3月24日，朝鲜进行4年多来首次洲际弹道导弹试射。此举正式打破朝鲜在2018年4月宣布中止核试验和洲际弹道导弹试验的决定，也违反多个安理会决议及2018年美朝、朝韩之间的一系列协议或共识，被视为触碰了美国设定的“红线”。美韩日等国相继给予强烈谴责，朝鲜半岛局势再度进入新一轮紧张周期。

朝鲜此次试射并不令人意外。近日，美韩国防和情报机构已多次公开预测，朝鲜将进行远程导弹试验，甚至不排除核试。朝鲜领导人金正恩在今年1月19日召开的第八届中央政治局第六次会议上曾表示，将研讨是否需要重启暂停的核导试验活动。2月27日和3月5日，朝鲜以卫星开发为名进行了相关试验。3月16日，韩国军方称朝方疑似发射新型洲际导弹，但试验失败。

朝鲜时隔4年多重新进行洲际导弹试射，主要有以下意图和背景：

首先，打破目前的被动局面。2018年初朝鲜宣布暂停核导试验以来的4年多时间里，美国并未给予相应的补偿措施。2019年初美朝河内峰会不欢而散后至今，朝核问题长期处于僵滞状态，美国不愿再在朝核问题上浪费外交资源，对近两年朝鲜的一系列军事示强举动也基本置之不理。由于美国主导的对朝制裁体系长期维持，朝鲜经济民生异常困难，此状态长期拖延明显不利于朝鲜。外界普遍认为，核和远程导弹试验是美国的红线，朝鲜希望借此迫使美国重视朝鲜诉求、打破当前困局。

其二，由于俄乌冲突，当前的国际时机对朝鲜比较有利。此前外界大多推测朝鲜顾忌安理会制裁加码，可能在核导问题上较为谨慎。然而今年年初俄乌冲突的意外爆发，使主要大国无暇顾及朝核问题。美国在俄乌问题上焦头烂额，无过多精力应对朝鲜。安理会中，美俄现在处于严重对立状态，俄罗斯很难配合美国同意追加对朝制裁。美国不断打压中国，中国也很难同意美国侧重于以制裁解决朝核问题的主张，而主张重视朝鲜的安全和发展关切。韩国则处于新旧总统交接期，朝野正忙于总统府搬迁、人事任命、政策分歧等一系列斗争，对朝鲜很难有实质应对。

其三，给韩国新政府“下马威”。韩国刚刚选出尹锡悦新一届政府，其对朝政策基调更强调“原则”，要求朝鲜“先弃核、后补偿”，所重用的外交安全团队多是李明博政府旧部，曾主张强硬的对朝政策。朝鲜进行洲际导弹试验，对韩国新政府也是一种压力测试和提前示威。

朝鲜试射远程导弹，对东北亚地区的政治影响远大于军事影响。近年来，美国对朝鲜核导的实际威胁能力并无过度担忧，它认为以朝鲜的综合国力、工业能力等制造的导弹，离实际威胁美国本土还有很大距离。因此，美国近两年对朝鲜高超音速导弹、潜射导弹等一系列试验都轻拿轻放，甚至视而不见。近期，美国对朝核问题的重视程度有所提高，美国国防与情报当局接连详细公布朝鲜将恢复远程导弹和核试验等消息。不过，美国却不着急推出避免朝核危机的方案（例如尽快恢复谈判、对朝释放善意等），反而实施新的对朝制裁，频繁与日韩加强军事和外交沟通。

目前，美国在朝核问题上既不愿对朝谋求务实交易，也不可能采用武力手段，反而更可能趁机利用朝核问题，加大对华施压。在韩国新当选的保守政府更亲美、对朝强硬的政策倾向下，美国大概率会以朝核问题为抓手，趁机加强美日韩合作和美韩同盟，甚至在半岛加大“萨德”等军事部署，推动韩国加入四国机制或五眼联盟。若此，必将恶化东北亚地区的繁荣稳定，加剧阵营对立。

与世界其他区域相比，稳定繁荣是东亚地区当下最大的优势，也是东亚国家最大的利益公约数。朝核问题还是应当用和平对话的方式解决。美国及各方应当考虑朝鲜的安全和发展需求，朝鲜也应该坚持七届三中全会确立的经济建设为重的路线，不断提升本国综合国力，在无核化上做出积极姿态。持续对立和对抗，是东亚地区大部分国家都不愿意看到的。

On March 24, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time in more than four years. The launch ended the DPRK's suspension of nuclear and ICBM tests that it had announced in April 2018, violating several UN Security Council resolutions, as well as a series of agreements or matters o consensus in 2018 between the U.S. and the DPRK, and between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea. The test was said to have crossed a red line set by the U.S., which, along with the ROK, Japan and other countries, strongly condemned the DPRK. Thus, the situation on the Korean Peninsula once again entered a new cycle of tension.

