面对特朗普总统在贸易问题上的混乱与不确定性，李克强总理近期在全国人民代表大会上作的政府工作报告释放了经济政策保持连贯性的讯息。他的经济目标仍设定在“6.5%左右”，同时财政赤字维持在占GDP的2.6%，低于去年的3%。

可以理解，持怀疑态度的评论员或许会从两个对立的角度批评李克强的讲话：太过具体，太过空泛。事实上，它是为中国在新的一年里继续应对各项挑战做准备。

首先，太过具体。一年又一年，中国官方公布的经济增长率一直在较窄的范围内波动，2014年7.3%，2015年6.9%，2016年6.7%，2017年6.9%，2018年又变成了6.5%。

然而，中国的经济增长真的如此稳定么？能源消费等其他用于衡量经济活动的指标一直在剧烈波动。随着网络的兴起与服务业增长，中国的产业结构与相对价格发生了急剧变化。辽宁和内蒙古等省份已经宣布以两位数的幅度下调GDP，这就相当于承认此前曾在经济数据上造假。这种变动不得不让人怀疑官方数据的整体稳定性。

任何报告体系都存在造假的动机，让结果看上去完成甚至是超过了预定目标。当经济表现对于个人职场升迁存在巨大影响的时候，这种情况变得格外显著。但无论在哪，经济活动都一直处于混乱的动态之中。而当面对中国这种格外快速的增长与转变时，经济活动就变得更加难以追踪。统计学家们深知这种特性，明智地努力提高数据的准确性。

不仅仅是海外分析人士认识到了发布数据的局限性。在担任辽宁省省委书记期间，李克强就曾宣称中国的经济增长数据多为“人造”，因此应当转而关注如电力消费和货物运输等指标。在解读中国经济增长目标时，我们需要铭记这种关于数据准确性的“公开的秘密”。

第二，政府工作报告太空泛。这份36页的工作报告列举了九个关键政策目标。很多目标在措辞上都相当笼统，只是在重复过去十年的类似议题。举个例子，“积极扩大消费，促进有效投资”。李克强再次强调要坚决打好三大攻坚战：防控化解重大风险；精准脱贫；污染防治。这又有何新意，有何实质性内容？

然而，相对于太过具体、太过空泛，我们不妨将李克强的政府工作报告视为将延续改革的实质性内容融合在创造空间应对关键议题的信号中。

首先来看实质性内容。新闻记者本质上都在追寻那些可以成为新闻的“新鲜事”。相反，当管理中国这样一个主要经济体时，坚定不移的方向更为重要。中国面临的挑战依旧未变，这并不令人意外。它源于这些挑战的本质与规模：无论是治理空气污染，还是建立起完善的养老保障系统，抑或是降低中国对债务支撑房地产市场投资的依赖，都没有药到病除的特效药。虽然在某些领域，改革和改变或许会来得更为迅猛、更为有效，但这并非挑战依然存在的原因。

因此，可以理解为何李克强强调的三大攻坚战透露出实质上的延续性。首先，加快供给侧结构性改革，尤其是减少关键领域的过剩产能。第二，加速推动创新产业的发展。第三，深化国有企业、私营企业、产权、财政系统、金融领域、医疗养老以及环境保护等领域的改革。鉴于这些议题的数量和广度，李克强的整份政府工作报告合理列举了关键措施。

取得成功的关键并不是罗列细节，而是坚持不懈地在全中国推动贯彻落实。为了取得这一目标，习近平主席强调中共的领导作用以及政府机构改革。新成立的国家监察委员会将负责处理腐败和违规等问题。一旦完成机构改革，几大部委和监察机构的整合将精简并优化政府职能。

贯彻改革需要时间，在改革获益之前，需要付出调整成本。如果改革切实可行，新机构需要时间来投入运行。降低钢铁产能过剩或通过叫停工业活动减少污染都会给经济增长带来负面影响。然而，中共领导层一直不愿接受经济增长出现明显放缓，无论这种暂时放缓会给长期经济增长带来何种益处。无法促进经济增长或影响个人仕途，或伤害中共本身。

这就需要释放信号。今年明显调低的经济增长目标释放出的信号就是，为应对各种风险和挑战，中国现在愿意承受较低的经济增速。从6.9%微降到6.5%帮助中共规避了对其领导层无法带领经济实现增长的批评。虽然外界对于数据的准确性依然存有疑虑，但这一信号成功得以释放。李克强同时放弃了自己在2017年提到的“在实际工作中争取更好结果”的期许：渐进式努力不应聚焦在继续推动取得更高经济增长数字上，而应放在解决其他优先事项上。

李克强还谈到了防控风险。中国领导层深知中国经济面临的风险。前财政部部长楼继伟就曾指出，中国金融领域存在“严重的扭曲”和“一系列乱象”，同时“中国发生系统性金融风险的可能性非常大”。而对影子银行和安邦保险等个别企业采取行动将有可能拉低经济增速。中国政府需要为应对这种情况预留空间， 而不是逼迫各省份拼命榨取最后一点经济增速。而直到未知风险出现，我们永远都无法预知还有哪些未知风险存在。

虽然报告关注的主要焦点是国内，但还存在一些外部风险，其中最为严峻的就是与美国的贸易战。虽然贸易在2017年为中国经济增长贡献了10%，但自从2012年以来，贸易一直是中国经济增长的有限净贡献项。如果美国针对中国启动大规模的贸易限制措施，这一稳定态势将发生急剧变化。中国领导人将很难如2008年那样通过推出国内刺激计划来抵销来自国外的紧缩压力。让我们再次强调，为增长预留一些空间不失为审慎之举。

通常，对于中国的分析都会低估中国领导人对面临挑战的了解程度，因此无法在准确的语境中分析中国的各项声明。李克强总理在全国人大会议上作的政府工作报告就再次透露出了这样一个迹象，即中国领导层实际上深知中国面临的各种问题，他们给自己预留了空间来应对这些挑战，并稳步在改革实质上取得进步。

Amidst the turbulence and uncertainty of President Trump's stance on trade, Premier Li Keqiang's recent work report to the National People's Congress contained a message of continuity on economic policy. He also set targets of “around 6.5%” for growth, together with a budget deficit of 2.6% of GDP, down from 3% last year.

