近日，由中国南海研究院和英国菲耶塔国际公法律师事务所合作完成的《南海仲裁案裁决的法律批驳》（A Legal Critique of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration）通过《亚洲国际法年刊》在荷兰博睿学术出版社全文线上发布，并面向国际社会、境内外研究机构和专家学者开放，提供长期免费下载服务。

这份历时两年、篇幅近200页的报告是菲律宾南海仲裁案非法裁决出炉以来，第一份由中国智库组织和主导、国际知名律师事务所和多位来自英国、美国、荷兰的顶级国际法专家以及有代理国家法律服务、实践经验丰富的诉讼律师深度参与撰写的重磅成果。

报告以客观、公正、中立的“第三方视角”援引和参考了大量国际司法与仲裁案例及国家实践，对南海仲裁案仲裁庭在法律解释与适用、证据采信、事实认定等方面存在的诸多谬误和瑕疵进行了全面系统的批驳。报告在西方国家正式出版发行有助于国际社会进一步了解南海仲裁案的真相，尤其是隐藏在其背后的政治操弄及法律缺陷，并从国际法视角理解中国“不接受、不参与、不承认”立场的必然性和正当性。

应当指出的是，该报告的发布不是为了掀起新一轮外交法律论战，而是希望再度以严谨、客观的学理分析向国际学术界和整个国际社会深刻揭示南海仲裁案及其裁决的历史性错误，以及裁决对于南海和平稳定的负面影响和对国际法治、海洋秩序造成的严重损害。报告呈现出几方面亮点和特点：第一，仲裁庭裁定对于菲律宾所提的第1、2项诉求具有管辖权，在实体法上很容易被质疑。中国在南海的海洋权利与南沙岛礁领土主权问题之间有着无法割裂的联系，而与领土主权有关的国际争端之强制性解决，已经为1982年《联合国海洋法公约》（以下简称《公约》）所排除。仲裁庭对于中国历史性权利主张的裁决，尤其是历史性权利主张并不包括“历史性所有权”的结论，也存在诸多不得不令人生疑之处。仲裁庭区分了“历史性所有权”和“历史性权利”，并据此认为《公约》规定的争端解决程序仅仅排除了狭义界定下的“历史性所有权”问题。从国际法上看，这一结论并无确实的基础。即使仲裁庭的这个结论是正确的，也有大量证据证明，中国在“断续线”内的海洋权利主张包括了“历史性所有权”。同样让人怀疑的是，仲裁庭是否是一个有权利决定中国所主张的断续线及相关的历史性权利“没有法律效力”的适格机构？客观地讲，这个问题根本就不涉及对“《公约》的解释或适用”，因而也不在依据《公约》而成立的仲裁庭之管辖范围内。

第二，对于菲律宾所提之第1、2项诉求所涉及到的实体问题，仲裁庭做出的裁决也容易受到实体法上的质疑。尤其仲裁庭得出结论认为，《公约》“没有留下可以主张历史性权利的任何空间”，这一结论非常值得怀疑。历史性权利能够独立于《公约》而继续存在，这一结论已经由厄立特里亚诉也门仲裁案的裁决所确认，与《公约》某些条款保持了一致。因此，仲裁庭关于“超出《公约》所施加的限制性规定而主张的历史性权利、其他主权权利或管辖权业已为《公约》的规定所废止”的结论很有可能是错误的。对于仲裁庭来说，无视“断续线”和“断续线”所指向的诸多权利，基于《公约》已经“取代”所有历史性权利这一判断得出结论是不适当的。相反，历史性权利制度存在于包括专属经济区在内的多种海洋区域，能够为与《公约》并行的一般国际法所保护。

第三，对于菲律宾提出的第3、7项诉求所涉南沙岛礁和地物的法律地位问题，仲裁庭所做出的各项裁决也经不起推敲。仲裁庭认为，太平岛和南沙群岛中的所有其他高潮地物均为“岩礁”，都不能维持《公约》第121.3条意义上的人类居住或经济生活。无论是作为一个法律问题，还是作为一个证据问题，这一结论都备受质疑。

第四，根据所搜集的证据，仲裁庭本可以得出结论认为美济礁是一个高潮地物，可以根据《公约》第121.3条有资格拥有领海。如果仲裁庭得出这样的结论，对于菲律宾所提的第5、8、9、12项诉求（仅就它们涉及到的美济礁及其领海而言），它就没有管辖权，因而也就不能对诸多实体问题做出若干实体性裁决。尤其要指出的是，如果这样，它就不会得出“美济礁位于菲律宾的专属经济区之内”这样的结论，也不会认为中国在美济礁周围海域进行的若干活动都违反了《公约》的规定。

