南海仲裁案的仲裁结果，实质上否定台湾实际占领的南沙群岛最大岛屿太平岛作为“岛”的性质，降格为“岩礁”，对台湾造成很大冲击。台湾“外交部”部长李大维认为：仲裁法院针对南海的判决是先前预判中“最糟糕的情况”，其结果将台湾置于政治困境。

岛内不仅对仲裁结果中称台湾为“中国台湾当局”（Taiwan Authority of China）相当不满，认为贬抑了台湾“主权国家地位”；也对“九段线”被裁定无效使台湾“U型线”主张受影响表示不满。太平岛不在菲律宾要求仲裁范围内，仲裁庭却自行扩权宣告包括太平岛在内的南沙群岛全部为“岩礁”，使得台湾没有了主张太平岛附近200海里专属经济区的权利。岛内各界认为，尽管台湾既非《联合国海洋法公约》缔约方，又非仲裁参与方，完全可不接受仲裁结果，但这份裁决严重损害了台湾的法律地位及相关海域权利，造成深远的实质性伤害。

民进党当局在针对仲裁结果发表官方声明与立场主张后，采取尽量低调的“冷处理”做法。蔡英文登舰发表演讲，但并未随舰巡航，尺度拿捏相当微妙，背后折射出蔡当局面临来自各个面向的多重压力：首先，前任领导人不分蓝绿，皆坚持对太平岛的主权。陈水扁离任前登太平岛主持机场启用典礼，宣示维护海疆与领土的完整决心。马英九更是费劲心力，举办“南疆史料特展”，多次以法学专家身份“现身说法”阐明在南海U形线的一切权利，邀请国际学者及媒体记者登岛，见证太平岛具备《国际海洋法公约》关于“岛屿”必须具备“维持人类生存与自身经济生活”的条件。上述前任领导人的作为都给蔡英文以压力。

第二重压力来自岛内民众。蔡英文在520就职典礼上宣誓依照“宪法”当选，有责任捍卫“中华民国”的“主权”和“领土”，对东海及南海问题，主张搁置争议，共同开发。但现在一纸裁决令民众觉得常识受到挑战，权益受到损害。太平岛周围200海里专属经济区是台湾渔民的传统渔场。仲裁结果影响台渔民原有的作业权益，增加了菲律宾、越南等邻近国家干扰或强行扣押台湾渔船的风险。“全国渔会”对蔡当局施压，要求其积极维护“国家”与渔民既有权益。

再者是来自美国的压力。一直以来，美国希望台湾在南海问题上不与中国大陆联手并保持低调，服从美国在亚太的战略安排。仲裁事件印证了台湾作为美国一颗战略棋子的现实。蔡英文多次表态在安全上站在美日“价值同盟”一边，南海议题上与美保持一致，“尊重国际法及海洋公约”。但无论是马英九力证太平岛“是岛非礁”，还是蔡英文的表态，都对美无实质性触动，因美国在亚太有自身利益与战略安排。

从蔡当局在仲裁结果公布前仍不断提“尊重国际法及海洋法公约”，事后断不承认仲裁决定的回应，可见其或是盲目乐观，或是资讯不畅，亦可能是硬吞苦果。综上所述判断，最后一种可能性更大。此次仲裁结果在法律上将南海岛礁全数判定为礁的“斩草除根”做法，不仅暴露出“价值同盟”的空洞与虚伪，也折射出美国在推动其亚太战略时完全无视台湾的利益,全然出于美在南海域内的利益考量。

危机中也并非生机全无。蔡英文如想在“后仲裁时期”将台湾从南海困境中解套，还需正视问题根源，借鉴前人智慧，寻找真正出路。为此，蔡应改变其南海论述模糊而消极的立场。

蔡英文政府南海政策的核心问题在于：台湾的“U形线”主张包括对太平岛的“主权”源于“先占先得”的历史性权利。但蔡政府出于“台独”理念及现实政治，不愿台在太平岛权利上与中国历史挂钩，欲与中国大陆切割，因而片面强调《联合国海洋法公约》，避谈历史性权利。这种矛盾的思维与避重就轻政策造成的结果，便是被其他国家利用。此次仲裁证明了蔡南海政策路径的失败。

南海仲裁案结果已公布于世，但后续效应尚未全部显现。台湾地位特殊，角色微妙，蔡英文政府尽管处于政治困境之中，但也非全无出路：第一，以清晰而积极立场制定南海政策，保护渔民利益，并效仿其前任作出主权宣誓。第二，放弃对美日所谓“价值同盟”的幻想，重新审视自身在南海问题上的角色。第三，放开心胸与眼界，看到中华民族的历史、现况与未来，将中国历史、台湾前途及太平岛权利完全挂钩。

The arbitral tribunal's ruling from The Hague has denied the status of Taiping Island, which has been under Taiwan's effective control, as an “island”, and reduced it into “rocks”, dealing a heavy blow to Taiwan. Taiwan “Foreign Minister” David Lee pointed out: What the arbitral panel had come up with is “the worst scenario” anticipated, which has put Taiwan in a political dilemma.

