在南中国海，把各国能源设施纳入海上“联合开发区（JDAs）”，将给领土紧张关系提供一个诱人的解决方案。

笔者所在研究机构Grenatec设计了一个以市场为导向的计划，旨在促进南中国海的和平与繁荣。该计划以市场力量取代炮艇外交，将令各方获益。

这一构想的中心点，是在南中国海的东西两侧建立JDAs。其中，开发权通过竞投来分配，收益将投入互联设施。其模式，是类似东盟国家拟议的跨东盟天然气管网（TAGP）和跨东盟电网（TAEG）。

亚洲开发银行和中国发起的亚洲基础设施投资银行将负责监督把JDAs的收益回投到基础设施中。这一机制的运营总部应设在新加坡，而碳交易应在深圳进行。

假以时日，该网络将扩大到东北亚（日本、韩国），在东海形成类似的JDAs和基础设施体系。这一系统也可以向南扩展到印度尼西亚和澳大利亚，促进蒂汶海和澳大利亚西北大陆架的能源开发。

这一切的最终结果，将是以南中国海为核心，建立起泛亚洲能源设施（PAEI）。它的第一步是铺设连接海上JDAs和陆上跨境管网的天然气管道，之后也许还会有大容量输电线路。

这个灵活、适用、不会过时的泛亚洲能源设施将为亚洲服务一个世纪，甚至更长。它将显著减少亚洲的碳排放。

对能源安全、能源市场改革和大规模减排问题从大处着想，为多方着想，为长远着想，其积极意义怎么说都不为过。

南中国海不断升温的领土紧张，是经济学所谓“公地悲剧”的一个典型实例。也就是说，当资源产权不明时，会导致野蛮和罔顾环境可持续的快速开发。因为如果行动太慢，资源就会被别人分享。

中国的九段线，中国在越南声称拥有主权的海域部署“勘探”钻井平台，以及中国能源巨头中海油表示可能在南海另一有争议地区配置浮式液化天气技术，所有这一切，都可以看作是“公地悲剧”局面下合乎逻辑的“先动”战略。

JDAs出现于1960年代，至今已存在于世界各地。在JDAs下，海上领土主张有冲突的国家同意共同开发资源，搁置领土争议。

目前在南中国海已经有两个JDAs，越南北部和中国海南岛之间的北部湾，是建立第三个的理想地点。

在那里，中国和越南已经进行联合海上勘探。如果发现有开发利用价值的能源，中越两国可在联合开发区框架下共同开发。这将给越南中部和南部、马来西亚、菲律宾甚至中国南部的海上开发开创一个先例。项目的开发应由企业联盟承担，以分摊投资风险。

目前，海上油田的投资，几乎都是由买卖双方通过签订长达数十年的合同提供，这些合同的基础是对长期油价走势的猜测。由于猜测偏离现实，所以可能导致过剩、短缺和现货价格动荡。这种情况只对投机者有利，是市场不健康的标志。相反，一个因网络架构而变得更灵活、更有效的市场，有助于让供给和需求保持同步，并形成更可预测的定价。

一个有力的说法是，参与有多边竞投的南海联合开发区或多边开发区，将收益回投到基础设施，会让中国得到比野蛮单方面开发更多的机会。

因为几乎可能肯定，中国顶级国有石油天然气企业（如中海油和中石油），中国顶级输气管道工程公司和电力基础设施公司（如中国国家电网和中国南方电网），将成为主要受益者。

人们很容易以为，中国倡导创建1000亿美元资本亚投行的动机，是要凭借它的数万亿美元贸易盈余，为国内大企业创造海外基建机会。

那是因为中国国内基础设施需求逐渐饱和，这些企业由于缺少新项目面临萎缩。

处理好的话，中国基建产业的国际化再定位将使各方获益。关键是，要确保这些基础设施建设是在“开放进入，共同承载”基础上建设与运营。也就是说，要向所有国家开放，不受政治决策影响。对这一点不该有争议。这种改革已经在中国国内市场进行，将其延伸到外部有助增加市场的一致性。

位于东南亚中部的能源交易城市国家新加坡，是管理多边南海基础设施的理想“中介人”。新加坡已经在东盟提出的跨东盟天然气管网和跨东盟电网中发挥重要作用，东南亚这两个区域性样板，将来也可以充当泛亚能源基础设施的核心。

今年晚些时候，中国将主办亚太经合组织会议。中国已表示，希望基础设施和更深层的区域经济融合成为会议讨论的主题。之后，澳大利亚将主办20国集团年会，它同样希望将基础设施投资问题纳入年会议程。

亚太经合组织和20国集团会议，为讨论未来更广泛的多边能源网络及其经济效益提供了绝佳的机会。它有助于人们认识，高效、多边的能源设施对减少气候变化有利，而这正是明年巴黎第21届联合国气候变化大会的一个关键议题。

Multilateral South China Sea energy infrastructure connected to offshore Joint Development Areas (JDAs) offers an attractive solution to territorial tensions.

