哪里在转向呢？不，并不是奥巴马政府的转向亚洲，我说的是另一个转向，它发生在候选人特朗普从候选人变成候任总统、再变成总统的时候。一些人希望，或者不如说想让自己和别人相信，那位具有煽动性的“流氓”候选人终会消停下来，成为更老练、更传统的特朗普总统。但特朗普总统头几个星期的施政表现证明，这些希望是徒劳的。正如《经济学人》写的：“在他的批评者看来，特朗普先生鲁莽、一团糟，尤其上周针对七个中东国家公民的临时入境禁令，秘密起草，仓促实施，根本不可能实现它宣称的保护美国避受恐怖袭击的目标。”

2017年1月27日星期五，在美国弗吉尼亚州的阿灵顿，唐纳德·特朗普总统在国防部英雄厅签署了行政命令。(奥利维尔·杜里瑞,阿巴卡通讯社)

示威者和移民权利倡导者聚集在克林顿城堡国家纪念馆，游览纽约自由女神像的起始点。（美联社）

他的头几个星期委实非比寻常，令人精疲力竭。尽管我们关心的是全球治理和自由世界秩序，但正像布鲁金斯学会的汤姆·怀特数月前所说，特朗普和他的亲信——包括“白宫西翼黑武士”史蒂夫·班农或迈克尔·弗林——似乎打算“将秩序付之一炬”。看来本届总统的信念是：民族主义甚至民粹主义药方才是“对症下药”，至少对美国来说是如此。

充其量，这位总统剑拔弩张的外交政策言论是在效仿伟大的汤姆·谢林的国际关系核威慑战术决策法。谢林将这一战略定义为“非理性中的理性”。几十年前，一些总统顾问曾经请求当时的总统理查德·尼克松采用这种战略。该理论认为，面对竞争对手表现得略为疯狂，可以提高谈判中的地位。然而困境在于，特朗普主要针对的似乎是他的朋友，面对天然对手尤其是俄国的普京时，他的态度反而更微妙。他赞赏的都是民粹主义者，如英国独立党前领导人奈杰尔·法拉奇，或菲律宾现总统。在他脑子里似乎不存在什么理性客观。

这些念头来自哪里？特朗普从哪里得出这种概念，认为无论对朋友还是对敌人，国际关系都只是一场零和竞赛？毫无疑问，在贸易和WTO或NATO等战略联盟方面，没有人比特朗普本人更极端。几十年来，至少在贸易上，他一直都对不利的多边贸易协定大加痛斥。他不断批评美国加入的协定伤害了美国，让美国制造业就业机会流向墨西哥和中国。特朗普指责前任政府，说它们为了帮助别国宁肯牺牲美国利益。他在周四的早餐祈祷时表示，“我们几乎被世界上所有国家利用”，“再也不会发生这样的事了”。但他的世界观还有更阴暗一面。他的一些观点直接取自史蒂夫·班农，后者是右翼新闻、观点与评论网站“布赖特帕特新闻”前执行主席，特朗普的首席策略师。许多人认为，班农全程介入了移民行政命令的推出。此外，班农一直支持欧洲国家的民粹运动，主张终结欧盟。特朗普对这些观点的认同，标志美国政策的显著转变。经过数十年依靠建立多边联盟确保和平之后，如今白宫表明它将有意破坏这些国际机制。班农2014年在梵蒂冈的演讲中表示，这是对更美好过去的回归：

“我认为，强大的国家和国家强大的民族主义运动创造强大的邻国”，班农说。“这才是构建西欧和美国的模块，我认为它是我们的前进方向。”

然而，这种民族主义政治路径与历任美国总统及其主要顾问们格格不久。美国例外一向是美国外交政策思想的要素之一，但在自由秩序建筑师们看来，狭隘的民主主义和竖起高墙会导致敌对、竞赛和战争。科德尔·赫尔曾长期出任弗兰克林·罗斯福总统的国务卿，是战后外交战略的主要设计者，爱德华多·波特最近在《纽约时报》上引用他的著述说，“如果我们能通过降低贸易和关税壁垒，通过消除人为的贸易障碍，来增加各国之间的商业往来，我们就能大大消除战争本身”。这可不是呼吁越来越多的民族主义。

