2016年6月14日，中国外交部长王毅（左二）和东盟外长一同出席在中国云南玉溪举行的中国-东盟国家外长特别会议。（法新社）

2013年9月，中国与东盟国家就“南海行为准则”（COC）全面启动磋商。2017年8月，中国与东盟国家签署COC框架文本。如无意外，中国和东盟国家领导人将在今年11月的中国-东盟领导人峰会上正式宣布启动COC实质性磋商，也就是对“重要和复杂问题”开展磋商。COC备受国际社会关注的不外乎两点：它到底是什么？何时正式出炉？

第一，COC是什么？其中至少包涵三个层面的内容，即为什么要制定COC，它与2002年签署的《南海各方行为宣言》（DOC）有何关系，它的性质是什么。

COC并非近些年南海问题升温而制造出来的一个新概念。早在1992年7月东盟外长会上，菲律宾就提出制定“南海行为准则”的构想，最终得到与会外长对通过一项南海宣言的支持，即《东盟南海宣言》。

1992年至2000年，中国政府当时认为，东盟与中国领导人共同签署的联合声明等政府性文件足以指导处理南海争端问题，没有必要再另搞一套。但从2000年起，中国政府又从强化发展同东盟关系长远利益出发，同意与东盟国家成立COC磋商联合工作组。

2002年之前，中国与东盟国家就COC举行了积极磋商，但因为对其草拟的文本内容、性质以及具体涉及的适用地理范围、联合军演、争议海域捕鱼活动等细节问题存在分歧，最终各方妥协性推动签署了众所周知的DOC，用以暂代COC。

2011年7月，中国与东盟达成《落实<南海各方行为宣言>指针》。2013年9月，落实的DOC联合工作组就COC启动具体磋商，以此为标志，COC磋商就此全面铺开。

至于DOC与COC的关系，DOC是中国和东盟国家就南海问题签署的首个政治文件,对于管控南海危机、维护南海和平稳定具有里程碑式的重要意义。COC是DOC的升级版，两者一脉相承，不可割裂。DOC第十款明文规定“有关各方重申制定南海行为准则将进一步促进本地区和平与稳定，并同意在各方协商一致的基础上，朝最终达成该目标而努力”。中国和东盟国家正是在全面有效落实DOC框架下积极推进COC的磋商，且两者同为一个工作组的人员构成。因此，COC的制定理应以DOC为起点和框架，在此基础上寻求最广泛共识，照顾各方舒适度。

COC的性质问题，也是最为核心的问题。COC是类似于DOC的政治文件？还是具有约束力的法律文件？目前东盟国家内部尚存争议，没有统一的认识。很明显，制定一个没有任何法律约束力的COC，对东盟国家增信释疑、有效管控南海争端危机、阻止域外力量介入作用有限。当初正是由于东盟某些国家认为DOC不具备法律约束力，才肆意采取有违DOC的单边行为，破坏遵守DOC的承诺和彼此间的政治互信。

目前，中国政府对于COC秉持的是一种开放态度，是否具有约束力将视与东盟10国磋商进程而定。如果中国政府当前直接表示COC不具有任何约束力，势必会打击东盟的积极性，也显得中国不自信，因为长期以来某些国家本身就对中国充满猜疑，所谓中国担心COC的约束力也制约自身在南海的行动。但从当前形势来看，COC是否具有约束力，或者说有多大程度上的约束力，讨论此项内容的时机还远远未到。各方有很高的期待，但也要有足够的耐心。

越南希望将COC变成一项附带争端解决机制的具有强制约束力的法律文件，希望借此掣肘中国政府在南海的维权行为。菲律宾单方面提起南海仲裁案，仲裁庭对菲律宾提出的DOC是不具有约束力的政治文件予以支持，也就变相鼓励将COC定性为具有法律约束力的争端解决机制。然而，可以断定的是无论是已经制定的DOC，还是正在磋商中的COC，都不可能是领土主权和海洋划界的争端解决机制，而是为了共同维护南海地区的和平与稳定的危机管控机制，旨在促进各方提升互信，避免发生冲突，通过打造共同认可的地区规则，为最终和平解决争端奠定基础。中国政府坚持“搁置争议，共同开发”，以“双轨思路”处理南海问题。

第二，COC何时出炉？2017年8月签署的COC框架文本只是整个COC磋商进程中的阶段性成果，不涉及具体的“重要和复杂性问题”，也并非外界所误解的COC正式文本。在COC磋商中，妥协性签署DOC之前碰到的诸如适用范围、军事活动等系列重要和复杂问题会再次一一呈现，实质性磋商必将是一个逐步积累、举步维艰的过程。COC的制定关系到各方利益及南海地区和平与稳定大局，需要有充分的空间和时间来协商，而重中之重则是有一个高度的政治互信和良好的外部环境为基础，这也就决定了COC磋商无法设置明确的时间表，一切都只能在没有外界重大干扰和南海形势基本稳定的前提下循序渐进。美国、日本、澳大利亚作为南海域外国家，长期以来急切期望制定具有强制约束力的COC，并给国际社会造成中国有意在COC上“拖延”的错误认识。其实2016年7月的中国-东盟外长会上，王毅外长对于COC磋商提出了十六字愿景，即“合理预期、协商一致、排除干扰、循序渐进”。

东盟已走完50年历程，南海问题不是中国和东盟间的问题，更不是中国-东盟关系的全部。部分南海声索国出于一己私利，对落实DOC框架下合作项目积极性不高，更有国家利用东盟轮值主席国机会假借东盟10国之力对中国施压，力促尽快签署COC，甚至让美国、日本等域外力量参与其中，这显然是极不明智的抉择。眼下当务之急是各方继续全面有效落实好DOC框架下的务实合作，以合作促发展，为COC的最终制定创造必要条件和良好氛围。

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (second from left) and Asean foreign ministers attending an Asean-China foreign ministers' meeting in Yuxi, China, on 2016 June 14 (AFP)

In September 2013, China and the ASEAN countries began negotiations to produce a code of conduct in the South China Sea (the COC). A COC framework text was signed in August 2017 and, if things go smoothly, their leaders will announce the formal launch of the substantive part of the COC consultation at their summit in November. This consultation will deal with certain “important and complex issues”. But what is the COC anyway, and when will it be realized?

