尽管多数专业人士对美朝对话最终能走多远一直抱怀疑态度，但是对于2月27-28日特朗普与金正恩在河内举行二度会晤，各方的普遍预期是经过双方工作层面大半年的谈判准备，两国首脑将签署一份在新加坡联合声明基础上使互动进程或多或少再推进一步的共同文件。因此，会谈无果而终不能不使多数人感到意外。一个共同的问题是，为什么会出现这样的结局？这个问题的答案与人们判断美朝对话究竟能走多远，以及朝核问题能否最终得到解决有重要关系。

美朝两国首脑长途跋涉来到河内，在国内外高度关注下举行第二次会晤，是要为最终做成一笔巨大交易而达成至关重要的阶段性协议。能否实现这一目标取决于两点：第一，金特二人是否都真正为签约而来，并确信对方和自己一样怀有诚意。第二，双方能否在标志实质性进展的核心条款上达成妥协？第一点是以全面解决朝核问题为目标的美朝对话能够持续推进的基础，第二点是双方间关于朝鲜弃核步骤的谈判能产生实质性成果的关键。从金特第二轮会谈后美朝双方分别释放的信息来看，导致河内会谈无果而终的直接原因是在朝鲜做出进一步弃核行动换取美国同意解除联合国制裁的交换条件这一核心环节上，双方没能达成妥协而导致谈判破裂。

然而，在人们十分关注的导致谈判破裂的具体条款的分歧上，美朝各自提供的说法是两个不同的版本。先是特朗普在会谈结束后单独举行的记者会上答问时解释说：“他们（朝方）希望全面解除制裁，但我们不会这么做。他们愿意拆除我们期望的大部分地区的核设施，但我们不能为此放弃全部制裁。”他之后又补充说，“他们希望解除制裁，但他们不愿拆除我们想要他们拆除的区域，而他们愿意拆除的区域并不是我们期望的。”

朝方代表团在会谈破裂后很快离开现场，直到28日午夜时分由外相李勇浩举行了简短的新闻发布会，针对特朗普的说法明确指出，朝方在这次会议上提出了一项现实的建议，即以在美朝两国专家共同监督下拆除全部宁边核设施，换取部分制裁的解除。李勇浩强调说：“我们没有要求全部制裁的解除，具体而言，目前联合国有11项针对朝鲜的制裁决议，我们只寻求解除发布于2016年和2017年的五项制裁决议中最关乎我国民生经济，影响人民生活的条款。”他进一步解释道：“虽然实际上我们更需要关于安全保障的承诺，但我们理解美方的难处，因此我们只提出解除部分制裁的对应措施，考虑到目前朝鲜和美国之间的信任程度，这项提议是现阶段我们能够采取的最大去核化措施。”李勇浩还说，朝方在会谈中还提出不再进行核试验和洲际导弹试验的计划，以解除美方的担忧，但由于美方过分的要求，特朗普浪费了一个可能再也不会有的机会。

美朝两家不同说法具有重要含义。特朗普的说法是在暗示，问题主要在于朝鲜方面提出过高的要求；反之，朝方的说法是要表明，他们提出的交换条件是十分现实合理的，同时暗示特朗普在最后时刻提高了要价才导致会谈失败。朝鲜副外相崔善姬在新闻发布会上说：“在周三周四的谈判中，我们的领导人对美方的'算计'感到困惑，我的印象是委员长同志可能已经失去和美方继续走下去达成协议的热情。”

美朝双方谁的说法更可信呢？笔者认为，朝方的说法似更可信些。从金正恩委员长这次前往河内赴会的隆重程度和宣传方式，以及在抵达河内后的前期活动中所释放的积极信息来看，朝方对第二次金特会晤签署一个共同文件是抱有很高期望和相当的信心。朝方通过前期的谈判和摸底，认为双方已为此做好了准备。据韩美媒体报道，在本次金特会前，朝美双方已经完成了《河内宣言》的草稿，只留有少数细节供两位领导人谈判决定，其中就包括申报拆除另一处核设施的问题。特朗普在会后举行的记者会上也表示，双方“已经有准备好的宣言草案，只需要签字就行了”。笔者还推测，李永浩外相在新闻发布会上披露，朝方在河内会谈中“提出不再进行核试验和洲际导弹试验的计划，以解除美方的担忧”， 是为保证会谈成功着意为特朗普准备的一条“额外许诺”。“但由于美方过分的要求，特朗普浪费了一个可能再也不会有的机会。”

