2023年4月26日，美国总统乔·拜登和韩国总统尹锡悦在白宫玫瑰园会晤。

韩国总统尹锡悦在万众瞩目中开始了访美之行。之所以被瞩目，离不开他自己的“努力”。似乎还没有哪一位美国的友邦领导人在访美前这么高调地祭出闪亮的“投名状”——迅速恢复韩日关系，表示考虑对乌军援，发表涉台言论，等等。只凭这些，就可以想象尹总统在美国受欢迎的程度。

尹总统之所以如此重视这次美国之行，是因为此次美韩首脑会面是在半岛紧张局势日益严峻和中美战略竞争背景下进行的，其成果将在很大程度上决定今后韩国的方向，也将对中韩关系、中美关系、地区局势等产生相当的影响。

韩国民众对尹总统访美是有很大期待的。有韩国媒体以“韩美应成为共享价值和利益的双向同盟”为题报道此次首脑会晤，从侧面反映出韩国民众并不认同美韩同盟的平等性，认为没有从同盟那里得到与其付出相匹配的对待。

从历史经验来看，与美国共享经济利益的可能性不大。现实更证明了这一点。就在美韩首脑即将会晤前夕，美国政府向韩国提出要求，如果中国禁止美国企业美光向中国出口，三星电子、SK海力士等韩国企业不要填补中国的半导体缺口。也就是说，拜登政府要求盟国企业不惜损害自身利益，来“参加”美国的对华半导体战争。尹锡悦政府也没有让美国失望，韩国总统室回应称，将“尽最大努力将韩国企业的损失降到最低”。意即韩国愿意配合，只是希望代价不要太大，损失不要太多。这种不平等的关系对美韩同盟的未来不是一个好兆头。

但美国认为，在韩国人最担心的安全问题——朝核问题上确认美国对朝的延伸威慑，将是美国对盟友最好的补偿。据韩国媒体报道，韩美两国正在推进共同文件中明文规定的“如果韩国受到朝鲜的核攻击，美国也将使用核武器”的方案。同时，为提高核延伸威慑的共同企划和执行力，双方正在协商另设部长级常设磋商机制。一旦确定下来，美国将通过正式文件向国内外明确有关“核报复”的承诺。韩方认为这一点“意义重大”。

这对美国来说也意义重大。美国关注的重点是如何应对中国。随着实力下降，美国的“如意算盘”是通过与盟国和友邦结成遍布中国周边的“小团体”，在政治、经济、科技、安全、外交等多方面打压、遏制中国，让中国孤立于世界，最终阻断中国的发展之路。而强化、扩大在朝鲜半岛的军事存在，结成牢固的美韩、美日韩同盟网络，在东北亚地区对中国甚至俄罗斯形成军事压制，无疑是一步好棋。

但这步棋能否下成，还要看尹锡悦政府如何回应美国要其进一步参与制衡中俄的要求。这是一个困难的选择。虽然尹总统自己的倾向性很明显，但他还要考虑来自中俄可能的反应，考虑国内经济放缓、外贸逆差、企业受损的压力，以及国内民众和在野党强烈的反对声。最重要的是，韩国要有正确的自我认知，而不是迷失在美国给予的“风光”中，只有这样才能对自身做出准确的定位。

U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in the Rose Garden of the White House on April 26, 2023.

Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk-yeol just completed his closely watched visit to the United States. The trip attracted much attention thanks mostly to his own efforts: No leader of a U.S. ally has ever presented such high-profile “proof of allegiance” before visiting. He swiftly repaired relations with Japan, disclosed a plan for military aid to Ukraine and made comments on Taiwan. It is thus easy to see how he will be viewed in the U.S.

Yoon did so much for the trip because his meeting with President Joe Biden would take place against a backdrop of escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula and China-U.S. strategic competition, and its outcome will to a great extent determine the ROK's future orientation and affect China-ROK and China-U.S. relations, as well as the regional situation.

The South Korean public had very high expectations for the Yoon visit. One media outlet even came up with the headline “ROK and U.S. Should Become Two-Way Alliance of Shared Values and Interests” — which indicates members of the public don't consider the U.S. and ROK as equals in the alliance, or believe their country has been treated in a way that matches its contribution.

Judging from past experience, the probability of sharing economic benefits with the U.S. is low. Reality has further proved this. Just before the summit meeting between the ROK and American leaders, the U.S. government required the ROK to prevent Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix Semiconductor Inc. from filling China's semiconductor gap once China prohibits Micron Technology, Inc. from exporting to China. This represents the first time the Biden administration has asked companies in an allied country to participate in the U.S. semiconductor war against China at its own expense.The Yoon government didn't let the U.S. down. The ROK president's office said the government would try its best to reduce the losses of ROK companies “to the minimum,” meaning the ROK is ready to cooperate —only it hopes the price won't be too high and losses won't be too much. Such an unequal relationship doesn't bode well for the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Yet the U.S. believes affirming extended U.S. deterrence against North Korea, which is the ROK's biggest concern, will be the best compensation. According to South Korean media, the ROK and the U.S. are working toward stipulating in explicit terms in a joint document that “if the ROK suffers a nuclear attack by the DPRK, the U.S. will also use nuclear weapons.”Meanwhile, to upgrade the capacity for jointly planning and executing nuclear extended deterrence, the two sides are discussing the establishment of a new mechanism for regular ministerial level consultations. Once the decision is made, the U.S. will make a clear commitment at home and abroad in the form of a formal document about the will of “nuclear retaliation” ratified posthumously by leaders of both countries. The ROK side deems this to be “of significant importance.”

This is also important for the U.S., which is concentrating on how to deal with China. As U.S. strength declines, it is forming small cliques with allies and partners on China's periphery — suppressing and containing China in such aspects as politics, economy, science, technology, security and diplomacy — in a bid to isolate China from the rest of the world and finally cut off its path of development.At that point, enhancing and expanding a military presence on the Korean Peninsula, building a solid U.S./Japan/ROK alliance network will certainly be a critical move for militarily suppressing China, and even Russia, in Northeast Asia.

However, the prospects for the success of such a move hinges on how the Yoon government responds to the U.S. demand for it to participate further in its attempts to contain China and Russia. This will be a difficult choice to make, though Yoon's personal inclination is obvious. He still has to consider potential responses from China and Russia, pressures from the slowing domestic economy, foreign trade deficits and business losses — as well as strong opposition from the general public and opposition parties at home. Most important, to position itself correctly the ROK should have a clear awareness of its own conditions, avoid being intoxicated by glory bestowed by the United States.