2020年5月28日，美国国务卿迈克尔·蓬皮奥向国会提交了《2020年香港政策法案报告》，它是根据《1992年香港政策法案》的要求以及《2019年香港人权与民主法案》所修订。作为提交程序的一部分，美国国务卿每年需要证明香港是否在北京的政治令状下依然保持着充分自治，以确保其可以依据美国法律享有特殊优惠待遇。这一证明源自1984年《中英联合声明》中承诺的“高度自治”以及在1997年7月中国收回香港主权时颁布的该地区迷你宪法——“基本法”确立的“一国两制”原则。5月28日，国务卿蓬皮奥宣布，他已无法证明香港享有充分的自治来确保其拥有特殊优惠待遇。第二天，美国总统特朗普指示其政府开启撤销香港特殊优惠待遇豁免政策的程序，这些豁免政策包括双边引渡条约和军民两用技术出口管制等。美国的这一决定是对中国全国人民代表大会5月28日起草并通过香港《国家安全法》作出的回应。该法案将禁止任何针对中央政府的叛国、分裂、煽动、颠覆和外国势力干涉等行为，法案自身是对香港未能根据“基本法”第23条要求进行相关立法的回应（“基本法”是治理香港的迷你宪法）。

鉴于中央政府《国家安全法》的具体内容、通过日期以及（也是最重要的）在香港地区的执行手段等目前还是“已知的未知”，美国国务院的这种做法是极度的反应过度。

根据香港“基本法”确立的“一国两制”原则，除“有关国防、外交”和“其他按本法规定不属于香港特别行政区自治范围的事务”，其他都归香港特别行政区政府管辖。通情达理的人们会问，当社会治安遭到破坏以至于危害国家根本安全利益时，“基本法”第14条规定的“维护社会治安”究竟是只属于香港特区政府的管辖范围，还是中央政府也可以行使共同管辖权。毕竟，避免社会治安遭到破坏是联邦或中央政府的利益与职责核心所在，虽然维护法律秩序通常属于州政府或地方政府的管辖权限。这种观点有先例可循。在俄罗斯诉乌克兰（2019年4月）一案中，世贸组织争端解决机构任命的仲裁委员会就裁决，“维护内部法律与社会治安”是影响国家“根本安全利益”的典型职责。同样，通情达理的人们还会问，中央政府在香港的土地上设置包括情报机构在内的国家安全机构是否超出了“基本法”中确立的中央政府负责“国防和外交事务”的职权范围。的确有可能如此。另一方面，在《海洋法公约》规定的框架中，美国国务院自己就认为情报搜集活动是“军事活动”的子集。众所周知的是，中国人民解放军已经在该地区派驻了驻守部队。

但行使与狭义“社会治安”相关的共同管辖权以及在香港的土地上设立基本的国家安全机构是否相当于推翻并终结香港的“高度自治”并不值得商榷。事实绝非如此。香港眼下的社会和经济制度，包括1984年《中英联合声明》中规定的备受珍视的言论自由、集会自由、结社自由、旅行自由、行动自由、职业选择自由以及宗教信仰自由，都将继续保持基本完整，并接受香港法律体系的最终裁定。只有当这些自由在香港的土地上被滥用，以至于危及国家主权和安全并挑战了中央政府的权力及“基本法”的权威时，或是针对内地进行渗透和颠覆活动时，根据新的《国家安全法》，这些很可能越过了中央政府的“红线”。

美国国务院《2020年香港政策法案报告》另一个令人质疑的特点是它对于“一国两制”在香港的法律体系内如何体现并实施的解读问题重重。这在涉及中央政府与香港特区政府关系的宪法问题上尤为显著。

