《环球邮报》在中国总理李克强正式访问加拿大前夕报道说，加拿大和中国同意启动有关引渡条约的谈判。经过草率认定，不仅《环球邮报》同一天的社论，就连议会反对派和一众新闻评论员对这一决定也是冷嘲热讽。《环球邮报》担心这类条约会让加拿大及其司法制度同北京的“高压手段”产生瓜葛。其他人则提到了中国的高处决率，中国缺乏正当程序和透明度的“野蛮”司法体系，以主当前反腐运动背后的政治动机。次日《环球邮报》继续危言耸听，在头版刊登文章，讲述中国特工如何扮成游客进入加拿大，追捕习近平反腐运动下的逃犯，劝他们回国自首。这种所谓的“猎狐行动”其实世人皆知，在加拿大以外的许多国家都发生过。本文不是给他们找借口，而是提供背景，说明为什么与中国签订引渡条约符合加拿大（及中国）的利益。

除了批评中国的人权记录和特工的所作所为，加拿大媒体立即联想到了数日前加拿大人高凯文的获释。高凯文以间谍罪被中国关押了两年，他和妻子自称基督教的“传教士”，2014年8月被捕之前，他们在中朝边境经营一家咖啡店。多数加拿大人认为，对高凯文的指控是无中生有，或许是对加拿大公开指责中国网络间谍攻击国家研究委员会的报复。9月初特鲁多总理正式访问中国期间，向对方提出了高凯文一案。特鲁多的这次访问被认为相当成功，在前哈珀政府对华关系起起伏伏后，他实现了“重启”双边关系的目的（访华期间，特鲁多宣布加拿大将申请加入亚投行，加中签署了12亿美元的贸易协议，加方宣布在华开设更多签证中心，甚至近在眼前的油菜籽进口禁令也暂时叫停，解决了加拿大农民的燃眉之急）。但特鲁多有一个问题没有解决：他离开中国的时候，高凯文还关在监狱里。经过快速闭门审判，高凯文于9月14日被释放。

就在审判并驱逐高凯文的前几天，特鲁多先生的国家安全顾问丹尼尔·让在北京讨论了启动引渡条约谈判的问题。政府声称，高凯文的释放与启动条约谈判之间不存在利益交换和直接联系。也许确实是没有明确的关连。中国人并不想在李克强访问加拿大前夕找麻烦，特鲁多访华期间释放高凯文也并不丢脸。事实上，两国最高层之间的建设性对话才是解决问题的推手。

仅仅为解决一个领事案件而同意启动引渡条约谈判，对特鲁多政府来说是不可能的。相反，决定启动谈判的依据是要让涉及中国的法律问题有一个坚实透明的基础。向加拿大派遣秘密特工的事情早已有之，甚至在习近平反腐运动之前就有。声名狼藉的走私犯（同时贿赂中国官员）赖昌星1999年持假护照进入加拿大，并申请难民身份。他在被遣返之前足足争取了12年，为的是避免被引渡回中国。赖昌星事件和让他回国的政治压力（暂且不讨论他的罪行），成为中国不明智地背着加拿大当局擅自追捕罪犯的佐证。处理这类问题的最好方式，是用“正式”机制取代目前的“非正式”手段。与中国当局定期对话，用法律框架处理赖昌星这样的问题，会使现状显著改善，让中方不再我行我素。这是加拿大得到的第一个好处。

第二个好处是控制从中国大量流向加拿大的热钱。没人知道究竟有多少钱涌入加拿大，但后果大家都看得见，就是温哥华飞涨的房价和BC省赌场里可疑的豪客。有人估计中国每年非法流出资金高达1万亿美元，加拿大吸收了其中相当一部分，原因是加拿大洗钱条例执行不力，机场执法宽松，甚至查获到未申报的钱箱后，也只是象征性罚款，钱仍然归还持有者。其他多数国家都是将这种钱款没收。据IBTimes报道，中国重要的经济逃犯有26人在加拿大（美国40人）。加拿大并不需要这些人。阻止热钱流入和贪官逃到加拿大的最可靠方法就是达成引渡条约，这样他们很快会去别的地方。单是加拿大和中国就引渡进行谈判（也许需要很多年）这件事，就能起到明显的抑制作用。这是加拿大得到的另一个重要好处。

