新年伊始，截止到1月25日，朝鲜不甘寂寞，先后进行五次导弹试验，其中还包括两次高超音速导弹试验。1月19日，朝鲜召开中央政治局会议，宣布鉴于美国未放弃敌对政策和军事威胁，将研讨重启此前暂停的核和远程导弹试验。美韩研究机构也预测朝鲜今年可能进行远程导弹试验。2018年以来总体平静的朝鲜半岛局势显露出重回紧张的迹象。

目前朝鲜半岛局势存在内在的失衡，若长期维持现状，对朝鲜极为不利。当前，美国主导的对朝国际制裁体系纹丝不动，甚至是越勒越紧，朝鲜经济发展需要的绝大部分外贸、外资、外汇被切断。在当今全球化的国际社会中，若是长期封闭，仅靠自力更生最多只能勉强维持政权生存，经济发展和改善民生等长远目标根本无从谈起。平壤近年也多次承认制裁导致其经济发展目标未能完成。

朝鲜与周边国家的经济社会发展差距越来越大，必然给其带来越来越大的竞争压力。尤其是，朝鲜与韩国长期分裂，始终面临零和竞争的高压态势。韩国在经济起飞的基础上推动国家治理、外交、军事等领域日益跃升为中等强国，对朝构成了很大的竞争压力。韩国不仅在经济上远超朝鲜，在军事上对朝鲜的优势也越发明显。外界往往关注朝鲜的核导进展，却忽视韩国在军事上的狂飙突进。在核武器上，韩国有美国的延伸威慑，并不亚于朝鲜的核威慑。在常规军事竞争中，韩国比朝鲜更为咄咄逼人。文在寅政府时期的军费创纪录地增长了36.9%，按2021至2025年的国防中期计划年均增幅将达6.1%。2020年全球火力（GFP）“世界军力排名”中，韩国从2015年的第11位跃升到第6位，朝鲜则从2019年的第18位下降为第25位。2021年，韩国首架国产第五代战机KF-21飞天，首枚潜射导弹升空，首艘自主研制的3000吨级常规弹道导弹潜艇“岛山安昌浩”号下海。随着美国解禁韩国的导弹射程，朝鲜引以为傲的中远程导弹韩国也都有了，而且依靠丰富的资金和工业制造能力，技术水平更加先进甚至还出口发达国家。韩国还在积极部署轻型航母、潜艇、预警雷达等。

在上述情势下，朝鲜必然希望打破现状，尽快实现以经济发展为基础的综合国力提升，尽快追赶周边国家。2018年，朝鲜宣布集中精力发展经济，其主要目标是在拥有核武器保障国防安全的情况下，通过外交攻势打破外交孤立和制裁，再以某种程度上的改革开放实现经济腾飞。朝鲜领导人会见美韩首脑时已多次提及实现经济发展的迫切愿望。

美国对朝鲜的意图和困境洞若观火。所谓“甲之蜜糖，乙之砒霜”，朝鲜越是急于打破现状，美国越认为维持现状更为有利，因此它奉行拖字诀，不急于和朝鲜达成实质交易。在目前缓和局面下，美国不必轻易触碰朝核问题这个烫手山芋，不致耗费过多国内政治成本，在外交上可以集中处理中国、俄罗斯、中东等优先事务。而且，美国认为时间在自己一边，只要坚持现有国际制裁框架，朝鲜就没有经济和军事发展的后劲，即使平壤开发出核武器也不能当饭吃，长此以往仍将面临垮台危机。因此，美国对于朝鲜近两年持续的武力示强，即使触碰了安理会制裁决议，姿态仍放得很低，大多淡化处理，反而高举“无条件对话”的道义大旗。另一方面，拜登政府在维持对朝国际制裁体系、加强美韩和美日韩军事同盟体制、坚持朝鲜无核化的原则立场方面毫无放松，可谓“说的全是软话，做的全是狠事”。

不在平静中爆发，就在平静中灭亡。朝鲜必然要动起来，摆脱制裁绳索越勒越紧、越挣扎越紧的危局。其无非有两种选择，一种是在无核化问题上有实质进展，同步换取外界解除相应制裁，另一种是反其道而行，升级军事示强，刺激美国和周边神经，增进新的谈判筹码，迫使美国和国际社会承认朝鲜拥核国地位，并解除制裁。

