特朗普政府自1月20日上任以来，执政精力聚焦国内改革、终止乌克兰危机和中东冲突上，对亚太地区的投入似乎不多。到目前为止的主要动作，包括1月22日国务卿鲁比奥主持召开“四边安全对话”（QUAD）外长会，2月特朗普会见日本首相石破茂和印度总理莫迪。最新消息是，3月底美国国防部长赫格塞斯将前往印太司令部和关岛美军基地，并访问菲律宾、日本。虽然目前特朗普第二任期的“印太战略”还不清晰明朗，鉴于“印太战略”为特朗普第一任期所提出，且大国竞争已是美国两党共识，“印太战略”未来大概率会继续推进。不论是否会出台“印太战略”3.0版，重塑美国对华优势、服务“让美国重新伟大”的核心目标，都将是特朗普政府印太地区政策的出发点和主要诉求。

美国“印太战略”自2017年特朗普第一任期提出以来，经历了从理念构想成型到多领域机制构建的发展。特朗普第一任期推出以“自由和开放”为口号的“印太战略”，主要举措是外交上优先升级美日、美韩等双边同盟，积极拉拢印度，重启“美日印澳四国安全对话”（QUAD）并升级到外长会；军事上推进“太平洋威慑倡议”，将美军太平洋司令部更名为印太司令部，扩大在南海的“航行自由”行动，将台湾纳入“安全伙伴”框架；经济上与日本、澳大利亚等盟友推出一系列支持地区基础设施、能源安全、数字经济和网络安全的举措，如“蓝点网络”计划、“数字连接与网络安全伙伴关系”、亚洲能源促增长与发展倡议（EDGE）等。特朗普第一任期“印太战略”强化了单边军事手段，但缺乏整体经济框架，与盟友关系也龃龉不断，总体上建树不多。

拜登政府任内，“印太战略”进入机制发展期。拜登政府延续特朗普时期的对华竞争战略，以“塑造中国周边战略环境”为目标推进“印太战略”。2022年2月出台的《印太战略报告》提出开放、连接、繁荣、安全、韧性五大支柱，并系统阐述美国推进“印太战略”的五大目标和十项行动计划。拜登政府通过QUAD、AUKUS、美日韩等小多边机制强化与盟伴的科技与安全协同，将美国-东盟关系升级为“全面战略伙伴关系”，举行“美国-太平洋岛国峰会”积极拓展在南太平洋地区影响力，并推出“印太经济框架”（IPEF）弥补经济短板。然而，受制于乌克兰和中东两场危机及盟友利益分歧等因素，实际成效“高开低收”。

特朗普重返白宫后，其“印太战略3.0”将基于“美国优先”理念，投射特朗普本人的政策偏好和行事风格，表现出更多的单边主义、交易性与不确定性。一是战略收缩与资源聚焦，即从全球分散到“印太”集中。从特朗普本人和核心决策班子的政策主张和表态看，特朗普将延续“新孤立主义”倾向，减少对欧洲、中东的投入，将资源重新聚焦到“印太”地区，集中力量对付中国。二是盟友关系功利化，转向“交易式同盟”。特朗普政府在深化与盟伴防务合作的同时，会要求日本、韩国、澳大利亚等分担更多防务成本，“以经济换安全”。同时，推动美印情报与防务合作深化，在“印太战略”中发挥支点作用，但印度需购买更多美国军备，并向美国开放农产品市场。三是奉行“以实力求和平”，优化军力配置，进一步强化在“印太”地区的军事部署，包括扩大在关岛、菲律宾等基地的前沿存在，部署中程导弹等进攻性武器系统，并加速武装盟伴和海上东盟国家，增加与地区国家的联演联训。四是经济胁迫工具化，大搞“美国利益至上”，可能更多将“关税大棒”挥向亚太国家，重塑地区贸易规则，促进制造业回流，并要求日、韩、印度和东盟国家降低对华依赖，寻求美国对能源主导权和供应链的掌控。

特朗普第二任期的外交政策将加剧亚太地区形势的不确定、不稳定。本地区国家一方面可能寄希望于四年后美国回归多边主义，采取一定妥协策略，另一方面也将加紧强化自身的战略自主能力。此外，中国对亚太秩序的引领塑造能力在不断增强，周边国家与中国的合作意愿也在上升。未来四年，亚太格局将进一步呈现“中美竞合”与“地区自主”并行的双重张力。而亚太国家间的互动合作将更大程度上决定本地区能否避免“新冷战”陷阱，走向更具包容性的多极秩序。

Since the inauguration of Donald Trump on Jan. 20, the U.S. administration has concentrated mostly on domestic reforms and ending conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East conflict. It seems to have put little effort into the Asia-Pacific region. Its main moves related to the Asia-Pacific have been Secretary of State Marco Rubio's hosting the Quad foreign ministers meeting on Jan. 22 and Trump meeting with the Japanese and Indian prime ministers in February. The latest news is U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's trip to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the military base in Guam. He visited the Philippines and Japan starting on March 24.The Indo-Pacific Strategy of Trump 2.0 remains unclear — although the idea was put forward during his first term, and major power competition has been a bipartisan consensus. It will likely continue to be pursued. Whether or not there will be an Indo-Pacific Strategy 3.0 to rebuild U.S. advantages against China, serving core MAGA goals will be both the starting point and the major goals of Trump's Asia-Pacific policy.

