近期，中美关系面临的挑战和摩擦增多。经贸、涉台等问题之外，两国在南海的互动也一直引人关注。特朗普政府的“印太战略”仍将南海问题作为一个主要抓手。从长远看，美国在南海问题上与中国对抗的姿态不会放松，有时还可能变得更加强硬。

中美南海分歧根源何在？

去年底以来，美相继出台的国家安全战略报告、国防战略报告、核态势评估报告和总统经济报告等官方文件，均将中国视为“战略竞争对手”，甚至贴上试图挑战美国所主导国际秩序的“修正主义国家”标签。美战略界、学界和舆论界关于中美关系的新一波负面论调抬头，认为竞争将成为中美关系主流。有学者指出南海始终是中美战略竞争的重点领域之一，甚至提出“中美在南海的冲突不可避免”。

中美关系的广度、深度和韧性今非昔比，中美必然在南海发生冲突的观点似乎有点危言耸听。南海局势自2016年下半年以来，基本保持“降温、趋稳”势头，在中美关系议程上的位置也相对靠后。不过也应看到，在高调推行“自由、开放的印太战略”的大背景下，美国在南海与中国“较劲”的势头仍在悄然积聚。在近期因美国对华政策消极面上升而引起中美竞争态势加剧的情况下，南海问题成为中美关系新“引爆点”的危险不能排除。

在一些美国学者看来，中美在南海的战略利益针锋相对，难以调和：美国坚持“自由、开放”的国际和地区海洋秩序，中国则试图修改有关游戏规则；确保美国军事力量自由进入或通过包括南海在内的“全球公共海域”是美国的国家利益，中国则试图将南海当作“中国湖”，限制或排斥美国进入南海；美国“印太战略”的优先目标是维护并加强同盟体系和伙伴关系网络，中国则正在通过“一带一路”等谋求印太地区主导地位，挑战美国对该地区的影响。

然而，上述分析和论断完全是从零和对抗逻辑出发，基于对中国有关政策意图的误解和曲解而做出的。中美在南海问题上的分歧，表面上看似乎是守成大国与新兴大国之间的“结构性矛盾”使然，但“结构性矛盾”的说法并不能反映中美关系合作、竞争并存的复杂现实，也有可能成为“自我实现的预言”，将双方最终推入“修昔底德陷阱”，对问题的解决并无益处。

如果抛开先入为主的成见，多一些换位思考和理性判断，应当有助于将中美在南海的分歧控制在一个合理的区间。以笔者管见，中美管控南海分歧需要回答三个问题，以下逐一进行阐释。

1、南沙主权纷争：美国如何定位

中国是南海诸岛的真正主人，自然也是南沙争端的主要当事国。在争端解决前，中国有正当的权利和合理的关切维护本国立场和主张不受损害，有关措施不应被视为“扩张活动”或对地区秩序的“破坏”。

美国虽表示对争端的解决结果、亦即有关岛礁的归属不持立场，却对争端的解决方式存在关切，反复强调争端能否和平解决事关美国利益。在其看来，这既是基于“维护国际秩序”的需要，也因为南沙争端直接涉及其盟友菲律宾等，南海一旦生战，将“考验”美同盟义务。而考虑到中国与其他当事国间实力的“不对称”，美不得不出面“维持平衡”。但这一判断并非基于事实。和平解决南沙争端，是中国从自身长远利益出发所做的战略选择，也是争端当事国间多次达成的共识，并不是任何外力影响或施压的结果。如果美国在南海的目标是“不战不乱”，中美双方在南海问题上就不应有原则性的分歧。

恰恰是美国在南海争端问题上，坚持以地缘政治思维和同盟关系来划线，并在实际言行中释放出强烈的“拉偏架”信号，才为和平解决南沙争端带来诸多干扰。比如，近来美国务院高官鼓励东盟“运用集体力量捍卫航行自由”；美海军“卡尔·文森”号航母战斗群今年3月到访越南岘港，并与日本海上自卫队在南海北部进行联合训练；甚至有美国学者提出，组建美日澳印“四国联盟”的目的是为“解决南海问题”开辟新路径。

美国去年12月决定将美驻以色列使馆迁至耶路撒冷。虽然美方一再声称该行动不影响圣城最终地位，但仍然引起很多国家的担忧。值得注意的是，美国会否将同样的逻辑用在南海，以“不影响最终解决”为前提，在南沙采取影响争端当事国立场的单方面行动？这种可能性是今后搅动南海局势的一个隐忧。

