2024年5月7日，法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙、中国国家主席习近平，及其夫人布丽吉特·马克龙和彭丽媛在法国上比利牛斯省的图尔马莱山口（Col du Tourmalet）举行私人会谈。法新社

习近平主席不久前的访欧之行是衡量中欧关系现状的最佳晴雨表。但快速分析此次出访之后发现，令人不安的迹象超过了有希望的进展。

此次出访距离上次已经过去五年，其间出现很多重大变化。如今，中国经济面临重重挑战，欧洲则面临安全忧虑。

这些变化影响到讨论议程，凸显了利益分歧。欧洲最关心的问题是乌克兰战争，故其领导人敦促习近平采取行动。与此同时，欧盟通过反补贴调查加强对中国若干关键领域产品的审查。对此，中国使用了外交战略和报复措施，包括对关键原材料实行出口限制，以惩罚欧洲的“去风险”行动和经济安全政策。

虽然这次访问填补了外交空白，但立即解决双方讨论的问题可能性不大。尽管达成了各类协议和承诺，但根本性的紧张局势依然存在。其表现就是欧盟领导人2023年12月时向习发出呼吁，但迄今为止收效甚微。

这种僵局引发外界对双边关系状态的质疑。访问结束后欧洲对中国的信任是否有所改善？为什么欧盟一再提出的关切对中国来说似乎毫无商量余地？最终，虽然就次要问题有可能达成共识，但这种伙伴关系潜在的结构性挑战仍未改变，从而给所有表面的共识蒙上阴影。

欧中政策演变背景下的第一战略选择——法国

习访目的地包括法国、塞尔维亚和匈牙利。鉴于中国外交十分看重象征性姿态，了解这种非常规安排背后的动机至关重要。

首先，德国和法国在中国的对欧外交政策中是重中之重，且这两个国家拥有不同层面的影响力。

德国连续八年以中国为最大贸易伙伴，这凸显了一种深深的依赖。过去20年，通过似乎已经过时的范式，德国占中欧进出口总额的比重由5%上升到20%。习近平访欧之前，德国总理朔尔茨单独访问中国，说明德国对华政策的矛盾，这也有可能损害欧盟的凝聚力和德国的整体声誉。朔尔茨还拒绝与马克龙、冯德莱恩一起会见习近平。这些举动与他在2022年11月呼吁的“改变做法”相矛盾。

相比之下，法国有原则的外交和在中美紧张局势背景下日益突出的地位赢得了中方尊重，被视作加强对欧关系时的可靠伙伴。习近平访问巴黎期间承认两国战略利益的一致性，这说明法国的可靠性和政治可信度。尽管说是为了纪念中法建交60周年，但背后更深层次的含义已经浮现出来。2023年，中国与西班牙建交50周年庆祝活动期间，习近平并没有访问马德里，而是在北京和西班牙首相桑切斯进行了简短会晤。这与他同其他国家领导人的广泛接触形成鲜明对比。

在最近的讲话里，马克龙强调欧洲“战略自主”的立场，介绍了欧盟在重大威胁下的生存战略。他强调这一原则反映出欧洲外交政策日益自信，这将塑造中欧关系的格局。

马克龙注重加强对华关系，主张拥有更多主权，不受美国影响，这符合习近平的想法。与之形成鲜明对比的是，他也认为中国产能过剩和对欧大量出口带来了风险，对此习近平予以否认。不过，这种担忧已经被中国国内接受。北京大学教授卢锋承认，产能过剩在部分行业普遍存在。

欧洲通过加深一体化和统一防御来寻求战略自主权的努力，将影响其与美国、北约和中国的往来，这将通过三个阶段显现。首先，优先考虑独立于美国的自主权将重塑欧盟的跨大西洋战略。随后，这些转变将影响北约，提升欧盟的集体防御能力。最终，这些转变将有助于欧盟更公平地与中国接触，使其能够自主追求自身利益。