The answer to the first question involves at least three things. Why is the COC necessary? What is the relationship between the COC and the DOC - the Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea – which was concluded in 2002? And what is the nature of the COC?

To begin with, the COC is not a new concept manufactured because of recent tensions in the South China Sea. The ASEAN countries adopted a “South China Sea Declaration” as early as in July 1992 when their foreign ministers met and acted on a Philippine proposal for a “South China Sea code of conduct”.

The Chinese position from 1992 to 2000 was that such inter-governmental documents were adequate for guiding China and ASEAN countries in handling disputes on the South China Sea and that there was no need to devise new mechanisms. Yet from 2000 onward, the Chinese government agreed to set up a China-ASEAN working group for COC consultation in the long-term interests of stronger ties with ASEAN countries.

China worked vigorously with ASEAN countries on the COC. But parties disagreed on many things like the language, nature and geographical coverage of the document, joint military exercises, fishing activities in disputed waters. Finally, a compromise was reached in the 2002 signing of the now well-known DOC as a temporary substitute for the COC.

In July 2011, China and ASEAN reached the “Guideline for the Implementation of the DOC”. In September 2013, the joint working group for DOC implementation held consultations on the COC.

What is the relationship between the DOC and the COC? The DOC is the first political document signed by China and the ASEAN countries on the South China Sea. It's an important milestone in the efforts to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea and to control and manage possible crises in the region. The COC is an upgraded version of the DOC. They are closely related and must not be separated from one another. Article 10 of the DOC provides that concluding parties reaffirm their commitment to a COC aimed at furthering peace and stability in the region on the basis of consensus. In fact, China and the ASEAN countries are promoting COC consultation within the framework of comprehensively and effectively implementing the DOC and have used the same working team to achieve the purpose. The formulation of the COC, therefore, ought to take the DOC as its starting point and structural framework, while seeking the broadest possible consensus and accommodating all parties.

Finally, we come to the core question: the nature of COC. Is it, in essence, a political document similar to the DOC, or is it a legal instrument that is binding on the parties? ASEAN member countries remain divided on this question. If the COC at end of the day is not legally binding, it can only play a limited role in helping the ASEAN countries effectively manage disputes and crises in the South China Sea and fend off intervention by non-regional players. Certain ASEAN members, as we remember, have taken unilateral actions in violation of the DOC, reneging on their own commitments and undermining political trust with other countries, because they did not regard the document as legally binding.

At present, China holds an open attitude towards the COC, letting the consultation process take its own course. If China were to say that the COC shouldn't be legally binding, that would not sit well with the ASEAN countries. Nor would it help China's image. Certain countries are full of suspicions of China. In their view, China would hate a legally binding COC because it would constrain her actions in the South China Sea. It is still far too early for China to address the issue of whether the COC is a legally binding document or not, or what that would mean. What China needs to do now is demonstrate patience.

Vietnam wants the COC to be a strong legally binding instrument complete with a dispute-settlement mechanism. It wants to harm China's efforts to protect its rights in the South China Sea. The Philippines received support in the arbitration case that the DOC was just a non-binding political document. This was interpreted as an encouragement to make the COC a legally binding, dispute-settlement mechanism. What can be said categorically is that neither the DOC nor a COC still under discussion can become a dispute-settlement mechanism that defines territorial sovereignty and maritime demarcation. They are designed to manage crises and collectively maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea by promoting mutual trust, preventing conflicts and building commonly accepted rules conducive to the eventual peaceful settlement of disputes. The Chinese government will continue to pursue the policy of “shelving the dispute and going for common development” and follow the “dual-track approach” in handling the South China Sea issue.

When will the COC be realized? The COC Framework adopted in August 2017 has nothing to do with specific negotiations on the “important and complex issues”. Nor does it provide any formal text of the COC. In the course of COC consultation a host of important and complex issues will be encountered, such as applicability of geographical areas and military activities, similar to those before the signing of the DOC. The COC consultation will be a gradual accumulation of consensus. At stake are the interests of different parties and the overall peace and stability in the region. Time and space is needed to address the issues. China's negotiations on the COC cannot follow a set timetable as it can only proceed on the condition that there is basic stability and no major outside interference in the region. The United States, Japan, and Australia are not countries along the South China Sea. But they have misled the world with the false notion that China is impeding the COC negotiation process. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi indicated clearly at the China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in July 2016 that COC consultation could only make gradual progress with reasonable expectations, consensus-building, and freedom from unwarranted interference.

Some claimants, driven by selfish interests, were not enthusiastic for cooperation under the DOC framework. Some others, using the rotating ASEAN presidency, opted for a speedy conclusion of the COC by putting pressure on China and bringing in influence from the US, Japan, and other outside players. This is unwise, and will not enjoy popular support inside the region. It is imperative for all relevant parties to earnestly and comprehensively implement the cooperation projects under the DOC framework, promote development through cooperation, and create conditions favorable to the realization of the COC.