At 1 a.m. on Jan. 3, a motor convoy escorting Qasem Soleimani, major general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and commander of Iran's elite Quds Force, was hit by several missiles delivered by an American MQ-9 Reaper on Baghdad Airport Road.
As the cars exploded in flames, killing 10 people, Soleimani's body was charred beyond recognition. He could only be identified by his ring. Ironically, several of the 10 Iranian and pro-Iranian commanders who were killed had been instrumental in the defeat of the Islamic State.
Two days after the assassination, Iraq's Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi addressed his country's parliament and suggested that Soleimani was on a peace mission to de-escalate tensions with Saudi Arabia, and that Iraq was brokering the talks.
The effort by the United States Congress to craft a resolution limiting Trump's war powers against Iran, which most Americans support, is a move in the right direction, but it can neither reverse past policy mistakes nor halt the current escalation.
One of the assassination's goals was to accelerate regime change in Iran after years of misguided covert operations. And it is no longer the only alternative in the region.
Trump's U-turn
Only a few years ago, there was still great hope in Iran. After years of diplomacy, the comprehensive nuclear accord — JCPOA, July 2015 — was reached by Tehran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — China, France, Russia, the UK and the U.S. — plus Germany and the European Union.
Under the deal, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, while gaining relief from sanctions imposed by the U.S., the United Nations, as well as from multilateral sanctions on the energy, financial, shipping and automotive sectors, among others. After years of struggle, Iran's oil production and economy began to recover. Yet, already during the Trump transition, the Congress paved the way for the ongoing escalation by extending the Iran Sanctions Act for a decade.
Subsequently, Trump began developing a far more muscular policy against Iran to gain the economic and geopolitical support of Saudi Arabia. In May 2017, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a historic arms deal, which totaled $110 billion immediately and $350 billion over a decade. In return, the Trump White House began a coordinated escalation to counter Iran, starting with U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal. After Iran's missile attacks on two U.S. bases, which deliberately avoided targeting people, Trump promised a further ratcheting up of economic sanctions against Iran.
Worse, since early 2017, the Trump administration has given a green light to clandestine operations that seek to soften Iranian moderates, while pushing hawks strategically to act in ways the White House could use as a pretext for regime change and new rounds of sanctions.
Initially, Trump relied on the neoconservative John Bolton's “Shah scenario” for regime change. It has been followed for covert operations by some of the most controversial CIA officials, who were also deeply involved in the detention and interrogation program condemned by the 2014 Senate report. The current head of the CIA was charged over the destruction of videotapes containing evidence of torture.
Critics see the covert signature of the head of the CIA and its Iran desk chief as one catalyst behind the 2019-20 Iranian protests.
Oil and armaments
Unsurprisingly, the Iraqi parliament has called for the expulsion of U.S. troops from the country. Oil and military exports are seen as the main U.S. interests in the Middle East. After all, Iran and Iraq hold some of the world's largest deposits of proven oil and natural gas reserves. Combined, their reserves exceed those of Venezuela, which has the world's largest proven reserves. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the UAE account, respectively, for 22 percent and 7 percent of total U.S. military arms exports.
China's effective presence in the region began to increase only in the early 21st century, but it differs from the U.S. role, which stems from the postwar era. Moreover, in the past decade, the international environment that gave rise to the tacit U.S.-Saudi pact has crumbled with the shale gas revolution in America, while the spread of brutal terrorism and counterterrorism pose questions about U.S. goals in the region.
In contrast to China's emphasis on economic development, the U.S. approach has been predicated on political and strategic alliances and regime change. The list of these interventions is long, particularly in the Middle East, where it includes coups and interventions in Syria, Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. After the U.S. became an oil importer, and then the 1970s energy crises, the proclivity for intervention intensified.
In the past, major oil and gas exporters earned significant revenues from the U.S., but today China ranks as the top export destination for Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait and Oman. If successful, China's Belt and Road Initiative could be seen as a 21st century Marshall Plan that can accelerate infrastructure investment, particularly in modernizing medium- and low-income nations. In 2018, the Middle East and North Africa leapfrogged other emerging economies as a destination for BRI projects, which boomed to an estimated $28.1 billion. Since the launch of the initiative, these investments have soared to more than $123 billion in a half-decade.
By comparison, U.S. total economic and military assistance amounted to $50 billion in 2017. In the Middle East, most went to Iraq ($3.7 billion), Israel ($3.2 billion), Egypt ($1.5 billion), Syria ($0.9 billion) and Yemen ($0.6 billion). Even combined, these revenues account for barely a third of Chinese BRI projects in the region — and their objectives are not constructive.
Expansions and contractions
Before 2015, Iran's economy shrank by 9 percent over two years because of sanctions. After stabilization, sanctions relief enabled Iran's oil exports to return to nearly pre-sanctions levels, boosting 7% economic growth in 2016. Growth broadened to the non-oil sector. Real GDP growth was projected to rise toward 4.5 percent over the medium-term. After the U.S. withdrew from the nuclear deal, secondary sanctions drove Iran's economy into mild recession, as major companies exited to avoid being penalized by the U.S.
Thanks to Trump's policies before Soleimani's assassination, Iran's economy was expected to undergo a second consecutive year of recession and shrink by 8.7 percent in 2019 and 2020. Inflation was projected to reach 38% annually with mounting fiscal pressures. But stagnation is not enough for the Trump administration, which appears to be fostering a steep contraction, and possibly Iran's economic collapse.
Historically, U.S. stance in the Middle East has rested on assertive politics, economic sanctions, military interventions, covert operations and regime changes. In the Trump era, the darker side of this stance has grown paramount, as evidenced by the alienation of U.S. allies in Europe.By contrast, the Chinese stance relies on political cooperation, economic development, non-interference and explicit opposition to clandestine activities and regime change. With its BRI projects, China has the potential to accelerate economic development in the region.
As is the case elsewhere around the world, there is room for both the U.S. and China in the Middle East. The rise of multipolarity in the region holds the promise of a more peaceful, stable and prosperous future — particularly now that U.S. escalation in the region could cause a global contraction in 2020.