法国、德国的领导人和欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩对中国的看法仍然存在矛盾。马克龙主张谨慎接触，冯德莱恩则倾向于和华盛顿保持一致，德国优先考虑维持现状。然而，中国随后的行动使欧洲加强政策一致性和敏感性的努力受挫。

2024年5月7日，中国国家主席习近平和夫人彭丽媛抵达塞尔维亚首都贝尔格莱德的尼古拉·特斯拉机场，受到塞尔维亚总统亚历山大·武契奇（前右二）和夫人塔玛拉·武契奇（前右一）的欢迎。(照片: 王壮飞 / 中国日报)

2024年5月9日，在匈牙利布达佩斯布达城堡举行的欢迎仪式前，中国国家主席习近平（右）与匈牙利总理欧尔班·维克托（左）握手。(照片：Vivien Cher Benko/Pool/AFP)

奇怪的选择：塞尔维亚和匈牙利

选择塞尔维亚和匈牙利作为此次访问的目的地，看似不合常规，却强调了中国在该地区及其他地区的战略利益。了解相关背景信息能极大地帮助我们理解其地缘政治的意义和影响。

首先，匈牙利（2004年加入欧盟）和塞尔维亚（2009年起申请加入欧盟）是中国在中东欧地区的附庸，但这两个国家在欧洲政策制定方面的影响力有限。此前，马克龙曾警告中国不要采取“分而治之”的策略，主张通过欧盟机构进行统一接触。

其次，匈牙利的经济规模是上海的1/3，德国的经济规模是匈牙利的25倍，法国是其18倍。塞尔维亚的经济更落后，相当于匈牙利的1/3。虽然经济差距巨大，但中国超过60%的对欧投资流入这两个国家。对于“产能过剩”和“去风险化”等概念，匈牙利领导人欧尔班斥之为“虚华辞藻”和“意识形态”。

第三，塞尔维亚总统武契奇前不久在备受争议的选举中获胜，而欧尔班对欧盟机构和价值观持对抗立场。习近平选择和他们会面，表明了他对民粹主义领导人的支持——在欧洲民粹主义立场是被慎重对待的。此举似乎象征领导人之间的相互支持，而不是国家之间的平等互访。

然而从地缘政治角度看，中国认为访问这些看似无关紧要的国家具有战略利益，主要有以下三个原因：

首先，同中国一样，塞尔维亚和匈牙利与俄罗斯关系密切，有可能形成地缘政治轴心。

习近平访问塞尔维亚时，恰逢中国驻塞尔维亚大使馆被炸25周年，这成为批评北约的机会。习近平将三名中国公民的意外死亡与残酷的南斯拉夫战争联系起来，他“绝不会让历史悲剧重演”的声明具有外交舞台效果，他还指出中塞友谊是两国人民用鲜血凝成的。

虽然这种安排具有象征意义，但声明发表的时机也许更有效地表达了对北约全球安全角色的反对，特别是考虑到中国不久将欢迎普京访华。鉴于普京对成千上万无辜者的死亡负有责任，这是一个棘手的难题，

最后，在贸易方面，布达佩斯-贝尔格莱德铁路项目继续取得进展，而这可能是欧洲最大的“一带一路”倡议项目。该项目由中国承包商实施，连接匈牙利和塞尔维亚两国的首都，将扩大中国商品从希腊进入欧洲的走廊。该项目体现着中国在该地区的战略基础设施投资和长期规划。

因此，这可能暗示中国的欧洲战略发生转变，即加强与没有太多影响力的外围欧盟国家的关系，但它们可以作为中国进入欧洲统一市场的切入点。此外这也表明，对中国的利益来说，欧盟机构和其他国家可能没有这般重要。

2024年5月6日，法国巴黎爱丽舍宫，中国国家主席习近平（左一）、法国总统马克龙（右二）、欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩（右一）举行中法欧三方会晤。(华春莹推特账号）

