美国国务卿蓬佩奥近期的南海政策声明宣示了美国南海政策的重大变化。在中美博弈激化的背景下，这一变化蕴含了更多的战略意涵，也可能导致巨大的冲突风险。中美能否进行有效的危机管理，将面临前所未有的重大考验。

蓬佩奥的政策声明是2010年以来美国南海政策的最重大变化。2010年，时任国务卿希拉里·克林顿抛出“南海问题事关美国国家利益”的说法，标志着美国正式确立了对南海的介入政策，也显示美国开始将南海问题置于“亚太再平衡”和中美战略竞争框架下运筹。然而，这一介入政策并未抛弃美国不就主权问题选边站的传统立场。面对南海形势的持续演变，美国虽然不断就此向中国施压，但即便面对黄岩岛事件、菲律宾的所谓“南海仲裁案”、中越海上对峙等诸多危机事件，美国在主权问题上都没有突破其传统立场。蓬佩奥的近期声明，明确声称中国在南海的相关诉求为“非法”，在黄岩岛、仁爱礁、万安滩等一系列中邻争议问题上明确立场，全面否定中方主权立场，这既抛弃了美国几十年的政策立场，也使美国的“介入”政策进一步明晰化、深入化。

美国南海政策的上述质变，是美国对华实施全政府、全方位施压的组成部分，具有更加显著的战略意涵。特朗普政府执政以来，通过贸易战、科技封锁、人文脱钩、插手涉港涉台等政策工具，来实施其对华竞争战略，南海问题并非其关注重点。蓬佩奥的政策声明，则表明特朗普政府开始重新拾起“南海牌”，借此强化近期对中国的极限施压态势。通过打“南海牌”，一方面，美国可以寻求中国近年来的海上维权成果予以推回（push-back），扭转其在南海地区愈发不利的战略态势；另一方面，美国也可以借此激活中国与相关声索国的矛盾，借机将越南、菲律宾、印尼等纳入美国对华政策的“工具箱”，同时给正在进行中的南海行为准则磋商使绊儿。

上述战略收益驱动了美国南海政策的质变，却也可能给急速下滑的中美关系注入巨大的冲突风险。历史上，南海地区历来是引发中美重大危机的主要风险所在，包括2001年的撞机事件、2009年的“无暇”号事件，以及诸如“迪凯特”号事件等多次海上危险遭遇。同时，美国南海政策的每一次重大变化，都会以不断强化的军事行动为注脚。在蓬佩奥声明之前，美军就已经加强了在南海地区的行动频率和强度。而为了落实蓬佩奥的政策声明，美军近期频繁采取极具挑衅意味的抵近侦察行动，高调渲染“双航母”进入南海、多国联合演练等，并不断暗示其对擦枪走火风险的容忍度。更加危险的是，在当前的美国国内政治氛围下，特朗普政府面对疫情不断恶化、选情岌岌可危的困境，对中国的极限施压已经是无所不用其极，很可能在南海地区采取更加无底线的摊牌行动，届时中国将不得不予以回击。包括美国战略界在内的诸多人士担忧，中美滑向新冷战乃至热战的风险在急剧增大，南海最有可能成为中美兵戎相见之地。

多年以来，美国将南海问题视作“中国能否坚持和平崛起”的试金石，中方则将其视作“美国能否接纳中国崛起”的试金石。而就目前形势看，一旦处理不慎，南海问题就可能成为中美冲突的第一张多米诺骨牌。

有鉴于此，中美两军重启对话、加强危机管控已经迫在眉睫。中美防长近期的通话，有助于打破对话中断的困局。当务之急是，一方面，两军更应树立“不冲突”的基本底线认知，对“不冲突”作为两国共同利益的认知应予以再强化。另一方面，中美应视情况启动两国海军首长、联参对话等重要沟通机制，就一线部队避免摩擦、潜在危机时进行联络等内容进一步细化磋商。中长期而言，中美两军则需要着眼于竞争态势下的战略稳定机制构建，并为此付出更大努力。

The recent policy statement on the South China Sea by Mike Pompeo, the U.S. secretary of state, marks a significant change. Against the backdrop of an intensifying Sino-U.S. game, the change carries more strategic connotations and could lead to conflict. It will be a major test of the ability of China and the United States to manage differences effectively.

