2019年6月中旬，习近平主席对朝鲜进行了国事访问，这也是中国最高领导人时隔14年首次访朝。这次访问是在中美贸易争端有很大不确定性、朝美对话自2月河内会晤后出现明显停滞的背景下举行的。6月底，中美首脑在大阪G20峰会期间举行会晤，双方在贸易问题上重启谈判，并且讨论了朝核问题。美国总统特朗普在随后访问韩国期间，与朝鲜最高领导人金正恩在板门店进行了历史性会面，让人们看到了朝美新一轮外交磋商和政治解决朝核问题的希望。

对此，不少分析的解读角度是中美朝三方博弈，即中国希望在中美贸易战中打“朝鲜牌”，迫使美国达成协议，而朝鲜则期待打“中国牌”，迫使美国让步。国际政治中的“打牌论”经久不息，也有道理，然而在朝鲜半岛问题上，中国的对朝政策逻辑并非仅用“打牌论”就能解释。笔者认为，中国在美朝关系上更多是思考如何扮演好美朝的外部智库角色。

朝鲜对“美国特色民主制”的认知困难

朝鲜核危机走到今天是各种因素叠加的结果，而朝美始终处于高度不信任状态是核心原因。当然，美国政府采取的敌视朝鲜立场，试图颠覆朝鲜现政权，是促使朝鲜“拥核自保”的一个重要起因。同时，朝鲜对美国的认知及由此而来做出过激反应，也是不可否认的。笔者认为，从认知角度看，朝鲜最大的困难在于准确、平衡和理性地理解美国特色的民主制。

首先，美国两党政治下的总统选举往往会带来一时间政策立场上的“极端化”，具体表现为，候选人为了在论战中让自己的观点鲜明，会提出几乎全盘否定现任总统的政策。而对美国极度不信任的国家，往往会聚焦负面言行，不能完整地看到全貌。

第二，新总统当选后需要一段时间保持和竞选纲领的一致性，而这往往会被其他国家看成对外交承诺的背叛，从而对威胁产生错误认知。克林顿总统第二任期内，朝美关系的互动已经到了相当高的层级，2000年10月奥尔布莱特访问平壤，已经在讨论克林顿访朝事宜。朝鲜次帅李明騄访问美国时，曾邀请克林顿访朝，并承诺解决美国的一切安全关切。美国民主制的特点在于，每当政府更迭的时候就会进行外交政策评估，事实上不仅仅是外交政策的重新评估，国内政策也是一样，小布什执政后整个对朝话语体系就变了。

美国作为超级大国，其国内政治动态外溢到国际政治，极大地影响着外部对美国对外战略、外交政策及政策连续性的认知。与此同时也要看到，由于朝鲜的政治体制完全不同，又长期与美国没有外交关系，再加上国小力微，它自然会感到困惑、不懂、愤怒，从而产生过激反应，导致紧张升级。朝鲜应该更多地理解美国民主制的特点，妥善地应对美国国内政治过渡期出现的外交行为波动。如何巧妙地缓解美国的压力，利用好战略机遇期，中国在同美国打交道过程中积累了大量的经验可以分享。这方面中国可以起到朝鲜的外部智库作用。

美国破解对朝“认知僵化”需要中国

美国对朝鲜同样存在“认知僵化”问题。冷战后美国成为唯一超级大国，在对外认知上，美国对那些与其不同质的国家进行简单分类，将朝鲜、伊朗等定义为“无赖国家”，将索马里等定义为“失败国家”，将中国、俄罗斯定义为“修正主义国家”。特别是对第一类国家，同它们进行外交谈判或对其减少制裁，几乎成了政治不正确的事。这种政治上的禁忌，造成美国对朝核问题谈判往往无法全心投入。朝核问题的最终解决需要朝美实现关系正常化，以及朝鲜融入国际社会和地区经济社会网络，而这个过程需要分阶段、同步走。朝鲜在核问题上做出承诺与行动，需要与减少对朝制裁和朝美关系正常化谈判同步进行。在朝核问题上，特朗普总统可以说是前所未有的非常规美国领导人，是唯一与朝鲜领导人见面的在任美国总统。然而，他在对朝政策上突破的最大障碍，则是美国国内已经形成的偏见和认知。

朝美没有外交关系，经济往来为零。中国则是主要大国中最了解朝鲜的国家，也是关系最紧密的国家，中国给美国的建议对特朗普说服其国内反对者很有帮助。中国国务委员王毅近期对媒体透露，习近平主席在大阪与特朗普会面时提出适时缓解对朝制裁，这实际上就是中国在发挥美国在朝鲜半岛问题上的外部智库作用。

On June 20, 2019, President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the first visit to the DPRK by a Chinese leader in 14 years. The visit took place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty: the China-US trade dispute carried on and, in February, talks between the DPRK and the United States in Hanoi had broken down. At the end of June, however, the presidents of China and the United States met during the G20 summit in Osaka. The two sides re-launched talks on trade issues and also discussed the DPRK nuclear issue. During his subsequent visit to South Korea, US President Donald Trump met with DPRK leader Kim Jong Un in Panmunjom, projecting hope for a new round of diplomatic consultations and political settlements.