乌克兰与中国：欧洲的双重深切担忧

欧洲目前面临两大担忧：乌克兰战争以及对华经济问题，包括贸易赤字、市场准入、不对等和产能过剩。中国不愿就这些问题采取行动。如果这些错综复杂的问题得不到解决，竞争压力将进一步加剧。

同时，乌克兰战争是中欧关系里最复杂的问题。虽然中国承诺不再向俄罗斯出售军民两用产品，而且习近平和马克龙共同发出“奥运会休战”这种令人尴尬的呼吁，但欧洲不明白为什么中国没有采取任何行动。习近平说他曾对俄罗斯强调“决不能使用核武器”，但欧洲还是最担心这场战争，它促使欧洲向中国寻求帮助，但没有获得理睬。

贸易方面，欧盟领导人仍然致力于实现经济再平衡，表明双方的矛盾有可能升级。冯德莱恩表示，欧盟致力于使用防御性工具。她指出，我们“无法消化中国的过剩产品……我鼓励解决这些结构性产能过剩问题”。欧盟领导人似乎也被迫使用经济安全工具来对抗中国，这让他们没有理由退缩。这表明习近平缓解中国有政府背景企业对外紧张关系的努力可能不成功。

此外，此次出访体现的中国利益表明，中国仍将欧洲视为主权国家集合体，把一些国家视为朋友，另外一些国家则不是。这种方法以前可能奏效，但现在受到地缘政治的挑战。要真正赋予欧洲权力，就需要各国放弃国家主权，在政治和经济上成长以实现有效竞争，而不是相反。习近平带着独特的满足感离开欧洲，只因为几个欧洲人和他一样蔑视美国的全球霸权。而事实上，中国应该考虑这种战略对实现其主要目标是否最有利。

总体而言，虽然此次出访不乏宏大的声明，且领导人会晤对将来达成协议至关重要，但中国向欧盟传达的印象令人费解，可能被解读为“分而治之”这种过时策略的再现。在现实政治的驱动下，这可能促使欧盟对华政策的立场转向更加自信、务实。遗憾的是，尽管双方在过去两年尝试了各种外交努力，但较量日益加剧看来是铁定的了。

French President Emmanuel Macron, Chinese President Xi Jinping and their wives Brigitte Macron and Peng Liyuan spent time holding private talks at the Col du Tourmalet in Hautes-Pyrenees Department of France. May 7, 2024. AFP

President Xi Jinping's recent voyage to Europe is the best barometer for measuring the current state of China-EU relations. A swift evaluation reveals more unsettling signs than promising advancements.

The visit occurred amid significant shifts since Xi's last journey five years ago. Today, China's economy faces a myriad of challenges, while Europe grapples with security anxieties.

These developments influenced the discussion agendas, highlighting divergent interests. Europe's foremost concern, the war in Ukraine, prompts leaders to urge Xi to take action. Meanwhile, the EU intensifies scrutiny of China through anti-subsidy probes, targeting key sectors. In response, China deploys diplomatic strategies and retaliates, including export restrictions on critical raw materials, aiming to penalize European de-risking efforts and economic security policies.

While the trip filled a diplomatic gap, the likelihood of an immediate resolution for the issues discussed seems slim. Notwithstanding agreements and promises, core tensions persist. This pattern mirrors EU leaders' appeals to Xi in December 2023, which have thus far yielded minimal results.

This deadlock raises questions about the broader state of the relationship. Has European trust in China improved after the visit? Why do recurring EU concerns seem non-negotiable for China? Ultimately, while agreement on secondary issues is conceivable, the underlying structural challenges of the partnership remain unaltered, overshadowing any superficial consensus.

France, First Strategic Choice amid Evolving EU-China Policy

Xi's itinerary encompassed visits to France, Serbia, and Hungary. Given the importance of symbolic gestures in Chinese diplomacy, it's crucial to capture the rationale behind this unconventional selection.

