外经济政治关系的重要政策工具。有些RTA不仅是为了通过非歧视性的待遇增加成员之间的贸易量，还有政治诉求及争夺国际经贸规则制定权的考量。

三是排他属性和原产地原则。美加墨贸易协定的签订就进一步加强了北美三国的区域化程度，排他属性十分明显。

环顾全球，不仅仅是中美，日韩也出现贸易纷争，这是全球化演变进程中的“缩影”。越来越多的国家以“国家安全”为名将贸易制裁和关税作为常态工具，全球化正从一体化走向碎片化，进入到“分割存量蛋糕”而不是“做大增量蛋糕”的时代，竞争更趋激烈，摩擦更趋频繁，这将极大地考验各经济体的韧性。一个更加开放的市场注定将会成为全球的“稀缺资源”。

The current trade war between China and the United States is reshaping the global trade pattern and value chain. Economic globalization is entering a new stage of development. Since the outbreak of the trade war over a year ago, both China and the United States have been deeply affected. Chinese goods under increased tariffs exported to the United States fell by 14 percent and trade volume decreased by $18 billion, accounting for 3 percent of total Chinese annual exports to the United States. American exports to China shrank by 38 percent and trade volume decreased by $23 billion, or 15 percent of U.S. exports to China.

How does a trade war affect the global value chain and industrial division of labor? There are two important mechanisms: one, both China and the United States may try to avoid the impact of tariff increases on costs through industrial transfers; two, they may also reduce incremental risks by directly downsizing bilateral trade. The former may lead to the transfer of some Chinese industries to other countries while the latter may result in global trade and economic contraction. In the long run, the trade war will not only change the global trade pattern and industrial division of labor quantitatively and structurally but also further intensify global competition in the value chain.

At present, a new round of global manufacturing transfers has started and may well continue for several years. Data from China and the United States offer ample evidence. For China, the decline in exports to the United States in the first half of this year was mainly offset by export increases to the EU, ASEAN, Mexico and the Taiwan region. For the United States, the decline in imports from China was mainly replaced by increased imports from the EU, Mexico, Vietnam, Republic of Korea and the Taiwan region. Some of the changes came from entrepot trade but a large proportion was structural due to industrial relocations.

Official data from Vietnam show that, among the 51 countries and regions with increased direct investments in the country, China ranks first with a share of 24.6 percent. China has also become Malaysia's largest source of foreign investment in manufacturing for three consecutive years. According to data from the Malaysian Investment Development Authority, Chinese investment in Malaysian manufacturing from 2016 to 2018 was MYR 4.7 billion, 3.9 billion and 19.7 billion respectively, accounting for 17.2, 18.1 and 34 percent of foreign direct investment approved in the relevant year.Southeast Asia is becoming a key destination for the transfer of labor-intensive industries. At the same time, Chinese industries are also experiencing strategic adjustments for the long term, especially with increased investments in high-tech and R&D. In 2018, import and export of high-tech products accounted for 30.7 percent of total foreign trade volume. In the first five months of this year, while private investment in Guangdong's manufacturing industry fell 10 percent year-on-year and traditional manufacturing industries faced declines ranging from 9 to 40 percent, investment in high-tech industries rose 1.8 percent, demonstrating a trend in the restructuring and upgrading of industrial sectors.

It is predicted that regardless of whether China-U.S. trade friction continues or not, the trend of reconfiguration of the global manufacturing industrial chain and reconstruction of industries across different regions will be irreversible. Such change is profoundly impacting the trade and industrial division of labor among countries in at least two overarching ways.

First, the trade intensity of the global value chain has decreased. In recent years, although the absolute value of cross-border trade is still growing, its share in global commodity output is declining. McKinsey reports that between 2007 and 2017 the share of merchandise goods in total global value chain output fell from 28.1 percent to 22.5 percent. In the most complex value chain with the strongest trade attribute, the decline of trade intensity is especially obvious.

Second, the three global value chains have demonstrated increased regional instead of global attributes. Since 2018, super-large free trade agreements such as CPTPP, EPA, USMCA and one between the EU and the Southern Common Market have been signed, with increasingly prominent regional attributes. According to the World Trade Organization, as of June 2019 the total number of effective regional trade agreements (RTAs) reported to the global body had reached 474. These ultra-large RTAs have the following characteristics:

A. Existence of an apparent central country. Although there are great differences in content, RTAs signed by the central member with other members have strong similarities in certain provisions, hence different models of central member dominance.

B. RTAs have become important policy tools in foreign economic and political relations. Some RTAs are designed not only to increase trade volumes among members through discriminatory treatments but also to satisfy political desire for competition to establish an upper hand in making international economic and trade rules.

C. Exclusivity and the principle of origin. The US-Canada-Mexico Trade Agreement further strengthens regionalization in North America, with obvious exclusivity.

Today's world is witnessing trade disputes not only between China and the United States but also between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Such disputes epitomize the globalization process. In the name of national security, more and more countries use trade sanctions and customs duties as regular tools. Globalization is moving from integration to fragmentation, in which players strive to divide the existing cake instead of making the cake bigger. Consequently, competition becomes more intense and friction more frequent, seriously testing the resilience of various economies. A more open market is bound to become a scarce resource in the world.