Pompeo's policy statement is the most significant change in U.S. South China Sea policy since 2010. At that time, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton identified the South China Sea explicitly as “a matter of U.S. national interest,” thus formally establishing a U.S. interventionist policy. It also showed that the United States had begun to place the South China Sea within the framework of its Asia-Pacific rebalancing and its strategic competition with China.In the face of the evolving situation in the South China Sea, the U.S. has been exerting pressure on China, but even after the Huangyan Island incident, the Philippines' arbitration ruling, the Sino-Vietnamese maritime confrontation and many other crises, it has not openly changed its sovereignty stance.But Pompeo's recent statement clearly declares that most of China's claims in the South China Sea are illegal and makes clear the U.S. position on China's disputes with its neighbors over Huangyan, Ren'ai Reef and the Wan'an Basin. It denies Chinese sovereignty. This not only abandons the policy position of the U.S. in place for decades but also further clarifies the U.S. intent to intervene.

This qualitative change in U.S. policy in the South China Sea is part of an all-around pressure approach to China and has a more significant strategic connotation.Since the Trump administration came to power, it has implemented a competitive strategy toward China through such policy tools as a trade war, a technology blockade, cultural decoupling and intervention in Hong Kong and Taiwan, but the South China Sea was not its focus.Pompeo's policy statement indicates that the Trump administration has begun to pick up the South China Sea card again to strengthen its pressure campaign. By playing this card, the United States can attempt to push back China's maritime rights achievements in recent years that reversed its unfavorable strategic position in the South China Sea. In addition, the United States can aggravate China's conflicts with other countries that have claims in the South China Sea — creating an opportunity to include Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia in its toolbox against China — and at the same time make it difficult for the ongoing consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to conclude.

These strategic gains have driven a qualitative change in U.S. policy and heighten the risk of conflict in the already rapidly declining China-U.S. relationship. Historically, the South China Sea has been a focal point for a potential major crisis between China and the United States — note the 2001 collision, the Immaculate Conception case in 2009 and the USS Decatur incident.In addition, every major change in U.S. policy in the South China Sea has been accompanied by intensified military operations. Before the Pompeo statement, the U.S. military had already increased the frequency and intensity of its operations in the South China Sea. In order to implement Pompeo's policy statement, the U.S. military has recently undertaken frequent and provocative reconnaissance along China's sovereign waters, sent two aircraft carriers to the South China Sea and carried out multinational joint exercises. It has also hinted at its “tolerance” for the risk of a firefight.What's more dangerous is that in the current domestic political climate in the United States, the Trump administration, in the face of a worsening coronavirus epidemic and with the president's re-election campaign in crisis, has been putting extreme and unrelenting pressure on China, and is likely to provoke an unscrupulous showdown in the South China Sea, prompting China to hit back.Many people, including many in the U.S. strategic community, are concerned that the risk of China and the U.S. sliding into a new cold war — or even a hot war — is increasing rapidly and that the South China Sea is most likely to be where it starts.

For years, the United States has viewed the South China Sea as a litmus test of whether China can maintain its peaceful rise, and China has viewed it as a litmus test of whether the United States can accept China's rise. In the current situation, if not handled carefully, the South China Sea issue could become the first domino to fall in a Sino-U.S. conflict.

In view of this, it is imperative that the two armies restart dialogue and strengthen crisis management. The recent call between the Chinese and U.S. heads of defense could help break the deadlock in the dialogue. The two militaries should establish and reinforce the basic bottom-line cognition of non-conflict as being in the common interest of both countries. In addition, China and the U.S. should initiate important communication mechanisms, such as the dialogue between the two naval chiefs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as appropriate, to further refine consultations on the avoidance of friction between front-line forces. In the medium and long term, the two militaries need to make greater efforts to build a mechanism to ensure strategic stability in an increasingly competitive situation.