3月10日至3月15日，清华大学战略与安全研究中心（CISS）主任达巍（右四）、助理研究员孙成昊（左三）率领的代表团赴美国华盛顿和纽约两地，走访美国政府机构、智库及高校。图为代表团走访海军分析中心（CNA）。

笔者近日赴美国华盛顿、纽约两地进行了一系列走访调研，主要围绕当前及下一阶段中美关系与美方战略界人士交换意见，试图更好把握美国对华政策脉动以及两国关系发展走向。

从整体态势看，自旧金山会晤之后，两国关系进入相对稳定时期。但也要看到，美国对华战略竞争的决心较为坚定，难以在短期内做出调整。旧金山会晤对于稳定双边关系极为重要，两国元首发挥战略引领作用，一系列对话机制渐次铺开，双方不仅阐明了各自在关键议题上的原则立场，也推动了多个领域的对话与合作，并逐步向更多领域扩散。

例如，在芬太尼问题上的合作将有助于两国执法机构进一步加强沟通与协作，即将开展的人工智能政府间对话或许也有助于在一定程度上缓和科技领域的紧张态势。可以感受到，美方也在思考如何更好发挥元首会晤的积极作用，并通过推动各层面、各领域对话与合作获得务实成果。

从中短期看，2024年的中美关系或许仍将保持较平稳态势，却也必须警惕防范可能的挑战。首先，如何看待和应对涉及地区安全议题的风险点十分关键。尤其是在台海、南海等问题上，美方坚持自己的理解和政策取向，与中方存在分歧，但有一点是双方共识，即都不希望在亚太地区爆发军事冲突。美国也必须考虑如何平衡安全困境和同盟两难的问题，即各方对自身“绝对安全”的追求可能恶化整体安全形势、对盟友的过度承诺可能导致危机升级，甚至将美国牵连进一场不必要的冲突。

其次，如何避免美国大选这一国内政治因素干扰中美关系。从目前形势看，在初选过程中，中国议题并非首要议题，美国民众更多还是关心本国政治、经济、社会等方面，在外交领域则更关注俄乌、巴以等更剧烈的危机和冲突。然而，美方已经出现将中国与美国国内政治、经济、舆论形势绑定的苗头，包括炒作中方干预选举，推动对中国联网汽车、港口起重机的可能打压措施，以及针对TikTok的法案等，都会导致中国议题以不同但负面的形式出现在美国民众面前。

第三，如何形成中美两国更可持续的战略框架值得思考。对华战略竞争的定位和框架始于特朗普，拜登加以沿用，这充分证明“竞争”作为对华战略的关键词是两党共识。区别在于，一些共和党人士对于拜登政府的对华竞争举措不甚满意，认为强调接触过多，强调竞争过少；竞争言语过多，竞争举措过少。无论如何，这意味着美方反思对华“竞争”战略本身的空间正在萎缩，更多的辩论焦点已经转向具体的竞争方式。美方反复强调竞争并不必然带来冲突的说法或许没有错，但这一说法也无法否认冲突很可能是竞争的一种结果。而即便这种结果的可能性是百分之一、千分之一，也是中美两国乃至世界都无法承受的。如果是这样，用“竞争”定义中美关系就是极度危险且不可取的。

从更长远的时间段看，美国大选结果对于下一阶段中美关系将产生深远影响。中国无意介入美国选举，不管谁当选下一届美国总统，中国都希望中美关系能够稳定前行，但面临的机遇和挑战可能有所不同。

若民主党继续执政，将进一步加强对华战略竞争的系统性框架，强化与盟友关系。当前拜登政府提出“投资、联合、竞争”（invest、align、 compete）以指引其对华竞争策略，注重投资本国、联合盟友以展开对华竞争，同时与中国框定有限的合作议题。

