根据两国官员的表态来看，南海领土纠纷肯定将给6月5日到7日在北京举行的第八轮中美战略与经济对话（SED）蒙上阴影。

中国官方的《中国日报》报道说，据称在本轮对话中中国将试图“在海事问题上向华盛顿试压……美国在南海不断增加的军事存在是中国的主要担忧之一”。中国外交部副部长郑泽光也在本周对话前表示：“我们希望美方能恪守承诺，不要选边站队，而是要按照事情本身的是非曲直，而不是按照是否是盟友来确定它的立场。”

同样，美国国务院负责东亚事务的助理国务卿丹尼尔·拉塞尔在5月31日举行的一场吹风会上表示，在本轮对话中，美国将“对中国在南海的举动表达关切”，并且“很可能在所谓的南海军事化问题上和中国针锋相对”。美国国防部长阿什顿·卡特最近语气也更为强硬，他说，中国的行为“有违国际法”，中国可能将很快发现自处于“自我孤立的长城”之后。

近期，两国在南海的紧张关系持续升温。五月，两架中国战机危险地接近一架美国EP-3侦察机，美国称之为“危险的拦截”。而此前数天，美国海军再次派出舰船巡航南海，这也是中国在有争议的南沙群岛开始人工造岛之后，美国海军执行的第三次航行自由行动（FONOP）。美国海军导弹驱逐舰“USS威廉·P·劳伦斯号”航行到了永暑礁12海里之内海域，中国正在这里建设3000平米的军用飞机跑道。

在美国及其盟友看来，中国在南海的行为有违国际惯例法和《联合国海洋法公约》（UNCLOS）。事实上，中国通过持续努力，一方面在有关其南海领土主张的法律问题上制造模糊性，另一方面则推行所谓的“灰色地带压制”，即利用海警船和民用船在相关海域造成既成事实，同时避免直接军事冲突和美国干预。

因此，不出意外的话，海牙常设仲裁法院很可能在裁决中支持菲律宾在南海的法律主张。不过，中国预计将无视这一判决，并继续在争议海域建设军事设施，还可能派出高级别官员视察南海岛礁，并可能在争议海域宣布建立所谓的“防空识别区”（ADIZ）。北京近期几乎不可能在模糊的、几乎包括整个南海的“九段线”主张上做出妥协。

不过，在中美战略与经济对话开始之前，美国官员也正努力淡化南海紧张局势对其他领域的外溢影响。美国负责经济发展、能源和环境的副国务卿凯瑟琳·诺维莉就在本周的一场特别吹风会上表示：“我肯定没有发现——事实上，我领衔了一系列对话——南海问题有任何实际外溢影响。”

“我认为，奥巴马政府中国政策的一项真实成绩是，创造了一种双边关系，能够同时控制严重摩擦，以及全球（如果不是银河）范围的合作，”丹尼尔·拉塞尔说。他补充道：“这部分解释了为何美中两国可以处理和控制问题领域，不至于爆发冲突，也不至于发展出可能导致冷战那样零和动能的战略对抗。”

中国外交部新闻发言人也表示，在即将召开的中美战略与经济对话中，中国愿意“加强沟通和互信、管控争议、扩大合作，并推动中美新型大国关系发展”，而不是强调分歧。这值得期待，并且美国国务院官员关于争议对经济和气候变化等SED议题影响很小的说法也颇有几分道理。中美战略与经济对话依然是一个重要的交流渠道，也是衡量两国整体关系的地震仪。对话还提供了平台来推进此前对话所达成的联合动议，例如实施已接近完成的象牙进口禁令。

不过，就像网络间谍议题一样，南海紧张局势已经超越战略与经济对话、间接影响到了整体双边关系，并制造出一种不信任和紧张氛围，在被媒体炒作放大之后，这种氛围限制了双方政策制定者的手脚。事实上，南海问题已经成为中美战略关系中的一个重要议题。在制定应对中国在国际体系内崛起的防卫政策时，政策制定者在南海问题上的态度被用来区分“熊猫拥抱者”（鸽派）和“屠龙勇士”（鹰派）。这还反映出对一个强大集权国家在全球体系内崛起的潜在和公开担忧情绪。

南海紧张局势被视为是地缘政治力量从西方向东方转移的征兆。这种力量转移的一部分来自于中国逐步弱化现有以规则为基础的秩序，并逐步把美国从亚太地区赶出去的努力。因此，华盛顿认为其有义务通过对抗中国来向其地区盟友和合作伙伴保证：美国不会被轻易从该地区赶出去。对抗中国在南海的扩张因此被视为是美国在21世纪的“慕尼黑时刻”。在中国公然挑战现行以规则为基础的国际秩序的情况下，姑息中国只会鼓励中国在其他领域采取更加大胆举措：姑息只会让挑衅者变得更加咄咄逼人。