First of all, China's foreign policy in Europe places emphasis on Germany and France as top priorities, each embodying different dimensions of influence.

Germany's enduring status as China's top trading partner for eight consecutive years underscores a profound reliance, which has escalated from 5% to 20% over the past two decades, with an approach seemingly entrenched in outdated paradigms. Chancellor Scholz's solo visit to China preceding Xi's trip highlights Berlin's conflicted China policy, potentially undermining EU cohesion and Germany's overall reputation. Scholz declined to join Macron and von der Leyen in meeting with Xi. These moves contradict his call for a “change in approach” in November 2022.

In contrast, France's principled diplomacy and rising prominence amid U.S.-China tensions garners respect, positioning it as the reliable ally for enhancing EU relations. Xi's visit to Paris acknowledges aligned Franco-Chinese strategic interests, signaling France's reliability and political credibility. Although framed as commemorating the 60th anniversary of Franco-Chinese diplomatic ties, deeper implications emerge. In 2023, during the 50th anniversary celebration between China and Spain, Xi didn't visit Madrid. Instead, he briefly hosted Prime Minister Sanchez in Beijing, contrasting with the extensive engagements with other leaders.

Despite Macron's stance on European 'strategic autonomy,' underscored by his recent speech outlining a survival strategy for the EU amidst significant threats, his doubling down on this principle reflects a growing assertiveness in European foreign policy, shaping the dynamics of China-EU relations.

Macron's focus on bolstering ties with China while asserting greater sovereignty, apart from American influence, aligns with Xi's preferences. This contrasted sharply with his acknowledgment of the risks stemming from China's overcapacities and extensive exports to Europe—a point Xi dismisses. Nonetheless, such concerns are accepted within China; Professor Lu Feng of Peking University conceded that supply overflows prevail in several sectors.

This European drive for strategic autonomy through deeper integration and unified defense would impact its dealings with the U.S., NATO, and China, unfolding in three distinct phases. Initially, prioritizing autonomy from the U.S. would reshape the EU's transatlantic strategy. Subsequently, this shift would affect NATO, enhancing the EU collective defense capabilities. Ultimately, these shifts would facilitate the EU to engage with China more equitably, empowering it to pursue its interests autonomously.

Conflicting views on China persist among France, Germany, and the President of the European Commission. Macron advocates for careful engagement, while von der Leyen leans towards alignment with Washington's agenda. Germany prioritizes maintaining business as usual. However, China's subsequent actions confound efforts for greater coherence and sensibility in European policies.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife, Peng Liyuan, are welcomed on May 7, 2024 by Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic (front, second from right) and his wife, Tamara Vucic (front, right), upon their arrival at Nikola Tesla Airport in Belgrade, capital of Serbia. (Photo: WANG Zhuangfei / CHINA DAILY)

Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) shakes hands with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban (left) prior to a welcoming ceremony in Buda Castle of Budapest, Hungary on May 9, 2024. (Photo: Vivien Cher Benko/Pool/AFP)

Odd Choices: Serbia and Hungary

Choosing Serbia and Hungary for a European visit may appear unconventional, yet it underscores China's strategic interests in the region and beyond. Providing context is crucial for elucidating the geopolitical significance, and impact.

Firstly, despite their roles as China's vassals in Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary, a EU member since 2004, and Serbia, EU applicant since 2009 (the process is merit-based), wield limited influence over broader European policymaking. Macron previously cautioned against China's “divide and conquer” tactics, advocating for unified engagement through EU institutions.

Secondly, despite significant economic gaps—Hungary's economy is one-third the size of Shanghai's, Germany's 25 times larger, and France's 18 times; Serbia trailing at a third of Hungary's—China has funneled over 60% of its European investments into these nations. Hungarian leader Orbán dismissed terms like 'overcapacity' and 'de-risking' as mere “rhetoric” and “ideological.”