Since being proposed in 2017, America's Indo-Pacific Strategy has evolved from a theoretical concept into mechanisms in multiple areas. The main measures of the strategy during Trump 1.0 — which proclaimed a “free and open” Indo-Pacific — included diplomatically prioritizing the upgrading of such bilateral alliances as those with Japan and South Korea, actively roping in India and reviving the Quad and elevating it to a foreign ministers meeting.Militarily, it implemented the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, renaming USPACOM as USINDOPACOM, expanding “freedom of navigation” activities in the South China Sea and incorporating Taiwan into the Security Partners framework. Economically, it took a series of steps, together with allies and partners (such as Japan and Australia) to support regional infrastructure, energy security, digital economy and cybersecurity, such as the Blue Dot Network, Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership and the Asia EDGE Initiative. The “Indo-Pacific Strategy” of Trump 1.0 consolidated unilateral military capabilities, but it accomplished little for the lack of an overall economic framework. Constant conflicts with allies arose. Overall, its achievements were limited.

During the presidency of Joe Biden, the Indo-Pacific Strategy entered a stage of mechanism development. The Biden administration continued Trump's strategy of competition with China, pushing forward the Indo-Pacific Strategy to shape the strategic environment around China. The Indo-Pacific Strategy, which was published in February 2022, proposed five pillars: openness, connectivity, prosperity, security and resilience; and it systematically expounded five goals and 10 action plans.The Biden administration consolidated sci-tech and security coordination with allies and partners through such minilateral mechanisms as the Quad, AUKUS and the U.S.-Japan-South Korea and U.S.-Japan-Philippines cooperation. It upgraded U.S.-ASEAN relations into a comprehensive strategic partnership, held the U.S.-Pacific Islands Country Summit to actively expand influence in the South Pacific and proposed the IPEF to make up for its economic weaknesses. However, constrained by such factors as the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as by the conflicting interests of some allies, they accomplished less than expected.

Following Trump's return to the White House, the new administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy 3.0 will be based on the idea of “America first” to project Trump's personal policy preferences and working style, and demonstrate more unilateralism, transactionalism and uncertainty.First comes a strategic contraction and resource concentration, evolving from global dispersion to concentration on the Indo-Pacific region. Judging from policy statements by Trump himself and by core members of his decision-making circle, Trump will continue his “neo-isolationist” tendency, reduce inputs in Europe and the Middle East, concentrate resources on the Indo-Pacific and focus on dealing with China.Second is a utilitarian approach to alliances and partnerships, orienting at “transactional alliances.” While deepening defense cooperation with allies and partners, the Trump administration will ask Japan, South Korea and Australia to share more defense costs and trade economic benefits for security. It will attempt to deepen intelligence and defense cooperation with India, turn India into a fulcrum in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy (asking India to buy more U.S. military equipment) and open its market to U.S. agricultural products.Third is the pursuit of a policy of “peace through strength” to optimize military deployments, further enhancing them in the Indo-Pacific, including expanding America's front-line presence at bases in Guam and the Philippines. It will deploy such offensive weapons systems as mid-range missiles, accelerate the arming of allies and partners (and maritime ASEAN members) and increase joint drills and training with countries in the region.Fourth is economic coercion, openly pursuing Trump's “America first” agenda. The strategy may increasingly include pointing the baton of tariffs at Asia-Pacific nations to reshape regional trade rules and promote the reshoring of manufacturing. Japan, South Korea, India and ASEAN countries will be asked to reduce their dependency on China. And U.S. energy dominance and control over supply chains will be sought.

The diplomatic policy of Trump 2.0 will worsen uncertainty and instability in the Asia-Pacific. Regional countries on the one hand may make some compromises, hoping the United States will return to multilateralism over the next four years. On the other hand, they will hurry to consolidate their own strategic autonomy.China's ability to shape the Asia-Pacific order is steadily increasing, and the willingness of neighboring countries to cooperate with China is also on the rise. Over the next four years, the Asia-Pacific landscape will further demonstrate the tension of the parallel existence of China-U.S. competition and regional autonomy. Interaction and cooperation between Asia-Pacific nations will, to a greater extent, determine whether or not the region can avoid the trap of a new cold war and proceed to a more inclusive multipolar order.