第五，仲裁庭决定不分析其他高潮地物（安波沙洲、费信岛、南钥岛、鸿庥岛、马欢岛、敦谦沙洲、景宏岛和弹丸礁）在《公约》上的法律地位。仲裁庭这种“走捷径”的做法令人吃惊，也颇具争议，违反了其在确认管辖权时所负有的相应义务。要履行这一义务，仲裁庭就必须通过一种有意义的方式，参考可以得到的全部证据，评估南沙群岛中全部岛礁的法律地位。

第六，在菲律宾提出的诸多诉求中（第8至第13项诉求），都涉及到了中国在南海进行的诸多活动，但对于菲律宾这些诉求中的大多数来说，仲裁庭可能都没有管辖权。对于第8、9、12项诉求，仲裁庭可能没有管辖权的理由见上面的概述部分。此外，仲裁庭还很有争议地认为，《公约》第298条第1款b项关于“军事活动例外”的规定不可适用，对于中国将南沙部分地物据为领土及在这些地物之上的建筑活动，仲裁庭都错误地行使了管辖权。

第七，在菲律宾所提的一些诉求（第8至第13项诉求）中涉及到中国在南海的诸多活动，虽然仲裁庭对于这些诉求确实拥有管辖权，仲裁庭就这些特定实体问题做出的若干裁决在法律上可能是正确的（如关于国家在《公约》下所承担的环境义务与适当顾及义务），但这些裁决都涉及到若干孤立的事件，或者建立在较为有限的证据基础之上。进一步讲，仲裁庭认为，中国执法船舶在黄岩岛附近海域的执法活动违反了《公约》第94条的规定。但事实上，《公约》第94条并不适用于领海地区发生的争议，因而这一裁决并不正确。

第八，在若干方面，仲裁庭违反了它在《公约》项下的义务，即它本身需要证明菲律宾的这些诉求“在事实上和法律上均确有根据”。这些违反《公约》义务的行为包括仲裁庭直接聘用档案保管人，以便找出日后可以由仲裁庭用来支持菲律宾指控中国的证据；但与此同时，仲裁庭既没有探究可能本来容易获得的证据，也没有探究可能本来会抑损菲律宾诸多诉求的证据（如台湾声称的关于太平岛之地位的证据）。仲裁庭的这一做法超越了它所获得的授权，减轻了菲律宾的举证责任。

第九，更进一步地讲，仲裁庭还犯了一个程序上的错误：在实体问题开庭审理之后，它任命了四位专家，但没有向双方当事人提供对这四位专家进行质证的机会，但却根据这些专家的意见做出裁决。

第十，在本案涉及到第三国的权益时，仲裁庭错误适用了货币黄金原则（又称“不可或缺第三方原则”——译者注），错误地裁定“马来西亚在法律上的利益并不会成为本案'争议的标的'，不会因为本仲裁庭的裁决而受到影响”。很明显的是，当仲裁庭做出若干裁决，裁定马来西亚声索的若干高潮地物构成《公约》第121.3条意义上的“岩礁”时，该裁决就确实牵连到了马来西亚在法律上的主张。这些裁决也会牵连到越南在法律上的声索。据此可以质疑对于南沙岛礁的法律地位问题，仲裁庭是否有权管辖。

南海仲裁裁决出炉已经四年多，中国“不接受、不参与、不承认”的官方立场已为国际社会广泛知晓。但从目前南海法律争斗的现实看，裁决并非“废纸”一张，其对中国南海权利主张、南海和平稳定以及进行中的中国与东盟国家的“南海行为准则”磋商的负面影响正日益显现。鉴此，对裁决进行批驳以对冲其负面影响，是中国涉海智库和法学工作者应有的使命。

Recently, A Legal Critique of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (hereinafter referred to as the Critique) was jointly completed by National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS) and FIETTA LLP. The full text was published in the Asian Yearbook of International Law and released online by Brill Academic Publishers in the Netherlands for free download by domestic and foreign research institutions, experts and scholars and the international community in general.

Initiated and led by a Chinese think tank with internationally renowned law firm partners, top international law scholars from the UK, the US and the Netherlands, as well as solicitors with rich experience in representing nations in similar legal cases, the Critique is a nearly 200 pages report that has undergone two years of preparation. As such, it is the first refutation of the illegal ruling of the South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China) (hereinafter referred to as the Award).

