图片来源：CSIS | 战略与国际研究中心

2018年台湾地方选举——“九合一”选举以执政的民进党惨败而结束。选举中，国民党候选人韩国瑜高喊“九二共识”，引发了翻转全台湾选举结果的“韩流”。选后，岛内认同“九二共识”的县市首长和议会处于绝对多数，他们要求在“九二共识“基础上与大陆展开交流合作的强烈愿望与拒不认同“九二共识”的民进党当局形成强烈反差，民进党当局为选举结果寻找各种理由，为其上台后单方面改变两岸现状给台湾民众造成的损失进行各种辩护，但在如此惨败的战绩面前，所有的说辞都苍白无力。

距离2020年台湾地区领导人选举还有一年多的时间，民进党有可能一方面全力准备2020年选举，应对2018年选举中展现出来的新民意，一方面继续将台湾民众无法继续获取和平发展红利的责任推卸给大陆。两岸关系或将进入到冷缠斗阶段。

一、围绕“九二共识”内涵进行的冷缠斗

此次选举中，选民喊出了台湾最大党是“讨厌民进党”的口号（意即讨厌民进党的人最多）。这是2016年民进党上台以来四面出击导致四面楚歌的结果。选举过程中，以韩国瑜为代表的候选人高喊“九二共识”政治基础上的竞选承诺，赢得了选民的高度回应，并通过选票否定了民进党的岛内施政方针和对抗的两岸政策。

选举结束之后，台湾当局立即通过陆委会做出冷缠斗举动，即通过媒体公开放话，称交流不应有任何政治前提，称大陆对“九二共识”的定义就是一个中国原则，并挑衅性地称“一个中国原则之下，中华民国在哪里”？作为两岸关系的常识，“九二共识”就是海峡两岸在1992年就一个中国原则达成的共识，这是1992年两岸两会达成的共识。习马会时马英九在全世界的镁光灯下对此做出了极为清晰的阐述，这一点众所周知。陆委会的发言明显具有挑拨分歧，不认同共识的态度。这种态度本身就是对韩国瑜等候选人提出并经选票确认的“九二共识”的否认。

二、围绕两岸城市交流进行的冷缠斗

选举结束后，蔡英文称台湾选民没有在两岸政策议题上做出选择或重大改变，这恐怕不符合选举中选民的呼声。国民党候选人明明喊出了“九二共识”，当选连任的无党派台北市长候选人柯文哲也明确表达了“两岸一家亲”的两岸观点和施政观念，这怎么能说选民没有在两岸政策议题上做出选择呢？蔡英文明确讲，台湾当局对城市交流采取正面开放态度，但是在台北与上海双城互动交流中，台湾有关部门却通过技术性、细节性的约束表达了对“九二共识”的不认同，表达出逼迫大陆赴台交流代表在民进党当局立场下进行互动的意思。围绕着两岸城市交流性质问题，民进党不是求同存异，而是拒不修正在两岸关系上的政治定位和相关政策，这为两岸城市交流的扯皮、降低效率埋下了伏笔。如此拖下去，蓝营认同“九二共识”的县市长们将在城市交流上面临窘境。两岸政策的决定权和主导权在民进党当局手中，蓝营县市长的竞选主张能否兑现，不仅在于这些县市长们和大陆能力范围内的积极响应，还在于民进党当局是否真的支持“九二共识”基础上的两岸城市互动。

三、围绕和平发展红利进行的冷缠斗

2019年即将打响2020年台湾地区领导人选举的第一枪，中国国民党和民进党在未来几个月内的政绩也将成为未来选举中重要的一张牌。若蓝营执政县市交流互动有成绩，对中国国民党候选人有加分作用，在未来的选举中台湾选民对“九二共识”的正面作用也将加强。今后台海形势虽然复杂严峻，但两岸县市交流合作会出现新气象，取得新成果。民进党当局在2020年选举中也会鱼目混珠，将这些和平发展红利的获得归功于自己的两岸政策。

其实，实现“货出得去，人进得来”，其前提是承认“九二共识”。蔡英文当局不认可这一点，意味着冷缠斗还将继续。

Picture Credit: CSIS | Center for Strategic & International Studies

The “9-in-1” local elections in Taiwan ended with the defeat of the ruling DPP. KMT candidate Han Guoyu's high-profile endorsement of “One China” triggered a dramatic reversal in the elections. Following the elections, county and city chiefs in the island that identify with the “1992 Consensus” on “One China” constitute an absolute majority. Their strong desire for exchanges and cooperation with the mainland based on the consensus is in sharp contrast with the ruling DPP authorities' stubborn resistance against it. Facing the election outcomes, the DPP authorities are making every effort to evade responsibility for the losses they have incurred for the people of Taiwan by unilaterally changing the status quo of relations across the Taiwan Strait. Yet no excuse can justify such a defeat.

More than a year is left before Taiwan elects its next leader in 2020. The DPP may on one hand cope with the new public opinion revealed in the 2018 elections, or it can continue shifting responsibility for the island's inability to share the peace dividends from fine cross-Strait ties to the mainland while preparing for the elections in 2020. Cross-Strait relations may thus begin a period of cold wrangling.

During the latest elections, voters came up with the slogan “disliking the DPP”. During the elections, candidates like Han Kuo-yu came up with loud campaign pledges based on the common political basis of the “1992 consensus”, winning positive responses from voters, and discrediting the DPP's policies on the island as well as regarding cross-Strait ties.

After the elections, the Taiwan authorities immediately announced that exchanges should have no political preconditions, and provocatively questioning the Republic of China's status under the 'One China' principle.After the elections ended, Tsai Ing-wen claimed that voters in Taiwan did not make a choice. KMT candidates evidently endorsed the “1992 consensus”, Ko Wen-je, the re-elected mayor of Taipei, who has no party affiliation, also clearly emphasized the idea of both sides of the Strait belonging under one roof. How could one believe that voters have not made a choice on topics regarding cross-Strait policies?

Tsai made it clear that the Taiwan authorities retain a positive, open attitude to cross-Strait city-to-city exchanges. During the interaction and exchanges between Taipei and Shanghai, however, relevant authorities in Taiwan expressed disapproval of the “1992 consensus” through technical, detailed restrictions, indicating the inclination to press delegates from the mainland to interact with their counterparts in Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan authorities' principle. Regarding the nature of cross-Strait inter-city exchanges, the DPP authorities have sown the seeds of endless wrangling and inefficiency for such exchanges in the future by amplifying differences and refusing to adjust mainland policies and political positions. If such behavior persists, newly elected county and city chiefs in the “blue camp” who identify with the “1992 consensus” will face a dilemma in inter-city exchanges. Since the decision-making power remains in the hands of the DPP authorities, whether the “blue camp” county and city chiefs can honor their campaign promises rests not only on these local leaders, and the active responses the mainland side can make, but also on whether the DPP authorities truly support cross-Strait inter-city interaction on the basis of the "1992 consensus."

Since competition for the 2020 local leader election will begin in 2019, the performance of the DPP and KMT in the next few months will be crucial. Headway in cross-Strait inter-city interaction in counties and cities where the “blue camp” rules will help KMT candidates. Conditions across the Strait remain complex, cross-Strait exchanges at the county and city level may deepen. The DPP authorities will also take advantage of such developments and attribute such dividends from peaceful development to its own mainland policies.

In fact, the campaign promise of “goods can go out, people can come in” when it comes to cross-Strait ties was based precisely on the “1992 consensus.” The Tsai authorities' denial of that spirit means wrangling is just beginning, and will continue.