不过，即便美国在战略与经济对话上采取特别强硬的态度，美国在这一问题上也不太可能增加或失去多少信誉。无论过去还是未来，美国的选择都会受其官方立场限制，即美国不会在领土争端中选边站队。不管嘴上怎么说，美国都不会冒险加剧冲突，而中国也表示没有兴趣制造公开对抗。“献身永兴岛”这样的标语有种明显的超现实意味，无论是北京还是华盛顿都不太可能在这一问题上改变目前立场，双方都已强调南海领土纠纷应以和平方式解决。

不过，除非出现巨大政策转向，否则美国在南海问题上缺乏影响力。一方面，美国选择在战略与经济对话中淡化而非强调这一议题，这显然将令其地区盟友和伙伴——主要是越南和菲律宾——怀疑美国的承诺和信誉。这可能被解读为美国默许了中国的可疑法律解释。另一方面，如果美国采取大胆举动，则可能令越南和菲律宾更加不愿意妥协，并导致紧张局势升级。

或许，还应该强调这一议题和其他对中美两国来说同样重要或更加重要的国家安全议题的比例关系（例如网络安全、朝鲜问题、反恐和气候变化等），由于南海领土争端给会议议程带来的不信任情绪，这些问题有可能得不到足够重视，尽管双方都已表示这不会发生。南海争议是一个地区议题，并且也首先只会产生地区影响——除非爆发公开冲突——而例如朝鲜用导弹攻击日本这样的事，会立刻具有深刻的国际影响。

因此，鉴于在南海问题上，没有直接的美国国家安全利益——仅仅只是一般性原则——存在风险，因此审慎的做法可能是，要么在对话议程中弱化南海领土纠纷（就像此前多轮对话那样），要么暂时回避这一问题直到纠纷方在地区谈判中取得成果。

如果他们能将重点聚焦在推进具有共同利益的其他领域合作上，中国和美国将获益更多，这些领域包括“3C”：汇率操纵（Currency exchange rate manipulations)、网络安全（Cybersecurity)、气候变化（Climate change)，这三大问题都是相当复杂的双边议题，都需要密切关注。

我们能否从“3C”中汲取一些教训来指导解决南海争端呢？

有可能。例如，关于克制实施或支持商业网络间谍行为的谈判多年来一直没有进展，直到（正如一些分析人士指出的）美国的制裁威胁令中国认识到这一问题在中美双边关系中的重要性。（制裁也令中国领导人注意到解放军可能滥用情报搜集活动实施贪腐。）

结果是，中国国家主席习近平和美国总统奥巴马在2015年9月签署协议，两国将在网络空间加强双边合作，并建立互信。虽然中国并未减缓其网络攻击（在2016年3月，鉴于依然面对来自中国和俄罗斯的持续网络威胁，奥巴马延长了为期一年的、即将在4月1日失效的网络空间国家紧急状态。），但这的确有助于让这一议题去政治化，并减少对双边关系其他领域的外溢效应。

Based on remarks by officials from both China and the U.S., territorial disputes in the South China Sea were set to overshadow the eighth round of the annually-held China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) that took place from June 5th through June 7th in Beijing.

At the dialogue, China purportedly intends to “pressure Washington over maritime issues (…) the United States' increasing military presence in the South China Sea is among China's major concerns,” the state-run China Daily reported. “China hopes the United States would honor its commitment of not taking sides and fix its stand according to what is right or wrong, not according to allies,” Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang said this week ahead of the dialogue.

Similarly, during the meeting the United States is expected to show “concerns with Chinese behavior in the South China Sea,” and “is likely to take issue with China on the alleged militarization of the South China Sea,” Daniel Russel, the U.S. State Department's Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs said during a press briefing on May 31st. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter recently used a harsher tone when he said that Chinese actions are “contrary to international law” and that China may soon find itself behind “a Great Wall of self-isolation.”

Tensions in the South China Sea between the two countries have indeed been on the rise of late. This May, two Chinese fighter jets flew dangerously close to a U.S. EP-3 Aries signals reconnaissance aircraft, an encounter the United States called a “dangerous intercept.” This came days after the United States Navy conducted its third freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea since China started building artificial land features in the disputed Spratly Islands. The FONOP consisted of the guided-missile destroyer USS William P. Lawrence sailing within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef, on which China is constructing a 3,000 meter airstrip for military aircraft.

For the United States and its allies, China in the South China Sea has been behaving contrary to customary international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Indeed, China has engaged in a continuous effort to create legal ambiguity over its territorial claims in the South China Sea paired with so-called gray zone coercion—the use of China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia vessels to establish facts on the ground in the surrounding water while avoiding open military conflict and U.S. intervention.

It is thus unsurprising that the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague is likely to rule in favor of the Philippines' legal assertions in the South China Sea. China, however, is expected to disregard the ruling and will continue building military sites in disputed waters, perhaps supported by a number of high-level visits of Chinese officials to some of the occupied features in the South China Sea, in addition to possibly announcing the establishment of a so-called Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over contested territories. Beijing will almost certainly not compromise on its ambiguous “nine-dash line” claiming nearly all of the South China Sea anytime soon.

Nevertheless, U.S. officials have been at pain downplaying the spillover effects of the tensions in the South China Sea to other areas prior to the kickoff of the S&ED next week. “I certainly haven't found—and I lead a number of these dialogues—that there's any real spillover from the South China Sea type of thing,” said U.S. State Department Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, Catherine A. Novelli, during a special briefing this week.

