直到1996年以前，人民币即使在经常账户交易中也不是完全可兑换的。而一直到2009年以前，中国政府还不允许人民币用于贸易结算。此后中国货币和金融影响力的飙升，反映在欧洲和亚洲离岸人民币货币与债券交易的快速发展。到2014年，中国已经与30个国家和地区达成人民币贸易结算互换安排，韩国三星、法国Alstom等公司的中国子公司已经采用人民币支付结算。然而，尽管中华人民共和国不仅是美国的第二大贸易伙伴，而且是它的最大债权人，美国却明显缺席人民币的国际化进程。

国际清算银行的数据显示，人民币在全球货币交易中的份额已从2010年的1%上升到2013年的2%、2016年的4%。虽然远不及美元88%的大头，但仍反映了短期内的惊人增长。到2016年，人民币已经是世界第八大交易货币。人民币被纳入IMF特别提款权货币篮子，只会进一步提高它作为结算货币的潜在吸引力。事实上，人民币在货币篮子中的初始权重为11%，这让它领先于英镑和日元，仅次于欧元和美元。人民币排在日元之前，说明未来人民币的作用将扩大，虽然日元目前在全球货币交易中的份额比人民币要高得多（2016年为22%）。

已经有预测认为，到一定时候，人民币甚至有可能取代美元，成为国际大宗商品交易的计价单位。这种转变类似于二战之后美元自己作为国际储备货币对英镑的取代。目前人民币已经在外国央行的外汇储备中占有一席之地，这一进展不仅是因为中国日益强大的经济实力，也由于欧元相对疲软。但至少到目前为止，美元作为首选“避险”货币，其地位仍受到了支撑。

之前人民币国际化的重要举措包括2010年7月在香港建立离岸人民币市场，2014年11月的沪港通计划，以及2016年12月的深港通计划。离岸市场正式建立后，香港的人民币交易激增，人民币日益取代了香港对美元和欧元的外币持有。而且，新近的互通计划促进了两市之间的直接投资流动。放眼东亚，中国自2009年以来一直是澳大利亚最重要的出口市场，澳大利亚Fortescue Metal等企业已开始用人民币进行交易。但要实现人民币的潜力，需要金融进一步自由化。近期人民币疲软，中国在海外直接投资下降，2016年12月海外直接投资同比下降了近40%。但势在必行的是，中国当局应该继续放松而不是收紧资本管制。

在亚洲之外，大幅提升人民币的对外角色继续取得重大进展。特别是伦敦已经成为香港以外最重要的离岸人民币中心，伦敦的人民币结算量在2016年超过了新加坡。2016年，伦敦证交所上市的人民币债券超过95只，融资总额约60亿美元。目前的一个潜在重大举措是以可行性研究方式审议建立新的上海－伦敦互通计划，这将首次为欧洲投资者提供直接进入中国内地股市的通道。而且，伦敦也不是欧洲唯一的人民币中心。2015年11月在法兰克福建立的中欧国际交易所，是上海证券交易所、德意志交易所集团和中国金融期货交易所的合资公司。卢森堡也集中了大量的人民币计价基金。

人民币国际化的另一个原因是中国与巴西、俄罗斯、印度、南非等其他金砖国家的关系日益紧密。金砖集团在国际贸易结算中已经渐渐远离第三方货币，如美元和欧元，它们在2015年通过新的开发银行和应急储备安排进一步确立了正式关系。虽然英国2016年6月的脱欧公投被普遍视为对欧元前景的伤害，但它也给更团结的金砖集团提供了一个从欧盟的衰落中获益的机会。有意思的是，在英国公投的第二天，金砖国家股市跌幅都明显小于全球基准股指4.7%的平均跌幅。而且，在2016年6月24日少数录得意外反弹的国家中，两个表现最好的就是金砖集团国家，巴西股指意外反弹了5.5%，俄罗斯反弹5.3%。

虽然大部分国家都在更好地利用这条巨龙的威力和能量，就像中国老话说的那样，但美国只在反复争论是否应该认定中国为“汇率操纵国”。这一指控很难得到中国经常账户盈余数据的支持，2016年，其盈余已经降到占中国GDP的2.1%的温和水平。特朗普执政期间，国会对中国出口水平的担心，对中国企业向美国市场渗透的担心，极有可能引发保护主义政策。但另一方面，特朗普总统本人应该充分了解与中国更积极交往的潜在共同利益，中国工商银行就是特朗普大厦的最大金主，它是最大的租户，为每平方英尺支付的租金比大厦内任何其他大办公租户都多。

具有讽刺意味的是，中国对他国影响力的增加促进了经济的相互依存与联通，恰在此时，美国却倾向于采取更为孤立的战略，如退出TPP这类国际协定。这种做法只能进一步为中国打开大门，包括中国有可能在已具雏形的区域全面经济伙伴关系协定（RCEP）中发挥主导作用。RCEP包括东盟10个成员，以及中国、澳大利亚、印度、日本、新西兰和韩国。美国领导的TPP极有可能被中国领导的RCEP实质性取代，后者代表的区域贸易集团覆盖了27%的全球贸易。考虑到人民币覆盖面已经扩大，对美国领导地位的挑战无疑已经形成。美国必须提高警惕，以免有朝一日门庭冷落。

The renminbi did not become fully convertible even for current account transactions until 1996 and the Chinese government did not allow it to be used for trade invoicing prior to 2009. China's soaring monetary and financial influence since then is reflected in burgeoning offshore renminbi currency and bond trading in Europe as well as Asia. Swap arrangements for renminbi trade settlement with 30 countries and regions had been entered into by 2014 and companies like Korea's Samsung and France's Alstom have adopted renminbi payment settlement in their Chinese subsidiaries. The United States' participation in renminbi internationalization remains conspicuous by its absence, however, notwithstanding the People's Republic of China's role as not only its second largest trading partner but also its largest creditor.

