俄罗斯总统普京时隔24年对朝鲜进行国事访问，双方签署了《全面战略伙伴关系条约》。条约规定，当任何缔约方遭受侵略时，另一方将向其提供援助。近期，美国不断指责朝鲜向俄提供弹药、俄罗斯向朝提供先进军事技术。在俄朝关系走向对抗美国准同盟的同时，国际分析人士也高度关注此访对中国的影响，他们主要有两种观点，一是认为俄朝军事接近将导致中国在半岛的影响力弱化，二是认为这将为美国强化东亚同盟提供借口，导致中美关系进一步恶化。但笔者认为，这些观点是对中俄美关系和东北亚安全的误读。

首先，俄罗斯不是朝鲜半岛最核心利益攸关方，其在半岛问题上的影响力必须通过中俄战略协作和多边对话机制实现。从历史上看，1950-53年的朝鲜战争，俄罗斯不是直接参战方，没有参与停战谈判，也不是朝鲜战争停战协定的签字方。朝鲜、中国和美国才是停战协定签字方，这意味着半岛最核心的外部利益攸关方是中国和美国。上世纪90年代，朝鲜半岛问题四方会谈参加国是朝鲜、韩国、中国和美国。21世纪初，中国主导建立“六方会谈”后，俄罗斯和日本被邀请加入。2018年4月，朝韩领导人板门店峰会后发表的联合声明也表示，同意探索朝韩美或朝韩美中四方会谈，将停战协定转变为和平条约，建立一个长久稳固的和平机制。

除了东北亚以外，俄罗斯在朝鲜半岛问题上的战略利益更有对欧洲安全的考量。俄罗斯的战略重心始终在欧洲，但欧亚安全问题又相互影响。在乌克兰问题上，俄罗斯认为是冷战后欧洲安全架构的严重失衡造成了安全危机和冲突。因此，在东北亚地区建构一个均衡、包容和可持续的安全架构，将有利于强化俄罗斯在欧洲安全上的主张。普京访朝当天在《劳动新闻》上发表文章，清晰表明了要在“欧亚地区建设相互平等和不可分割的安全架构”。

为此，俄罗斯对中国在半岛问题上的主张和提议积极支持。例如，2017年7月4日，中俄两国外长在莫斯科发表关于朝鲜半岛的联合声明，双方以中方关于朝鲜暂停核导活动和美韩暂停大规模联合军演的“双暂停”倡议、实现朝鲜半岛无核化和建立半岛和平机制的“双轨并行”思路以及俄方解决朝鲜半岛问题的分步走设想为基础，提出了共同倡议。今年5月普京访华，双方发表的联合声明中再次呼吁国际社会支持中俄的共同倡议。

第二，俄朝此次战略伙伴条约并非类似美国和日韩那样的军事同盟，没有改变地区的力量平衡。相反，美国近年在双边同盟基础上建构小多边安全机制，呈现了军事同盟集团化倾向，本质上已经在改变力量平衡和战略稳定。

到2018年为止，中俄与美国在联合国积极合作，通过了多项限制朝鲜发展核导活动和实施一定程度经济制裁的安理会决议。2018年，朝鲜半岛外交出现重大转机，中俄两国按照上述双轨思路为恢复“六方会谈”积极创造条件。然而，2019年美朝河内首脑会谈后，双方关系出现全面停滞，其主要原因是美国坚持朝鲜完全弃核和进行不可逆的无核化，之后美国才考虑解除制裁和讨论关系正常化。为打破僵局，2019年底，中俄向安理会提交草案，主张鉴于朝鲜核导活动暂停，履行了安理会决议部分义务，应调整对朝鲜的制裁。但由于美国和盟友坚决反对，朝鲜半岛外交的重要窗口期再次被错过。拜登政府执政后不断强化军事威慑和经济制裁，朝鲜则通过强化军力来应对，半岛局势进一步紧张。在中国看来，美国半岛政策之所以强硬，本质上是要以朝鲜核导计划为借口在东北亚加强军事部署，维持霸权。

俄朝接近现阶段主要是政治上的，关键信号是地区安全必须建立在平等安全基础之上。而朝鲜半岛要想持久和平，最终仍需回到“六方会谈”的多边外交轨道上来。

Russian President Vladimir Putin recently paid a state visit to North Korea, the first in 24 years, during which the leaders of the two countries signed a pact for a comprehensive strategic partnership. The pact includes “the provision of mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of the parties to this agreement.”In recent days, Washington has persistently accused Pyongyang of ​​providing ammunition to Moscow, and Moscow of supplying advanced military technology to Pyongyang. But as the Russia-North Korea relationship edges closer to an alliance against the United States, international analysts are more concerned about the implications of Putin's visit for China. There are two prevailing views. First, closer military cooperation between Russia and North Korea will diminish China's influence on the peninsula; second, their cooperation will serve as a pretext for the United States to strengthen its alliances across East Asia, potentially further straining its relations with China. I believe, however, that these views stem from a misunderstanding of China-Russia-U.S. relations and the broader security issues in the region.

