应中方邀请，日本外相林芳正于4月1日至2日访问中国。这是自2019年12月以来日本外相首次访华，因此中方给予足够重视，国务院总理李强、中央外办主任王毅、国务委员兼外长秦刚相继同林芳正举行了会谈。双方围绕中日关系及共同关心的国际和地区问题深入交换了意见，中方还就台湾、半导体及福岛核污水排放等问题向日方亮明了态度。如对双边关系出现的杂音和干扰，王毅表示“根本原因在于日本国内一些势力刻意追随美国的错误对华政策”，秦刚更直言不讳地指出“日本不应为虎作伥，应多做有利于地区和平稳定的事”。

究竟日本为“虎”作了哪些“伥”，以至于让中国前后两任外长把话说得如此直白？总体而言，可以从三个方面加以论述。

首先，在安全保障问题上，日本充当了“辅美遏华”的“急先锋”。众所周知，美国为维护以本国为主导的霸权体系，在亚太地区强化“五眼联盟”（FVEY），兜售“四边机制”，拼凑三边安全伙伴关系（AUKUS），收紧军事同盟，构筑所谓的对华“一体化威慑力”（即拉拢盟友和伙伴形成联合威慑力，对华形成强大遏压和威慑的多层次网络）。这其中，美国希望日本发挥“战略杠杆”作用，并明确将美日关系定位为“新时代全球伙伴关系”，强调“对不符合国际秩序的中国行为抱有共同关切”。日本也积极回应，表示要让日美同盟成为自由开放的印太地区及全世界和平与安全的基石。

以此为背景，日本2022年12月通过的“安保三文件”明确提出中国是日本前所未有的最大战略挑战，为此日本不但要发展“反击能力”，还要转变“美攻日守”的传统同盟分工结构，让日本成为“攻守兼备”的国家。而未来无论是大幅提升国防支出，还是修改《日美防卫合作指针》《日美地位协定》等，均将朝着把日本打造成“辅美遏华”的“远征前进基地”这一方向发展。

其次，在经济安保问题上，日本充当了“助美制华”的“排头兵”。日本认为，中美博弈的另一个侧面是第四次产业革命的主导权竞争，因此与“志同道合国家”加强合作，促进经济安全保障合作，以此形成两轮驱动格局，引领未来国际秩序的形成——如通过构筑“小院高墙”，在半导体等部分高精尖领域推动对华“脱钩断链”，并重组相应供应链和确保日本技术优势——就显得至关重要。

为此，日本一方面与美国确立新的“美日竞争力与韧性伙伴关系”，成立创新和竞争力委员会，并积极参与美国主导的“印太经济框架”、“芯片四方联盟”、美日荷半导体协议等，另一方面通过强化与印度、东盟的经济联系，推动其摆脱对华经贸依赖，增加中国将经济优势转化为政治影响力的难度。此外值得注意的是，就在林芳正访华前一天，日本经济产业省宣布，将加强对6大类23种高性能半导体制造设备出口管制。可以想见，未来中日正常的半导体产业合作势将受到限制，进而严重损害中方的相关利益。

最后，在台湾问题上，日本充当了“联美压华”的“桥头堡”。日本认为其外交的最大价值就是竭力维系“自由与开放的国际秩序”，并在此过程中肩负重任，向国际社会彰显日本的国际责任和国际影响力。因此，明明日本介入台湾问题是赤裸裸地干涉中国内政，且其动机复杂多元，既有维护自身利益的经济与安全考量，又有制衡中国的政治盘算，但为给涉台提供一个“大义名分”，日本也像美国那样越来越注重从价值角度强调“保台”的重要意义。

基于此，日本利用各种双边或多边会谈的国际场合，在强调台湾的价值理念与美日欧等西方国家相同，各国应关注“台湾海峡和平与稳定的重要性”的同时，暗示性地渲染台湾正遭受中国大陆的“威胁”。尤其需要强调的是，俄乌冲突爆发后，日本积极将乌克兰局势与台湾问题进行“扭曲联结”，强调欧洲-大西洋与印太安全不可分割，强烈反对“任何单方面以武力或胁迫改变东海和南海现状的企图”，“台湾海峡和平稳定是国际社会安全与繁荣不可或缺的因素”。

日本上述的“为虎作伥”，显然与两国最高领导层达成的“互为合作伙伴、互不构成威胁”的政治共识背道而驰。但中日是搬不走的近邻，这也就意味着认真摸索和平相处之道具有时代必要性和历史必然性。诚如李强总理所强调的那样，双方唯有着眼大局和长远，加强对话合作，妥善管控分歧，排除风险干扰，不断扩大双边关系积极面，才能共同推动构建契合新时代要求的中日关系。

At the invitation of China, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi visited on April 1 and 2. It was the first visit by a Japanese foreign minister since December 2019. A host of connections were arranged, including meetings with Li Qiang, China's premier; Wang Yi, director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission; and Qin Gang, foreign minister and member of the State Council.The two sides had in-depth exchanges on China-Japan relations and international and regional issues of common concern. China also explained its positions on the Taiwan question, issues related to semiconductors and the discharge of contaminated water from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant.As for the jarring notes and disturbances in bilateral relations, Wang said “the fundamental reason is that some forces within Japan knowingly follow the wrong policy of the United States toward China.” State Councilor Qin was even more outspoken, stating that Japan should refrain from fanning the flames of trouble, and should do more to contribute to regional peace and stability.