“I think that one of the real accomplishments of the Obama Administration with regard to China has been the creation of a relationship that can handle both significant friction and global if not galactic-scale cooperation,” according to Daniel Russel. “And that has been one of the secrets of the ability of the U.S. and China to deal with and to manage problem areas without coming to blows and without developing the kind of strategic rivalry that creates an absolute Cold War, zero-sum dynamic,” he added.

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson has also expressed China's desire to “strengthen communication and mutual trust, manage and control disputes, expand cooperation, and move forward the new type of major-country relationship between China and the United States” during the upcoming S&ED, rather than dwelling on disagreements. This is to be expected, and there is some truth to State Department officials' assertions that the impact has been minimal on, for instance, the economic and climate change S&ED agenda. The S&ED remains an important communications channel and seismograph to gauge overall relations between both countries. It also provides a platform to move forward joint initiatives from the previous S&ED on, for example, implementing the near-complete ban on ivory imports.

Yet, like the cyber espionage issue, the South China tensions have vicariously affected the overall bilateral relationship beyond the S&ED by creating a climate of mistrust and tensions amplified by the media and forcing policy makers' hands on both sides. The reality is that the South China Sea has become one of the major issues in China-U.S. strategic relations. The position that policy makers take on the South China Sea disputes is used as a character screen to separate Panda-huggers (doves) from dragon-slayers (hawks) when it comes to formulating defense policy in response to China's rise in the international system. It has become a projection screen for latent and blatant concerns over the rise to the top of an authoritarian and powerful state in the global system.

South China Sea tensions are merely seen as a symptom of a larger geopolitical power shift from the West to the East. Part of that power shift is China's effort to slowly undermine the existing rule-based order, while gradually pushing the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region. As a consequence, Washington sees it as its duty to stand up to China to ensure regional allies and partners that the United States will not be dislodged from the region that easily. Countering China's expansion in the South China Sea is therefore seen as the United States' 21st century's “Munich Moment.” Appeasing China, while it is openly challenging the existing international rule-based order, will merely encourage bolder Chinese actions elsewhere: Appeasement makes the aggressor only more aggressive.

Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the United States will gain or lose much credibility no matter how tough of a line the United States would take during the S&ED. The United States' options have been and will be limited by its official stance, which states that it does not take a position on the territorial disputes. Despite all of its rhetoric, the United States will not risk escalating the conflict, and China has also signaled no stomach for an open confrontation. The slogan 'Mourir pour Woody Island' has a distinct surreal ring to it and neither Beijing nor Washington will likely shift its current stance on the issue with both emphasizing a peaceful solution to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

The United States, however, lacks that leverage in the South China Sea unless a major policy shift occurs. On the one hand, the United States choosing to downgrade or not raise the issue at the S&ED could certainly make regional allies and partners—most notably Vietnam and the Philippines—doubt U.S. commitment and credibility. It could be interpreted as acquiescence to China's dubious legal interpretation. On the other hand, bold U.S. actions could also make Vietnam and the Philippines less willing to compromise and further increase tensions.

Perhaps, it is also important to highlight the question over the proportionality of the issue in comparison to other national security issues equally or more important to both China and the United States—e.g., cybersecurity, North Korea, counter-terrorism and climate change etc.—which are under danger of being insufficiently addressed because of the mistrust that the South China Sea territorial disputes can cast over the meeting's agenda, despite assurances from both sides that this will not be the case. The South China Sea disputes are a regional issue with regional implications first and foremost—unless open conflict were to break out—whereas the consequences of say, a North Korean missile attack on Japan, will have immediate and profound international repercussions.

It is therefore perhaps prudent, given that for the United States no direct national security interests—but rather general principles—are at stake in the South China Sea, to either downgrade the South China Sea territorial disputes on the agenda—similar to previous S&EDs—or sidestep them until some progress has been made in regional negotiations between the claimant states.

China and the United States would profit more so by focusing on progress in other areas of mutual interest including the three big C's: currency exchange rate manipulations, cybersecurity, and climate change—all three of which are in themselves complicated bilateral issues that require close attention.

Can we draw some lessons from any of the big C's for the South China Sea disputes?

Perhaps. For example, discussions on refraining from conducting or knowingly supporting commercial cyber-espionage stagnated for years, until, as some analysts argue, the threat of sanctions helped push China to acknowledge that the issue was important in the China-U.S. bilateral relationship. (What the sanctions domestically achieved in China was drawing to the leadership's attention the misuse by the People's Liberation Army in a corrupt fashion of its intelligence operations.)

The result was that Chinese President Xi Jinping signed an agreement with U.S. President Barack Obama to deepen bilateral cooperation and build trust between the two countries in cyberspace in September 2015. While it did not slow down cyberattacks—in March 2016, Obama renewed the year-old national emergency in cyberspace before its expiration date on April 1st due to continuing cyber threats from China and Russia—it did help to depoliticize the subject and reduce spillover effects into other areas of the relationship.