近期，中国外交部发言人在回答彭博社记者提问时，指出国际海洋法没有“国际水域”一说，台湾海峡不是“国际水域”（international waters）。这本来属于事实陈述，却引发外媒讨论，认为中美围绕台湾问题的博弈进入“深水区”。无论“深水”还是“浅水”，厘清台海水域的法律地位，将有助中美两国（包括媒体）在谈论时表意更准确，这也是为竞争日益复杂的中美关系安装“护栏”的一种方式。

“国际水域”不是法律语言

彭博社记者口中的“国际水域”并不是一个正式的国际海洋法的概念，有些国家用来非正式地指代“公海”（high sea）。1982年的《联合国海洋法公约》（以下简称《公约》）没有给出“公海”的定义，但在第七部分“公海”中提到“本部分的规定适用于不包括在国家的专属经济区、领海或内水或群岛国的群岛水域内的全部海域”（第八十六条）。由此可见，海洋法中的水域有公海、专属经济区、领海、内水、群岛水域，但没有“国际水域”。

台湾海峡属于一国之内大陆与岛屿之间形成的海峡，其连接东海和南海，有不少国际船舶航行其中。美国国务院发言人称“台湾海峡是一条国际水道（international waterway）”，这同样不是准确描述台湾海峡的法律语言。《公约》第三部分“用于国际航行的海峡”（straits used for international navigation）规定，“在公海或专属经济区的一个部分和公海或专属经济区的另一部分之间的用于国际航行的海峡”（第三十七条）。由于《公约》只是描述而没有给出这类海峡的明确定义，所以，单从地理特性和功能性上看，台湾海峡可被归于这类海峡，但完全不适用本部分的通行制度。“本部分的任何规定不影响海峡沿岸国领海以外的水域作为专属经济区或公海的法律地位”（第三十五条），“如果穿过某一用于国际航行的海峡有在航行和水文特征方面同样方便的一条穿过公海或穿过专属经济区的航道，本部分不适用于该海峡；在这种航道中，适用本公约其他有关部分中包括关于航行和飞越自由的规定”（第三十六条）。这些规定排除了台湾海峡适用《公约》第三部分“用于国际航行的海峡”，需根据海峡内不同水域的法律地位来确定通行制度。

台湾海峡水域的构成与通行制度

由于两岸情况特殊，中国迄今只公布了大陆、西沙群岛和钓鱼岛的领海基线，其余地方包括台湾岛和澎湖列岛的领海基线尚未公布。按照《公约》有关规定，内水是指领海基线向陆地一侧的全部水域，是国家领土的组成部分。领海是指领海基线向海一侧、宽度不超过12海里的海域，包括上空、海床和底土，也是国家领土的组成部分。沿海国在内水和领海享有主权。毗连区从领海基线量起，不得超过24海里，国家享有海关、财政、移民或卫生事项的管制权。专属经济区是领海以外并邻接领海的一个区域，从领海基线量起，不应超过200海里。沿海国在专属经济区享有“勘探和开发，保全和管理自然资源”，“从事经济行开发和勘探”的主权权利，以及三项管辖权，即对人工岛屿、设施和结构的建造和使用，海洋科学研究，海洋环境的保护和保全。

台湾海峡最窄处约70海里，最宽处约220海里。根据《公约》和中国国内法，台湾海峡水域由中国的内水、领海、毗连区和专属经济区构成。国家对不同水域享有的权利和义务不同，不同水域适用的通行方式也不同。如在领海，所有国家，不论为沿海国或内陆国，其船舶均享有无害通过权（第十七、十八、十九条）；如果任何军舰不遵守沿海国关于通过领海的法律和规章，而且不顾沿海国向其提出遵守法律和规章的任何要求，沿海国可要求该军舰立即离开领海（第三十条）。再如在专属经济区，所有国家享有航行和飞越的自由（第五十八条）。《中华人民共和国专属经济区和大陆架法》的第十一条同样规定，任何国家在遵守国际法和中华人民共和国的法律、法规的前提下，在中华人民共和国的专属经济区享有航行、飞越的自由。

谁在破坏国际规则？

1982年《公约》开放签字时，中国是首批签字国之一。迄今已有160多个缔约方，但不包括美国。美国没有加入《公约》，固然有其国内政治的缘由，但本质上还是谋求全球海洋利益的霸权思维在作祟。因为不加入《公约》，并不妨碍美国享有《公约》中规定的权利，但可以规避义务。所以面对《公约》指出的“公海应只用于和平目的”（第八十八条），以及各国在专属经济区内“应适当顾及沿海国的权利和义务”，并应遵守沿海国制定的不与《公约》和其他国际法规则相抵触的法律和规章（第五十八条），美国都可以选择忽视。

自2020年以来，美国军舰平均每月在台湾海峡航行一次。当然，由于台湾海峡有大片水域属于专属经济区，美国在中国的专属经济区可以有“航行自由”，又因为没有加入《公约》，它可以毫不“顾及沿海国在专属经济区的权利和义务”，宣称“这是对一个自由开放的印太地区的承诺”。这种近乎挑衅的“航行自由”，为“台独”分子撑腰打气，不断掏空、虚化“一个中国”原则底线。两岸分治70多年，若非美国不断花式支持“台独”分子，两岸的和平统一之路也不会走得这么曲折。

