近年来，美国日益强化中国作为“系统性竞争对手”的定位，“去中国化”是其战略目标，“脱钩”是其重要手段，而“科技脱钩”是对华“脱钩”的核心。同时，美国通过“盟友+规则”体系，强化“去中国化”的同盟体系。对华“转链”、“断链”，将“以中国为中心的全球产业链供应链体系”调整为“以美国为中心的全球产业链供应链体系”，成为美国对外战略尤其是对华战略的首要选项。

另一方面，当下美国贸易政策体现出越来越浓的新重商主义，既想保护国内市场，又想为自己的优势产业打开国际市场，既想主导构建维护其霸权利益的国际秩序，又想借机打击竞争对手。美国贸易政策中的自由主义不断褪色，保护主义大行其道，贸易政策的进攻性和对抗性不断增强。从借“国家安全”之名行保护主义之实，到以“供应链安全”“技术安全”为由构建排他性的新标准、新规则，美国贸易政策已经超越所谓“公平贸易”，越来越呈现出安全化趋向。甚至可以说，贸易安全化已经完全替代贸易自由化，成为美国贸易政策的核心内容，并服务于其整体国家安全战略。

可以说，美国加速对华脱钩、重振自身产业的战略轮廓逐渐清晰。一方面，延续特朗普对华贸易政策的主基调和做法，甚至加大对华科技打击力度，对华实施科技战逐步上升为美国一项国家战略。拜登政府通过《基础设施投资法案》《芯片与科学法案》《通胀削减法案》等，试图以立法手段“釜底抽薪”，倒逼产业回流。另一方面，缓和与盟友和伙伴国家在特朗普时期的紧张经贸关系，建立新的针对中国的政策协调机制，如美欧贸易和技术委员会（TTC），同时向盟友和伙伴国家推出“印太经济框架（IPEF）”和“美洲经济繁荣伙伴关系（APEP）”等，试图在欧洲、亚洲、美洲三管齐下，通过“友岸外包”“友岸制造”组建供应链联盟，加速供应链替代，并与盟友加强出口管制合作，试图在全球高科技领域对中国建立“隔离墙”。

中国对美国具有相当程度的技术依赖性，而美国对中国也具有相当程度的市场依赖性，但这种相互依赖性正变得越来越脆弱。美国以“权力逻辑”取代“市场逻辑”，以制裁倒逼转移，严重扰乱了全球产业链国际分工，破坏全球供应链稳定。目前，产业链供应链显现出一些“去中国化”苗头，在美国进口来源地中，中国进口份额从2018年的21.4%降至2021年的17.7%。科尔尼管理咨询公司用美国自中国进口产品规模（包括香港地区）占亚洲14个低成本经济体进口规模的比重衡量美国产业链“去中国化”程度，发现该指数从特朗普上台之初的66%下降至2021年底的55%，5年间下降了11个百分点，这说明美国对中国产业链的依赖程度有所下降。值得关注的是，美国促进制造业回流战略可能面临拐点。2020年以来，受新冠疫情及其他因素的持续影响，虽然美国国内制造业生产总值增长7.3%，但却比之前更加依赖14个亚洲低成本国家或地区的制造生产。与此同时，该指数在2021年二季度降至50%低点后，由于亚太新兴经济体疫情反复，导致产业链遭受打击，部分出口订单又反流至中国，中国对美国出口份额有所回升。（2022年，由于中国国内收紧疫情防控政策，部分出口订单又转向东南亚）。

事实证明，美国实施“供应链遏华”战略并寻求供应链“去中国化”几乎不可能实现。几十年来，全球已经形成对中国产业链供应链高度依赖的产业分工格局，中国产业链供应链规模庞大，已成为120多个国家（地区）的最大贸易伙伴，“中国制造”在全球产业链供应链中占据重要地位。麦肯锡全球研究院发布报告显示，2020年，在全球186个国家和地区中，33个国家的第一大出口目的地是中国，65个国家的第一大进口来源地是中国。从工业制成品出口来看，中国工业制成品出口规模占全球比重持续提升，2020年达到19.5%，明显高于美国（5.0%）、德国（9.6%）和日本（4.5%）等制造业大国。

经过多年发展，中国早已深度融入全球产业分工体系，并成为全球贸易网络中心。根据UN Comtrade数据测算，2020年，中国贸易网络中心度为98.55，居全球首位，远高于居第二位的美国（88.41）和第三位德国（86.96）。与此同时，在中美贸易战以及美国对华脱钩的大背景下，近几年中国与亚洲邻国贸易联系还在进一步加深，这意味着中国全球贸易网络与产业链供应链核心节点地位依旧突出，中国产业发展所形成的庞大需求将为全球产业链供应链的发展持续注入强大动力。

产业链供应链博弈正在成为中美竞争博弈的主战场，美国对华实施科技战将呈现长期性、谋划性和加剧性的发展趋势。为此，中国必须做好打“持久战”的战略准备。但同时，中国仍要坚持全球化下的开放与合作思维，通过扩大制度型开放，充分发挥中国制造业竞争力以及可以定义产品、技术、标准、规则的市场优势。

In recent years, the United States has reinforced its position that China is a “systemic competitor,” with “de-Sinicization” as its strategic goal. Decoupling has become a prominent element in the U.S. toolbox. Decoupling in the high-tech sector uses stronger alliances and rule-making against China. The “supply chain shift” and “supply chain severing” that aims to diminish a China-centered global industrial and supply chain system in favor of a U.S.-centered one, has become the primary option in U.S. foreign strategy, especially toward China.