对平壤的利益认知来说，前者是在不得已情况下的次优选择，后者才是更容易的首要尝试。因此，朝鲜才祭出高超音速导弹这种通常军事大国还在摸索的前瞻性武器。然而，美韩军事界普遍认为，朝鲜试射高超武器的政治外交目的大于军事目的，这一尝试在技术和实战层面并不“高超”，并未刺激到美国神经。毕竟先进武器的发展，需要制造业实力、材料、制导等支撑，需要长期巨额投入和不断试错，归根结底还是要与本国经济发展实力正相关。在美国无动于衷的情况下，下一步平壤可能进一步推高紧张，加大对美国施压，这就是1月19日政治局会议威胁重启核导试验的原因所在。

虽然朝鲜半岛紧张可能会升温，但这不意味着朝鲜将回归到2017年在核导武器上的狂飙突进模式。当时，朝鲜的主要目的是快马加鞭突破核门槛，和谈也不过是其缓冲和蓄力的工具。而当前朝鲜在军事上的示强加码，主要目的是实现拥核前提下的外交和制裁突破，争取正常国家的发展空间。朝鲜目前的举动，仍是2018年来以经济建设为中心战略路线的新表现，核心仍是对美交易。而且，朝鲜在核问题上也不会走得太远，毕竟制裁这个大棒还在美国手里。

朝鲜半岛紧张再度升级，对周边国家和地区都会有不利影响，长远看对当事国也是不利的。眼下的关键是美朝双方必须认识到各自国家和政策能力的界限，追求更为折中的现实目标。美国长期缺乏真心解决朝核问题的意愿，不愿在安全和发展方面照顾朝鲜切实关切，而是火中取栗，把朝核问题当作策略性工具，借此深化美韩同盟和美日韩军事合作，导致极度缺乏安全感的朝鲜坚定走上拥核自保之路。这中间的最大风险倒不是朝鲜对美发动核袭击，而是核扩散和国际核不扩散体系解体。困窘的朝鲜可能让核、导技术流入国际市场，其他国家特别是周边邻国也有可能效仿朝鲜拥核。

朝鲜面临美韩同盟的巨大安全压力，发展核导武器主要出于防御目的，而非美西方渲染的威胁他国。但国际核不扩散规则和地缘政治的约束，导致其很难像印、巴那样成为不受制裁、正常发展的拥核国。纵观朝鲜的国家战略，始终存在安全与发展的内在张力，这严重制约了其长远的发展。事实表明，绝大多数国家没有核武器也能生存和自强，关键取决于该国的国内治理和合理的外交政策，核武器并不是保障安全和繁荣的充分或必要条件，拥核虽然可以获得一定的安全保障，但若牺牲发展利益，也无法保障长远的安全。

As of Jan. 25, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has conducted five missile tests, including two hypersonic models. On Jan. 19, the Political Bureau of the Workers' Party of Korea's Central Committee convened and announced that it would discuss restarting previously suspended nuclear and long-range missile tests in light of the failure of the United States to abandon its hostile policy and military threats. Research institutions in the U.S. and Republic of Korea are predicting that the DPRK may conduct long-range missile tests this year.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula, which has been generally calm since 2018, has shown recent signs of renewed tension. An inherent imbalance will make it difficult to keep things as they are for long. It would be extremely detrimental to the DPRK to maintain the status quo indefinitely. At present, U.S.-led international sanctions against the DPRK have not relaxed but have tightened. Most of the foreign trade, foreign capital and foreign exchange needed for the DPRK's economic development have been cut off.In today's globalized international community, if the DPRK remains closed for an extended period, the regime can at best barely survive by self-reliance, and there is no way to talk about long-term goals, such as developing the economy and improving people's lives. Pyongyang has repeatedly admitted in recent years that sanctions have caused it to fail to achieve its economic development goals.