加拿大与中国签订引渡条约后，因政治问题而不是经济犯罪的人可能命运未卜地遭到遣返。对于这种批评，特鲁多总理说过，与中国就条约进行谈判，加拿大会有严格的标准，会遵循符合加拿大价值观的严格程序。从启动条约谈判到形成条约文本，其间是一个漫长的过程，而细节注定是关键。加拿大最新的引渡条约（与意大利签订，取代之前的条约）定义了可被引渡的罪行，即必须是两国都认可的罪行。条约还列出了所需的证据标准，列出了一方为何可以拒绝引渡的强制性与任意性理由。可以认为，与中国的条约也将包含上述条件，甚至更多。中国与多数西方国家没有签订引渡条约，除了澳大利亚（澳方尚未批准）、法国和西班牙，这些国家都有强大的法治传统（当然西班牙是近些年的事）， 因此可以想像加拿大与中国也能找到共同点。当然，谈判不会轻而易举，也许要花很多年。在这期间展开进程与对话要远远好过目前的失控。

如果加拿大基于现有引渡模式和特鲁多作出的保证，与中国达成协议， 那将有助于推动中国向国际司法标准靠拢，其过程也会消弭两国的潜在麻烦，促进加中关系在其他领域向前发展。中国推动一项协议，帮助扩大其双边条约，收紧贪官身上的套索。这让加拿大有讨价还价优势，去争取达成加拿大公众愿意接受的协议。对加拿大来说这是另外的附带好处。

批评者急于指责中国的司法体制，认定加拿大将变成同谋。他们对中国司法缺陷的批评是正当的，但并没有批评到点子上。与中国打交道的方法应该是按照加拿大的利益和价值观，制定双边的、基于法律的、明确合作内容的条约安排。这比嘴上谴责中国的体制而又一事无成强得多。

On the eve of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's official visit to Ottawa, the Globe and Mail reported that Canada and China had agreed to begin negotiations on an extradition treaty. In a hasty rush to judgment, this announcement was pilloried not only by the Globe in an editorial the same day, but by the opposition in Parliament and numerous other commentators. The Globe expressed concern that such a treaty risked implicating Canada and its judiciary in Beijing's “sledgehammer methods”. Others referred to Beijing high rate of executions, lack of due process and transparency in its “brutal” judicial system, and pointed to political motivations behind the current anti-corruption drive. The following day the Globe continued its breathless coverage, with a front-page story on Chinese agents entering Canada posing as tourists in an attempt to track down fugitives from President Xi's anti-corruption campaign and to try to persuade them to return to China to face the music. These activities, known as “Operation Fox Hunt” are widely known and have taken place in a number of countries besides Canada. That is not to excuse them, but to provide background for why an extradition treaty with China would be in Canada (and China's) interest.

In addition to criticism of China's human rights record and the activities of its undercover agents, there was immediate linkage in the Canadian press to the release, a few days earlier, of Canadian Kevin Garrett who had been held in detention in China on charges of spying. Garrett and his wife, self-professed Christian “missionaries” operated a coffee shop on the China-North Korea border prior to their arrest in August of 2014. Most Canadians assume the charges were trumped up as possible retaliation after Canada publicly accused China of being behind cyberespionage attacks on the National Research Council. Prime Minister Trudeau raised the Garrett case during his official visit to China at the beginning of September. He had what is generally regarded as a very successful visit, meeting his objective of “resetting” the bilateral relationship after the ups and downs of the previous Harper government (during the visit, Trudeau announced that Canada would apply to join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, was present at the signing of $1.2 billion in trade deals, announced the opening of more visa centres in China and was even able to get an impending ban on the import of Canadian canola seed postponed, relieving an immediate problem for Canadian farmers). However, there was one problem Trudeau did not solve; when he left China Kevin Garrett was still in prison. He was finally released on September 14, after a quick closed-door trial.