At present, U.S. trade policy is increasingly tinged with neo-mercantilism, as it wants to protect the domestic market and open up the international market for its own superior industries at the same time. It also seeks to build an international order to safeguard its hegemonic interests and crack down on its competitors. The liberalism of U.S. trade policy is fading, protectionism is taking hold and an aggressive and confrontational nature is gaining traction. From practicing protectionism in the name of national security to setting exclusive new standards and rules on the grounds of supply chain security and tech security, U.S. trade policy has already departed from so-called fair trade and become increasingly security-driven. It is fair to say that “trade securitization” has completely replaced trade liberalization as the underpinning of U.S. trade policy, in order to serve its overall national security strategy.

The contours of the U.S. strategy are becoming clear: It aims to revive American industries and accelerate decoupling from China. On one hand, it inherits the tenor and approach of Donald Trump's trade policy toward China and further intensifies the crackdown on China's science and technology. The so called sci-tech war against China has been elevated to a U.S. national strategy. President Joe Biden's administration has been promoting reshoring through such legislative means as the Infrastructure Investment Act, the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act. On the other hand, it is trying to ease tensions in its economic and trade relations with allies and partners that started in the Trump era, as part of its efforts to establish new policy coordination mechanisms against China, such as the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the American Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP). All represent attempts to create a “wall” against China in the high-tech sector through a three-pronged approach — namely the formation of supply chain alliances through friend-shoring outsourcing and manufacturing, accelerated supply chain substitution and robust export control cooperation with allies.

China is quite dependent on the U.S. technologically, and likewise for the U.S. on China, but this interdependence is becoming increasingly tenuous. The U.S. has replaced market logic with the logic of power. It uses sanctions to force manufacturing transfers, seriously disrupting the international division of labor in the global industrial arena and rattling global supply chains, which have also shown signs of de-Sinicization. The share of U.S. imports sourced from China declined from 21.4 percent in 2018 to 17.7 percent in 2021.Kearney Management Consultants ran an index calculation comparing U.S. imports from China (including Hong Kong) with U.S. imports from 14 low-cost economies in Asia, to gauge the degree of de-Sinicization. The index has fallen from 66 percent at the start of Trump's presidency to 55 percent by the end of 2021, a decline of 11 percentage points in five years. This represents a decline in U.S. dependence on the Chinese industrial chain.However, it is likely that the U.S. strategy of reshoring may be at an inflection point. Since 2020, because of the pandemic and other factors, U.S. domestic manufacturing output has increased by 7.3 percent, while it has also become more dependent on manufacturing production in 14 low-cost Asian countries or regions. At the same time, after the index fell to 50 percent in the second quarter of 2021, China's share of exports to the U.S. rebounded as the emerging Asia-Pacific economies suffered industrial chain disruptions on the back of a resurgent pandemic, with some export orders reversing back to China. (In 2022, some export orders were diverted back to Southeast Asia, as China tightened its COVID response measures after domestic outbreaks.)

It is clear that the U.S. can hardly be expected to pull off its strategy of supply chain containment and its attempt to de-Sinicize the supply chain. Over the decades, the world has developed an industrial division of labor that is highly dependent on China's supply chain. China's industrial supply chain is so extensive that it is the largest trading partner for more than 120 countries (regions), and “Made in China” permeates the global industrial supply chain.According to a report released by McKinsey Global Institute, in 2020, among 186 countries and regions, 33 had China as their top export destination and 65 had China as their top import source. In terms of exports of manufactured goods, China's share of global exports continues to rise. It reached 19.5 percent in 2020, significantly higher than that of major manufacturing countries such as the United States (5.0 percent), Germany (9.6 percent) and Japan (4.5 percent).

After years of development, China has been deeply integrated into the global industrial division of labor system and has become the center of global trade networks. According to UN Comtrade, China's trade network centrality reached 98.55 in 2020, the highest in the world, with the U.S. trailing at 88.41, a distant second, and Germany in third place at 86.96.In the context of the U.S.-China trade war and the decoupling from China initiated by the U.S., China's trade ties with its Asian neighbors have deepened in recent years, which means that China's global trade network, and its status as a hub of supply and industrial chains remains prominent. Massive demand released by China's industrial development will continue to provide strong impetus for the development of the global supply chain.

Industrial and supply chains have become the main theater of competition between China and the United States. America's technology war against China will be deliberate, intense and long-term. For this reason, China must be strategically prepared for a protracted fight.At the same time, China must maintain an open and cooperative approach to globalization, and press ahead with institutional opening-up to fully leverage China's competitiveness in manufacturing and unlock its advantages in defining products, technologies, standards and rules.