在美国看来，在“基本法”管辖范围内涉及香港-内地关系的案例中，北京不应享有排他的司法解释权。自治的原则规定了香港法院长期建立起来的行使司法解释、复核政府行为的权力必须得到维护。美国这种司法解释、复核和宣布无效都属于地方权力的观点是错误的。当一个地区的司法机关被要求就地方法律是否符合“基本法”进行裁决时（正如香港的上诉法院近期确认的那样），这些权力的确属于该地区的司法机关，但当涉及北京-香港关系的宪法权限时，情况就并非如此了。在这种情况下，根据“基本法”，北京的确享有最终解释权，要求香港法院通过香港终审法院请求全国人民代表大会常务委员会就相关条款作出解释。此外，当香港法院引用这些条款时，香港法院“有责任”以全国人大常委会的解释为准。最终，在中央政府与香港特区政府关系的条款上，全国人大常委会享有解释“基本法”的“普遍而独立的权力”，而香港法院有责任在进行司法审查时遵循这种解释。这是法律明文规定的。美国国务院在这方面的错误解读不禁让人怀疑它究竟对于“一国两制”原则核心的法律基石问题有何种程度的理解，抑或是完全没有理解。

特朗普政府的《2020年香港政策法案报告》及其终止确认香港的自治地位正值香港处于一个后回归时代的关键节点。2020年9月，一场具划时代意义的香港立法委员会选举即将举行，这或将见证自香港主权回归中国后“支持民主”的反对派首次占据要职。在选举前（亲北京人士依然在立法会享有多数席位时），北京似乎下定决心要通过出台《国家安全法》堵住香港安全与情报漏洞。与此同时，香港依然深陷常年房价高企的泥潭（更不用提流产的逃犯引渡条例），这些问题向来由一小部分一心寻求推动自决议程的少数派主导。香港履行围绕“基本法”第23条进行国家安全相关立法的承诺，以及达成根据“基本法”第45条和第68条进行“普选”的目标也似乎遥遥无期。美国取消对香港的特殊优惠待遇（主要是为了刁难中国）有可能进一步分裂本已诉求各异的政治势力，最终导致害人害己。

我们希望，当新一届美国政府在2021年1月宣誓就职时，它会对彼时已经颁布的《国家安全法》采取一种精细的解读，并就此在《2021年香港政策法案报告》中围绕香港的高度自治地位作出一个更深思熟虑的决定。

On May 28, 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo submitted the 2020 Hong Kong Policy Act Report to Congress, as required under the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 and amended by the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019. As part of the submission process, the Secretary of State is required to annually certify whether Hong Kong continues to be sufficiently autonomous from Beijing's political writ to warrant special and differential treatment under U.S. law. This certification stems from the “high degree of autonomy” promised in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the “one country, two systems” principle enshrined in the territory's mini-constitution, the Basic Law, at the time of its reversion to Chinese rule in July 1997. On May 28th, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that he could no longer certify that Hong Kong was sufficiently autonomous to warrant such treatment. The next day, President Trump directed his administration to begin the process of eliminating the territory's special and differential policy exemptions in U.S. law, ranging from the bilateral extradition treaty to export controls on dual-use technologies. The decertification was in response to the China National People's Congress' (NPC) decision on May 28th to draft and thereafter pass a national security law for Hong Kong that will prohibit acts of treason, secession, sedition, subversion, and foreign interference against the central government– itself a response to the territory's failure to bring in such a law as required under Article 23 of the city's Basic Law (the mini-constitution that governs the territory).

The U.S. State Department's decertification is a wildly-over-the-top reaction, given that the specific contents of the central government's national security law, its date of passage, and – most importantly – its means of enforcement on the territory of Hong Kong are all 'known unknowns' at this point of time.

As per the 'one country, two systems' principle enshrined in the Basic Law, all functions except “those relating to defense and foreign affairs” as well as “other matters outside the limits of [Hong Kong's] autonomy” are the preserve of the territory's government. Reasonable people can argue whether the “maintenance of public order”, as enumerated in Article 14 of the Basic Law, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Hong Kong government or is amenable to the central government's concurrent exercise of authority when the breakdown of public order impinges on the state's essential security interests. Averting the breakdown of public order resides, after all, at the heart of a federal or central government's interests and duties – even if maintenance of law and order is typically listed as a state or local right. And there is precedent for such an opinion. In Russia v. Ukraine (April 2019), an arbitral panel constituted under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement system had ruled that “maintenance of law and public order internally” was a quintessential function of the state that impinged on the state's “essential security interests.” Equally, reasonable people can argue whether the local presence of the central government's national security organs, including intelligence agencies, on Hong Kong's soil exceeds the central government's “defense and foreign affairs” remit enshrined in the Basic Law. It could well be the case. On the other hand, the U.S. State Department itself considers intelligence gathering activities as a sub-set of “military activities”, insofar as its engagement with the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention is concerned. And as is well known, the Chinese People's Liberation Army is already garrisoned on the territory.