In an objective, fair and neutral third-party perspective that employs rigorous juristic analysis, the Critique presents a comprehensive and systematic refutation of many fallacies and flaws in the award made by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in terms of legal interpretation and application, evidence admissibility and fact-finding.

With regard to the "nine dash line" and China's historic rights in the South China Sea, the Critique concludes that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the Philippine's Submission concerning China's historic rights and "nine dash line" in the South China Sea. The Tribunal is not competent to determine the lawful effect of China's nine dash line and related historic rights. China's maritime entitlements in the South China Sea are inextricably linked to questions of territorial title over lands and maritime areas in the South China Sea from both historical and legal perspectives and are therefore clearly excluded from compulsory international dispute settlement under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Tribunal's critical conclusion that UNCLOS "leaves no space for an assertion of historic rights" is highly questionable. Historic rights can and do continue to exist alongside and independent from UNCLOS, as confirmed by the award in the Red Sea case (Eritrea/Yemen) and even in some UNCLOS provisions.

Regarding the legal status of some features in Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands), the Critique concludes that the Tribunal's findings are also highly questionable. The Tribunal erroneously denied the integrity of China's Nansha Islands and wrongly concluded that Taiping Islands (Itu Aba Islands) and other islands are not eligible for exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. The Tribunal's conclusion that Taiping Islands and all of the other high-tide features in the Nansha Islands constitute "rocks," which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own in the sense of Article 121 of UNCLOS, is open to challenge both as a matter of law and as a matter of evidence. Had the Tribunal been impartial and objective, it could not have concluded that Meiji Reef (Mischief Reef) and other marine features are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, and Chinese activities in the waters around Meiji Reef (Mischief Reef) violate the provisions of UNCLOS. By taking a shocking and controversial "shortcut" in analyzing the legal status of high-tide features, the Tribunal arguably violated its obligation under UNCLOS to confirm its own jurisdiction.

With regard to China's maritime activities in the South China Sea, the Critique concludes that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over most of these activities. Even though a number of the Tribunal's specific merits findings are probably not so controversial on the surface, many of those findings were actually related to isolated incidents or based on limited evidence.

The Tribunal arguably violated its responsibility under UNCLOS to satisfy itself that the Philippines claims were "well founded in fact and law". For example, the Tribunal engaged with archivists in order to seek out evidence that was ultimately relied upon in order to uphold the Philippines' claims against China. In parallel, the Tribunal failed to explore evidence that may have been readily available to it and that may have undermined the Philippines' claims (such as evidence held by island of Taiwan in respect of Taiping/ Itu Aba Islands).

In doing so, the Tribunal arguably exceeded its mandate by relieving the Philippines of its burden of proof. In addition, the Tribunal committed a further procedural error by failing to provide the Parties with an opportunity to cross-examine four experts that it appointed after the merits hearing, and upon whose advice it relied in the Award. As mentioned above, the Tribunal's many practices, such as lowering the threshold of compulsory procedures and violating the principles of "state consent" and "no trial without complaint", may lead to international abuses of litigation and bring serious damages to the international rule of law.

A prediction can be made that the official release of the third-party Critique in Western countries will help the international community to further perceive the truth, comprehend the political manipulations and legal defects of the South China Sea Arbitration, and understand from the perspective of international law the necessity and legitimacy of China's position in that China does not accept or participate in (the arbitration), and does not recognize the so-called "award".

It should be pointed out that the release of the Critique is not to set off a new round of diplomatic and legal debates with the Philippines. It seeks to reveal once again to international law academia and the entire international community the historic mistakes of the Tribunal and its award and the adverse effect of the Arbitration on the peace and stability of the South China Sea and the international maritime order. We hope they can take this as a lesson in order to cherish and maintain the current good momentum being made in the South China Sea.

It has been more than four years since the award of the South China Sea Arbitration was issued. China's official position of "no acceptance, no participation and no recognition" has already been widely known by the international community. However, judging from some countries' preferences for invoking the Award and the existing legal battles in the South China Sea, the Award is far from being just a piece of paper.

Rather, its negative influence on China's rights and claims as well as the long-term stability in the South China Sea and the maritime cooperation under the framework of the Declaration on the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea (DOC) is increasingly apparent.

Therefore, it is not only the due mission for China's think tanks of marine studies and legal professionals to fathom. It is also the obligation for every Chinese citizen with a sense of justice to unmask and refute the Award from a third-party perspective and make the Critique known to the international community. This will undercut or even eradicate the negative effect of the Award.