中国近期购买美国大豆显示出其巩固在布宜诺斯艾利斯达成的停战协议的意愿，但这种停战很可能不会持续太久。过去一年见证了美国对中国持续的经济攻势：快速升级贸易关税、针对外国投资的新立法，以及更少为人注意的在重谈北美自由贸易协定和在未来美国贸易协议中加入针对中国的条款。简言之，白宫旨在削减中国的贸易顺差，纠正中国的市场扭曲，限制其技术和经济优势。向美国盟友施压禁止华为参与新的5G网络，以及美国要求逮捕华为首席财务官，则是美国协同行为的又一证据。在华盛顿，中国如今被视为战略对手，因此小规模的让步不太可能令好斗的特朗普政府满意。

北京正准备应对关税的负面溢出效应，但这种效应还叠加了中国经济已存在的问题。近年来，由于资本投资回报率降低、劳动力成本升高以及人口老龄化，中国经济从2000年代早期的高增长减速换挡。更少的劳动力将支撑老龄化社会更高的福利开支，这与其他东亚发达经济体的经历并无二致，尤其是日本。鉴于这些原因，经济预测显示2019年中国经济产出增速约为6.3%，这颇为意外，也略低于中共设定的6.5%目标。毕竟，与大众观念相反，对美国出口只占中国GDP的4%，且总出口占经济的比重不到20%，而内需才是增长的主要引擎。

主要经济指标都显示中国消费者情绪悲观，尤其是汽车和房地产销售。因此，北京正推进财政和货币刺激措施来刺激萎靡的国内需求。去年10月，政府启动一项全新的所得税系统，提高个人所得税起征点，并为抚养孩子的家庭提供抵扣。中国还小心翼翼地放松了货币政策。人民币贬值可以被错误指控中国为汇率操纵国的特朗普政府所利用。因此，中国人民银行尚未调整其基准利率，而是将商业银行准备金率降低了1个百分点。这令中国银行业得以向市场注入1090亿美元流动性，这将有利于商业和个人，使他们更容易借钱消费或投资。同时，中国当局会非常小心地避免政府刺激措施恶化其主要经济问题，包括产能过剩、影子银行、负债过高以及过度重视低效国企。

无论如何，中国都将加倍下注被视为具有战略价值的新产业，例如人工智能、电动汽车、大数据和物联网。鉴于可以指数级提高计算能力的联网机器将提升劳动生产率，所谓的“第四次工业革命”将带来经济福音。北京将推进其“中国制造2025”产业政策，同时尽力淡化该文件对外国听众的重要性。中国可以利用其巨大的消费市场为本国巨头隔绝外国竞争，并为其提供必要的规模经济以便和西方科技巨头展开竞争。这种逻辑的一个典型例子就是中国版亚马逊——阿里巴巴。

无论中国还是美国都不想要长期贸易战，但两国政府的算计是典型的懦夫博弈：华盛顿不会后退，因为其察觉到中国的弱点，即经济表现对政权稳固至关重要。直到最近，中国领导人认为可以联合欧盟、日本等美国传统盟友来遏制特朗普的保护主义。此外，受中国关税打击的特朗普选民会在去年11月的中期选举和2020年的总统大选中削弱其政治前景。不过，参议院依然是共和党占多数，并且美国总统也证明他可以无需国会批准单方面行事。特朗普不分敌我的霸凌策略甚至离间了欧盟，令其同中国等其他国家一起针对特朗普的钢铝关税在WTO提起申诉。不过，特朗普正在掏空WTO。很多人未注意到，日本并没有加入谴责钢铝关税的队伍，这意味着特朗普对日本拥有有效影响力，这种影响力主要来自安全领域（提防中国），同时也意味着近期日中示好缺乏深度。出于这些原因，中国正在小幅调整以适应特朗普。

出于上述原因，趋势并不乐观。贸易摩擦可能滑向非常有害的贸易战。由于经济减速，中国针对特朗普攻势的国内应对措施可能需要升级。不过，习近平和特朗普的关系据报道仍然友好，两位领导人为了可能的和解一直为对方保留面子。在双方谈判之际，有些方法可以缓解紧张局势。正如欧洲和日本所见证的，中国游客近年来大幅增加。绝非偶然的是，2018年第一季度中国的经常账户出现逆差，这主要是由于服务贸易逆差扩大，它靠的是中国向全球“出口”游客。因此，一些小幅象征性措施，如人员和学生交流或放开旅游签证，可能会给美国经济带来福音，因为旅游部门有积极的外溢效应。可以确定的是，中国经济很可能比白宫预计的更加富有韧性。让我们准备好迎接寒冬，但也静待其后的春天。

China's recent purchase of US soybeans signals its willingness to buttress the truce agreed in Buenos Aires, but the truce is unlikely to last for long. The past year has witnessed the United States' sustained economic offensive towards China, with a rapid crescendo of trade tariffs, new legislation on inbound foreign investments, and – less noted – the inclusion of China-specific clauses in the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement and future US trade deals. In short, the White House aims at reducing Chinese trade surpluses, amending China's market distortions and curbing its technological and economic advance. Pressure on US allies to ban Huawei's involvement in new 5G networks, and the US-mandated arrest of Huawei's Chief Financial Officer are further proof of the United States' concerted efforts. Within the Beltway China is now chiefly understood as a strategic rival, and small concessions are unlikely to appease a belligerent Trump administration.

