点击阅读最新一期《中美聚焦文摘》第31期

美苏冷战结束后，世界出现和平发展潮流，但朝鲜半岛却冷战犹存，至今仍是东亚和全球的一个安全热点。其主要问题包括南北分裂、美韩与朝鲜长期敌对、朝鲜发展核武以及由此带来的一次又一次核危机。这些问题给半岛及东北亚带来了严重的军事安全风险。

1992年首次朝核危机爆发以来，有关方曾与朝举行双边、四方、六方等多种形式的对话谈判，但都以失败告终，形成了“危机-对话-达成协议-协议失效-危机”的恶性循环。朝核及半岛问题对话失败的根本原因是，美朝双方极度缺乏互信，有关方对半岛无核化的定义和实现无核化并建立和平机制的路线图、时间表分歧巨大，朝鲜对“利比亚模式”高度警惕。

与此前多次出现的高度紧张相比，近两年来的半岛形势相对平静，但所存在的诸多问题一个也未解决，形势令人担忧。

首先，在2019年美朝河内对话无果而终、特别是2020全球疫情暴发后，虽然“双暂停”在半岛仍得以维持，但半岛无核化对话已全部停止。拜登政府上台后表示愿与朝鲜无条件恢复对话的建议，以及5月份出台的对朝新政策，均受到朝鲜公开批评。朝方领导人声称，如果美国不彻底改变对朝敌视政策，朝鲜决不会再与美国进行对话。

其次，已跨越核门槛的朝鲜仍在继续发展核力量，力争获得类似印巴事实核国家的地位。2018年朝鲜曾提出实行新的战略路线，但2020年金正恩又重提并进路线，在今年1月的劳动党八大上，他更公开宣示了朝鲜未来继续发展核武的宏大规划。在此情况下，国际上已越来越多地出现一种疑问：朝鲜还有可能弃核吗？

第三，到目前为止，朝鲜仍保持了国内政治的基本稳定，但经济发展面临严重困难。国内经济体制失灵及遭受严厉国际制裁，是朝鲜经济困难的主要原因。此外，2020全球疫情的暴发及国内严重的自然灾害，更加剧了朝鲜的经济困难。

第四，半岛、东北亚继续笼罩在核扩散、军事对峙与军备竞赛的阴影下。今年5月美国允许韩国发展中导，8月美韩继续进行针对朝鲜的联合军演，9月朝韩接连进行新型弹道导弹试射。这种态势如不改变，朝鲜将可能进行新的核导试验，韩日将进一步扩充军备，朝鲜拥核的多米诺骨牌效益也将日益显露出来。

第五，9月底南北关系出现了一丝缓和迹象。朝鲜宣布恢复与韩国的沟通联络，并称愿在一定条件下与韩国就发表终战宣言进行商讨。但韩国发表终战宣言的建议却受到美国冷遇，南北恢复对话仍困难重重。

第六，中美关系的严重恶化使双方在半岛问题上的合作意愿受到很大削弱。解决朝核问题不是当前中美各自的优先事项。

总之，如果目前半岛的僵持状况不能改变，新的危机迟早还会发生。为避免半岛再现紧张局势，中美应发挥大国担当，努力缩小分歧，争取早日重启半岛无核化合作。对此笔者有以下六点建议：

一、中美应通过高层对话共同宣示解决半岛问题是两国的重要合作领域，而非竞争、对抗领域。为此，美国必须改变一方面寻求与中国开展半岛合作，同时又在诸多领域实施对华打压的错误做法。

二、中美应共同推动有关各方在坚持“双暂停”前提下重启半岛无核化对话，特别是支持南北双方首先重启对话、缓和关系。半岛统一最终将由南北双方以和平方式自主实现。

三、中美应就新形势下实现半岛无核化的基本政策达成共识。这些政策包括：

坚持实现半岛无核化的目标不动摇；

坚持通过和平对话而非诉诸武力解决朝核问题；

平衡解决有关各方的合理安全关切，推动实现半岛无核化与建立半岛和平机制双轨并进；

实行“一揽子、分阶段、同步走”的方针。

四、中美朝韩四方应首先为结束半岛战争状态做出重大努力，并应共同提出实现半岛无核化的路线图。四方会谈应逐步发展为六方会谈。

五、坚持发挥联合国安理会在解决朝核半岛问题上的重要作用。一项当务之急是探讨如何执行安理会对朝制裁的可逆条款问题，这可能成为重启半岛对话的一把钥匙。

六、在实现半岛无核化的过程中，中美两国须努力维护双方战略稳定，包括危机管控。

Click to read the November issue of China-US Focus Digest

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a trend of peace and development in the world. However, the negative effects have lingered on the Korean Peninsula, which remains a security hotspot for East Asia and the world. The peninsula continues to suffer from the North-South split, the long-standing hostility between the DPRK on one side and the United States and the Republic of Korea on the other, and by the DPRK's nuclear weapons program and the resulting nuclear crises. These problems have brought serious military security risks to the peninsula and more broadly to northeastern Asia.