First, Russia is not one of the major stakeholders on the Korean Peninsula, and can only exert influence on issues in the region through strategic coordination with China and multilateral dialogue mechanisms. During the Korean War (1950-53), Russia was officially not a belligerent; therefore, it did not participate in the armistice negotiations or sign the final agreement. The signatories are North Korea, China and the United States, which means that the most important external stakeholders on the peninsula are China and the United States.In the 1990s, North Korea, South Korea, China and the United States participated in the so-called Four-Party Talks. In the early days of the 21st century, China took the lead in establishing the Six-Party Talks; and then Russia and Japan were invited to join the multilateral mechanism. In April 2018, the Panmunjom Declaration was issued after the inter-Korean summit, stating both nations' agreement to promote trilateral meetings involving themselves and the United States; or quadrilateral meetings — involving the two sides, the U.S. and China — with a view toward replacing the armistice with a peace agreement and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime.

Today, Russia focuses more on its strategic interests in East Asia out of concern for security issues in Europe. Its strategic focus has long been in Europe, but the security of Asia and Europe are intertwined. Regarding Ukraine, Russia asserts that the serious imbalance in the European security architecture after the Cold War has created security crises and conflicts. Therefore, building a balanced, inclusive and sustainable security architecture in Northeast Asia will help bolster the impact of its proposals on European security. On the day he landed in North Korea, Putin published an article in Rodong Sinmun, an official newspaper in North Korea, in which he emphasized the need to “build an architecture of equal and indivisible Eurasian security.”

To this end, Russia has lent generous support to China's proposals on the peninsula. For example, the foreign ministers of the two nations issued a joint statement in Moscow on July 4, 2017. They also presented a joint initiative based on China's “double suspension” initiative (wherein North Korea could suspend its nuclear and missile activities in exchange for the suspension of large-scale U.S.-South Korea military exercises). It also offered a dual-track approach of denuclearizing the peninsula while establishing a peace mechanism, as well as Russia's step-by-step vision for a resolution. In their joint statement issued during Putin's visit to China in May, the two nations once again called on the international community to support their joint initiative.

Second, the comprehensive strategic partnership pact between Russia and North Korea is not a military alliance unlike those built by the United States, Japan and South Korea, and it has not upset the balance of power in the region. Yet Washington has created many small multilateral security mechanisms on the basis of bilateral alliances in recent years, demonstrating a trend toward building military alliances. This approach has undermined the balance of power and strategic stability across the region.

By 2018, China, Russia and the United States had engaged in active cooperation at the United Nations and adopted a number of Security Council resolutions designed to restrict North Korea's nuclear and missile development and impose economic sanctions on Pyongyang. Diplomatic activities on the Korean Peninsula reached a milestone, as China and Russia created enabling conditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks in accordance with the dual-track approach.However, since the Hanoi summit in 2019, relations between the U.S. and North Korea have stagnated on all fronts. Why? The United States has insisted on the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a precondition for its lifting sanctions and discussing the normalization of relations. To break the deadlock, China and Russia submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council at the end of 2019 arguing for the adjustment of sanctions because the nation had suspended its nuclear and missile programs and fulfilled some of its obligations under Security Council resolutions. In the face of firm opposition from the United States and its allies, however, an important window of opportunity for diplomatic success on the Korean Peninsula was once again closed.Since the 2020 U.S. elections, however, the Biden administration has continued to strengthen military deterrence and economic sanctions on Pyongyang. And Pyongyang has responded by expanding its military power, adding to tensions. From China's perspective, Washington's tough stance is driven by its goal of expanding its military presence in Northeast Asia and maintaining its dominant position by using North Korea's nuclear and missile programs as a pretext.

At present, Russia and North Korea are moving closer, primarily at the political level, signaling that regional security must be based on an architecture of equal security. To achieve enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula, it is imperative that communication resumes under the multilateral framework of the Six-Party Talks.