Thirdly, Xi's decision to visit Serbian President Vučić's, especially in the wake of his controversial election win, and Orbán, due his confrontational stance towards EU institutions and values, suggests support for populist leaders—a stance met with caution in Europe. Instead of equal nation-to-nation visits, the move appears to symbolize leader-to-leader endorsements.

However, from a geopolitical perspective, China sees strategic benefits in visiting these seemingly inconsequential nations for three primary reasons.

Initially, Serbia and Hungary share close ties with Russia, aligning with Beijing and suggesting a geopolitical axis.

Then, Xi's visit to Serbia coincided with the 25th anniversary of their embassy bombing, granting a platform to criticize NATO. There, Xi juxtaposed the accidental deaths of three Chinese citizens with the brutal Yugoslav wars. His proclamation of “never allowing such tragic history to repeat itself” resonated with diplomatic theatrics, suggesting a China-Serbia bond forged with the equal measure of blood from their compatriots.

Although the setting may carry symbolic weight, expressing opposition to NATO's global security role could likely be achieved more effectively, especially given the timing of issuing such a statement while welcoming Putin to Beijing shortly afterward. This presents a difficult puzzle to reconcile, considering Putin's accountability for the deaths of thousands of innocents.

Finally, on the trading front, progress continues on the Budapest–Belgrade railway, potentially the largest Belt and Road Initiative project in Europe. Executed by Chinese contractors, this project links the capitals of Hungary and Serbia, expanding the corridor for Chinese goods entering Europe from Greece. This underscores China's strategic infrastructure investments and long-term plans in the region.

The move, therefore, could hint at a potential shift in China's European strategy by strengthening ties with peripheral and less influential EU nations, which nevertheless serve as entry point for China into the single market. Furthermore, it suggests that EU institutions and other states may not hold a similar importance to China's interests.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (1st L), French President Emmanuel Macron (2nd R) and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (R) hold a trilateral meeting at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France, May 6, 2024. (X account of Hua Chunying)

Europe's Dual and Stalled Concerns over Ukraine and China

Europe faces two main concerns: the war in Ukraine and China-related economic issues, including trade imbalances, market access, asymmetries, and overcapacity. China is revealing a reluctance to take action on these matters. If the interconnectedness of these factors remains unaddressed, competitive pressure will intensify further.

Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine stands as the most complex issue in China-EU relations. Despite China's commitment to abstain from selling dual-use goods to Russia and the awkward “Olympic truce” agreed by Xi-Macron, Europe is perplexed by China's inaction. Xi recalled to stress Russia “that nuclear weapons must not be used.” However, the war tops Europe's concerns, prompting unattended requests for China's help.

On the trade front, EU leaders remain committed to economic rebalancing, suggesting that tensions may escalate. Von der Leyen stated the EU's dedication to employ defence instruments. She specified, we “cannot absorb China's surplus production… I have encouraged to address these structural overcapacities.” Consequently, EU leaders seem driven to use the economic security toolbox against China, leaving them little reason to hold back. This suggests Xi's efforts to ease tensions for Chinese state-controlled enterprises might have fallen short.

Furthermore, China's interests projected during this trip indicates it still views Europe as a collection of sovereign states, some considered friends and others less so. While this approach may have worked before, it is now challenged by geopolitics. True European empowerment entails relinquishing national sovereignties and growing politically and economically for effective competition, rather than the opposite. Indeed, China should consider whether this strategy is the most advantageous for accomplishing its main goal: Xi departed with the unique satisfaction of having a few Europeans share his defiance of U.S. global hegemony.

Overall, while this trip was filled with grandiose declarations, and leaders' meetings are essential for building future agreements, the impression conveyed by China to the EU is somewhat perplexing, possibly interpreted as a revival of outdated divide-and-conquer tactics. This may shift the EU's China policy towards a more assertive, pragmatic stance driven by realpolitik. Regrettably, despite all the diplomatic efforts both sides have made in the last two years, the perception of growing rivalry seems destined to solidify.