Since the first nuclear crisis in 1992, the parties concerned have held various dialogues and negotiations with the DPRK, including bilateral, four-party and six-party versions, all of which ended in failure and formed a vicious circle of crisis-dialogue-agreement-failure-crisis. At the heart of the failure are the extreme lack of mutual trust between the U.S. and the DPRK, the great divergence in the definition of peninsular denuclearization, the road map and timetable for denuclearization and a peace mechanism and the high vigilance of the DPRK against the so-called Libya model.

Compared with the high tensions that occurred repeatedly before, the situation on the peninsula has been relatively calm in the past two years. However, none of the many problems have been solved, which is worrying.

First, although “double suspensions” have been maintained on the peninsula since the fruitless Hanoi summit in 2019, denuclearization dialogues have all been stopped, especially since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Biden administration's proposal to resume dialogue unconditionally and its new policy announced in May were publicly criticized by the DPRK. The Korean leader vowed to never engage in dialogue with the U.S. again unless the latter completely abandons its hostility.

Second, the DPRK, which already crossed the nuclear threshold, continues to develop its nuclear forces and strives for a de facto nuclear power status similar to that of India and Pakistan. It proposed a new strategic line in 2018. In 2020, however, Kim Jong-un revived the parallel development policy, which combined the economy with a nuclear program. At the eighth KWP congress in January, he announced an ambitious plan for a nuclear future. In this context, a growing voice in the world has been asking: is it still possible for the DPRK to abandon its nuclear program?

Third, the DPRK has so far maintained its basic political stability, but its economic development faces serious difficulties. Failure of the domestic economic system and severe international sanctions are the main causes. The COVID-19 pandemic and severe natural disasters have only made things worse.

Fourth, the peninsula and Northeast Asia remain under the shadow of nuclear proliferation, military confrontation and an arms race. In May, the U.S. gave the green light to the ROK to develop its missiles; in August, the two conducted joint military exercises targeting the DPRK; and in September, the North and the South both conducted new ballistic missile test launches. If this situation does not change, the DPRK may well conduct new nuclear and missile tests and the ROK and Japan may further expand their arms. This is the domino effect of DPRK's nuclear ambition.

Fifth, there were some signs of a thaw in North-South relations at the end of September. The DPRK announced the resumption of communication with the South, and expressed its readiness to discuss, under certain conditions, a declaration to end the state of war. But the ROK's proposal for an end-of-war declaration did not get a warm response from the U.S., and the resumption of North-South dialogue remains fraught.

Sixth, the serious deterioration of China-U.S. relations has greatly weakened the willingness of the big powers to cooperate on issues related to the peninsula. Addressing the nuclear issue is not a current priority for either country.

In short, if the current stalemate is not changed, a new crisis will arise sooner or later. To avoid the recurrence of tensions on the peninsula, China and the U.S. should play their part as major powers, narrow their differences and work for an early resumption of cooperation on peninsula denuclearization. Here are my ideas on how:

1. China and the U.S. should jointly declare through a high-level dialogue that the settlement of the peninsula issue is an important area of cooperation, not competition or confrontation. To this end, the U.S. must stop suppressing China in many different areas as it seeks China's support on the peninsula.

2. China and the U.S. should jointly push for the resumption of bilateral dialogue on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula under the precondition of upholding the two suspensions. They should give special support to the resumption of North-South dialogue to relax and develop their relations. Unification of the peninsula should eventually be achieved by the DPRK and ROK independently and peacefully.

3. China and the U.S. should agree on the basic policies for denuclearization of the peninsula. These include:

• Adhering to the goal of denuclearization without wavering;

• Resolving the nuclear issue through peaceful dialogue rather than resorting to the use of force;

• Addressing the legitimate security concerns of all parties in a balanced manner and promoting in parallel denuclearization and a peace mechanism;

• Handling the matter with a packaged solution to be implemented in phases and with simultaneous actions.

4. China, the U.S., the DPRK and the ROK should first make major efforts to end the state of war on the peninsula and jointly put forward a road map for the denuclearization of the peninsula. The four-party talks should be gradually developed into six-parties.

5. The important role of the UN Security Council in resolving nuclear issues should always be respected and used. A priority is to explore how to implement the reversible provisions of UN sanctions, which could be a key to restarting dialogue on the peninsula.

6. In the process of denuclearization, China and the U.S. must work hard to safeguard the strategic stability between them, including crisis stability.