美国总统唐纳德·特朗普和巴西总统米歇尔·特梅尔。

美国国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森今年2月初对拉美和加勒比地区的出访，其野心和范围令人印象深刻。这次访问始于墨西哥，途经阿根廷、秘鲁、哥伦比亚和牙买加。蒂勒森明确表示，美国愿意与该地区的伙伴和朋友开展长期不懈的合作，以增强民主并为该地区可持续的经济增长提供支持。

本次访问的头条新闻是地区各国强化了必须应对委内瑞拉日益加深的人道主义危机的共识。随着大批难民逃离委内瑞拉崩溃的经济和社会，这场危机已经开始影响包括巴西、哥伦比亚、圭亚那和加勒比国家等邻国。事实上，就在蒂勒森返回华盛顿不久，将于4月召开的美洲峰会轮值主席秘鲁总统佩德罗·巴勃罗·库琴斯基就正式取消了对委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗参加峰会的邀请。地区各国正在加紧努力敦促委内瑞拉政府改弦更张，其他措施，包括对委内瑞拉实施进一步制裁，预计也将很快公布。

就在即将启程奔赴墨西哥之前，蒂勒森在德克萨斯州大学发表了一次演讲。在这次演讲中他提及了一个关注度不高的议题，即中国正在西半球持续展开活动，而这无助于地区发展，因此需要美国更加勤勉地参与该地区事务。美国国务卿同时暗示，中国在海外的行为方式唤醒了新帝国主义的幽灵，而这正是该地区长期以来一直反对的。例如，他暗示“拉美不需要只想为本国人民谋福利的新帝国主义势力”。

中国官方媒体愤怒地对此予以否认。《环球时报》写道，“中国人民或许会惊讶地发现，他们的国家居然被贴上了新帝国主义势力的标签……中国对拉丁美洲做过什么？”新华通讯社则称，美国“反对任何形式的多边主义”，它同时通过援引对学界的采访来反击蒂勒森的言论。其他媒体也表达了相似观点。

然而，这份德州大学演讲明确指明了美国新的拉美和加勒比政策，其重点是阻止中国在该地区的野心，这与特朗普政府在全球范围内对抗中国的战略一致。这是一个政策转向。在拉美地区问题上，奥巴马政府安于采取放任自流的态度，有意识地缩减了美国在该地区扮演的角色，同时特地为该地区培养自己的领导者创造空间。从抽象意义上来看，对于构建地区能力、降低对美国的传统依赖，这的确是有益之举。然而，奥巴马政府未能将中国日益增长的影响力以及北京为填补空白而日益膨胀的机会主义野心纳入考虑范围。并不是美国将拉美和加勒比地区推入中国的怀抱，而是当美国后撤时，这种撤退为他人留下了可供填补的空间。就在特朗普上任刚满一年之际，美国就出台了多项措施，包括退出TPP及声称要对北美自贸协定进行重新谈判，而这一趋势现在正在加速。

眼下，美国似乎正在寻求修正这种做法，并试图积极夺回这个一直以来倾向于对华盛顿言听计从的地区。现在的问题是，美国采取的措施是否太过无力，又或者是否已经太迟，抑或是华盛顿是否还有能力重新夺回地区事务主动权。

近期，中国国家主席习近平和中国外交部长王毅都宣布，欢迎拉美和加勒比地区加入“一带一路”倡议。这将正式把一些国家拉入中国全球基建轨道。这给美国敲响了警钟，同时也令美国重新夺回该地区的努力进一步复杂化。毫无疑问，拉美和加勒比地区亟需大规模的基础设施建设投资，而该地区像欢迎其他人一样欢迎中国参与发展地区基建项目。但令美国格外担忧的是，中国的投资模式为国家主导，因此受制于来自北京的政府利益，这就有可能强化中国政府在该地区的影响力。事实上，中国已经开始时不时地行使这种影响力。

此外，华盛顿也越来越感觉中国人的慷慨援助加速了委内瑞拉的崩溃。虽然具体数字或许各不相同，但中国向委内瑞拉发放了上百亿美元的贷款，部分估算这一数字或许高达700多亿。这些贷款令委内瑞拉政府得以巩固统治，向全面威权主义推进，同时追求不可持续的经济发展路线，从而造成了一场全面爆发的人道主义危机。这并不是说中国希望委内瑞拉变成一个失败国家或一个威权国家，但中国对于委内瑞拉巨额的无条件经济援助的确带来了这些意想不到的后果。

弥合分歧需要双方展示战略智慧，同时也应意识到当前的道路只会加剧不必要的紧张局势。华盛顿和北京都在西半球拥有利益，双方都不可能放弃这些利益。令当下情势充满挑战的是这些利益无法完美匹配。因此，探索那些可以达成妥协的领域至关重要。

一个崩溃的委内瑞拉不符合任何人的利益。委内瑞拉能够持续出口石油符合中美双方利益。事实上，如果可以帮助该国石油产业扭转快速下滑的趋势并改善管理不善的现状，石油产量有望得到显著增长。不可否认的是，当下的委内瑞拉政府无法做到这些。因此，如果委内瑞拉能够建立一个更民主、更具代表性、可持续性的政府，这符合中美两国利益。

正如华盛顿和莫斯科于上世纪80年代通过不懈的双边外交努力帮助中美洲结束了残酷战争一样，华盛顿和北京可以考虑采取类似方式解决眼下的问题。通过在双边层面以及通过联合国展开有意义的对话，中国可以迅速改变美洲国家对其意图的认知。如果北京这样做，成果将极其显著。事实上，竞争虽然无可避免，但合作必然会带来更好、互惠互利的结果。

Donald Trump and Brazillian President Michel Temer

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's early February visit to Latin America and the Caribbean was impressive in ambition and scope. Beginning in Mexico and continuing on to Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Jamaica, he made clear the United States' long and abiding interest in working with regional partners and friends to strengthen democracy and support sustainable economic growth.

