按照东亚雁阵模式，中印之间产业发展时差与落差所形成的“互补相长”本应成为莫迪政府“产业兴国”的重要路径。然而，2020年加勒万河谷冲突以来，莫迪政府所推行的产业政策实践日益聚焦于“对华产业替代”，并视此策略为增强“印度自造”能力的重要路径。

莫迪政府的“对华产业替代”策略主要包含五大部分，即签证收紧、税务稽查、投资限制、关税调整和补贴刺激。

一是，大幅收紧在印中资企业关键岗位中方员工的赴印工作签和商务签。但对三类中企的员工签证，莫迪政府又网开一面，即有助于印度产业链“补短填缺”的中企、与印企或美西方企业合资的中企、愿与印分享产业技术的中企不在印度政府签证限制之列。签证收紧政策严重恶化了智能手机、工程承包、通信等印度已有“替代备胎”的中企在印度的生存与运营环境。

二是，动辄即对在印中企开展税务稽查。尽管稽查不分对象，但近几年中企是重点“照顾”对象。由于印度税务稽查机构太多，中企不堪应付。税务稽查主要来自财政部下辖印度税收情报局（DRI，印海关专责反走私／反逃税的最高机构）、执法局（ED，专责调查反洗钱的权力机构）、所得税局（IT，重点调查非法利润转移）、海关特别调查和情报处（SIIB，负责处理欺诈、虚假陈述、逃税等案件）等四大执法机构及其省一级分支机构。印度税务政策设计存在的明显模糊性和滞后性，以及查税机构与招商引资部门间的政策失调甚至政策冲突，既给赴印中资企业“合规”运营提供了多种“入场”选择，更给印度税务机构日后查税增加了诸多人为操作空间。中印关系交恶后，中企当年入场时的“合规缺陷”既成为饱受稽查和罚款的痛点，更为莫迪政府实施“对华产业替代”策略提供了方便之门。一些中企因之陷入停产甚至倒闭困境。中国智能手机品牌在印度频陷税务稽查困局即是明证。

三是，2020年4月特别是加勒万河谷冲突以来，针对中国投资，莫迪政府修订了一系列政策法规，不仅限制中企对印投资增量，且竭力减少在印中企投资存量。此外，莫迪政府还以“国家安全”为由推出“信任清单”措施，最大限度地拒绝中企投资印度，特别是排除中企参与印度政府招投标项目，严重压缩从事交通、通信、能源等工程承包类中企在印度的未来生存空间。这类中企要么改行，要么完成手头项目后走人。

四是，增加商品进口关税，逼迫在华产业链对印迁移或在印建立合资企业，实现“印度制造”本土化。这项政策的核心就是，政府通过分阶段提高终端产品关键部件的进口关税，逐步限制零部件进口并使其国产化、本土化，从而在印度实现产业链的闭环运作。由于在本地组装或生产终端产品与进口终端产品之间人为制造了巨大的成本差，诱压下的国际厂商不但在印投建组装厂，而且还将产业链更上游、附加值更高的零部件工厂移往印度。莫迪政府以智能手机试水，获得明显成效。从整机装配到普通器件甚至到高价值配件，印度在手机制造业领域已初具全产供链（除芯片、电池之外）的布局。iPhone14与15先后在印度实现量产即是明证。受此鼓舞，莫迪政府计划在电视机、微波炉、数码相机甚至家具、玩具等劳动密集程度更高的产业复制手机成功模式。

五是，加勒万河谷事件爆发后，莫迪政府推出“生产关联激励计划”，重在通过财政补贴，增强“印度自造”能力，优先鼓励已拥有一定产能的产业加强本土制造能力。此项财政补贴计划涵盖的14个行业与印当前自华进口的绝大部分产品相重合。显然，这一靶向财政补贴计划重在降低对华产业依赖，加快“印度自造”速度，并已在智能手机、制药、新能源汽车等领域明显见效。

中印关系交恶是莫迪政府加快“对华产业替代”的底层逻辑，即以安全逻辑替代了市场逻辑。加勒万事件爆发以来，中印双边任何问题动辄被“泛安全化”，使得原本可以“优势互补”的中印产业互动模式变成了印度“踩着中国过河”的产业互动模式。

此外，莫迪政府愈发认定，只有“去中国化”才能成就印度制造业崛起。一方面，“对华产业替代”是印度“产业兴国”的必由之路。中国产业拥有高度集群优势和全产业链配套成本优势，如果产业链上不与中国“脱钩”，基于市场运营规律，印度难以实现产业自立自强。另一方面，美西方“全球化重构”的核心是“去中国化”，重构过去30年“美西方＋中国”的全球化产业合作模式，而放眼全球，唯一能充当这个“超级替补”的经济体就是印度。

考虑到印度经济的庞大规模以及较为齐全的产业门类，莫迪政府的“对华产业替代”政策实践势必会对中国产业发展形成冲击。中国必须有效应对，既要做好自己的产业链与创新链，特别是通过智能化、数字化、自动化，不断强化产业的高度集群优势和全产业链成本配套优势，同时也要完善我产业链迁移政策特别是对印迁移政策，以免“种了别人的地，荒了自家的田”。

According to the “flying-geese” theory of growth for East Asian economies, the natural complementary nature of India and China — a result of their different stages of industrial development — could have been a viable pathway for India to thrive. However, since the conflict in the Galwan Valley in 2020, the Indian government has increasingly focused on seeking industrial substitutes for China, regarding the move as a critical part of its “Make in India” campaign.