The DPRK's missile launch was not a surprise. Recently, the U.S. and ROK defense and intelligence agencies predicted in public that the DPRK would soon conduct a long-range missile test, or even a nuclear test. The DPRK's leader, Kim Jong-un, said at the sixth Political Bureau Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee on Jan. 19 that he would examine the need to restart the suspended nuclear missile tests. The DPRK conducted tests on Feb. 27 and March 5 under the pretext of satellite development.

The DPRK launched a new ICBM after more than four years, mainly with the following intentions and background:

First, it wanted to break the current passive situation. In the more than four years since the DPRK announced the suspension of nuclear missile tests (in early 2018), the U.S. has not given it compensatory measures. After the breakup of the Hanoi summit in early 2019, the DPRK nuclear issue was put on hold. The U.S. has been unwilling to expend diplomatic resources on it and has largely ignored a series of military shows of strength by the DPRK over the past two years.As the U.S.-led sanctions regimen against the DPRK has been maintained for a long time, the DPRK's economy and people's lives have been in exceptional difficulty. If this continues long-term, it clearly benefits the U.S. to the detriment of the DPRK.It is widely believed that nuclear and long-range missile tests by the DPRK are a U.S. red line. The DPRK hopes to force the United States to pay attention to the its demands and break the current deadlock.

Second, the current international timing, given the Russia-Ukraine conflict, is more favorable to the DPRK. Previously, it was widely speculated that the DPRK might be more cautious on nuclear and missile issues for fear of more sanctions. However, the unexpected outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict earlier this year has left the major powers with no time for the DPRK's nuclear issue. The U.S., preoccupied with the Russia-Ukraine issue, is not focusing on the DPRK nuclear issue.In the Security Council, the U.S. and Russia are now in a serious confrontation, and it's difficult for Russia to cooperate with the U.S. on additional sanctions against the DPRK. As the U.S. continues to suppress China, it is also difficult for China to agree with the U.S. proposition of focusing on sanctions to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue. Instead China is advocating attention to the DPRK's security and development concerns. The ROK is in a period of transition between old and new presidents, and the entire country is busy with a series of struggles, including the presidential office relocation, personnel appointments and policy disagreements. All this makes it difficult for the country to respond substantively to the DPRK.

Third, the DPRK wants to give the new ROK government a kick in the pants. The ROK has just elected a new government, led by Yoon Suk-yeol, whose policy tone toward the DPRK emphasizes “principles” and demands that the DPRK give up its nuclear weapons before being compensated. The new government uses mostly the same diplomatic and security teams as the old Lee Myung-bak administration, which have advocated a tough policy toward the DPRK. The DPRK's ICBM test is also a stress test and an early demonstration for the new government.

The test will have far greater political than military implications for Northeast Asia. In recent years, the U.S. has not seemed very concerned about the actual threat capability of the DPRK's nuclear missiles but rather believes that missiles made with the DPRK's comprehensive national power and industrial capacity are still a long way from actually threatening the U.S. mainland. For this reason, the U.S. has turned a blind eye to the DPRK's hypersonic missile and submarine-launched missile tests over the past two years.However, the U.S. has recently taken the DPRK nuclear issue more seriously. American defense and intelligence authorities have announced in detail that the DPRK will resume long-range missile and nuclear tests, but instead of rushing to launch proposals to avert a crisis — such as resuming negotiations as soon as possible and showing goodwill toward the DPRK — the U.S. has imposed new sanctions and strengthened military and diplomatic communication with Japan and the ROK.

The U.S. is currently not willing to seek a pragmatic deal with the DPRK on the nuclear issue, nor is it likely to use force; it is more likely to take the opportunity to use the nuclear issue to increase pressure on China. With the newly elected conservative government in the ROK being more pro-U.S. and tougher on the DPRK, the U.S. is likely to use the DPRK nuclear issue to strengthen U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation and the U.S.-ROK alliance — and even increase its military deployments, such as SAD, in the peninsula and push the ROK to join the four-nation mechanism or the Five Eyes alliance. If this happens, it will certainly degrade the prosperity and stability of Northeast Asia and intensify the confrontation between camps.At present, compared with other regions of the world, stability and prosperity are the biggest advantages of the East Asia region and the greatest common interest of East Asian countries. The DPRK nuclear issue should be resolved by peaceful dialogue.

The U.S. and other countries should consider the security and development needs of the DPRK, and the DPRK should adhere to the line of economic development established at the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, continuously improve its composite national strength and make a positive gesture on denuclearization. Continued opposition and confrontation are something that most countries in East Asia do not want to see.