中国承诺向巴基斯坦提供460亿美元投资主要是出于两点考虑。目前，中国的4万亿美元外汇储备和每天700万桶的原油进口主要依赖有可能受到竞争对手钳制的海运。由于相信美国正寻找代理人遏制自己的崛起，中国也在寻找可替代的、不那么脆弱的贸易新通道。第二点是，中国最终认定，解决巴基斯坦这个动乱但可靠（甚至是可依赖）朋友的问题的最好方法，是投资电力行业和发展基础设施。作为更宏大的一带一路战略的组成部分，中巴经济走廊是有优先权的，因为它是连接中国和阿拉伯海的唯一路网，与通过海路连接能源丰富的波斯湾市场相比距离缩短了一万多公里。

中国承诺的投资规模超过了当年的120亿美元（相当于2015年的1200亿美元）马歇尔计划。马歇尔计划在二战后重建了数个欧洲国家。一些正在实施的中国援助项目也已纳入中巴经济走廊计划。这种大规模的资本注入如果使用得当，很可能改变地区的力量均势。

中巴经济走廊预计建设15年，它包括西、中、东部三个通道，连接中国新疆维吾尔自治区的喀什和中国在巴基斯坦修建的瓜达尔深水港，这里距霍尔木兹海峡仅400公里。全球约20%的石油经由霍尔木兹海峡运输，其中大部分运往中国。

由于中国强烈要求经济走廊项目非政治化，巴基斯坦的一个跨党派会议决定首先开发西部的通道。

早在佩尔韦兹·穆沙拉夫总统当政时期（1999－2008年），有关中巴经济走廊的事宜就已经被讨论过。颇有洞见的中国人劝说巴基斯坦政治领导人跨越党派界线，并在鲜为人知的地方接触潜在的中国合作伙伴。

这样一来，中国领导人不仅自上而下，同时也自下而上地得到中国工业与金融企业对中巴经济走廊的支持。通过双方企业家之间的谈判，几乎所有投资都采取了商业贷款的形式。中国自己这种对经济走廊项目积极、稳健的参与，表明了它对巴基斯坦增长与稳定的坚定承诺。中国对巴基斯坦的影响力将提高，并将传播得更远。

巴基斯坦持续不断的严重电力短缺至少使国内生产总值（GDP）损失2%。为此，近340亿美元的投资将被用来修建新的发电厂。到2017年至2018年，电力项目将取得前期成果，也就是新增10400兆瓦电量。这将激发巴基斯坦工业与农业的大部分潜在活力，改善普通人的生活。巴基斯坦预计，到中巴经济走廊建成的2030年，它的GDP有望增长15%。经济走廊的其余投资将用于发展光纤网、公路、瓜达尔港和能源供给线。

如果巴基斯坦在吸收外国直接投资方面的表现有所改观，中巴经济走廊计划的巨大投资就能带来转型。设计一个无缝机制去实现中巴经济走廊的抱负，对巴基斯坦来说是一项挑战。这个项目的实施也有助于提升巴基斯坦极其低下的治理水平。

具备自我毁灭性思维定式的巴基斯坦似乎已经明白，仅靠军事实力无法阻止印度的力量投射，巴基斯坦还必须拥有经济实力，才能与印度在地区及更广范围不断增长的影响力竞争。与寡头式文职领导人相比，巴基斯坦军方更明白这个新等式的必要性。

由于有巨额投资，中国将更加倾向于保护巴基斯坦的安全利益。同时，由于中巴经济走廊项目能使巴基斯坦的GDP增长15%，这笔投资将缩小印巴两国间的经济差距。南亚区域合作联盟的其他国家也将不可避免地寻求中国的项目支持和资金，而这些都是印度难以企及的。

中巴经济走廊的独特性在于，它只连接中国和巴基斯坦，而且是打通中国到印度洋的最短路线。因此它会成为中国一带一路构想的一个支点。一带一路旨在连通亚洲和欧洲大陆的60个国家。为实现这个计划，中国打算建设一系列网中网，如南方丝绸之路、中亚丝绸之路、21世纪海上丝绸之路以及中巴经济走廊。

