近期，美国国务卿布林肯访华。这是中美落实两国元首旧金山会晤共识的重要举措，有助于双方保持对话、管控分歧、加强国际事务协调。今年4月2日，拜登总统同习近平主席通话时表示，希望安排布林肯国务卿访华。由此可见，在美国大选年的背景下，拜登政府在加大对华外交接触方面展现出很强的主动性。俄乌冲突、巴以冲突的延宕，对拜登选情的影响日益加大。尤其是，美国国内多所大学爆发的支持巴勒斯坦的抗议行动，加剧了民主党精英的焦虑，美国青年选民和少数族裔群体对拜登的支持率料将下降。

在上述背景下，确保中美关系不出现“战略意外”变得至关重要。布林肯访华期间表示，美中关系是世界上最重要的双边关系，负责任地管理两国关系是美中双方的共同责任。美方不寻求改变中国体制，无意同中国发生冲突，不寻求同中国脱钩，不寻求遏制中国发展，一个发展、成功的中国对世界是好事。中美同意保持高层交往和各层级接触，继续发挥外交、经济、金融、商务等领域磋商机制作用，进一步推进中美禁毒、气变、人工智能合作，进一步推进中美禁毒、气变、人工智能合作。

保持中美关系稳定，离不开妥善处理台海、南海等问题，需要加强对中美互动的全过程管理。5月下旬，赖清德将正式就任台湾地区领导人。赖清德的“台独”倾向昭然若揭，他在就职后会否通过挑衅性言行制造危机，备受关注。布林肯表示，美方继续奉行一个中国政策，不支持“台独”。然而，从美国深化与台湾地区政治、军事关系的实际行动看，美国的“一个中国政策”与大陆的“一个中国原则”之间的差距似在加大。中方对布林肯明确表示，台湾问题是中美关系第一条不可逾越的红线。中方要求美方不折不扣恪守一个中国原则和中美三个联合公报，不得以任何方式向“台独”分裂势力发出错误信号。

此外，美国在南海方向的负面言行也在增多，可谓文武兼备、多管齐下。一方面，美国试图进一步提升“南海仲裁裁决”的国际法理地位，为菲律宾小马科斯政府在黄岩岛、铁线礁的侵权挑衅撑腰打气。另一方面，美国不仅加快自身在菲律宾境内基地部署军事力量，还通过打造美国、日本、菲律宾三边联盟以及美日菲澳四边机制等方式，强化“武力护菲”的准备，推进多国舰机联合巡航等一系列对华示强行动。

值得警惕的是，布林肯访华主要谈及的三个议题，也显示出美国大选年因素对中美关系的不利影响。一是所谓中国支持俄罗斯的军事工业问题。拜登政府试图将中国塑造为影响乌克兰危机走向的关键因素。对此，中方强调，美方需要切实反思自身在乌克兰危机中应当承担的责任。乌克兰问题不是中美之间的问题，美方也不要把它变成中美之间的问题。

二是所谓中国干预美国大选问题。这是近年来美国政界人士渲染炒作的新话题，借以指责中国对美国实施“锐实力”行动，破坏美国的民主体制。对于中国而言，无论拜登还是特朗普上台，都不会改变对华施压的大方向。换言之，这就好比是“两碗毒药”，中国何须费力“干预”选举。民主党将希拉里·克林顿在2016年大选中败给特朗普，归咎于俄罗斯的干预。今年如果拜登败选，恐怕要把这顶帽子扣到中国头上。

三是所谓中国产能过剩问题。经济和就业是美国大选的核心议题。美国大选的赢家不是依赖普选票，而是“得摇摆州者得白宫”，其关键在于获得摇摆州蓝领工人的支持。不久前美国财长耶伦访华时大谈产能过剩问题，此番布林肯来华继续就此施压。这表明拜登政府试图在大选年加大对美国本土产业的保护力度，以讨好蓝领工人，赢得中西部工业地带摇摆州的支持，避免在贸易问题上被特朗普攻击。