The trial and expulsion took place a couple of days after Mr. Trudeau's National Security Advisor, Daniel Jean, was in Beijing to discuss the start of talks toward an extradition treaty. The government claims there was no quid pro quo and no direct connection between the release of Garrett and their agreement to start discussing a treaty, and there probably wasn't any explicit linkage. The Chinese wanted to get an irritant out of the way before Li visited Canada and couldn't lose face by releasing Garrett during Trudeau's visit. The fact that there was constructive dialogue between the two countries at the most senior level no doubt helped resolve the issue.

It is most unlikely that the Trudeau government would agree to begin negotiations on an extradition treaty just to secure the release of one consular case. Rather, the decision to proceed rests on the need to put legal issues with China on a firm and transparent basis. The issues behind the despatch of undercover agents to Canada go back a long way, even before the launch of Xi's anti-corruption drive. Notorious smuggler (and briber of Chinese officials) Lai Changxing, who entered Canada on a fraudulent passport in 1999, claimed refugee status and fought extradition to China for 12 years before he was finally repatriated. Lai's saga, and the political pressure that had to be applied to get him back (his crimes were not in dispute) was a contributing factor to China's ill advised “self-help” methods of pursing convicted criminals without informing the Canadian authorities. The best way to deal with such methods is to provide for a front-door mechanism to replace the current back-door approach. Regular dialogue with the Chinese authorities and a legal framework to handle cases like that of Lai would be a marked improvement over the status quo, and would help put an end to Chinese free-lancing. That is the first benefit for Canada.

A second would be a means to control the enormous flows of hot money from China to Canada. No one knows for sure how much money is flooding into Canada, but the results are well known in terms of an inflated property market in Vancouver and suspicious high rollers at BC casinos. Some estimate put the illegal outflow from China at up to $1 trillion per year, and Canada gets its fair share, in part because of weak enforcement of money-laundering regulations and even lax enforcement at airports where suitcases of undeclared money have been seized, and then returned to their owners on payment of a nominal fine. In most other countries the funds are confiscated. According to a report in the International Business Times, 26 of the top Chinese economic fugitives have fled to Canada (the US has 40). Canada does not need these people. The surest way to stop the flow of hot money and corrupt officials from fleeing to Canada is to put in place an extradition treaty. They will quickly go elsewhere. Just the fact that Canada and China are talking about extradition (and the talks may go on for many years) will act as a significant disincentive. This is another major benefit for Canada.

But what about the criticism that if Canada signs an extradition treaty with China it will be sending back to an uncertain fate persons guilty of political rather than economic crimes? Prime Minister Trudeau has said that Canada has high standards and will follow a rigorous process consistent with Canadian values in negotiating a treaty with China. Agreeing to begin negotiating a treaty is a long way from agreeing to the text of a treaty, and the devil will certainly be in the detail. Canada's most recent extradition treaty (with Italy, replacing an earlier treaty) defines an extraditable offence—it must be a crime in both countries—outlines standards of evidence required and lists a number of mandatory and discretionary reasons why either party can refuse extradition. One can assume that a treaty with China will contain these conditions, and more. While China does not have an extradition treaty with most western countries, it has one with Australia (not yet ratified by Australia), France and Spain, all countries with a strong rule of law tradition (Spain in recent years). Therefore it is not inconceivable that Canada and China can find common ground, although the negotiation will not be easy and could take a number of years. In the meantime, a process and a dialogue will be underway, something that is far superior to the “under-the-radar” activities that are currently occurring.

If Canada is able to conclude an agreement with China on the basis of its current extradition model and the assurances given by the Prime Minister, it will have helped nudge China closer to international judicial standards, and in the process will have removed a potential bilateral irritant, thus allowing Canada-China relations to move forward in other areas. China is pushing an agreement, in part to help it expand its network of bilateral treaties and tighten the noose on corrupt officials. This gives Canada leverage to get the kind of agreement that will be acceptable to the Canadian public. Here is yet another collateral benefit for Canada.

The critics are quick to condemn the Chinese judicial system, and to jump to the conclusion that Canada will become complicit. Their criticisms of the shortcomings of Chinese justice are valid, but they miss the point. The way to deal with China is to engage on the basis of Canadian interests and values and build a network of bilateral, legally-based treaty arrangements that will define the terms of cooperation. That is far better than decrying the Chinese system, but doing nothing about it.