近期，拜登政府签署对华投资限令，赋予美国政府新的广泛监管权力，禁止美国公民、永久居民和企业对中国的半导体与微电子、人工智能、量子计算三大高科技领域投资。这意味着美国中长期对华科技进攻战略加速。

拜登政府对华投资限制法案是美国所谓“增强对华竞争力”更广泛立法当中的一部分。投资限制令与此前的高科技出口管制、实体制裁、产业链脱钩断链等共同构成美国对华科技遏制战略。近年来，美国不断加强对华高科技制造领域的遏制和打压，不仅对关键技术、关键能源、关键资源，还对关键投资采取限制，并通过构建保护高技术的法律限制，扩大职能机构审查权限，加速中美高技术脱钩。2018年起，美国积极推动针对出口管控制度、外商投资审查等领域的集中式立法改革，完成了《国防授权法案》（NDAA）《外国投资风险评估现代化法案》（FIRRMA）《出口管制改革法案》（ECRA）《国家关键能力防御法案》）等立法建设，明确要保护的对象是美国的“重要技术和产业基础”。随着中美之间的科技博弈进一步展开，美国对华科技遏制日益加速。出口管制难以覆盖产业链所有环节，而投资限令则能更有力地切断技术合作，这也是美国祭出投资限制工具的重要考量。

为了更有针对性地应对所谓来自中国的竞争，美国开始对从美国境内流出的对外投资予以必要的审查，这一新的政策工具被称为“对外投资审查机制”也即反向CFIUS。事实上，早在2018 年 8 月，美国国会就推动通过了《FIRRMA 法案》，以强化美国外国投资委员会（CFIUS）监管权限，并首次将中国对美投资的审查范围扩大到风险投资、非控股式战略投资等领域。拜登上台之后，美国更进一步收紧高科技领域对华投资限制，在制定2018年《出口管制改革法案》、2022年《芯片与科学法案》的立法辩论过程中，美国国会对建立反外国投资安全审查机制展开了讨论。

而早些时候，美国财长耶伦和美国国家安全事务助理沙利文也在不同场合表示，美国将延续“小院高墙”遏华思路，加强与盟友间政策协调，在半导体等“国家安全”相关领域完善对华出口管制，加强外国投资审查，限制关键技术对外投资。而今，拜登政府的投资限令以所谓“国家安全”为由，对先进半导体和微电子、人工智能、量子信息科学等尖端领域的对华投资进行审查或阻止投资，以“保护美国关键技术”，这是美国经济胁迫和国家强制干预的又一典型例证。

半导体、人工智能、量子计算等高技术行业，既是全球风险投资追逐的热点领域，也是中美竞争激烈的前沿。根据拜登政府投资限令，美国将打击通过并购、私募股权和私募资本，以及合资企业和融资安排等方式进行的投资，但对在此行政令签署前就已经签订的、有约束力的交易则排除在限制投资之外。这意味着，存量投资不会被回溯限制。然而，即便如此，新限令也势必将进一步恶化近年来美国对华投资下滑的趋势。根据荣鼎集团数据，2022年美国对华直接投资为82亿美元，创下20年来新低，其中对华风险投资仅为13亿美元，创下10年来低点。中国科技媒体钛媒体发布数据显示，2022年，美国私募股权和风险资本向中国投资70.2亿美元，较2021年的289.2亿美元大幅减少了75.7%，为近3年来的最低。

投资限令也将带来较为恶劣的示范效应，未来不排除拜登政府拉拢胁迫盟友配合强化对华投资限制。如，欧盟不排除进一步收紧对华科技投资。今年欧盟委员会发布的《欧洲经济安全战略》专设了对外投资章节，提出将设立新的成员国专家组，研究保障对外投资安全的可能措施。而德国出台的首份对华战略也包括外来投资审查和可能的对外投资审查等相关内容。

不过，美国投资限令到底能起到多大遏制作用也存在很大的不确定性。目前，美国内部围绕对华投资限制已经产生了分歧和担忧。就在投资限令出台之后，美国半导体行业协会立即发表声明，“希望美国最终出台的规则将允许美国芯片公司在公平的竞争环境中竞争，并进入包括中国在内的全球主要市场”。这意味着美国投资限令在短期打击中国科技发展的同时，也难以避免损害美国自身长期利益。

本质而言，美国实施科技出口管制和投资限制的每一个领域，被替代的可能性都会越来越大，管制和限令将进一步激发中国围绕关键核心技术进行研发，同时寻求对全球开放和创新合作，中长期而言，反而将削弱美国在全球高科技领域的主导力量。

U.S. President Joe Biden recently signed a restrictive order that gave the government extensive new powers to regulate investment in China. It prohibits U.S. citizens, permanent residents and companies from investing in China's three major high-tech sectors: semiconductors and microelectronics, artificial intelligence and quantum computing. This means that America's medium- to long-term tech offensive against China will accelerate.