全面投入运营后的瓜达尔港和中巴经济走廊将通过提供陆路安全，改变中国的海上贸易联系模式，减少中国往来马六甲海峡的贸易量。中国的能源供应将不再轻易受“马六甲困境”影响。为了保护自己的供应链，中国海军在印度洋的存在将会增多。由于拥有长期关系，加上新的联盟正在形成，巴基斯坦会很乐意把瓜达尔港设施开放给中国海军使用。

美国正通过分派印度洋的领导角色来讨好印度，这对中国和巴基斯坦来说都是无法接受的。事实上，印度讨好那些让中国戒备重重的大国，只能迫使中巴两国进一步加强结盟。中巴以瓜达尔港为基础的海军战略伙伴关系，将使印美联合称霸印度洋的野心难以实现。

出于对西方的不相信，俄罗斯和中国已经同意建立一个对话机制，将俄罗斯发起的欧亚经济联盟（EAEU）与一带一路相融合。这个协议标志着俄罗斯不再对中国的一带一路存有疑虑。而且，从当前的敌对态势看，巴基斯坦也不会把穿越阿富汗和中亚的陆路连接让给印度。这就将印度挡在了中亚丝绸之路以外。由于印度远离俄罗斯，且与美国目标一致，它在自家后院面临着不信任。这对印度的未来相当不利。而巴基斯坦与域外大国结盟也犯了同样的错误。

中国和巴基斯坦这两个印度的主要对手之间的经济合作，给印度带来双重困境。中国崛起的经济现实迫使印度不得不支持各地区的公路连通计划，如中亚和东亚的项目，以及连接中国、缅甸、孟加拉国和印度的南方丝绸之路。但对巴基斯坦的深恶痛绝，使印度忍不住要反对中巴经济走廊。莫迪总理5月份访华时甚至表示，印度反对中巴经济走廊穿过查谟和克什米尔的有争议领土。印度的这些偏见不会给两国带来和睦。

其实中巴经济走廊和一带一路给印度带来了机遇，一旦对伊朗的制裁解除，伊朗－巴基斯坦－印度天然气项目就可以复活。它的天然气管道很可能随着中巴经济走廊计划实施到位与欧亚经济联盟的管网连接。加入中国、俄罗斯、伊朗和巴基斯坦的能源供应安排，只会加强区域连通和对手之间的相互依存。这将成为南亚和中亚的经济桥梁。

中国经济规模是印度的五倍，虽然印度今年的经济增长速度可能超过中国，但整体追上中国需要50年以上时间。印度在应对中国战略崛起的时候应当具有更大灵活性，积极参与中国的一带一路。这只会有助于创造一个更加和平的世界。

The Chinese commitment to invest US$46 billion into Pakistan is driven by two main considerations. China's current $4 trillion foreign trade and 7 million barrels of daily oil imports are largely dependent upon sea-lanes that can be choked by competing powers. Convinced that the U.S. is seeking surrogates to contain its rise, China is seeking alternate and less vulnerable routes. Second, China has finally decided that its troubled but reliable (even dependent) friend, Pakistan, has problems that can best be handled by investing in its power sector and infrastructure development. In the process, as a part of its larger One Belt, One Road (OBOR) strategy, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) gets a priority because this is the only network that connects China to the Arabian Sea –shortening its maritime distance with the energy rich Persian Gulf market by over 10,000 kilometers.

The extent of China's commitment betters the US$12 billion (estimated to be $120 billion in 2015 dollars) Marshal Plan used to rebuild several European countries after World War II. Some on-going Chinese aided projects are now incorporated into the CPEC. This large infusion of capital, if utilized properly, can potentially change the regional power equation.

The CPEC will be developed in 15 years, along three corridors – western, central and eastern, connecting the two cities – Kashgar in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Pakistan's deep water Chinese-built Gwadar Port, just 400 km from the Straits of Hormuz. Twenty percent of world's oil passes through the Straits, much of it destined for China.

Following a strong Chinese urging to depoliticize the project, an All-Party Conference in Pakistan decided that the western route be developed first.

Elements of the CPEC were already being discussed during the President Pervez Musharraf era (1999-2008). The Chinese, as far sighted as they are, encouraged the Pakistani political leadership across the party lines, to reach out to potential Chinese partners in lesser-known places.

