美国将金融工具作为大国博弈的手段，正逐渐替代贸易战，且打击对手的举措也愈发频繁。局部关闭中概股赴美上市，被视为推动中美金融“脱钩”的最新动向。

近两年，美国频频在金融领域动用泛政治化的“行政令”对华发难，或将中国重点行业、目标企业或机构列入实体制裁名单实施资产管制，或发布中长期融资禁令禁止进入美国资本市场融资。这种菜单式制裁是特朗普政府近两年来一直在做的事情。

特别是去年5月，美国参议院一致表决通过《外国公司问责法案》，规定在美上市的外国企业如连续三年未按要求披露相关信息，将被强行要求退市。同月，美联邦退休储蓄投资委员会的“节俭储蓄计划”（TSP）正式宣布暂停追踪含有中国股票的指数基金。10月，美国国会发起《美国金融市场诚信和安全法》，欲禁止美国的投资公司、退休基金和保险公司入股被美国商务部列入“实体清单”或被美国国防部列入受中国军方支持公司名单上的中国公司。12月，美国财政部外国资产控制办公室更是将所谓“中方涉军企业”设为单独制裁项目。由此可见，美国国防部与财政部已形成联动执法机制，共同打击中国企业，且不断扩大对华企业的打击范围。

根据《彭博经济报告》，近年来随着中国经济体量的不断增长，以及中国企业海外融资规模的不断扩大，在美上市的中国企业数量也迅速增长。2005年有36家中国企业在美上市，总市值2600亿美元，仅占美国市场总市值的1%左右。至2020年，大约有600多家中国企业赴美上市，总市值约为5.9万亿美元，占美国市场总市值的8.7%。特别是中国科技巨头的IPO占据了在美上市的大头。

凡此种种大都是特朗普政府行政令作为。可以说，特朗普时期最大的改变就是重置了中美关系，并在美国社会内部改造了对华关系的基础和氛围，让“中国是美国最大竞争对手甚至敌手”成为美国社会普遍接受的认知。尽管人们对拜登时期中美关系的普遍预期比特朗普时期要乐观一些，但预计未来若干年内，美国对华政策的框架不会发生根本性改变，特别是从拜登新政府对华强硬立场的最新表态看，在金融领域“对华施压”的态势也还会继续，中美之间的金融博弈可能才刚刚开始。

美国利用其资本市场在全球金融市场的绝对主导优势，对中国在美上市企业发布投融资禁令，层层加码，甚至发起准金融制裁行动，确实给中国企业造成了很大的负面影响，这不仅提高了融资成本，也降低了全球投资者的投资意愿。鉴于美国资本市场在全球金融市场上短期内难以撼动的中心地位，未来美国金融打压和制衡手段还会继续带有强烈的单边主义色彩，这使得中国在中美金融博弈中处于严重的不对称地位。

然而，中国可以通过主动开放来应对这种金融封锁或金融“脱钩”，实现“再挂钩”。与美国形成鲜明对照的是，近年来中国金融开放的步伐不断加快，给美国和其他国家金融机构带来的利益也日益增加。2020年，中国央行工作会议就明确提出，要继续推动债券市场基础设施互联互通，稳妥有序推进资本项目开放。银保监会也发文提出，要推动消费金融、养老保险等领域的外资金融机构进入境内市场。

在这样的大背景下，包括美国金融机构在内的外资加速进入中国。2019年，PayPal收购了中国GoPay七成股份，使其成为第一家在中国提供在线支付服务的外国公司。2020年6月，美国运通获得批准，成为第一家通过与中国金融科技公司的合资企业在华开展境内业务的外国信用卡公司，同时被允许开展网络清算业务。标普全球在2019年成立了一家外商独资公司，成为第一家获得许可在中国国内债券市场开展信用评级服务的公司。据估算，中国金融市场规模为47万亿美元，外资金融机构在银行资产占比不到2%，在保险市场占比不到6%，金融开放将为外资金融机构创造巨大的增值和利润空间。

事实证明，金融开放吸引流入中国的跨境资本不断增加。截至2019年年末，境外机构与个人持有人民币股票与债券达4.4万亿元，同比增长52.4%。而经历了新冠疫情冲击的2020年，境外机构净增持银行间债券规模超过1万亿元，中国金融市场的国际吸引力持续提升。

完全有理由相信，对于逐利全球资源配置效率的金融资本而言，一个庞大且日益开放的市场对全球资本具有最大的“黏性”，也会形成中美金融联系之间更加稳固的纽带。

Financial instruments are gradually replacing trade wars as a more advantageous means of putting pressure on China, and the U.S. is frequently using it for gaming against other great powers. The partial shutdown of Chinese stocks listing in the U.S. is seen as the latest move to promote China's financial decoupling from the U.S.

