2024年5月31日，美国国防部长劳埃德·奥斯汀在新加坡香格里拉安全会议上会见中国国防部长董军。(照片：美国国防部）

军事对话是中美关系最重要的问题。随着这两个大国展开战略竞争，军事交流被视作防止战争爆发的最后一道防线，特别是防止意外冲突或军事领域的紧张局势升级。两军在西太平洋有争议水域和领域（如台海和南海）近距离接触时情况尤其如此。多年来，这些对话因为各种原因中断和暂停，主要原因是中国对美国与台湾往来的担忧。

一如2022 年 8 月美国众议院议长南希·佩洛西访台湾后的情况。佩洛西访台后，中国迅速宣布取消两国战区指挥官之间的交流，并取消防务政策协调会谈和海上军事安全磋商机制会议。此后的 16 个月里，两军除了国防武官间的常规沟通外，几乎没有其他形式的直接交流。

在此期间，西太平洋紧张局势升级，导致中美两军之间发生了一些最激烈的接触。2023 年夏天，中国海军和空军“不安全、不专业的行为”成为最危险的导火索，并完全有可能继续升级。面对如此严重的威胁，恢复与中国的军事对话成了拜登政府一年内多数时间的首要任务。

过去6个月里，许多双边军事对话渠道已经恢复，这主要得益于以下活动：

- 2023年12月21日，参谋长联席会议主席查尔斯·昆顿·布朗将军和解放军军委联合参谋部参谋长刘振立将军举行电话会议。

- 2024年1月8日至9日，防务政策协调会谈在华盛顿特区恢复举行。美国国防部负责中国事务的副助理部长迈克尔·蔡斯和中央军委国际军事合作办公室副主任宋延超少将出席。

- 2024年4月3日至4日，在夏威夷恢复海上军事安全磋商机制工作小组会议。

- 2024年4月16日，美国国防部长奥斯汀与中国国防部长董军举行视频会议。

- 2024年5月31日，美国国防部长奥斯汀与中国国防部长董军会晤。

应该提醒那些没有意识到这些会议重要性的人：仅仅6个月前，两军几乎没有进行过任何有意义的直接交流，反而在空中和海上发生了一系列危险的接触，差点再次引发2001年的撞机事件。美国政府高级官员表示， 截止2023 年秋季，中美之间军事对抗升级的几率在 6-12 个月内超过 50%。

但是，仅仅半年多时间过后，两军就已恢复军事对话等重要渠道，两国国防部长的新加坡会晤实际上宣告了两军关系已经正常化。

两军关系恢复的最根本原因，在于两国特别是两国领导人面对充满困难的一年，都希望寻求双边关系的稳定。无论媒体如何报道，两国关系基本遵循了去年 11 月习近平主席和拜登总统在伍德赛德峰会上达成的共识。

拜登政府目前正面临一场充满挑战的连任竞选。此外，乌克兰和中东战事不断，美国无法承受与世界第二大国中国发生军事冲突。大国竞争仍然到处存在，但管控紧张局势、避免战争对华盛顿来说至关重要。同样，中国寻求稳定与美国的关系，以便专注于其他重点工作。事实上，有人认为，2021 年拜登总统就职以来，中国一直希望稳定与美国的关系，但这一目标很难实现。

中美两军领导人跨越半个地球，努力实现妥协，但前景并不乐观。中美关系趋于稳定，但从根本上看仍不稳定。许多战略家认为，维持现状的美国与崛起的中国之间仍然存在着结构性冲突，而且未来几年将会加剧。

在程序层面，对美国而言，最严重、最紧迫的问题是印太司令部司令（现任海军上将帕帕罗）与中国东部和南部的战区司令部司令之间实现直接沟通，这是拜登和习近平在伍德赛德峰会上达成的共识。伍德赛德峰会已经过去了7个月，但这样的直接沟通仍未实现。双方没有进行直接沟通之前，美方不会认为两国领导人之间的共识得到了落实。