The Chinese leadership therefore, not only built a top-down, but also bottom-up support from Chinese industrial and financial houses, for the CPEC. Almost all the money is in commercial loans, negotiated between respective entrepreneurs. A robust and active participation built by the Chinese state itself underscores China's deep commitment towards Pakistan's growth and stability. Consequently, Chinese influence will increase in Pakistan and will spread beyond.

Since Pakistan continues to face crippling power shortages, which causes at least 2 percent GDP loss, almost $34 billion are to be spent in setting up new power plants. The early harvest power projects will yield 10,400MW of electricity by 2017-18. This will spur much of the latent industrial and agricultural activity, thus improving the lives of ordinary citizens. Pakistan estimates that there will be a 15 percent increase in its GDP by 2030, when the CPEC is due for completion. The rest of the money will be spent on fiber optics links, roads, Gwadar Port, and energy supply lines.

This huge investment can be transformational if Pakistan can improve upon its lackluster performance in FDI absorption. It is a challenge for Pakistan to devise a seamless mechanism to realize the CPEC ambitions. In process it helps improve Pakistan's abysmally poor governance standards too.

Pakistan, locked in a self-destructive parity mindset, seems to have understood that to deter India's power projection, military prowess alone will not do. Pakistan needs an economic muscle to match India's growing clout in the region and afar. Pakistan's military understands the need for this new equation even better than the oligarchic civilian leadership.

Following this major investment, China will be more inclined to protect Pakistan's security interests. And, with projected increase of 15 percent in GDP, this investment will start narrowing the economic gap between India and Pakistan. Other countries in the SAARC region will inevitably look to China for project support and money, which India cannot hope to match.

The CPEC is unique in the sense that it connects China and Pakistan only, and also connects China to the sea through the quickest route. It could be a pivot to China's One Belt, One Road (OBOR) concept that aims to connect 60 countries on the Asia and European land mass. To realize this plan, China intends to build a web of networks such as the Southern Silk Road, the Central Asia Silk Road, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and the CPEC.

A fully operational Gwadar Port and the CPEC, providing land based security, will shift the pattern of China's maritime trade links and reduce volumes to and from China through the Malacca. China's energy supplies will be less vulnerable to the 'Malacca Dilemma.' To protect its own supply chain, Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean could increase. Given long standing relations and the emerging power blocs, Pakistan will be happy to open Gwadar facilities for China's naval usage.

The U.S. is courting India with the declared purpose of assigning the lead role in the Indian Ocean, which is unacceptable to both China and Pakistan. In fact, India's cozying up to powers that China is suspicious of, compels China and Pakistan to strengthen their alliance further. China-Pakistan strategic naval partnership centered on Gwadar will scuttle the Indo-U.S. ambition of dominating the Indian Ocean.

Consequent to the emerging mistrust with the West, Russia and China have agreed to create a dialogue mechanism to integrate the Russian sponsored Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and OBOR. The agreement marks an end to Russia's hesitation about China's OBOR. Also, in the current state of belligerence, Pakistan is not going to give overland connectivity to India through Afghanistan and Central Asia. This shuts India out of the Central Asian Silk Road. With India distancing from Russia and aligning with the U.S. aims, India faces mistrust in its own backyard – much the same mistake Pakistan made in aligning with the extra regional powers – to the detriment of its own future.

For India, a major economic engagement between two of its adversaries – China and Pakistan – is a double dilemma. The economic reality of rising China compels India to support the various sections of road connectivity, like in Central Asia, East Asia and also connecting China with Myanmar, Bangladesh and India through the Southern Silk Road. Yet, India could not overcome its deep anathema towards Pakistan by objecting to the project, even though on the question of its passage through the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, during Mr. Modi's China visit in May. These Indian prejudices do not contribute to rapprochement between the two.

There are opportunities for India in the CPEC and in the OBOR. Once sanctions over Iran are lifted, the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas project can be revived. And with the CPEC in place, it is likely that the pipeline will also feed into the EUEA link. Joining an energy supply arrangement with China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan will only reinforce regional connectivity and interdependence amongst adversaries. This could be the economic bridge between South and Central Asia.

The Chinese economy is five times bigger than India's. Even with higher growth rate this year, India will need more than 50 years to catch up. India needs to loosen up while coming to terms with China's strategic rise and engage actively with China in OBOR. This will only help yield a more peaceful world.