如果拜登成功连任，对华政策连续性较强，其主要目标是在不发生冲突的前提下为“竞赢”中国打下基础。一方面，拜登政府可能继续推动经贸、科技领域的精准“去风险”或“脱钩”政策，加强对华出口管制、投资审查，加速调整供应链联盟策略，在科技领域持续扩大“小院”和堆砌“高墙”。另一方面，在没有连任压力前提下，拜登政府对华保持沟通与合作的动力仍存，两国现有对话机制有望延续和拓展。

若共和党一边的特朗普胜选，美国对华竞争战略方向不会发生实质性变化，但在竞争策略上会出现调整，竞争重点领域会有所变化。总体看，第二任期的特朗普将更接近2020年、而非2017年刚刚执政时的状态。例如，在经贸领域，中国可能将承受较为强烈的正面冲击。特朗普在竞选期间已表示，计划对所有中国产品增加高达60%的关税，且不在意中方对美国产品增加关税的反制措施。

在军事安全领域，特朗普第二任期的政策前景远没有经贸领域那么明确。特朗普在安全领域更偏向有限的“孤立主义”，即不愿为盟友承担过多责任，更倾向于从经济成本和收益的角度看待安全关系，导致经济政策安全化的同时出现安全政策经济化的双重趋势。在这种情况下，谁能够最终进入特朗普的内阁团队，谁将出任总统国家安全事务助理、国防部长、国务卿等重要职务将很大程度上塑造其涉华军事安全政策。

更令人担忧的是，在特朗普第二任期内，中美现有对话机制可能面临冲击。特朗普及其团队或许仍然对芬太尼等对美国国内政治影响较大的议题感兴趣，但对气候变化等全球治理议题并不在意。两国部分现有对话机制和沟通渠道或将面临“冻结”风险，双方可能需要在其他领域找寻更多共识与合作点。

From March 10 to March 15, a delegation led by Director of the Center for Strategic and Security Studies (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Da Wei (fourth from right), and Assistant Researcher Sun Chenghao (third from left), traveled to Washington, D.C. and New York, N.Y., to visit U.S. government agencies, think tanks and universities. The picture shows the delegation visiting the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA).

Recently, I traveled to Washington D.C. and New York for a series of visits. The main focus was exchanging views with officials and experts from the United States on the current and next stage of China-U.S. relations. The aim was to better understand the fluctuations in U.S. policy toward China and the development trend of the relationship.

With the summit in San Francisco, the relationship between the two countries entered a relatively stable period. However, it should be noted that the U.S. remains steadfast in its posture of strategic competition with China, which makes adjustments in the short term difficult. Yet, San Francisco has been crucial for stabilizing bilateral relations, with the leaders of both countries playing a strategic leadership role. A series of dialogue mechanisms have gradually unfolded, with both sides not only clarifying their respective principled positions on key issues but also promoting dialogue and cooperation in multiple areas and gradually expanding into more.

For example, cooperation on the fentanyl issue will help law enforcement agencies in both countries further enhance communication and collaboration. The upcoming governmental dialogue on artificial intelligence may also help to some extent in easing tensions in the technology sector. It can be observed that the U.S. is also considering how to better leverage the positive summit meetings and achieve practical results through promoting dialogue and cooperation across various levels and fields. In the short to medium term, the China-U.S. relationship this year may continue to be relatively stable, but it's also necessary to be vigilant, to guard against possible challenges.

First, it is of crucial importance to correctly perceive and address points of risk in regional security. As to the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea and other matters, the U.S. maintains its own understanding and policy orientation, which may differ from China's. But there is a consensus on both sides that neither wishes to see military conflicts erupt in the Asia-Pacific region.The U.S. must also consider how to balance security dilemmas with alliance commitments. Pursuing absolute security for oneself may exacerbate the overall security situation, while excessive commitments to allies may lead to escalation of crises, potentially dragging the U.S. into an unnecessary conflict.