My research organization, Grenatec, has developed a market-based plan for peace and prosperity in the South China Sea. This plan benefits everyone by replacing gunboat diplomacy with the power of markets.

The vision centers around creating Joint Development Areas (JDAs) on the eastern and western flanks of the South China Sea. Development rights would be allocated through competitive auction. Proceeds would be recycled into building interconnection infrastructure. The template would be the Association of Southeast Asian Nation states' proposed Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline and Trans-ASEAN Electricity Grid (TAEG).

The Asian Development Bank and China's proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank would oversee the recycling of JDA proceeds into infrastructure. The operational headquarters of the system would be Singapore. Shenzen could trade the carbon.

Over time, the network would be expanded into northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea). There, a similar combination of JDAs and infrastructure could take shape in the East China Sea. The system could also be extended southward to Indonesia and Australia. There, JDAs and infrastructure could spur energy development in the Timor Sea and Australia's Northwest Shelf.

The end result of all this would be a Pan-Asian Energy Infrastructure (PAEI) built from a South China Sea nucleus. The first step would to build gas pipelines connecting offshore JDAs to cross-border, land-based pipeline networks. High-capacity power lines could be added later.

Such a flexible, adaptable, ‘future proof' Pan-Asian Energy Infrastructure could serve Asia for a century or more. It would dramatically reduce Asian carbon emissions.

The positive implications of thinking big, thinking multilaterally and thinking long-term about energy security, energy market reform and large-scale carbon emission reduction are hard to overstate.

That's because rising territorial tensions in the South China represent a classic economics case of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons.' This occurs when ambiguous resource property rights create an incentive for aggressive, environmentally unsustainable exploitation by the nimble. The reason: delay leads to sharing.

China's nine-dotted line, China's placement of an ‘exploratory' oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam and recent statements by Chinese energy giant CNOOC Group it may deploy Floating Liquid Natural Gas (FLNG) technology in other disputed South China Sea areas can all be seen as a logical ‘first mover' strategy to take advantage of a ‘tragedy of the commons' situation.

Joint Development Areas (JDAs) have been around since the 1960s. They exist all over the world. Under JDAs, countries with conflicting offshore territorial claims agree to postpone resolution of the claims while they cooperate to develop the resources within them.

Two JDAs already exist in the South China Sea. The Tonkin Gulf, lying between North Vietnam and China's Hainan Island, is an ideal location for a third.

There, China and Vietnam are already engaging in joint offshore exploration. Should developable resources be found, China and Vietnam could jointly develop these under a JDA. This could set a precedent for others off central and southern Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and even southern China. Consortia of companies would develop the projects, spreading investment risks.

At present, offshore gas field investment is almost always funded by multi-decade contracts between buyers and sellers. But these are based upon little more than guesses where long-term prices may go. The results can be gluts, shortages and volatile spot prices as such guesses diverge from reality. This benefits only speculators — a sign of market ill health. By contrast, more liquid and responsive markets enabled by a network architecture can help supply and demand stay in better sync, creating more predictable pricing.

A strong argument can be made that participating in multilaterally auctioned JDAs/MDAs in the South China Sea where proceeds are recycled into infrastructure offers China greater opportunities than aggressive unilateral development.

The reason is that China's state champion oil and gas companies (such as CNOOC and Petrochina), gas pipeline construction companies and electricity infrastructure companies (such as State Grid Corp of China and China Southern Power Grid Company) are almost certain to be prime beneficiaries.

One can easily argue China's motivation for creating its proposed $100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was to recycle her multi-trillion trade surpluses into offshore infrastructure opportunities for her state champions.

That's because these companies face atrophy without new projects as China's internal infrastructure needs are increasingly met.

Handled right, this international re-orientation of China's infrastructure-building industry can benefit everyone. The key is to ensure such infrastructure is built and operated on an ‘open access, common carrier' basis, open to everyone and immune from political decision-making. This shouldn't be controversial. China is already applying such reforms to its internal market. Applying it externally enhances market consistency.

Southeast Asia's centrally-located, energy trading city state of Singapore is ideally suited to playing the ‘honest broker' in managing a multilateral South China Sea energy infrastructure. Singapore's already slated to play a major role in ASEAN's proposed Trans-Asian Gas Pipeline (TAGP) and Trans-ASEAN Electricity Grid (TAEG). These are Southeast Asia's two regional templates that could serve as the core of a Pan-Asian Energy Infrastructure.

Later this year, China hosts meetings of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Group. China has indicated it wants infrastructure and deeper regional economic integration to be among chief topics of discussion. Later, Australia will host the annual meeting of the Group of 20 largest economies. Australia similarly wants infrastructure investment on the agenda.

APEC and the G20 offer the perfect opportunity to discuss the deeper multilateral energy networks of tomorrow and the economic benefits they can provide. This could enhance recognition of the role efficient multilateral energy infrastructure can play in reducing climate change – a key agenda item at next year's crucial COP21 meeting in Paris.