应当说，为确保南海的长期稳定及争端的最终和平解决，美国要做的不是质疑中国和平解决争端的可信度，而是证明自身严守中立的可信度。

2、沿岸国和非沿岸国：对抗还是合作

中国是南海的沿岸国之一。这意味着中国在这片海域不仅可以按照国际法享有专属性的主权权利、管辖权等海洋权益，也与其他沿岸国一样，对南海地区的和平稳定、航道畅通和生态环境等拥有重大利益和关切。沿岸国就上述事项发挥主要作用，是权利也是责任。而且，随着国力上升，中国在其中的作用也有望持续增大。这有利于地区秩序的维护和规则构建，符合包括美国在内的国际社会的公共利益。

对此持怀疑态度的人会认为，强调中国的南海沿岸国身份，正是为了服务中国“独霸”南海、“排除”美国的战略，但事实并非如此。在沿岸国中，中国并非要一家说了算。中国和东盟国家签署了《南海各方行为宣言》，并正在商谈制订“南海行为准则”。中国还根据《联合国海洋法公约》关于“闭海、半闭海沿岸国的合作”的规定，积极推动建立南海沿岸国合作机制。

在与非沿岸国关系上，没有迹象显示中国有意否定或排斥有关国家在南海的合法利益和合理关切。实际上，海洋法公约在要求闭海、半闭海沿岸国开展合作的同时，也规定在适当情况下可邀请其他有关国家和国际组织参与合作。这既体现了沿岸国的主导地位，也承认了非沿岸国的作用。这表明，中美在南海不仅没有对抗的充分理由，反而存在务实合作的空间。

然而，美国在包括南海在内的中国近海所开展的军事活动，以及中美在此问题上的尖锐分歧，极大影响了双方探讨建设性合作的基础和氛围，也被众多学者和评论家作为双方在南海存在“无法调和的战略竞争”的证据。

实际上，中国作为沿岸国在南海拥有合理的安全关切，这属于防御性质，并不针对特定国家，也不影响包括美国在内的非沿岸国在南海国际航道行使国际法所赋予的自由通行权利。

问题在于，美国在南海开展的多频率、高强度和超抵近的军事活动，包括在中国南海岛礁邻近水域进行的“航行自由行动”以及其他军事部署，都明显针对中国，美方对此也不讳言。中国在安全上不得不采取应对措施。

为使有关分歧得到建设性处理，美国应当努力向中国等沿岸国证明，美军事力量在自由出入和通过南海国际航道的同时，不会影响沿岸国家的安全。

3、构建海洋秩序：中美分歧有多大

中国既是典型的“海洋地理不利国”，也是发展中的海洋大国。

除台湾岛外，中国绝大部分国土不直接面向大洋，而是毗邻包括南海在内的一连串边缘海。中国进入大洋，必须经过处于他国主权之下或邻近他国的海峡或水道。所幸的是，按照现行国际海洋法的基本原则，不利的自然地理环境并不能剥夺一个国家走向大洋的权利。占世界人口近15%的中国，在全球海洋的研究、利用和保护以及相应的规则制订方面，不应也不会缺席。

新时代中国国力的提升、海外利益的拓展、海洋意识的重新觉醒，都决定了中国有能力也有必要再次走向远洋，更多地认识海洋、利用海洋、保护海洋。同时，中国的发展中国家地位，又决定了当前及今后一个时期，中国与技术发达的海洋国家相比，在海洋的现代化利用管理方面差距仍然不小。自由、开放的海洋秩序不仅符合中国的长远利益，中国甚至比其他国家更需要它。

在新世纪历届联合国大会上，中国代表就“海洋和海洋法议题”所阐述的主张多次强调尊重所有国家合法、和平利用海洋的权利和自由，要求促进海洋开放，提出沿岸国法律规章不应损害航行自由原则，新的国际海洋立法进程不应损害各国依法享有的航行等权利。在全球海洋治理平台上发出的这些中国声音，与美国所说的“自由、开放”的海洋秩序观并无原则分歧，反而存在诸多潜在共同点。

现代海洋秩序由各国共同构建，随意给别国贴上“修正主义”标签不具建设性。回顾历史，现代国际海洋法律体系成形后的第一次修改，恰恰是美国坚持自身关切所带来的结果。《联合国海洋法公约》在1982年谈判完成后，美国认为公约的国际海底开发制度与美国利益不符，在公约文本表决时投了反对票，并拒不批准公约。此后，联合国秘书长召集非正式协商，于1994年制定了一份公约“执行协定”，对公约有关规定做出了修改。