所以，如果特朗普真的认为二战以来历任总统走的这条路是错的，那么现在我们要走向哪里呢？外交关系委员会的斯图尔特·帕特里克提出一些替代方案。如我最近在Rising BRICSAM网站发文所指，他心目中一共有五个替代方案。帕特里克认为，无论出现哪种替代秩序，所有五个选项中的要素都会被置入。虽然美国有可能更加孤立，但特朗普执政下，美国的行动很可能以侵略性为主，所以，无论存不存在同盟或国际机制，都有可能出现某种形式的民族主义大国框架。

这对美欧、美俄或最重要的美中这些主要双边关系来说意味着什么呢？显然，就算特朗普上台之前，无论克林顿、布什还是奥巴马政府，中国都越来越受到了美国的关注。所有人都承认，中国的国际特别是地区实力日益强大。尽管东海和南海局势紧张，美中未能完全努力实现朝鲜问题上的合作，但美中两国在伊朗特别是气候变化问题上达成协议，成为推动解决这些问题的基础。特朗普在贸易和“一个中国”政策上态度更加对立，这一切还能继续下去吗？

奥巴马时期政府官员、布鲁金斯学会高级研究员杰弗里·贝德在布鲁金斯学会的一份报告中提出一个方案，有可能扭转美中紧张关系。考虑到习近平主席和其他领导人在中共十九大召开前难以启动缓和性双边政策，贸易投资应该是最直接的合作领域。毫无疑问，在一些关键部门，外国人面临太多投资壁垒，中国的进口壁垒也十分繁多。中国领导人愿意就投资贸易条款进行谈判或重新谈判，对美中关系来说将是“对症下药”。最终，贸易投资倡议也有利于推进市场改革，而这也是习近平一再表示支持，将来也会继续这么做的。

So where is the pivot? No, not the Obama Administration's Asian pivot. I'm speaking of another pivot. This one was to occur when candidate Trump transformed from candidate to President-elect and then to President. Some hoped, or rather convinced themselves and others, that the incendiary 'rogue' candidate would settle down and emerge as a more diplomatic, more traditional, President Trump. But the first weeks of President Trump administration have proven those hopes to be futile. As The Economist wrote: “To his critics, Mr. Trump is reckless and chaotic. Nowhere more so than in last week's temporary ban on entry for citizens from seven Middle Eastern countries—drafted in secret, enacted in haste and unlikely to fulfil its declared aim of sparing America from terrorism.”

President Donald Trump signs Executive Orders in the Hall of Heroes at the Department of Defense Friday, Jan. 27, 2017 in Arlington, Va. (Olivier Douliery/Abaca Press/TNS)

Protesters and immigrants rights advocates gathered at Castle Clinton National Monument, the physical departure and arrival point for tours of the Statue of Liberty in New York City. (AP)

His first weeks have already been extraordinary and exhausting. While we concern ourselves with global governance and the liberal world order, Trump and his inner circle, including Steve Bannon, 'the Darth Vader of the West Wing,' or Michael Flynn, appear to be ready to 'burn the order to the ground,' asTom Wright at the Brookings Institution suggested several months ago. This appears to be a presidency built on a belief that nationalist, even populist prescriptions, are 'just what the doctor ordered' – at least for the United States.

Taken at its best, the high-strung foreign policy rhetoric of this President seems to echo the great Tom Schelling's tactical decision approach to nuclear deterrence in international relations. Schelling identified this strategy as the 'rationality of irrationality' and decades ago it was applied by some Presidential-watchers to then president Richard Nixon. The theory suggests appearing just a little crazy in order enhance your bargaining position with a competitor. However, the dilemma is that Trump is seemingly mostly targeting his friends, while being more nuanced when it comes to his perceived natural rivals, most notably Russia's Putin. His praise appears to be saved for populists like the UKIP's former leader Nigel Farage, or the current President of the Philippines. And there appears to be no rational objective in mind.