依照《公约》和国内法的规定，中国政府对台湾海峡的水域享有主权、主权权利和管辖权，同时也尊重其他国家在这一海域的合法权利。如果故意操弄这一问题，诬称“中国违反国际海洋法规则”，中国当然有必要讲清楚，以正视听。

There is no legal basis for “international waters” in the international law of the sea. It is false to call the Taiwan Strait international waters, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said at a regular news conference on June 13 when asked by a reporter from Bloomberg. It is a fact. Some foreign media said there are more and more disputes between China and the United States concerning the Taiwan question. Clarifying the legal status of waters in the Taiwan Strait will help China and the U.S. have a better understanding and talk about Taiwan more accurately. It will set guardrails for China-U.S. relations, especially on the Taiwan question.

“International waters” not a legal term

The term “international waters” used by the Bloomberg reporter is not a formal legal term in the international law of the sea, but it is used informally by some countries to refer to “high seas.” The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not give a definition, but in Part VII, titled “High Seas,” it stipulates in Article 86 that “The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.” Thus, the waters covered in the law of the sea include the high seas, exclusive economic zones, territorial seas, internal waters and archipelagic waters — but not “international waters.”

Situated between the mainland and the islands of a country, the Taiwan Strait connects the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Many international ships sail there. Ned Price, spokesman for the U.S. Department of State stated: “The Taiwan Strait is an international waterway,” which again is not accurate legal language. Part III of the Convention, titled “Straits Used for International Navigation,” stipulates in Article 37: “This section applies to straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.” Since the Convention only describes but does not give a clear definition of this type of strait, the Taiwan Strait may be classified as such on the basis of its geographical characteristics and functionality alone. But the regime of navigation under this part does not apply at all. According to Article 35, “Nothing in this Part affects the legal status of the waters beyond the territorial seas of States bordering straits as exclusive economic zones or high seas.” As stipulated in Article 36: “This Part does not apply to a strait used for international navigation if there exists through the strait a route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics; in such routes, the other relevant Parts of this Convention, including the provisions regarding the freedoms of navigation and overflight, apply.” These provisions exclude the application of Part III of the convention to the Taiwan Strait. The regime of navigation is to be determined in accordance with the legal status of the different waters in the Taiwan Strait.

Composition of waters in the Taiwan Strait and the navigation regime

Because of the special situation of Taiwan, China has so far only announced the baselines of the territorial waters of the mainland, the Xisha Islands and the Diaoyu Islands, while the baselines of the territorial waters of the remaining places, including the island of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, have not yet been announced. Under provisions of the convention, “internal waters” means all waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea that form part of the territory of the state. The territorial sea extends to a limit of 12 nautical miles from the baseline of a coastal state. Within this zone, the airspace above the sea and the seabed and subsoil are part of the territory of the state. A coastal state exercises full sovereignty over its internal waters and the territorial sea. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, but inside the zone the coastal state has control over customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary matters. A state's exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, extending seaward to a distance of no more than 200 nautical miles out from its coastal baseline. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has sovereign rights “for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources” and for “the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,” as well as jurisdiction that includes the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.

The Taiwan Strait is approximately 70 nautical miles at its narrowest and about 220 nautical miles at its widest. Under the convention and Chinese law, the Taiwan Strait's waters comprise China's internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone. States have different rights and obligations over different waters, and different modes of navigation apply to different waters. For example, ships of all states, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea (Articles 17, 18 and 19); and “[i]f any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.” (Article 30). For another example, in the exclusive economic zone all States enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight (Article 58). Article 11 of the Chinese law that governs the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf similarly provides that, “[a]ll states shall, on the premise that they comply with international law and the laws and regulations of the People's Republic of China, enjoy the freedom of navigation and overflight in its exclusive economic zone.”

Who is breaking international rules?

When the final Convention on the Law of the Sea was presented in 1982, China was one of the first signatories. To date, there are more than 160 parties, excluding the United States. While there are certainly domestic political reasons for the U.S. not joining the convention, it is essentially because of the its hegemonic mindset seeking its global maritime interests. Not being a party to the convention does not prevent the U.S. from enjoying the rights the convention provides, but it does help the country circumvent its duties. Therefore, in the face of the convention, which provides that “[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes” (Article 88), and that in exclusive economic zones “States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law insofar as they are not incompatible with this Part” (Article 58). The United States can choose to ignore these provisions.

U.S. warships this year have been sailing in the Taiwan Strait about once a month on average. Of course, because a large portion of the strait falls within China's exclusive economic zone, the U.S. has “freedom of navigation.” Because the U.S. is not a party to the convention, it can claim — without “regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State” — that this represents a U.S. “commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region.” Such freedom of navigation borders on provocation by supporting Taiwan separatists and continually hollowing out and deflating the “one China” policy. For more than 70 years, if it were not for America's constant support for advocates of Taiwan independence, the road to peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait would not have been so tortuous.

In accordance with the convention and Chinese law, China's government enjoys sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters of the Taiwan Strait, while respecting the legitimate rights of other countries in these waters. If this question is deliberately manipulated using the false claim that China is in violation of the rules of the international law of the sea, China certainly needs to clarify which is right.