1970年以来全球商业航运量几乎增加了四倍，如今每年有近9万艘商船装载着98.4亿吨货物通过印度洋。霍尔木兹海峡、马六甲海峡和曼德海峡是全球最重要的三大航运瓶颈，3600万桶石油由此运出，等于全球近40%的石油供应和64%的石油贸易运量需要经过这一海域。除了40%的石油产量，印度洋还占据全球渔业产量的近15%。

它无疑是连接中东、欧美、东南亚、大洋洲和东亚的一个战略性贸易枢纽。印度洋上贸易航线的任何中断，都可能对中国、日本、韩国等主要经济体以及产油的波斯湾等地区产生巨大影响。简单说就是，也许没有比印度洋更重要的大洋了。

随着1968年英国海军从“东苏伊士”撤出，美国人继而介入。通过与英国的共同安排，美国租借了英属印度洋领地的一个小岛——迪戈加西亚岛，在驱逐和迁走当地的近千居民后，美国在印度洋建立了永久海军基地。该基地是美国在印度洋优势地位的象征，威慑着所有对美国发起挑战的对手。这个地方是如此神秘，以至于不存在前往迪戈加西亚岛的班机或海上交通服务。

中国在印度洋的利益与它的能源需求和商业利益同步扩大，中国一跃成为世界上最大的贸易国。中国近80%的能源进口和95%的货物运输要经过印度洋，尤其是两大主要航运瓶颈，而它的整条航线都在美国和印度的军事控制下，这两个国家都把中国视为对手。实际上，中国的“海上丝绸之路”倡议使它更迫切地需要控制其贸易航线。任何一个与开放贸易利害攸关的国家，都无法承受在海上任由对手摆布。也因此，中国一直热衷于借西方媒体所说的“珍珠链”港口实现在印度洋的永久存在，它在缅甸、斯里兰卡、巴基斯坦等几个沿海国家开发港口，同时还盯上了塞舌尔、蒙巴萨、达累斯萨拉姆等其他地区港口。2017年7月，中国在吉布提建立海外海军基地，为目前中国在红海一带的永久性反海盗部署提供支援。

中国的崛起挑战着美国在印度洋的主导地位。数十年来，美国一直试图挑起印度对崛起的中国的恐惧，并力图招募印度充当地区警察，以此来对抗中国。奥巴马时代的“重返亚洲”也是这一战略目标的组成部分。美国支持印度对抗中国，因为这与它遏制中国这一更广泛的安全战略目标是一致的。而渴望获得地区主导地位的印度也欢迎美国的存在和支持，因为这与它主宰印度洋的愿景相吻合。在利益上相互支持，这对它们的共同对手中国是不利的。

说到中国在斯里兰卡、缅甸和巴基斯坦的港口建设，以及在吉布提的第一个海外海军基地，印度和美国的海军战略家们谎称他们担心所谓的中国海军在印度洋日益增长的存在，可是，他们却无视美国海军在迪戈加西亚岛的存在，无视遍布印度海岸、安达曼群岛以及如今设在毛里求斯和塞舌尔群岛的印度海军基地。尤其安达曼群岛离马六甲海峡很近，这让中国的海上利益面临严重风险。然而，中国海军在印度洋地区的存在主要是执行打击海盗任务，属于索马里近海及红海地区多边安排的一部分。

印美印两国一直特别强调要进一步加强海上关系，尤其是2015年发表《美印亚太及印度洋地区联合战略愿景声明》之后。有关军事关系的四个基础协议允许双方共享情报、使用战略性海军设施，等等。当然在现在的印度政府看来，美国加强在印度洋地区的存在是印度对抗中国的重要对冲。

印度和美国自1992年以来开始举行的“马拉巴尔”海上军演，也展示出两国的海上合作正在迅速发展。随着2015年日本加入，现在澳大利亚也加入（曾于2007年退出），军演的规模和范围都有所扩大。这四个国家现在组成的“四方安全对话”（Quad），被美国的智库和媒体吹捧为反对“独裁”中国的民主国家集团。拜登总统首次参加的国际活动——四方首次（线上）峰会凸显了美国外交政策的方向。

开国总理贾瓦哈拉尔•尼赫鲁曾将印度洋上的所有外国势力拒之门外，自那以后，印度对外交政策的看法已经发生了变化。随着印度现在与美国结盟，总理纳伦德拉·莫迪承认，印度愿意与“在该地区拥有强大利益和利害关系”的域外大国合作。也因此，印度和美国之间有了四个基础军事协议，如今美印两国举行的军演比任何两个国家都多。

美国国防部长劳埃德·奥斯丁上任两个月后对印度进行访问，称印度是“在当今快速变化的国际态势下日益重要的合作伙伴”，这显示了拜登政府对把印度当作对抗中国的地区代理人的重视。

中国的“一带一路”倡议和“海上丝绸之路”需要海上自由，这使得中国和美国为争夺印度洋的安全控制权展开了一场较量。由于印度现在选择与美国在安全方面联手，而这种关系显然与中国的利益是敌对的，因此，一场对印度洋控制权的争夺将导致资源的消耗，并有可能进一步加剧印度洋沿岸国家的分化。这种状况既不符合两国的最大利益，也不符合整个亚洲的利益。亚洲的未来最好是将外来者挡在门外。

Representing nearly a fourfold increase in the volume of commercial shipping since 1970 almost 90,000 vessels carrying 9.84 billion tons of cargo travel through the Indian Ocean annually. Three of the most critical global shipping choke points – Straits of Hormuz, Malacca Straits and Bab-el-Mandeb, from which some 36 million barrels of oil, equivalent to nearly 40 percent of global oil supply and 64 percent of oil trade pass through are in this ocean. In addition to 40 percent of oil production, the Indian Ocean accounts for nearly 15 percent of the world's commercial fishing.