The headline from the visit was a tightened regional consensus on the need to address Venezuela's growing humanitarian crisis, which is now affecting neighbors including Brazil, Colombia, and Guyana, and islands in the Caribbean, as refugees flee economic and social collapse. Indeed, shortly after Tillerson returned to Washington, the host of the April Summit of the Americas, Peruvian President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, formally rescinded the invitation for Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro to attend. Other regional steps including further sanctions may soon be announced as the effort intensifies to encourage the Government of Venezuela to change its destructive course.

Much less noticed, however, was the implication laid out in the Secretary's speech at the University of Texas, just prior to departing for Mexico, that China's continued inroads in the hemisphere are unhelpful for regional development and require that the United States become more diligent in its engagement with the region. The Secretary also hinted that China's approach created the specter of new imperialism, which the region has long rejected, suggesting, for example, that, “Latin America does not need new imperial powers that seek only to benefit their own people.”

Official Chinese media angrily rejected these comments. Global Times wrote that, “Chinese people might be surprised to find out that their country is labeled a new imperial power…What did China do in Latin America?” Xinhua claimed the United States is “against any kind of multilateralism,” and highlighted interviews with academics and journalists dismissing the Secretary's comments. Others expressed similar views.

Nonetheless, the Texas speech clearly identified a new U.S. approach to Latin America and the Caribbean, with a heighted focus on slowing China's regional ambitions, consistent with the Trump Administration's efforts to counter China globally. This is a shift. The Obama Administration was content with a laissez faire approach to regional issues, consciously diminishing the U.S. role in Latin America and the Caribbean while intentionally opening space for leadership to emerge from within the region itself. In the abstract, this was a worthwhile effort to build regional capacity and reduce historical dependence on the United States. However, the Obama Administration did not factor in the emerging role of China and Beijing's increasingly opportunistic efforts to fill the resulting vacuum. The United States did not push Latin America and the Caribbean into China's arms, but by pulling back, it created space for others to fill. This trend has now accelerated with the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and strident efforts to renegotiate NAFTA, among other steps that the Trump Administration has taken after just one year in office.

Now, it appears that the United States seeks a course correction, and intends to compete more actively for a region that has tended to defer by default to Washington. The question is whether U.S. steps will be too little, too late, or whether Washington will be able to recapture the initiative in regional affairs.

The effort may be complicated by recent announcements by President Xi and also by Foreign Minister Wang that Latin American and Caribbean nations would be welcomed into the Belt and Road Initiative, more formally bringing some nations into China's global infrastructure orbit, a development that has begun to ring alarm bells in the United States. There is no question that Latin America and the Caribbean require massive infrastructure investments, and China is as welcome to participate in developing regional infrastructure projects as anyone else. But the United States is particularly concerned that the Chinese investment model is state-led and therefore directed by government interests from Beijing, with the potential to increase Chinese government leverage within the region. Indeed, China has exercised such leverage from time to time already.

There is also a growing impression in Washington that Chinese largesse has facilitated the Venezuelan collapse. Although estimates vary as to the specific amount, Chinese loans to Venezuela in the 10s of billions of dollars—some estimates go to the $70 billion range—have allowed the regime to solidify its rule and push toward full authoritarianism while pursuing an unsustainable economic course, creating a full-blown humanitarian crisis. This is not to suggest that China desires Venezuela to be a failed state or even an authoritarian state, but rather that as a practical matter, China's significant unqualified economic support has enabled these unintended results.

Bridging these gaps will require strategic enlightenment from both sides, and also a recognition that the current path could create unnecessary tensions. Washington and Beijing both have interests in the Western Hemisphere that neither is likely to abandon. What makes this a challenging moment is that these interests do not perfectly coincide. Therefore it will be important to identify those areas where accommodation can be reached.

It is in nobody's interest that Venezuela collapse. It is in both U.S. and Chinese interests that Venezuelan oil continue to flow; indeed, that the rapid decline and mismanagement of the oil sector be reversed and output significantly increased. It is undeniable that this will not occur under Venezuela's current government. It is therefore in both Washington's and Beijing's interests that there be a political transition in Venezuela to a more democratic, representative, sustainable government.

Much like the resolution of the brutal Central American wars from the 1980's was facilitated by diligent bilateral diplomacy between Washington and Moscow, a similar approach today between Washington and Beijing could be considered. And by engaging meaningfully in such a dialogue, both bilaterally and at the United Nations, China will immediately change perceptions about its intentions in the Americas. Were it to do so, the payoff would be enormous. Indeed, competition is inevitable, but cooperation wherever possible will lead to even better, mutually rewarding results.