Second, how to respond to the interference of domestic political factors — such as those associated with the U.S. presidential election — is another important consideration. China-related issues are not the primary focus during the primary election process, as American voters are more concerned about the economy and society, while in the diplomatic arena they are more focused on intense crises and conflicts, such as Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine.But there are signs that public opinion — and some partisan political opinion — in the United States is now linking China to domestic politics and the economy. This includes hyping up allegations of Chinese interference in elections, pushing for crackdowns on Chinese-made internet-connected vehicles and port cranes, as well as legislation targeting TikTok, all of which may present China in different negative forms to the American public.

Third, it is worth considering how to establish a more sustainable strategic framework between China and the United States. The framing of China relations as a matter of strategic competition began with Donald Trump and has been continued by President Joe Biden, which demonstrates that competition is the keyword in the bipartisan consensus. Any difference lies only in some Republicans' dissatisfaction with the Biden administration's approach to competition with China. They believe it emphasizes engagement too much and competition too little, and that there's too much rhetoric and too few actual competitive measures.Either way, this implies that the space for the U.S. to rethink its “competition” strategy toward China is shrinking, and more debates are shifting toward specific modes of competition. While the often-repeated emphasis by the U.S. that competition does not necessarily lead to conflict may not be entirely wrong, one cannot deny the possibility that conflict may be one outcome of competition.Even if the likelihood of such an outcome is one in a hundred or a thousand, it is still something that neither China nor the U.S. — nor the world — can afford. If that's the case, defining the relationship between China and the U.S. primarily as one of competition is extremely dangerous and not advisable.

In the longer-term perspective, the outcome of the U.S. presidential election will have far-reaching implications for the next stage of China-U.S. relations. China has no intention to intervene in U.S. elections, and regardless of who is elected as the next U.S. president, China hopes that China-U.S. relations can continue to move forward steadily. However, the opportunities and challenges faced may vary.

If the Democratic Party continues to govern, it will further strengthen the framework of strategic competition with China and enhance relations with allies. The current Biden administration has put forward the “invest, align, compete” framework to guide its competitive strategy toward China, emphasizing investment in the U.S., aligning with allies to engage in competition with China and simultaneously delineating limited areas for cooperation.

If Biden is re-elected, there will be strong continuity in his administration's policy toward China, with its main goal being to lay the groundwork for out-competing China. On one hand, the Biden administration may continue to promote precise de-risking or decoupling policies in the economic, trade and technology fields; strengthen export controls and investment reviews concerning China; accelerate the adjustment of supply chain alliance strategies; and continue to expand the “small yard” and erect more “high fences” in the technological domain. On the other hand, without the pressure of another election, the Biden administration's motivation for communication and cooperation with China may still exist, and the dialogue mechanisms between the two countries would be expected to continue and to expand.

If Trump and the Republican Party win the election, there will be no substantial change in the strategic direction of U.S. competition with China, but adjustments may occur in the competitive strategy, with changes in some specific areas of competition. Overall, Trump's second term would likely resemble the situation in 2020 rather than when he first took office in 2017.For instance, in the economic and trade domain, China may face a more direct punch. During his campaign so far, Trump has already indicated plans to impose tariffs of up to 60 percent on all Chinese products, and he has shown a willingness to disregard any retaliatory measures from China, such as increased tariffs on American products.

In the realm of military security, the policy outlook for Trump's second term is far less clear than in the economic and trade domains. Trump leans toward a limited form of isolationism in security affairs, meaning he's reluctant to shoulder excessive responsibility for allies and tends to view security relationships from the perspective of economic costs and benefits.This has led to a dual trend where economic policies become securitized while security policies become economized. In this scenario, the individuals who ultimately join Trump's cabinet team, particularly those assuming key positions — such as national security adviser, secretary of defense and secretary of state — will heavily shape his security policy on China.

What's more concerning is that during Trump's second term, existing dialogue mechanisms between China and the U.S. may face challenges. Trump and his team may continue to prioritize issues such as fentanyl that have significant impact on domestic politics in the U.S., but they may not prioritize global governance issues such as climate change. Some existing dialogue mechanisms and communication channels between the two countries may be at risk of being frozen, prompting both sides to seek more consensus and points of cooperation in other areas.