A skeptical commentator might understandably criticize Li's speech from two, opposing angles: It was too specific. And it was too general. In fact, it helped set the stage for another year's effort on tackling China's challenges.

First – too specific. Year after year, China's officially-announced GDP growth rate has moved in a narrow band from 7.3% in 2014, 6.9% in 2015, 6.7% in 2016 and 6.9%t in 2017. 6.5% in 2018, anyone?

Yet has growth really been so stable? Other measures of economic activity such as energy consumption have moved much more dramatically. With the growth of the internet and services, there have been significant changes in sectoral mix and relative prices. Regions such as Liaoning and Inner Mongolia have announced double-digit downward revisions to GDP, admitting previous falsification of data. Such swings make the overall stability of official numbers suspect.

In any reporting system, there are incentives to game the system and demonstrate targets have been met or exceeded. This is especially true when performance has a big influence on individual careers. But, economic activity everywhere is dynamic and messy. It is especially hard to track when it's growing and shifting as rapidly as it is in China. Statisticians are wise to the games and make their own efforts to improve data accuracy.

It is not just overseas analysts who spot the limitations in reported data. Li Keqiang, in his time as Liaoning Party Secretary, himself declared Chinese GDP figures to be “man-made” and looked instead at numbers such as electricity consumption and freight transport. We need to bear in mind this “open secret” about data accuracy when interpreting announcements on growth targets.

Second – the work report was too general. The 36-page work report lists nine key policy goals. Many are general in their wording and repeat familiar themes from the past ten years: “Actively increasing consumption and promoting effective investment” to choose but one. Li sees three critical battles to be fought: Defusing major risks; poverty alleviation; and addressing pollution. What's new here and where's the beef?

And yet, rather than being too specific and too general, Li's statements can be better viewed as combining substance on the continuity of reform with signals that create the space to tackle key issues.

Substance first. Reporters by their nature look for what is 'new' to make the news. On the contrary, in steering a major economy such as China, constancy of direction is more valuable. The list of China's challenges remains remarkably consistent— this should not be a surprise. It results from the nature and scale of these challenges: there are few quick fixes to air pollution, putting in place a comprehensive pensions system or reducing China's dependence on debt-funded real estate investment. While in some areas, reform and change might have been faster and more effective, that is not really why the challenges remain relevant.

It makes sense therefore for Li's top three priorities to demonstrate continuity on substance. First, stepping up supply-side structural reform – in particular, reducing overcapacity in key areas. Second, moving faster to make China a country of innovators and, third, deepening reform in the areas of state-owned enterprises, private enterprise, property rights, the fiscal system, the financial sector, pensions and healthcare and environmental protection. And given the number and breadth of issues, the full work report does a reasonable job of listing key actions.

The key to success is not more detail here, but persistent implementation across China. To this end, President Xi is emphasizing the leading role of the Party and changes in government structure. The new National Supervision Commission will address both issues of corruption and lack of compliance or perceived resistance. Once implemented, the consolidation of various ministries and regulators will reduce overlaps and improve accountabilities.

Implementing change takes time: there are adjustment costs before benefits come through. New institutions need time to get up and running if change is real. Cutting steel capacity or shuttering industrial activity to reduce pollution hurts growth. Yet the Party leadership has always been reluctant to accept a significant growth slowdown, whatever the longer-term benefits. A perceived failure to deliver on economic growth could risk undermining either individual leaders or the Party itself.

This is where the signals come in. The clear downward trend in GDP targets signals the acceptance of lower growth now in exchange for tackling risks and challenges. The small reduction from 6.9% to 6.5% helps ward off criticism that the leadership is failing to deliver economic performance. This signal gets through regardless of questions on data accuracy. Li also dropped the aspiration for growth to be “higher if possible” that he voiced in 2017: incremental effort should not go on pushing for ever higher GDP, but should have other priorities.

Li talked too of managing risks. The Chinese leadership is all too aware of the risks facing the economy. Former Finance Minister, Lou Jiwei, has described the financial sector as “severely distorted” and “messy,” adding that the “likelihood of China generating systematic financial risks is pretty big.” Actions on shadow banking and major individual cases such as Anbang, the insurer, will tend to reduce growth. The government needs to have room to take this on, rather than have provinces scrabbling for the last bit of growth. Other risks, the unknown unknowns, always remain, by definition, unknown until they emerge.

While the focus is primarily domestic, there are also external risks – the largest being a trade war with the United States. Since 2012, trade has made a limited net contribution to growth, although it did contribute a tenth of China's growth in 2017. This stable picture would however change rapidly in the face of meaningful trade restrictions from the United States. Chinese leaders would be reluctant to offset contractionary pressures from abroad with domestic stimulus in the way they did in 2008. Again, having some leeway on growth is prudent.

Too often, analysis of China underestimates how aware China's leaders are of the challenges they face and fails to place announcements in the right context. Li's NPC work report is another sign that the leadership is indeed well-aware and is giving itself the space to tackle these challenges and to steadily make progress on the substance of reform.