So what exactly has Japan done to “fan the flames” to the point that China's two top diplomats were so outspoken? The answer can be summarized from three dimensions:

First, on the security front, Japan has acted as a vanguard to assist the U.S. effort to curb China. It is clear that the U.S., in order to maintain its hegemonic system, has strengthened the Five Eyes Alliance, peddled the quadrilateral mechanism, put together the AUKUS, intensified its military alliances and set up “integrated deterrence” against China in the Asia-Pacific region — a multilayered network of allies and partners to form a collective and powerful impediment. The U.S. expects Japan to bring strategic leverage to all this, and clearly positions the U.S.-Japan relationship as a global partnership for the new era, reiterating shared concerns about China's behavior that are supposedly inconsistent with the international order. Japan has also responded positively to make the U.S.-Japan alliance a cornerstone of peace and security in a free and open Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

Against this backdrop, the three security documents adopted in December 2022 clearly identified China as the greatest strategic challenge confronting Japan, and that for this reason Japan must not only develop a “counterbalance capability” but also transform the traditional alliance structure — in which the U.S. is on the offensive and Japan on the defensive — into one that sees Japan as both playing offensive and defensive roles. Going forward, Japan will go down the path of an “expeditionary forward base” for the U.S. to deter China, either through a significant increase in defense spending or a revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and the Status of Forces Agreement.

Second, on the issue of economic security, Japan has acted as a front in service to the U.S. objective of containing China. Japan believes that another aspect of China-U.S. competition is defined by which prevails in the fourth industrial revolution; therefore, it is strengthening cooperation with “like-minded countries” to promote economic security cooperation to form a two-wheel structure and craft the future international order, — such as through “small yards, high fences.”Therefore, it is high on Japan's agenda to advance decoupling from China in some highly sophisticated fields, such as semiconductors, and restructure the corresponding supply chains to secure Japan's technological supremacy.

To this end, Japan has, on one hand, built a new U.S.-Japan partnership of competitiveness and resilience, set up the Council on Innovation and Competitiveness and actively participated in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and Quadrilateral Alliance on Chips. On the other hand, it seeks to wean itself of dependence on China by strengthening economic ties with India and ASEAN, making it more difficult for China to turn its economic advantages into political influence.It is also worth noting that the day before Hayashi's visit to China, Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry announced that it would tighten export controls on 23 types of high-performance semiconductor manufacturing equipment in six categories, which would limit normal China-Japan cooperation in the semiconductor industry in the future and seriously damage China's related interests.

Finally, on the Taiwan question, Japan has acted as a bridgehead for the U.S. in suppressing China. Japan has been playing an underpinning role, believing that the greatest value of its diplomacy is to do its utmost to maintain a “free and open international order.” In doing so, Japan has taken on the important task of demonstrating its global responsibility and influence. Thus, it is clear that Japan's involvement in the Taiwan question is a blatant intervention in China's internal affairs and that its motives are complex and multifaceted, ranging from economics to security, to safeguard its own interests and its political calculations designed to check and balance China. But to carve out a righteous pretense for its involvement in Taiwan, Japan has been following the tune of the United States and has increasingly emphasized the importance of protecting Taiwan from a values-based perspective.

Based on this, Japan has used various international occasions, in both bilateral and multilateral talks, to emphasize that Taiwan's values are the same as those of the U.S., Japan, Europe and other Western countries, and that countries should pay attention to the “importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” while implicitly exaggerating the idea that Taiwan is “under threat” from the Chinese mainland.After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Japan has drawn parallels between the situation in Ukraine and the Taiwan question, stressing the intertwined nature of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security and strongly opposing “any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas by force or coercion.” It says that “peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is an indispensable factor in the security and prosperity of the international community.”

Japan's fanning the flames is clearly contrary to the political consensus at the highest level of leadership — the claim that they are partners and do not pose a threat to each other. But the fact that China and Japan are close neighbors means that it is both of immediate relevance and historical necessity to seriously explore ways to coexist peacefully. As Premier Li Qiang stressed, the only way to build a China-Japan relationship that meets the requirements of the new era is for both sides to focus on the overall picture and the long term, strengthen dialogue and cooperation, properly manage differences, forestall risks and disturbances and continuously expand the positive aspects of bilateral relations.