The restrictions are part of a broader move that can be called “enhancing U.S. competitiveness against China." Along with previous high-tech export controls, entity sanctions and supply chain decoupling, they are key elements of the U.S. strategy to contain China's technological progress.In recent years, the United States has continuously strengthened its containment and suppression of China's high-tech manufacturing sector. It has imposed restrictions not only on key technologies and resources but also on investments in certain fields. It has also expanded the government's regulatory powers by implementing legal restrictions to protect high tech, thereby accelerating selective decoupling between China and the United States.In 2018, the U.S. actively promoted centralized legislative reforms in areas such as export control systems and foreign investment reviews, completing such things as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), the National Defense Authorization Act, and the National Critical Capabilities Defense Act (NCCDA). These legislative acts clearly aim to protect the important technological and industrial foundation of the United States.

As high-tech competition between China and the United States further intensifies, the U.S. containment of China's technology is also accelerating. It is difficult for export controls alone to cover all aspects of the industrial chain: Investment restrictions have a greater impact on cutting off technological cooperation, so these tools are an important consideration for the United States. To more specifically respond to what it sees as competition from China, the United States has begun to review investments flowing out of the United States — a new policy tool called the “foreign investment review mechanism,” or “reverse CFIUS” (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States).In fact, as early as August 2018, the U.S. Congress was pushing FIRRMA, which strengthened the regulatory authority of CFIUS and expanded the scope of review of Chinese investments in the United States to include areas such as venture capital and non-controlling strategic investments. After Biden took office, the United States further tightened investment restrictions in the high-tech sector against China. During the legislative debates on the Export Control Reform Act in 2018 and the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022, Congress discussed the establishment of a foreign investment security review mechanism.

Earlier, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated on different occasions that the United States will continue its “small yard, high wall” policy to contain China, as well as strengthen policy coordination with allies, improve export controls in areas related to “national security” (such as semiconductors), strengthen foreign investment reviews and restrict investment in key technologies. Today, the Biden administration's investment restrictions — under the pretext of national security — review or block investments in advanced semiconductors, microelectronics, artificial intelligence, quantum information science and other cutting-edge sectors with China, in order to “protect U.S. critical technologies.” This is another typical example of economic coercion and national intervention by the United States.

High-tech industries such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing are not only hot spots for global venture capital but also fiercely contested areas between China and the United States. Under the Biden administration's investment restrictions, the United States will crack down on investments made through mergers and acquisitions, private equity and venture capital, as well as on joint ventures and financing arrangements. However, deals that were signed and legally binding before the issuance of this executive order are exempt. This means that existing investments will not be retroactively restricted. Even so, the new restrictions will inevitably further worsen the downward trend of U.S. investment in China in recent years.According to the Rhodium Group, U.S. direct investment in China in 2022 was $8.2 billion, a new 20-year low. Venture capital investment in China was only $1.3 billion, a 10-year low. According to Chinese tech media Titanium Media, private equity and venture capital from the United States amounted to $7.02 billion in China, a significant decrease of 75.7 percent from the $28.92 billion invested in 2021 and the lowest in nearly three years.

In the future, it cannot be ruled out that the Biden administration will coerce allies to strengthen their own investment restrictions on China, a negative ripple effect. For example, the European Union may tighten its technology investments in China as well. The European Commission's European Economic Security Strategy, which was released this year, includes a section on foreign investment, proposing the establishment of a new expert group to explore possible measures to safeguard foreign investment security. Germany's first strategic policy on China includes provisions for foreign investment review and potential scrutiny of outbound investments.

Yet the extent to which the U.S. investment restrictions can effectively curb China remains uncertain. There are already divergences and concerns within the United States. Immediately after the restrictions were announced, the Semiconductor Industry Association of the United States issued a statement saying, “We hope the final rules allow U.S. chip firms to compete on a level-playing field and access key global markets, including China.” This implies that while the U.S. investment restrictions may have a short-term impact on China's technological development, they could also potentially harm long-term U.S. interests.

In essence, in each area where the United States implements technology export controls and investment restrictions, there is an increasing possibility of substitution. The regulations and restrictions will further stimulate China's research and development efforts in core technologies and its pursuit of open innovation cooperation globally. In the medium and long term, these measures could weaken the United States' dominant position in the global high-tech industry.