Public opinion in the island is dissatisfied not only with the ruling's addressing Taiwan as “Taiwan Authority of China”, believing it has demeaned Taiwan's “status as sovereign state”; but also with its influence on Taiwan's claims by announcing the “U-shaped line” invalid.Taiping Island is not within the scope of the Philippine-initiated arbitration. The arbitral tribunal, however, spontaneously expanded its authority and declared that the Nansha Islands, including Taiping Island, are rocks or reefs, depriving Taiwan's right to claim 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone for the island. There is a prevailing consensus in Taiwan that since it is neither a signatory to the UNCLOS, nor a party in the arbitration, it can completely ignore the ruling, but the decision has seriously damaged Taiwan's legal standing, and its rights in corresponding waters, resulting in lasting substantive harm.

The Democratic Progressive Party authorities, after issuing an official statement on the ruling clarifying Taiwan's official stance, have resorted to a very low-profile approach to the matter. Tsai Ing-wen boarded the military ship that was to be dispatched to Taiping Island, yet didn't join the patrol. The delicate approach revealed that the Tsai administration is under pressures from various sources. First, former leaders of the island, no matter their political camps, all asserted sovereignty over Taiping Island. Chen Shui-bien presided over the inaugural ceremony for Taiping Island's airport, demonstrating the resolve to safeguard the integrity of maritime and territorial sovereignty; Ma Ying-jeou has done everything possible in that regard: He organized an exhibition of historical materials regarding the South China Sea; on multiple occasions personally expounded Chinese rights and interests within the “U-shaped line” in the capacity of an expert in international law; and invited international scholars and media representatives to Taiping Island to prove the island is fully qualified as an “island” as the UNCLOS defines, for it satisfies the condition of having the conditions to sustain human subsistence and its own economic life. Such deeds by former leaders have all mounted pressures on Tsai.

The second layer of pressure comes from the local public. Tsai claimed in her inaugural speech on May 20 that, having been elected in accordance with the island's “constitution”, she has an obligation to safeguard the “sovereignty” and “territory” of the “Republic of China”, and stated that the East and South China Sea issues should be handled under the principle of shelving disputes and engaging in joint development. But the ruling makes people feel their common sense has been challenged, and rights and interests damaged. The 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone surrounding Taiping Island has been a traditional fishery for Taiwan's fishermen. The ruling has compromised the existing rights and interests of local fishermen, and increased the risk that such neighboring countries as Vietnam and the Philippines could harass or forcefully seize fishing vessels from Taiwan. The “National Fishing Association” has pressed the Tsai administration to actively safeguard current rights and interests of the “country” and its fishermen.

Then there is the pressure from the United States. The US has always hoped that Taiwan would not join hands with the mainland on the South China Sea issue, instead keep a low profile, and abide by its strategic arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. The arbitration confirmed the reality that Taiwan is a chess piece on the US' strategic chessboard. Tsai Ing-wen has vowed on multiple occasions that security-wise, Taiwan would be on the same side with the US-Japan “values alliance”, keeping pace with the US on the South China Sea issue, and “respecting international law and the UNCLOS”. Neither Ma's utmost efforts to prove Taiping Island's status as an island, nor Tsai's assurances, however, have made any difference to the US, because the latter has its own self-interests and strategic arrangements.

Judging from the Tsai authorities' constant vows to “respect international law and the UNCLOS” prior to the ruling, and from its repeated statements on not accepting the arbitration afterward, they have either been blindly optimistic, ill-informed, or grudgingly swallowing a bitter fruit. Most likely is the third possibility. That the ruling legally defined all islands and features in the South China Sea as “rocks” not only exposed the void and hypocrisy of the “values alliance”, but also demonstrated that the US is in complete disregard of Taiwan's interests while carrying out its own Asia-Pacific strategy, concentrating solely on those of its own in the South China Sea.

But that doesn't mean this is an all-crisis, no-opportunity scenario. If Tsai wants to lift Taiwan out from the South China Sea dilemma in the wake of the arbitration, Tsai needs to face the root causes of the problem, borrow wisdom from predecessors, and find a viable way out. For that, Tsai should change her ambiguous and passive stance regarding the South China Sea issue.

The central problem in the Tsai administration's South China Sea policy is that Taiwan's “U-shaped line”, including its “sovereignty” claim for Taiping Island derived from historical rights arising from “first possession”. But based on its pro-independence philosophy and current political reality, the Tsai administration is not willing to associate Taiwan's rights to Taiping Island with China's historical rights. Out of its desire to split from the mainland, it has one-sidedly emphasized the UNCLOS, while avoiding any mention of historical rights. Such self-contradictory thinking and policies have rendered Taiwan a political instrument for other countries. The arbitration has declared the failure of Tsai's South China Sea policy.

Though the ruling has been published, its impacts are yet to fully present themselves. Given Taiwan's peculiar status and its delicate role, although the Tsai administration is trapped in a political dilemma, it does have ways out: First, come up with a South China Sea policy with a clear and proactive position, protect fishermen's interests, and make sovereignty claims like her predecessors. Second, give up unrealistic expectations on the US-Japan “values alliance”, reconsider its role in the South China Sea issue. Third, with an open mind and strategic insight, look at the history, present, and future of the Chinese nation, link Chinese history up with Taiwan's future, and corresponding rights to Taiping Island.