It is unquestionably a strategic trading hub connecting the Middle East to Europe and Americas, to Southeast Asia, Oceania and East Asia. Any disruption in the Indian Ocean trading routes can have a huge impact upon major economies like China, Japan, Korea, the oil producing Persian Gulf, and beyond. In short, there is perhaps no other ocean as important in comparison.

Following the withdrawal of the British from its naval commitments 'east of Suez,' in 1968 the Americans stepped in. Through a mutual arrangement with the British, the U.S. leased Diego Garcia, a small island in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) and set up a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean after expelling and relocating nearly 1,000 local residents. This base symbolizes the American preeminence in the ocean and deters any adversary to challenge the U.S. The place is so secretive that no regular flights or maritime traffic operate to Diego Garcia.

China's interests in the Indian Ocean have expanded in parallel with its energy needs and commercial interests that have catapulted China to the status of the biggest trading nation in the world. Nearly 80 percent of China's energy imports and 95 percent of its goods traffic passes through the Indian Ocean, particularly involving the two of the major shipping choke points. The entire shipping routes are militarily controlled by the U.S. and India – the two countries that consider China as their adversary. Its 'Maritime Silk Road' initiative have actually made the need for China to control shipping on its trade routes more acute. No country with so much at stake on open trade can afford to leave the seas at the mercy of its adversaries. China has therefore been keen to make its presence in the Indian Ocean permanent through what the western media calls, 'string of pearl' ports – developing ports in several littoral states like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and eyeing other regional ports like Seychelles, Mombasa, Dar us Salam, and more. China set up its overseas naval base in Djibouti in July 2017, which supports China's permanent anti-piracy deployment around the Red Sea region for now.

China's rise challenges American primacy in the Indian Ocean. For decades the U.S. has tried to stoke India's fears of rising China and has sought to enlist India as a regional gendarme against China. The Obama era 'Pivot to Asia' was also a part of this strategic aim. American support for India against China aligns with its broader security and strategic goals of containing China. India, aspiring for regional primacy, welcomed the American's presence and support as much as it aligns with the Indian vision of dominating the Indian Ocean. Mutual support for each other's interest works against their common adversary – China.

Citing Chinese port building in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Pakistan and its first overseas naval base in Djibouti, Indian and American naval strategists are ostensibly concerned at what they claim as growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. But they overlook the American naval presence in Diego Garcia and Indian naval stations all across India's coast, in Andamans, and now in Mauritius and Seychelles. The Andamans is particularly close to the Malacca Straits, putting the Chinese maritime interests at serious risk. China's naval presence in the Indian Ocean region is however, mostly for the anti-piracy missions as a part of a multilateral arrangements close to the Somali coast and the Red Sea region.

The two countries have, especially since the signing of 'U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision Statement for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region' in 2015, laid special emphasis in furthering maritime ties. The four-foundation agreements on military relations allow for intelligence sharing, use of strategic naval facilities and much more. Surely, the current Indian government believes that America's forward presence in the Indian Ocean region as a vital hedge against China.

The burgeoning naval collaboration is also demonstrated through the 'Malabar' naval exercises that India and the U.S. have held since 1992. Joined by Japan in 2015 and now Australia (after exiting in 2007) these have grown in size and scope. These four states now constitute 'the Quad' – touted as group of democracies against 'authoritarian' China by the American think tanks and the media. President Biden's first international engagement – the first (virtual) summit of the Quad underscores the direction American foreign policy is taking.

Indian outlook towards the foreign policy has changed since the days of its founding prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru when India shut out all foreign presence in the Indian Ocean. With India now aligned to the U.S., Prime Minister Narendra Modi concedes that India was willing to work with extra- regional powers “with strong interests and stakes in the region.” Hence, the four foundation military agreements between India and the U.S.. The U.S. and India now conduct more military exercises than any other two states.

Secretary for Defense Mr. Lloyd Austin declared India as “an increasingly important partner among today's rapidly shifting international dynamic,” within two months of assumption of post on a visit to India, demonstrating the importance that the Biden administration attaches to India as a regional surrogate against China.

China's 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI) and its 'Maritime Silk Road' which necessitates freedom of the seas sets up a tussle for security control of the Indian Ocean between China and the U.S.. And since India has now chosen to be in a security relationship with the U.S. that is clearly hostile to the Chinese interests, a contest for control of Indian Ocean will consume resources and in likelihood further polarize the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. Such a state is not in the best interests of either of the countries or Asia at large. Asia's future is best served with keeping the outsiders out.