看来，特朗普在河内提出朝方难以接受的要求是金正恩没有料到的，因此感到自己被算计了。人们不仅要问，是金正恩原本就误读了美方的要价，还是特朗普最后时刻改变了主意？在笔者看来，两个因素都有。就特朗普的特点而言，两者之间是有关联的。特朗普很可能在前往河内之前对他与金正恩最终谈判拍板的要价做了调整。在抬高对手的期望之后再做最后的杀价是其惯用手法，而这又与他决策往往具有随意性的特点之间没有清晰的界线。这正是特朗普风格。

然而，风格、手法远不是事情的全部。特朗普希望与朝鲜做成这笔大交易的欲望是不容置疑的。他想借此得一个诺贝尔奖留名青史的企图已经是路人皆知。但事态的发展表明，朝核谈判事关重大，特朗普所要权衡的因素比这一年多来美国与众多国家开展的任何经贸谈判都复杂的多得多。朝核问题所涉及的军事战略、地区安全、大国外交等诸多重要领域的复杂问题，特朗普所知甚少，完全没有在经贸领域中那种自信。更重要的是，在此问题上，特朗普不但面临建制派朝野各方力量的强烈质疑和抵制，而且受到他政治上的同盟军、政府内外右翼保守派的暗中反对和制肘。与此同时，国内政治对特朗普在朝核问题上决策的牵制，与特朗普本人在国内政治地位的强弱有直接关系。

去年6月，特朗普在新加坡之所以自信地接受了金正恩的“缺乏实质内容”的许诺（因此而在国内受到各方指责），签订了共同宣言，正是因为他通过减税法案而在政治上气势如虹。然而，去年秋季中期选举共和党失去对众议院的控制，特朗普的政治地位一路下滑。在河内金特会举行的同时，华盛顿却在上演一场大爆特朗普“丑事”的国会听证。今非昔比，特朗普当下必须确保第二份美朝共同文件成为给他在外交和政治上加分的成果。对此，特朗普在会谈后举行的记者会上的话可以作为很好的注脚：“我今天本来百分之百是可以签署某项协议的，我们其实都准备好要签署的文件了，但就是还不合适。”“我们只是认为今天签署协议不太合适，我们本可以，但我只是觉得这不太合适。”

我们还记得，前些日子特朗普忽然令人意外地表示，他对朝鲜弃核的目标并不急于求成。现在看来，他是在为河内之行进行铺垫。这既是说给国内方面听的，也是给朝方发出的信息。或许，金正恩对新加坡的良好结局印象太深了，而忽略了当下特朗普的特殊政治需要对朝美这一轮叫价的影响。

（原载太和时评）

Though most observers of the US-DPRK dialogue doubted how productive the second Trump-Kim meeting would be, onlookers around the world expected that the Hanoi summit, held on February 27-28, would at least result in the signing of a new document based of the Singapore joint declaration. Many shook their heads in total disbelief when the summit ended with nothing achieved. One common question is: what happened and why? Answers to this question may help determine how much further the US-DPRK dialogue can go and if the Korean nuclear issue can be eventually resolved.

Travelling thousands of miles and under intense international spotlight, the two leaders came to Hanoi to cut a deal- sign a critical agreement to consolidate gains made thus far. Success would have depended on two points: Whether each leader came to the summit with a genuine desire to sign an agreement, and whether the two sides were able to compromise on core provisions tantamount to the negotiation process. The first point serves as a basis upon which the dialogue can be sustainable and move forward towards the ultimate solution of the Korean nuclear issue. The second point holds the key to achieving substantive outcome in negotiations aimed at urging the DPRK to take steps towards denuclearization. From information released so far, it seems that the direct cause of the failed summit was the lack of compromise on the DPRK taking further steps towards denuclearization in exchange for a US agreement to lift UN sanctions.