From where do these ideas emerge? Where has Trump adopted this notion that international relations is a zero-sum contest with friends and rivals alike? Certainly on trade and strategic alliances such as the WTO or NATO, you need go no further than Trump himself. For decades now, at least with respect to trade, he has thundered against bad multilateral trade deals. Repeatedly, Trump has condemned United States for entering agreements that damage the United States and drive American manufacturing jobs to Mexico and China. Trump has been quoted as condemning previous administrations for their readiness to aid others at the expense of the United States. “We're taken advantage of by every nation in the world virtually,” he said on Thursday at a prayer breakfast. “It's not going to happen anymore.” But there is even a darker side to his worldview. Some of his perspectives seem to owe their authorship directly to Steve Bannon, former executive chair of Breitbart News, a rightwing news, opinion, and commentary website, who is also Trump's chief strategist. Many have suggested that the substance and rollout of the immigration executive order had Bannon's involvement all over it. Among other things, Bannon has been supportive of the populist movements in European countries and has favored the end of the European Union. Trump has echoed these sentiments, marking a remarkable shift in U.S. policy. After decades of building multinational alliances as a guarantee of peace, the White House has now indicated it may purposely undermine these international institutions. Bannon, in his 2014 speech at the Vatican, cast this as a return to a better past:

I think strong countries and strong nationalist movements in countries make strong neighbors,” Bannon said. “And that is really the building blocks that built Western Europe and the United States, and I think it's what can see us forward.

But this nationalist political approach seems so out of sorts with previous U.S. Presidents and their key advisors. American exceptionalism has always been an element of U.S. foreign policy thinking, but the architects of the liberal order saw that narrow nationalism and building walls led to rivalry, competition, and war. Cordell Hull, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's long-serving secretary of state and a key architect of postwar foreign strategy, once wrote and was quoted recently by Eduardo Porter in the New York Times saying, “if we could increase commercial exchanges among nations over lowered trade and tariff barriers and remove unnatural obstructions to trade, we would go a long way toward eliminating war itself.” This is not a call for growing nationalisms.

So if Trump truly believes that the well-worn path trodden by previous Presidents since the end of World War II are misguided, where do we go from here? Stewart Patrick, from the Council of Foreign Relations has suggested a series of alternatives. As I pointed out in a recent post at Rising BRICSAM, there are, in his mind, five alternatives. Patrick has suggested that elements from all five are likely to be built into whatever alternative order emerges. Though greater U.S. isolation is possible, it is more likely that aggressive U.S. actions will dominate during a Trump Administration and so a nationalist great power architecture of some form is likely with or without alliances and international institutions.

What does this suggest for key bilateral relations say with Europe, Russia, or, most importantly, China? It was evident even before Trump that China occupied growing U.S. attention whether from the Clinton, Bush, or Obama administrations. All recognized the growing power of China internationally, and especially regionally. Notwithstanding tensions over the East and South China Seas and difficult and incomplete efforts to forge US-China cooperation in Korea, US-China agreements over Iran and climate change particularly have been foundational in moving these issues forward. Can this be continued in Trump's far more competitive stance over trade and the One-China policy?

Jeffrey Bader, a former Obama official and currently a senior fellow at Brookings has identified options in a Brookings report that have the potential to reverse rising tensions US-China relations. Acknowledging the difficulty for President Xi Jinping and the other leadership figures facing the 19th Party Congress in initiating temperature-lowering bilateral policies, there is an immediate area of cooperation in trade and investment. There is no question that there are far too many barriers to foreigners in select, but key sectors, and too many barriers to imports. A willingness on the part of Chinese leadership to negotiate or renegotiate investment and trade provisions could 'just be what the doctor ordered' for the US-China relationship. Ultimately, proposals in trade and investment have the added benefit of advancing market reforms, which Xi has repeatedly supported and will likely continue to do so in the future.