《海洋法公约》作为160多个国家经九年谈判达成的一揽子协议，原本不允许保留性条款，对修正程序也做了明确、严格的规定。绕过明文规定的修正程序、另订相关协定来修改公约，构成了国际缔约实践中的一个经典案例。在规则制订过程中，任何国家都有基于自身利益的合理关切，美国作为大国应当有切身体会。

从大的战略取向来看，中美之间并不必然走向对抗，但由于在南海的战略定位和利害关切不同，中美难免会产生碰撞和摩擦。最终能否摸索出一条良性互动的共处之道，端视双方能否突破战略互信缺失的瓶颈，在构建新型国际关系和人类命运共同体的理念下管控矛盾和分歧，实现基于规则的利益趋同。

（文章出自南风窗）

The South China Sea is heating up, especially with the United States conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) against China near the Spratlys, Paracels, and Scarborough Shoal.

Points of disagreement

A series of strategic reports released by the Trump Administration since late 2017, including the National Security Strategy, place China as its number one strategic competitor and label it and Russia as revisionist powers. Some U.S. scholars take a very pessimistic view of U.S.-China relations and believe that this relationship is no longer characterized as cooperation with elements of competition but the other way round. They see the South China Sea as an important source of U.S.-China strategic rivalry and even assert that conflict between the two countries over the South China Sea is inevitable.

Such a view may be an overstatement. Since late 2016 the situation in the South China Sea has been stable and the territorial and maritime disputes have been under control. The South China Sea issue is temporarily not in the forefront of the agenda of the China-U.S. bilateral relations. However, the confrontation between the two countries in the South China Sea is still quietly gaining momentum and the risk of conflict cannot be disregarded.

According to some American scholars, the United States and China have overlapping strategic interests in the South China Sea: The U.S. promotes an open and free maritime order while China is challenging that order. It is in the national interest of the U.S. to ensure free access and passage of its military forces in the global public domain, including the South China Sea, while China takes the South China Sea as a “Chinese Lake” and tries to deny U.S. access to the area. One of the priorities of the Indo-Pacific strategy is maintaining the U.S.-centered alliance system and partnership network, while China is seeking dominance and excluding U.S. influence in the same region through its “Belt and Road” initiative.

These assumptions are based on a zero-sum mentality and a misreading of China's strategic intentions. And the conclusion that U.S.-China conflict in the South China Sea is inevitable is no more than a self-fulfilling prophecy and will not provide a solution to the problem.

In order to manage and bridge their differences in the South China Sea, China and the United States should not subscribe to this preconceived idea but rather put themselves in each other's shoes. To this end, they had better answer three questions.

What is the U.S. position on South China Sea disputes?

China is the sovereign of the Spratly islands and a major party to the territorial disputes over the archipelago. Prior to the final settlement of the disputes, China is legitimately concerned about defending and preserving its rights and interests. The measures adopted for that purpose cannot be regarded as expansionist or undermining regional order.

In accordance with its official statements, the United States does not take a position on who has sovereignty over the Spratly features, but it does have an interest in how the disputes are solved. The American officials keep saying that peaceful settlement of the disputes, which is essential under a rules-based international order, is vital to the national interest of the United States. In addition, the disputes directly involve the Philippines, an American ally. If the disputes escalate into a war or military conflict, the U.S. obligation under the alliance might be triggered and its credibility tested. Due to the asymmetry between China and other claimant states in their national powers, the United States has to play a role in maintaining the balance.

However, the fact is that China also sticks to a peaceful settlement of the South China Sea disputes. The choice is made by China on its own out of a strategic calculation of its long-term interests. It also reflects an agreement among all the parties directly concerned in the disputes. It is not a result of pressure from any third party. Anyway, if the goal of the U.S. policy is to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, then the difference between China and the United States in their strategic interests in the South China Sea may not be that big and irreconcilable.

The most effective way to solve a territorial dispute is through talks between the parties directly concerned. Giving a dispute too much significance does not help. Unfortunately that's what the United States is doing with the South China Sea disputes. It also applies its alliance system to the disputes, sending a strong signal that it is actually taking sides.

In order to maintain peace and stability and ensure a peaceful settlement of the disputes in the South China Sea, what the United States has to do is not question China's intentions to solve the disputes peacefully. Instead, it should show its own impartiality.

Cooperation or confrontation?

China is a coastal state next to the South China Sea. It means that China not only enjoys exclusive maritime rights and interests in this area under international law, but also has a direct stake in the peace, security, stability, free passage, and marine environment of the South China Sea. It has a right to a major role in any South China Sea dispute settlement. As China grows stronger, it is expected to make more input. This is beneficial to regional order and serves the international community, including the United States.