在战略层面，恢复会晤并不等于达成协议。从奥斯汀和董军在新加坡的会晤可以看出，在台湾、南海等一系列安全问题上，两国乃至两军的立场和政策存在着根本性的分歧。在军事活动方面，中美在对紧张局势起因的认识上同样存在根本性的分歧，而且，美国重视管理危机，中国则注重预防危机。华盛顿认为，只要其军事行动符合国际法，就有权在中国周边行动。因此，两军遭遇或者局势升级时，美国的做法是基于危机管理的心态。这使得两军之间的沟通尤为重要，因为只有开放畅通的沟通渠道才能管理危机。

相比之下，中国的做法是危机预防。由于两军的遭遇发生在中国周边，中国更希望美国减少军事活动，并将其军事部署远离中国沿海。按照这种逻辑，管理危机的最佳方式是从源头上防止危机的出现。

美国的反驳理由是基于法律：美国在包括台湾海峡在内的地区采取行动，并没有违反任何法律，同时它将继续行使自己的权利，比如航行自由行动。此前，这种持续的分歧促使美国采取行动伸张这些权利，也促使中国加快行动进一步驱逐美军。这一循环很可能在未来重演。

中美国防部长举行了会晤，但双方都不抱幻想，不认为恢复军事对话就能解决紧张局势背后的根本原因。中美在军事领域的斗争仍在继续，而下一次台海危机不可避免地发生时，这种斗争可能失控。鉴于当前台湾岛内的政治气氛，以及即将到来的美国大选的不确定性，下一次危机可能随时爆发。

但是，过去6个月的事情说明，大国竞争中，这些国家的地缘政治求生本能最为强烈，但只要拥有政治意愿和冷静的头脑，仍然有可能通过对话管理军事紧张局势。持怀疑和悲观 态度的人认为，中美关系注定崩溃，两军也将走向冲突。应该提醒他们的是，把防止战争作为最低共同目标仍然是有价值的任务——也许是最有价值的任务。尽管存在备战的倾向，但这种目标本身当能推动两军及所有人努力追求和平。

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin meets with Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun at the Shangri-La Security Conference in Singapore, May 31, 2024. (Photo: U.S. Department of Defense)

Military-to-military (mil-mil) dialogues stand out as the paramount issue in U.S.-China relations. As the two great powers engage in strategic competition, mil-mil communications are regarded as the last line of defense against war, especially an inadvertent war or accidental escalation of tension in the military field. This is particularly true as the two militaries operate in close proximity in contentious waters and domains in the West Pacific, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Throughout the years, these dialogues have been disrupted and suspended for a variety of reasons, but primarily due to Chinese concerns over U.S. interactions with Taiwan.

Such was the case in the aftermath of Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Following her visit, China swiftly announced the cancellation of communications between the theater commanders of the two countries, as well as the cancellation of the Defense Policy Coordination Talks and of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings. For the following sixteen months, the two militaries had minimal direct communications other than through the routine, regular channels such as the defense attachés.

During this period, tensions escalated in the West Pacific, leading to some of the most intense interactions between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. By the summer of 2023, the “unsafe, unprofessional actions” of the Chinese navy and air force had emerged as the most dangerous flashpoints with the full potential for escalation. The threat was so severe that the resumption of mil-mil dialogues with China became a top priority of the Biden Administration for much of the year.

However, over the last six months, many of the mil-mil dialogue channels have now been resuscitated, largely due to the following activities:

- December 21, 2023: Teleconference between Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General CQ Brown Jr. and PLA Chief of Joint Staff Department General Liu Zhenli.

- January 8-9, 2024: Resumption of the Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) in Washington DC between Michael Chase, DASD and Major General Song Yanchao, Deputy Director of CMC Office for International Military Cooperation.

- April 3-4, 2024: Resumption of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) working group meeting in Hawaii at the level of senior colonel.

- April 16, 2024: Virtual meeting between Secretary of Defense Austin and Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun.

- May 31, 2024: Meeting between Secretary of Defense Austin and Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun.

For those who don't realize the significance of these meetings, they should be reminded that merely six months ago, the two militaries almost had no meaningful direct communications, but a series of dangerous encounters in the air and at sea that were extremely close to creating another EP-3 incident. According to senior U.S. government officials, the risk of a military escalation between the U.S. and China was higher than 50% within 6-12 months by the fall of 2023.