However, the two sides differ on the details of what caused the negotiations to collapse. Mr. Trump, at his press conference right after the talks, explained, “[The DPRK] wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety and we couldn't do that…They were willing to denuke a large portion of the areas that we wanted, but we couldn't give up all of the sanctions for that.”

The DPRK delegation left the meeting site quickly after the breakdown and gave a short press conference only around midnight of the 28th. Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho, in response to Trump's comments, pointed out explicitly that they had made a realistic proposal to dismantle all nuclear facilities at Yongbyon under the supervision of US and DPRK experts in exchange for a partial lift of sanctions. Ri stressed, “In detail, we proposed the United States lift five sanctions resolutions – which were adopted between 2016 and 2017 and impede the civilian economy and the livelihood of our people – among 11 UN sanctions resolutions all together.” Mr. Ri also mentioned that during the negotiations, the DPRK offered to discontinue any more nuclear or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests to allay US concerns. Yet, due to excessive demand by the US side, an opportunity that may never come again was wasted.

The versions offered by the two sides, though different, carry important meanings. Trump's version seems to suggest that the DPRK was to blame for making excessive demands. The DPRK version indicates that their offer was both reasonable and practical, suggesting that Trump caused the breakdown by upping the ante at the last moment. Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui said at the press conference, “I have a feeling that Chairman Kim may have lost the will” to negotiate with Trump.

Which side should we believe? In the view of this writer, the DPRK version is more credible. When assessing the protocol arrangements, the positive signals released since Kim's arrival in Hanoi demonstrate that the DPRK was expecting to sign a joint document with the US at this summit. They believed that based on its judgment of prior negotiations, both sides were adequately ready for this outcome. According to US and ROK media reports, the US and DPRK had finished drafting the “Hanoi Declaration”, leaving just a few details for the leaders to decide on at the summit, including the issue of dismantling the nuclear facility at another site. But because of US overreach, Trump lost an opportunity that he might not see again.

Apparently, Trump made a demand unacceptable to the DPRK, which was beyond Kim's expectation. Kim must have felt that he was taken for a ride. The question people hasten to ask is whether it was Kim that had misread the American position in the first place or whether it was Trump that had changed his mind at the last moment. In the view of this writer, the answer lies somewhere in between. Given Trump's well-known character, it is very possible that Trump increased his demands in negotiations with Kim on his way to Hanoi. After all, toughening one's position after raising his opponent's expectation for a deal is nothing new to Trump and the man's usual whimsical style of decision-making.

Styles and tactics aside, it is beyond any doubt that Trump wanted fervently to have his deal with the DPRK sealed and thus secure him a Nobel Peace Prize. Yet the Korean nuclear issue is no easy matter. History shows that factors challenging Trump's skills as a balancer are far more complex than any trade negotiations the US has entered in the past year. It is an issue that involves military strategy, regional security, major-country diplomacy and many other areas confronting the United States, areas that he has little knowledge of . Moreover, it's an issue that Trump must not only resist doubts from establishment Americans of all quarters but also fend off tacit opposition by his political allies. At the same time, being vulnerable to domestic politics, the president's ability to make decisions on the Korean nuclear issue is directly related to the wax and wane of his political standing at home.

In June last year, Trump displayed great confidence by accepting Kim's pledge that was “devoid of substance” in Singapore and signing the joint document with the DPRK, despite mounting criticisms at home. He was able to do that largely due to his high popularity in the wake of tax cuts legislations. Unfortunately, the midterm elections last fall deprived the Republicans of the control of the House and caused Trump's political standing to weaken considerably. While the Hanoi Summit was in full swing, Washington was focused on a congressional hearing regarding the President's downfall. The situation has changed entirely. Trump now must ensure that his second joint document with the DPRK will strengthen his hand both diplomatically and politically.

People may still remember that a few weeks ago Trump unexpectedly remarked that he was not in a hurry for DPRK denuclearization, which, in retrospect, can be interpreted to prepare the public for what may happen at the Hanoi Summit. Perhaps, Kim was too impressed about the outcome of the Singapore Summit to take note of Trump's special political needs and its potential impact on the US positioning at this summit.