What is not debatable however is whether a narrow 'public order'-related exercise of concurrent jurisdiction and potential skeletal presence of national security organs on Hong Kong's soil amounts to an overturning and end of the territory's “high degree of autonomy”. It most unequivocally does not. Hong Kong's current social and economic systems, including its cherished freedoms of speech, assembly, association, travel, movement, occupational choices and religious beliefs, as outlined by the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, will continue to remain substantially intact and subject to final adjudication in the territory's court system. Only to the extent that such freedoms are abused on Hong Kong soil in a manner that endangers national sovereignty and security, challenges the power of the central government and the authority of the Basic Law, or conducts acts of infiltration and sabotage against the mainland, will they likely cross the central government's 'red-lines' in this new national security law.

An equally questionable feature of the U.S. State Department's 2020 Hong Kong Policy Act Report is its problematic understanding of how 'one country, two systems' is lived and practiced within the Hong Kong court system. This is particularly the case in instances that constitutionally concern central government-Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) relations.

In the U.S.' view, in cases concerning Hong Kong-mainland relations that come under the jurisdiction of the Basic Law, Beijing should not enjoy the exclusive power of judicial interpretation. Principles of autonomy dictate that the long-established practice of Hong Kong courts exercising the power of interpretation to adjudicate laws and review government actions must be upheld. This U.S. view of local power of judicial interpretation, review and invalidation is erroneous. While such power is indeed vested in the territory's courts when called on to adjudicate local laws' compliance with the Basic Law (as the territory's Court of Appeal has also recently affirmed), this is most certainly not the case in instances that fall within the constitutional purview of Beijing-Hong Kong relations. In such cases, Beijing does enjoy definitive power of interpretation under the Basic Law, requiring Hong Kong's courts to seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) through the territory's Court of Final Appeal. Furthermore, Hong Kong courts, when applying these provisions locally, are “under a duty to follow” the interpretation laid down by the National People's Congress Standing Committee. At the end of the day, the NPCSC enjoys “general and free-standing power” to interpret the Basic Law insofar as the relationship between the central authorities and the Hong Kong region is concerned, and the territory's courts are duty-bound to follow this lead during the course of judicial review. This is settled law. The U.S. State Department's defective interpretation in this regard begs the question thereupon as to how well it grasps – and does not grasp – the foundational pillars of law that reside at the heart of the “one country, two systems” principle.

The Trump Administration's 2020 Hong Kong Policy Act Report and its decertification of Hong Kong's autonomous status comes at a critical juncture in the territory's post-Handover history. In September 2020, a potentially landmark Legislative Council of Hong Kong (LegCo) election is due to be held, which could witness the opposition 'pro-democracy' forces occupying the Treasury bench for the first time since Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese rule. In advance of the election (and while its supporters still enjoy a working majority in the LegCo), Beijing appears determined to apply its national security scalpel to plug the territory's security and intelligence gaps. Hong Kong, meanwhile, remains weighed down by frustrations related to its perennial housing woes (not to mention the botched attempt to pass a fugitives law), which has been commandeered by a narrow minority bent on pushing their self-determination agenda. And a local version of fulfilling Article 23's promise of a national security law as well as Articles 45 and 68's goal of 'ultimate universal suffrage' appear no closer to realization. The U.S. hammer blow of decertification and elimination of Hong Kong's special policy exemptions in U.S. law (primarily in a bid to spite China) has the potential in this combustive mix to scatter the disparate political pieces even further to the detriment of all.

Hopefully, when a new administration assumes office in January 2021, it will undertake a nuanced review of the by-then promulgated national security law and arrive at a more considered decision on Hong Kong's substantially autonomous status in its 2021 Hong Kong Policy Act Report.