Beijing is bracing for the negative spillover effects of tariffs to kick-in, but they add up to preexisting issues in the Chinese economy. In recent years, China has been shifting gears away from the high growth of the early 2000s given the smaller returns on capital investment, higher costs of labor, and the greying of its population. A smaller labor force will have to sustain higher welfare costs for an ageing society, not unlike what other developed economies in East Asia are experiencing, first and foremost Japan. For these reasons, economic forecasts suggest that economic output in 2019 will settle around 6.3% in 2019, which is surprising and slightly below the Chinese Communist Party's 6.5% target. After all, and contrary to widespread beliefs, exports to the US account for only 4% of its GDP and overall exports account for less than 20% of the economy: internal demand is the leading engine of growth.

Key indicators point at Chinese consumers' bearish sentiments – especially with regard to automobile and real-estate acquisitions. For this reason, Beijing is pushing ahead with fiscal and monetary stimulus packages to prop up sluggish domestic demand. Last October, the government has kick-started a new income tax system that raises the cap on individual revenues susceptible to domestic levies and new measures that provide incentives for households with children. China has also loosened its monetary policy, but with greater circumspection. A devaluation of the Chinese yuan would play perfectly well into the hands of the Trump administration's misled accusations of China as a currency manipulator. For this reason, the People's Bank of China has not touched its base interest rates and preferred, instead, to decrease the reserves imposed on commercial banks by 1%. This has allowed Chinese banks to inject $109 billion into the market to the benefit of businesses and private individuals, which will lend money more easily and devote it to either consumption or investments. At the same time, Chinese authorities will tread carefully with government stimulus to avoid deepening its major economic woes: overcapacity, shadow banking, over-indebtedness, and an exaggerated importance given to inefficient state-owned enterprises.

At any rate, China will double down on new industries deemed to be of strategic value - such as artificial intelligence, electric cars, big data and the internet of things. The so-called “fourth industrial revolution” promises an economic boon given the major productivity gains brought by networked machines that can improve their computation abilities exponentially. Given the concomitant political and military potential of said technologies, Beijing will push ahead with its “Made in China 2025” industrial policy, while minimizing the document's importance to foreign audiences. China can take advantage of its enormous consumer market to insulate its national champions from foreign competition and providing them the necessary economies of scale to compete with Western technological giants. A clear example of this logic is Alibaba.

Neither China nor the US want a prolonged trade war, but the calculus in both capitals is typical of a game of chicken: Washington won't back off because it smells Chinese weakness, given the importance that economic performance plays to regime stability. Until recently, Chinese leaders thought that it could have contained Trump's protectionism with the support of traditional US allies, such as the EU and Japan. Moreover, Trump constituencies hit by Chinese tariffs would have weakened his political prospects during last October's mid-term and 2020 presidential elections. Yet, the Senate still has a Republican majority and the US president has proven that he can act unilaterally without Congressional approval. Trump's bullying tactics towards friends and foes alike have alienated the EU, which together with other parties, including China, has initiated a WTO complaint against Trump's steel and aluminum tariffs. Yet, Trump is hollowing out the WTO. Little-noticed, Japan did not join forces in denouncing steel and aluminum tariffs there; this hints at Trump's effective leverage over Japan, much of it in the security realm (and with China in mind), and the lack of depth to the recent Japan-China overtures. For these reasons, China has been somewhat accommodating towards Trump.

The trends are not promising given these dynamics. The trade skirmishes may well turn into a very harmful trade war. China's domestic response to the Trump offensive may need to be boosted in the face of a slowing economy. Yet, the relationship between Xi and Trump is reportedly on friendly terms and both leaders have consistently allowed the other to save face. There are ways to ameliorate the tensions while the two parties negotiate. As anybody in Europe or Japan has witnessed, Chinese tourism has boomed in recent years. Not by chance, in the first quarter of 2018, China registered a current-account deficit, brought by widening trade deficits in services, which in turn depends on China's “export” of tourists worldwide. For this reason, small symbolic steps such as people exchanges or the removal of tourist visa requirements with China might well provide a boon for the US economy given the positive spillover effects in the tourism sector. To be sure, the Chinese economy is likely to prove more resilient than expected in the White House: let's all brace for winter while waiting for spring.