In the past two years, the U.S. has frequently used pan-politicalized executive orders to make trouble with China in the financial sector, by putting China's key industries, target companies, or institutions on the Entity List and imposing asset controls. They've also issued medium- and long-term financing bans on China's access to the U.S. capital market for financing or commercial financing or on China's investment and related business in the U.S. This “menu” of sanctions has largely been the work of the Trump administration over the last two years.

Last May in particular, the United States Senate passed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act with unanimous consent, which will force the delisting of foreign companies listed in the U.S. if they fail to disclose relevant information as required for three consecutive years. In the same month, the U.S. Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board's Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) officially announced the suspension of index funds that track Chinese stocks.In October, the U.S. Congress initiated the American Financial Markets Integrity and Security Act, which will prohibit U.S. investment companies, pension funds, and insurance companies from investing in Chinese companies that are on the U.S. Department of Commerce's Entity List or on the U.S. Department of Defense's list of companies backed by the Chinese military.In December, the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) created a separate sanctions program (Chinese Military Companies Sanctions) for so-called "designated Communist Chinese military companies.”All this shows that the U.S. Department of Defense and the Treasury Department have formed a joint enforcement mechanism against Chinese companies and have been expanding the scope of their actions against Chinese companies.

According to a Bloomberg economic report, the number of Chinese companies listed in the U.S. has grown rapidly in recent years as China's economy continues to grow and the scale of overseas financing for Chinese companies continues to expand. Data shows that in 2005, there were 36 Chinese companies listed in the U.S., with a total market value of $260 billion, accounting for only about 1% of the total market value of the U.S. market; while by 2020, there are about 600 of them, with a total market value of about $5.9 trillion, accounting for 8.7% of the total market value of the U.S. market. In particular, IPOs of Chinese tech giants account for the bulk of listings in the U.S.

All the above-mentioned actions were carried out against China under the executive orders of the Trump administration. Arguably, the biggest change during the Trump era is the reset of China-U.S. relations and the transformation of the foundation and atmosphere of relations with China within U.S. society. It made the notion that, "China is the biggest competitor or even adversary of the US," a generally accepted perception in U.S. society.Although people are generally more optimistic about Sino-U.S. relations under Biden than under Trump, it is expected that the framework of U.S. policy toward China will not change fundamentally in the next few years. Judging from the new Biden administration's latest stance of hardening its position toward China, the U.S. will continue to "pressure China" in the financial sector and may have just begun its financial game with China.

The U.S. has used its absolute dominance of capital markets in global financial markets to issue investment and financing bans on Chinese companies listed in the U.S., adding layers and layers of restrictions, and even initiating quasi-financial sanctions. This has had a significant negative impact on Chinese companies, not only raising financing costs, but also reducing the willingness of global investors to invest. Given the central position of the U.S. capital markets in the global financial market, which is difficult to shake in the short term, the future U.S. financial suppression and counterbalance will continue to be strongly unilateral, which puts China in a serious "asymmetric position" in the China-U.S. financial game.

However, China can respond to this financial blockade or financial decoupling by actively opening up to achieve recoupling. In contrast to the U.S., China's financial opening has accelerated in recent years, bringing increasing benefits to financial institutions in the U.S. and other countries. In 2020, China's central bank working conference made it clear that China would continue to promote the connectivity of bond market infrastructures and open capital projects in a steady and orderly manner. The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission also issued a document proposing to promote the entry of foreign financial institutions in consumer finance, pension insurance, and other areas of the domestic market.

Against this backdrop, foreign investors, including U.S. financial institutions, have accelerated their entry into China. In 2019, PayPal became the first foreign company to provide online payment services in China after acquiring a 70 percent stake in Chinese company GoPay.In June 2020, American Express received approval to become the first foreign credit card company to conduct domestic operations in China through a joint venture with a Chinese fintech company, and was also allowed to conduct network clearing operations. Visa and Mastercard applied to form a network clearing license.S&P Global established a wholly foreign-owned company in 2019, the first foreign company licensed to conduct credit rating services in China's domestic bond market. The size of China's financial market is estimated to be $47 trillion. Foreign financial institutions account for less than 2% of banking assets and less than 6% of the insurance market in China. China's financial liberalization will create huge value-added and profit margins for foreign financial institutions.

Financial liberalization has proven to attract increased cross-border capital inflows into China. By the end of 2019, foreign institutions and individuals held 4.4 trillion yuan in Chinese stocks and bonds, up 52.4% year-on-year. And in 2020, which was impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic, the net increase in the size of Chinese interbank bonds held by foreign institutions exceeded 1 trillion yuan, and the international attractiveness of China's financial market continued to rise.

There is every reason to believe that a large and increasingly open market will be the most "sticky" for global capital, which is seeking to profit from the efficiency of global resource allocation. It will also form a more solid bond between China and the U.S. financial ties.