The Bank for International Settlements data revealed that the renminbi's share in global currency turnover rose from 1% in 2010 to 2% in 2013 and 4% in 2016. Although obviously well behind the dollar's dominant 88% share, this nevertheless reflects spectacular growth over a short period of time and the renminbi was already the eighth most traded currency in the world by 2016. The renminbi's inclusion in the IMF's special drawing rights basket of currencies will only further boost its potential appeal as a settlement currency. Indeed, the renminbi's initial basket weight of 11% puts it ahead of the pound sterling and Japanese yen and behind only the euro and U.S. dollar. Its placement ahead of the Japanese yen could itself be interpreted as pricing in an expanded future role for the renminbi given that the yen's current share in global currency turnover today (22% in 2016) is much higher.

There is already speculation that at some point the renminbi could even supplant the dollar's role as the numeraire for international commodity trading and such a shift would be akin to the dollar's own replacement of the sterling as international reserve currency after the Second World War. The renminbi has already begun to find a place amongst the reserve holdings of foreign central banks, a development fueled not only by China's growing economic strength but also the relative weakness of the euro. The dollar's role remains supported by its position as the primary “flight to safety” currency, at least for now.

Major prior steps in the internationalization of China's currency include the establishment of an offshore renminbi market in Hong Kong in July 2010, the November 2014 Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect Program, and the December 2016 Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect Program. Renminbi-based transactionsin Hong Kong exploded after the offshore market was formally established and the renminbi has also been increasingly displacing Hong Kong foreign currency holdings of dollars and euros. Meanwhile, direct investment flows between the two markets were facilitated by the more recent Stock Connect programs. Looking beyond East Asia, China has been Australia's most important export market since 2009 and companies like Australia's Fortescue Metal Group have begun transacting in renminbi. Further financial liberalization is needed in order for the renminbi to realize its potential, however. Recent currency weakness has been accompanied by declining Chinese overseas direct investment and such direct investment was down almost 40% in December 2016 relative to the prior year. It is imperative that the Chinese authorities continue to loosen capital controls rather than retightening them.

The substantial scope for expanding the renminbi's external role remains evident in the major inroads it has already made outside Asia. London, in particular, has become the most important external renminbi center other than Hong Kong and overtook Singapore in renminbi clearing volumes in 2016. There were more than 95 renminbi-denominated bond issues listed on the London Stock Exchange in 2016, raising approximately six billion dollars in aggregate. A potentially major additional step is currently under consideration in the form of a feasibility study for a new Shanghai-London Stock Connect Program that would, for the first time, provide European investors with direct access to mainland Chinese stocks. Nor is London the only European renminbi hub. Frankfurt's China Europe International Exchange was launched in November 2015 as a joint venture between the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Deutsche Börse and China Financial Futures Exchange. Luxembourg also has a heavy concentration of renminbi-denominated funds.

Another element in renminbi internationalization concerns growing ties between China and the other “BRICS” nations of Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa. The BRICS group, which has been moving away from the use of third party currencies like the U.S. dollar and the euro in international trade settlement, added formal ties in 2015 via their New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement. Although the UK's Brexit vote of June 2016 was widely seen as damaging the prospects for the euro, this may present a more unified BRICS group with an opportunity to benefit from a weakened European Union. Interestingly, the BRICS stock markets all fell significantly less than the -4.7% average global benchmark decline on the day after the UK referendum. And, among the small group of countries enjoying positive abnormal returns on June 24, 2016, the two top performers were both part of the BRICS group – with Brazil enjoying an abnormal return of 5.5% and Russia 5.3%.

Even as much of the world becomes better positioned to take advantage of the dragon's might and power in line with the old Chinese proverb, the United States has done little more than repeatedly debate whether or not China should be branded a “currency manipulator.” This charge is itself hardly supported by data on China's current account surplus, which declined to a rather modest 2.1% of Chinese GDP in 2016. It is still quite possible that congressional concerns with both the level of Chinese exports and penetration of the U.S. market by Chinese firms will provoke protectionist policies under the Trump administration. On the other hand, the potential mutual gains from engaging more positively with China should be abundantly clear to President Trump himself, given that the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China represents the Trump Tower's biggest source of revenue – serving as its largest tenant and paying more per square foot than any other major office tenant in the building.

Ironically, at the very time that growing Chinese influences on other nations are enhancing economic interdependence and connectedness, the United States seems intent on more isolationist strategies as reflected by the retreat from international agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Such actions only open the door further to China, including the potential for China playing a dominant role in the fledgling Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP covers the 10 members of the Southeast Asian group ASEAN plus China, Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. There is every possibility that a U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership could be effectively replaced by a China-led RCEP, which would represent a regional trade bloc covering near 27% of global trade. Given how far China's monetary reach has extended already, the challenge to U.S. leadership certainly seems to be already underway. The United States must be careful not to be left out in the cold.