The Indian substitution policy includes five main elements: tightened visa rules, tax probes, investment restrictions, tariff adjustments and subsidies.

First, the Indian government has markedly tightened work and business visa requirements for Chinese employees who hold hold critical positions in Chinese companies operating in India. However, Chinese enterprises that help improve and strengthen the Indian industrial chain, that have joint ventures with Indian or Western companies or that are willing to share industrial technologies with India are not restricted in this regard. The stricter visa policy has seriously degraded the living and operating environment for Chinese businesses in industries where Indian companies also operate, such as smartphones, engineering contracting and telecommunications.

Second, tax probes into Chinese enterprises in India are conducted at will. Theoretically, those are not targeted at any particular nationality, but in recent years Chinese businesses have been increasingly subject to tax inspections. The sheer number of tax agencies in India is already beyond the affordability of Chinese enterprises. They include four law enforcement agencies at the federal level, including provincial branches:the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) under the finance ministry, the top organ of Indian Customs against smuggling and tax evasion;the Directorate of Enforcement (ED), which is responsible for money laundering investigations;the Income Tax Department (IT), which focuses on illegal profit transfers; andthe Customs Special Investigation and Intelligence Branch (SIIB), which specializes in fraud, false statements and tax evasion cases.India's tax policies are designed with obvious ambiguities, lags and policy imbalances (or even conflicts) between tax inspection agencies and investment promotion departments. As a result, there are a variety of options for Chinese-funded enterprises to access the Indian market and operate in compliance, as well as much room for maneuvering by tax agencies seeking tax inspections.Since China-India relations deteriorated, “flaws in compliance” that were accommodated when Chinese companies entered the Indian market have not only invited tax audits and fines but also gave a ready excuse to the Modi government to implement its industrial substitution strategy. Some Chinese enterprises have had to suspend production or even close down. Smartphone brands, for example, have been the subject of frequent tax inspections in India.

Third, since the conflict in the Galwan Valley erupted in April 2020, the Modi government has revised a series of policies and regulations designed not only to restrict future Chinese investments but also to reduce existing investments. It has launched a so-called trust list on grounds of national security, rejecting Chinese investments in India to the maximum extent possible, excluding Chinese companies from the bidding process (for government projects in particular) and seriously reducing the future living space of Chinese enterprises with regard to transportation, communication, energy and other engineering contracts in India. Those already operating will have to change their main business or exit the Indian market after completing the projects at hand.

Fourth, import tariffs on goods have been increased to force the industrial chain in China to relocate to India or establish joint ventures in the country, thus achieving the localization of Make in India.At the center of this policy, the Indian government will gradually restrict the importation of critical components and spare parts for end products, localize their production and ultimately put in place closed-loop industrial chains by imposing higher import tariffs in a phased manner. With the artificially created — and huge — cost differences between locally assembled or produced end products and imported ones, international manufacturers under pressure have not only invested in building assembly plants in India but also moved manufacturing factories of spare parts there with higher added value in the upstream industrial chain.The Modi government tested the strategy with smartphones and achieved remarkable results. From the assembly of the whole machine to generic parts and even high-value accessories, India now has a roughly complete production and supply chain for smartphones (except for chips and batteries). This is evidenced by the mass production of iPhone14 and iPhone 15 models in India. Encouraged, the Modi government plans to replicate the successful model in more labor-intensive industries such as televisions, microwave ovens, digital cameras and even furniture and toys.

Fifth, after Galwan Valley, the Modi government launched its “production-linked incentive” scheme, focusing on enhancing Make in India capacity through financial subsidies and giving priority to encouraging industries with existing production capacity to strengthen local manufacturing. The 14 industries in the financial subsidy plan coincide largely with current Indian imports from China. Obviously, the tightly targeted scheme is designed to reduce dependence on Chinese industries and accelerate the Make in India campaign. It has seen remarkable results in smartphones, pharmaceuticals and new-energy vehicles.

The worsening of relations with China is the underlying factor behind India's desire to accelerate industrial substitution with respect to China. In other words, the security logic has superseded the market logic. Since Galwan, any and all bilateral issues have been turned into matters of security at will. This has changed the mode of China-India industrial interaction from being mutually complementary to India “crossing the river by touching China”.

In addition, the Modi government increasingly believes that Indian manufacturing will rise only when the country eliminates the presence of China in its own industries. On one hand, industrial substitution is the only way for India to rejuvenate itself through industry. China enjoys industrial clusters and cost advantages as a result of complete industrial chains at home. If India does not decouple from China, the laws of the market will not allow it to achieve industrial self-reliance. On the other hand, at the center of the West's goal of reconstructing globalization is an effort to reduce China's footprint and reshaping global industrial cooperation to replace the United States and the “West plus China” model in the past 30 years. India is the only economy in the world that is in a position to take up the role of a super substitute.

Given the huge size of the Indian economy and its relatively complete industrial sectors, the policy and practice of industrial substitution is bound to have an impact on China's industrial development. China must deal with this effectively by further strengthening its own industrial and innovation chains —especially via improved industrial clusters and whole-industrial-chain cost advantage through application of intelligent, digital and automation technologies. It must also improve its policy on industrial chain transfers — to India in particular — so as to avoid contributing to India's development at the cost of China's development.