Someone may suspect that China is seeking domination in the South China Sea and trying to keep the United States out. However, this is not true. China is cooperating with other coastal states in managing South China Sea affairs. China and the ASEAN countries have signed a Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea (DOC) and are negotiating a code of conduct in the South China Sea (COC). China is also promoting the idea of establishing a mechanism for South China Sea coastal state cooperation in accordance with Article 123 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which stipulates that states bordering a closed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other.

In terms of the relationship with non-coastal states, there are no signs that China is denying the latter's legitimate rights and interests in the South China Sea. In fact, the UNCLOS stipulates that coastal states, when cooperating with each other, shall endeavor to invite, as appropriate, other interested states or international organizations to cooperate with them. The provision reflects the leading role of the coastal states as well as the role that non-coastal states could play. In this sense, China and the United States are not destined to confront each other in the South China Sea, but have ample room to cooperate with each other in the region.

In the meantime, U.S. military operations in the South China Sea and other sea areas adjacent to China, and the differences between the two countries regarding the legality of these operations, do affect the environment for constructive cooperation. They are also taken as the evidence for U.S.-China strategic rivalry in the South China Sea.

When emphasizing its own strategic interest in the South China Sea, the United States has to understand that China, as a coastal state, also possesses legitimate security interests in the area. China's security concern is defensive in nature and is not targeted against any specific country. Nor does it obstruct freedom of navigation and overflight enjoyed by any state, including the United States, in the international sea lanes of the South China Sea.

The problem is that, the U.S. military presence, including the FONOPS and other military deployments, in close vicinity of China's territory, is aimed against China. Even the U.S. side does not deny it. In this case China has to react.

In order to constructively address the problem, what the United States should do is prove to the coastal states along the South China Sea, including China, that their security will not be affected when the United States exercises its freedom of access and passage in the area, especially by its military forces.

How do China and the U.S. view the global maritime order?

In international maritime affairs, China is a geographically disadvantaged state and a developing sea power.

Most of China's territory, apart from Taiwan, does not face the open ocean, but is rather locked by a chain of marginal seas. In order to sail to the open seas, China has to pass through straits or narrow sea lanes either under the sovereignty of other countries or close to them. Fortunately, under the existing rules of the law of the sea, geographical disadvantages do not deprive a country of its right to go to the oceans. China, with 1/5th of the world's population, naturally has growing interests in global marine governance, including the use and protection of the high seas and the international seabed area.

In the modern era, China's development, the extension of its overseas interests and the re-awakening of its maritime consciousness all signify its growing maritime capability. At the same time, China is still a developing country, and its navy still falls behind that of more advanced countries. Under such circumstances, open and free marine space is in China's interest more than that of other countries.

Since the new millennium, Chinese delegates, when addressing the oceans and the Law of the Sea at the United Nations General Assembly, have kept calling for respect for legitimate and peaceful uses of the oceans by all countries, demanding the opening of the sea, stressing that the laws and regulations of coastal states shall not damage freedom of navigation, and suggesting that new international maritime legislative processes shall not prejudice the navigational and other rights of states under international law. These positions are not in conflict with the “open and free” concept promoted by the United States. Instead the two sides should have more potential common ground.

Every sovereign state may participate in the international law making process. And labeling any other country revisionist is not constructive. Historically the major revision to the rules of the modern law of the sea actually came from concern from the United States. Upon the completion of the negotiation on the UNCLOS in 1982, the United States was dissatisfied with Part XI – the provisions governing the international seabed area – and voted against the document and didn't ratify the Convention. The United Nations Secretary-General later convened an informal consultation and in 1994 adopted an “implementation agreement” of the UNCLOS, containing substantial modification of the relevant provisions.

The UNCLOS is a package deal reached by over 160 countries through negotiation. As a result, it does not allow for any reservation unless expressly permitted by its other articles, and provides for specific procedures for the amendments. Therefore modifying a treaty through an implementation agreement constitutes a classic case in international rule-making. Anyway, in international legislation, it is natural for every participating country to raise its concerns and leave its footprint in the process. The United States has experience of this.

In conclusion, China and the United States are not bound for conflict in the South China Sea. They do have divergent interests and friction will always exist. Whether the two countries could explore a way for positive interaction depends upon their ability to overcome the lack of mutual strategic trust and to find common interests based upon agreed norms and under the idea of building a new international relationship and a community of shared future for mankind.

(This article is from the International Public Policy Review in Singapore.)