However, within merely six months, the two militaries have resumed the key channels of the mil-mil dialogue. The meeting in Singapore between the two defense chiefs practically announced the renormalization of U.S.-China mil-mil relations.

The most fundamental reason for the resumption of mil-mil ties was the two countries', especially the two leaders', desire to seek the stabilization of bilateral relations in what has proven to be a difficult year for both. Regardless of media sensations, bilateral relations have largely followed the consensus from the Woodside Summit last November between President Xi Jinping and President Biden.

The Biden Administration is currently facing a challenging reelection campaign amidst distractions from ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. With this, the U.S. can not afford to entertain or engage in military conflict with China, the second largest power in the world. Great power competition is still prevalent, but managing tensions to avoid a war is imperative for Washington. Similarly, China seeks to stabilize relations with the U.S. in order to focus on other priorities. In fact, some would argue that China has hoped to stabilize relations with the U.S. since the inauguration of President Biden in 2021, but achieving this has proved elusive.

While China-U.S. military leaders have essentially come halfway across the world in efforts to meet each other halfway, the picture is far from rosy. The U.S.-China relationship is being stabilized, but it remains fundamentally unstable. The structural conflict between the status quo U.S. and the rising China is still present, and only stands to escalate in the years to come in the eyes of many strategists.

On the technical level, for the U.S., the most serious and immediate issue that needs to be addressed is the direct bilateral communication between the Commander of the Indo-Pacific Command- now Admiral Paparo, and his counterparts at the Eastern Theater Command and the Southern Theater Command, as agreed by Biden and Xi at the Woodside Summit. That meeting has yet to happen though it's been seven months since Woodside. The U.S. side will not consider the agreement between the two leaders fulfilled until that communication occurs.

Furthermore, on the strategic level, the resumption of the meeting does not equate to the reaching of agreements. As seen from the Austin-Dong meeting in Singapore, the two countries, hence the two militaries, have fundamental differences regarding their positions and policies on Taiwan, the South China Sea, as well as a long list of security issues. On military activities, the U.S. and China fundamentally differ with each other on the source of tension, and the U.S.' priority of crisis management versus the Chinese focus on crisis prevention. Washington believes in its right to operate in China's periphery as long as those operations are within the boundaries of international law. Therefore, the U.S. approach is based on the mentality of crisis management when encounters or escalations happen. This has made the mil-mil communications particularly vital because only with open, unhindered communication channels could the crisis be managed.

China's approach, in contrast, is one of “crisis prevention.” Since the encounters have all taken place in China's periphery, China's preference is for the U.S. to reduce its level of military activities and withdraw its military presence further from the Chinese coastline. In this line of logic, the best way to manage a crisis is to prevent it from happening in the first place.

The U.S. counterargument is a legalist one – that Washington is not violating any law by operating in areas including the Taiwan Strait and will continue to exercise its right, such as the freedom of navigation operations. This continued disagreement has previously pushed the U.S. into action to assert such rights, and pushed China to dial up its operational tempo to drive the U.S. further away, a cycle that could very possibly repeat itself in the future.

Despite the defense chiefs' meeting, neither side bears the illusion that the fundamental source of tension is resolved by the resumption of mil-mil dialogues. The struggle between the U.S. and China in the military domain continues and could potentially blow out of control when the next Taiwan Strait crisis inevitably happens. And given the current climate of Taiwanese domestic politics and the uncertainty associated with the upcoming U.S. election, the next crisis could be just around the corner.

But the experience of the past six months does underscore one thing: despite the strongest geopolitical instinct in a great power competition, dialogues to manage military tensions are still possible when political will is present and cooler heads prevail. For skeptics and cynics who believe that U.S.-China relations are nothing but doomed and the two militaries are fundamentally on a collision course, they should be reminded that the prevention of war as a lowest common denominator is still a worthy cause – perhaps the most worthy of all. That aspiration alone should drive the two militaries, as well as all of us, to work toward peace despite the inclination to prepare for war.