The growing gap in economic and social development between the DPRK and its neighbors is bound to bring increasing competitive pressure. It is of particular note that the DPRK and the ROK have long been divided and have always faced zero-sum competitive pressure. The ROK's leap toward becoming a midrange power in the areas of national governance, diplomacy and the military based on its economic takeoff placed great competitive pressure on the DPRK. Not only is ROK far ahead economically but its military advantage over the DPRK is becoming increasingly apparent.While the rest of the world tends to focus on the DPRK's nuclear and missile progress, the ROK's rampant military progress is overlooked. In terms of nuclear weapons, the ROK has an extended U.S. deterrent, no less than the DPRK's nuclear deterrent. In conventional military competition, the ROK has been more aggressive than the DPRK. Military spending increased by a record 36.9 percent under the Moon Jae-in administration, and the medium-term defense plan for 2021-25 projects an average annual increase of 6.1 percent.In the 2020 Global Firepower ranking, the ROK jumped to sixth place from 11th in 2015, while the DPRK dropped to 25th place from 18th in 2019. In 2021, the Republic of Korea commissioned its first domestic fifth-generation fighter jet (the KF-21), launched a missile from a submarine and put into operation its first indigenously developed 3,000-ton conventional ballistic missile submarine, the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho.With the U.S. lifting the ban on the ROK's missile range, the ROK has all the medium- and long-range missiles that the DPRK is so proud to have. In addition, with its abundant capital and industrial capabilities, the ROK has produced more technologically advanced missiles and even exports them to other developed countries. The ROK is also actively deploying light aircraft carriers, submarines and early-warning radars.

In the above situation, the DPRK is bound to want to break the status quo and achieve the improvement of its composite national strength based on economic development as soon as possible to catch up with its neighboring countries.In 2018, the DPRK announced that it would focus on economic development. The main goal — with nuclear weapons ensuring its national security — is to break diplomatic isolation and sanctions through a diplomatic offensive and then achieve economic takeoff with some degree of reform and opening-up. The DPRK's leader repeatedly mentioned his urgent desire to achieve economic development when he met with the U.S. and ROK heads of state.

The U.S. has a clear understanding of the DPRK's intentions and predicament. As the proverb goes, one man's meat is another man's poison. The more the DPRK is eager to break the status quo, the more the U.S. thinks it is advantageous to maintain it. The U.S. is not eager to reach a substantive deal with the DPRK and is using delay tactics. Under the current detente, the United States does not have to touch the hot potato of the DPRK nuclear issue, which would bring domestic political costs. This makes it possible for it diplomatically to focus on China, Russia, the Middle East and other priorities.Moreover, the U.S. believes that time is on its side, and that as long as it adheres to the existing international sanctions framework, the DPRK will have no backbone for economic or military development. And even if Pyongyang were to develop nuclear weapons, those cannot be used as food. The DPRK will continue to face a crisis of collapse in the long run. Therefore, the U.S. has kept a low posture in response to the DPRK's continual shows of force over the past two years, even though it has violated the UN Security Council's sanctions resolution, mostly taking it lightly and downplaying it, rather than waving the moral banner of unconditional dialogue.On the other hand, the Biden administration has not relaxed. It has maintained the international sanctions system against the DPRK, strengthening the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan-ROK military alliances and insisting on the principled position of denuclearizing the DPRK. It can be said that all the U.S. words are soft but all its actions are tough.

Unless the DPRK bursts out, it will perish by inaction. The DPRK is bound to move to alleviate the dangerous situation, as the rope of sanctions is tightening as it struggles. There are but two choices. One is to make substantial progress on denuclearization in exchange for the lifting of the corresponding sanctions; the other is to escalate a military show of strength to poke at the nerves of the U.S. and its neighbors, with new bargaining chips to force the international community to recognize the DPRK as a nuclear power and lift sanctions.

As Pyongyang perceives its interests, the former is the second-best option as a last resort, while the latter is easier to attempt first. That is why the DPRK has launched hypersonic missiles — the kind of forward-looking weapons that military powers are still figuring out. However, it is widely believed in the U.S. and ROK military communities that the DPRK's test launch of the weapons was more political and diplomatic than military, and that the attempt was not advanced at the technical and operational levels. So it did not much irritate U.S. nerves.The U.S. and ROK believe that, after all, the development of advanced weapons requires the support of manufacturing, materials and guidance, as well as a huge long-term investment and a continuous trial and error process. Ultimately, the effort must be in step with the country's economic development. With the U.S. indifference, Pyongyang may attempt to ratchet up tensions to increase pressure on the U.S. This is why the meeting of the DPRK's Political Bureau on Jan. 19 may have marked a restart of nuclear missile testing.