9月8日至9日，“印太经济框架”（IPEF）第一次部长级线下会议在美国洛杉矶召开。会议确定了“印太经济框架”的四大支柱（贸易、供应链、绿色经济、公平经济），并分别就每个支柱发表了一份联合声明。

除印度外，其他13个参与方都签署了全部四份声明。印度认为“尚看不到（加入贸易支柱）能获得什么好处”，因此退出了有关贸易支柱的谈判，也没有签署该支柱的联合声明。主导会议的美国贸易代表戴琪和商务部长雷蒙多称，这次会议是“印太经济框架”的“里程碑”，形成了一个新的模式可以让世界其他国家“追随”。会议期间，部分国家还举行了双边会谈，表示愿意在“印太经济框架”下深化经贸合作。

会议形成的四份联合声明比较笼统和原则性，没有超过外界的预估，更没有回答一个美方早就应当作答的问题，即美国要用什么方式来笼络人心，以维持推进谈判的动力。按照美方的表态，“印太经济框架”后续谈判会“很快”开展，时间压力较大。一般认为，美方可能会要求其他参与方在明年美国主办亚太经合组织（APEC）峰会之前，即2023年的11月份之前，完成谈判及国内批准手续。次优的选项则是在拜登政府第一个任期结束以前完成各项工作。但多边经贸谈判非常耗时，比如《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》（RCEP）谈了10年28轮才最终完成，各国的国内批准流程也走了一年多。美方如果要求很短时间内就完成“印太经济框架”谈判，难度很大。

此外，“印太经济框架”还存在一些结构性和战略性的难题，诸如印度对谈判框架的否认、东盟国家的实用主义原则和“走一步看一步”策略、美国国内强大的“贸易怀疑论”势力、最终文本法律地位不对等等问题。美方要克服上述困难，解决诸种看起来几乎无解的难题，必须要拿出很诱人的条件，才能顺利推进有关谈判。事实上，大部分参与方也毫不避讳这个问题，公开表示要观察美方究竟能“从葫芦里拿出什么好东西”来。

目前看，美方为推动后续谈判拿出真金白银的可能性很低，故很可能会靠进一步挑起和中国的经贸冲突，来推动乃至逼迫其他参与方与美方合作。美国对亚太区域经贸合作和经济一体化的吝啬与其对乌克兰军援的“慷慨”形成鲜明对比，美方并不热衷于投资亚太区域和平稳定及安宁繁荣，前后两次对东盟国家2.52亿的投入似乎已是美国勉力为之了。在这一背景下，美国从正面给参与方提供的“实惠”（是很多东南亚国家所期待的）应是极为有限。对美国而言，成本更低、见效更快、“杀伤力”更大的，是加剧中美经贸摩擦的烈度和紧张程度，扩建“小院”、筑高“高墙”，将中美竞争压力传导给“印太经济框架”参与方，“督促”各方表明立场乃至“选边站队”。

在四份联合声明中，供应链支柱的声明完成度最高，可操作性最强，实现的路径也比较清晰，可能成为美方优先加以利用的领域。从声明中可看出美方在供应链方面设定的路线图和操作步骤，如先识别关键的供应链及可能被中断供应的关键商品，然后根据识别结果建立相应的预防、应对机制。整体思路实是拜登政府在国内有关政策的复刻版，即先进行供应链审查，根据审查结果在各关键领域逐项推进。近期美方制定针对中国的《芯片与科学法案》及启动国家生物技术和生物制造倡议，就是这一进程最新的结果。美方很有可能通过加力对中国的“规锁”，再用“印太经济框架”中的有关支柱向其他参与方扩散压力，从而维持“印太经济框架”后续谈判的动力。

当然，美方的算计是双重的，一面是“竞赢中国”，一面是“收割盟友”，对各参与方形成更大的政治经济胁迫压力。近期，日韩抗议美国的芯片和电动汽车政策，因为美方在有关领域与中国“竞争”的举措，其最终导向的结果是盟友被迫要向美国转移关键产供链。可以预见，美国有动机将“印太经济框架”谈判导入这条轨道之中，从盟伴处获得更多“实惠”，各方围绕这一问题的博弈恐将决定“印太经济框架”的最终走向。

On September 8–9, the first in-person ministerial meeting of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) was held in Los Angeles, USA. The meeting discussed the four IPEF pillars: Trade; Supply Chain; Clean Economy; and Fair Economy, and issued a joint statement on each of them.