Many analysts have interpreted this from the perspective of a three-party game between China, the United States, and the DPRK. The argument is that China hopes to play “the DPRK card” in the China-US trade war to force the United States to reach an agreement, while the DPRK expects to play “the China card” to force the United States to make concessions. Game theory has long been applied to international politics and it might explain some of the dynamics here. However, the logic of China's policy toward the DPRK on the Korean Peninsula cannot be explained by game theory alone. I argue that China is more concerned with how to play the role of external think tank in the relationship between the United States and the DPRK.

The DPRK Has a Perception Problem with American-style Democracy

The DPRK nuclear crisis is the result of various factors, but the high level of distrust between the DPRK and the United States is the core reason. Of course, the US government's hostility toward the DPRK and its attempt to subvert the current regime are significant causes of the DPRK's nuclear self-protection. At the same time, the DPRK's perception of the United States and the basis of its excessive counterattacks are undeniable. The DPRK must address the flaws in its perception of American-style democracy in order to understand it in an accurate, balanced, and rational way.

First, it is important for nations like the DPRK to understand that the two dominant political parties in the US presidential elections often elicit polarization in policy positions, but only for a time. Specifically, candidates make their views clear in debates and propose policies different from those of the current president. Countries that have great distrust of the United States focus too narrowly on the negative words and deeds raised during campaigns, which makes it hard for them to see the whole picture.

Second, we have seen that, after the election, a new president must deliver on campaign promises for a period. This is often seen by other countries as a betrayal of diplomatic commitments, creating a misperception of threats. During President Bill Clinton's second term, diplomatic interactions between the DPRK and the United States had reached a fairly high level. In October 2000, Madeleine Albright traveled to Pyongyang and discussed Clinton's trip to the DPRK. Afterward, the DPRK sent Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok to the United States and invited Clinton to visit and promised to resolve all US security concerns. American-style democracy is characterized by foreign policy re-assessments whenever the government changes. In fact, this is not only the case for foreign policy; this is true for domestic policy as well. The Gorge W. Bush administration changed the entire US discourse regarding the DPRK.

As a superpower, the United States's domestic political dynamics often spill over into international politics and greatly affect the external perceptions of US foreign strategy, policy, and diplomatic continuity. Given that the DPRK's political system is completely different and has had no diplomatic relations with the United States for a long time, coupled with the country's small strength, it is not so surprising that the country would become confused, unintelligible, and angry, resulting in excessive reactions and escalated tensions. The DPRK must understand that these are typical fluctuations in American-style democracy, not permanent threats. China has had long experience in dealing with the United States and can share how to subtly ease US pressure and use strategic opportunities. In this regard, China can play the role of external think tank to the DPRK.

The United States Needs China to Crack the DPRK's Perception Rigidity

The United States has a similarly rigid perception of the DPRK. After the Cold War, the United States became a global hegemon. In the process, it had adopted a simple classifications for other countries, defining, for example, the DPRK and Iran as “rogue states” and Somalia as a “failed country.” China and Russia, on the other hand, were defined as “revisionist states.” Having ominously dubbed certain countries “rogue states,” the US made it essentially politically indefensible to conduct diplomatic negotiations with them or to reduce sanctions against them. This political taboo has persisted, making it difficult for the United States to negotiate on the DPRK nuclear issue even today. A final resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue requires the normalization of relations between the DPRK and the United States, and the integration of the DPRK into the international community, including regional economic and social networks. The DPRK's commitments and actions on the nuclear issue must be synchronized with the reduction of sanctions against the DPRK and the normalization of relations between the DPRK and the United States, a process that must be done in stages. Trump can be said to be an unprecedented and unconventional American leader when it comes to the DPRK nuclear issue. After all, he is the only sitting US president to have met with a leader of the DPRK. However, his biggest obstacle to a policy breakthrough with the DPRK is the negative bias and perception that has persisted in the United States.

Since there are no diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the United States, economic exchanges are necessarily at zero. China is the country that best understands the DPRK, and it is the most closely related country. China's proposal to the United States has convinced Trump to try to persuade his domestic opponents. State Councilor Wang Yi recently announced to the media that President Xi asked Trump to ease the sanctions against the DPRK when they met in Osaka. This is China playing the role of the external think tank on the Korean Peninsula issue.