All four statements were signed by 13 participating counties, with the exception of India. India withdrew from the negotiations on the trade pillar and withheld its signature from the joint statement, stating that they “have to see what benefits member countries will derive [from joining].” U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Chi Tai and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, who led the meeting, said the gathering was a "milestone" in the IPEF and formed a new model for the rest of the world to "follow.” On the sidelines of the negotiations, some countries also held bilateral talks and expressed their willingness to deepen economic and trade cooperation under the IPEF.

The four joint statements that emerged from the meeting were in general terms and did not exceed outside expectations, nor did they answer the longtime question posed to Washington: What will the U.S. use to win people over to maintain the momentum of the negotiations? According to the U.S. side's statement, the IPEF follow-up negotiations will be carried out "soon,” so the pressure is high.It is generally believed that the U.S. side may require other participants to complete negotiations and domestic ratification procedures before the U.S. hosts the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit next year, or by November 2023. The next best option would be to complete the work before the end of the Biden administration's first term. However, multilateral economic and trade negotiations are very time-consuming, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which took 10 years and 28 rounds to finalize, plus more than a year for each country to process domestic ratification.

Ultimately, it will be difficult if the U.S. side requires the IPEF negotiations to be completed in a short time. In addition, the IPEF has some structural and strategic difficulties, such as India's denial of the negotiation framework, ASEAN countries' pragmatism and "step-by-step" strategy, strong domestic "trade skepticism" in the United States, and the unequal legal status of the final text. The U.S. will have to come up with very attractive terms to overcome the above difficulties and solve the seemingly insurmountable problems in order to successfully advance the negotiations. In fact, most of the participants have not shied away from this issue and have openly stated that they want to see what good things Washington has to offer.

At present, the possibility of the U.S. coming up with real money to promote follow-up negotiations is very low, so it is likely to push other parties to cooperate with it by further provoking economic and trade conflicts with China. The United States' stinginess toward economic and trade cooperation and economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region is in stark contrast to its "generosity" toward military aid to Ukraine. The U.S. doesn't seem to be keen on investing in peace, stability, or prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The $252 million invested in ASEAN countries on two occasions appears to be the best the U.S. can do. In this context, the "benefits" that the U.S. can directly provide to the participants (as many Southeast Asian countries expect) should be extremely limited. For the U.S., it would be more cost-effective and efficient to intensify Sino-U.S. economic and trade friction, increase the number of allies, and strengthen defense against China. This should transmit the pressure of competition between China and the United States to the participants of the IPEF, "urging" all parties to take a position and even "choose sides.”

Among the four, the joint statement on the supply chain pillar is the most completed, the most operable, and also clear in terms of the path to materialize, which may become a priority area for the U.S. to make use of. The statement shows the roadmap and operational steps set by the U.S. in the supply chain, such as identifying key supply chains and key commodities that may be disrupted, and then establishing corresponding prevention and response mechanisms based on the identification results. The overall idea is a replica of the Biden administration's domestic policy, i.e. to conduct a supply chain review first, and then advance in each key area based on the review results. The recent development of the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act against China and the launch of the National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative are the latest results of this process. It is likely that the U.S. will maintain the momentum of subsequent IPEF negotiations by increasing the "restrictions" on China and spreading pressure to other participants with the relevant pillars of the IPEF.

Of course, the U.S. calculations are twofold. One is to "defeat China,” and the other is to "make more allies" and increase political and economic coercive pressure on other participants. Recently, Japan and the Republic of Korea protested against the U.S. chip and electric vehicle policies because the ultimate result of the U.S. initiative to compete with China in related areas is that allies are forced to transfer key production and supply chains to the United States. It is foreseeable that the U.S. has a motive to introduce the IPEF negotiations into this track to get more benefits from its allies, and the game around this issue is likely to determine the ultimate direction of the IPEF.