总之，虽然中美关系在去年11月两国元首旧金山峰会后出现一定的企稳迹象，但却具有不容忽视的脆弱性。到今年下半年美国选战正式开打后，两党候选人打“中国牌”的做法或会更为突出。布林肯访华集中展现了拜登政府在处理中美关系问题上既想稳定、又要示强的矛盾心态，这对中国运筹对美战略而言构成复杂挑战。

（2024年5月经北京大学国际战略研究院项目组审核）

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's recent visit to China was an important interaction as the two nations seek to implement the consensus reached by their presidents in San Francisco. It was also important for maintaining dialogue, managing differences and enhancing coordination on international affairs.

In the context of the upcoming U.S. presidential election, the American administration has demonstrated a proactive approach to increase diplomatic engagement. In a phone call with President Xi Jinping in early April, for example, President Joe Biden expressed hope of arranging a Blinken visit. Additionally, the persistent Russia-Ukraine conflict and Palestinian-Israel conflict are having an increasing impact on Biden's reelection chances. In particular, pro-Palestinian protests at many universities in the United States have created a sense of anxiety among Democratic Party elites, potentially leading to a decline in support for Biden among young voters and ethnic minority groups.

In this context, it is crucial to prevent strategic surprises in China-U.S. relations. During his visit to China, Blinken emphasized that the U.S.-China relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, and that it is the two countries' common responsibility to manage it responsibly. The United States does not seek to change China's system, has no intention of sparking conflict with China and does not seek to decouple from China or hold back China's development. A developing and successful China is a good thing for the world, he added.

During his visit, China and the United States agreed to maintain high-level exchanges and engagement at all levels; harness consultation mechanisms in the fields of diplomacy, economy, finance and commerce; and promote cooperation on drug control, climate change and artificial intelligence.

The stability of relations also depends on the proper handling of issues regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea and good management of bilateral interactions on all fronts. In late May, Lai Ching-te will officially take office as the leader of Taiwan. Given his clear proclivity toward Taiwan independence, the question whether he will create a crisis through provocative statements and actions after taking office has attracted much attention. Blinken reiterated Washington's commitment to the “one China” policy and its opposition to Taiwan independence.

However, Washington's moves to deepen political and military relations with Taiwan indicate a widening gap between its “one China” policy and the Chinese mainland's “one-China principle.” China has emphatically told Blinken that the Taiwan question is the most important red line that must not be crossed. It has urged Washington to adhere to the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. joint communiques to the letter, to avoid sending any inappropriate signals to separatists in Taiwan.

On the South China Sea issue, the United States has adopted a multipronged approach marked by growing negative words and deeds. For one thing, it seeks to enhance the legitimacy of the South China Sea arbitration and lends support to the Philippines' infringement and provocative actions around Scarborough Shoal and Sandy Cay. For another, the U.S. has accelerated the deployment of military forces to bases in the Philippines and strengthened its readiness to defend the islands with force by building a trilateral alliance with Japan and the Philippines, as well as a quadrilateral mechanism with Japan, the Philippines and Australia. In addition, in a show of force, it conducted a joint patrol involving multinational warships and aircraft in the South China Sea.

Blinken's discussions in China demonstrated the adverse impact of the U.S. presidential election on bilateral relations, notably addressing three issues:

First is China's support for Russia's military industry. The Biden administration portrays China as a key factor in the course of the Ukraine crisis. In this regard, China emphasizes the need for the United States to reflect on its own responsibilities regarding the crisis. The Ukrainian issue is not one involving China and the United States, and so the U.S. should refrain from framing it as such.

Second is Chinese interference in the U.S. election. In recent years, American politicians have been hyping this issue, accusing China of carrying out sharp actions against the United States, thereby undermining its democratic system.

For the Chinese, Washington is bound to place pressure on China no matter which American political party comes to power. In other words, why should China bother to interfere in the election if the end result is the same? Democrats blamed Russian interference for Hillary Clinton's 2016 loss to Donald Trump. Similarly, they might attribute a Biden loss in this year's election to Chinese interference.

Third is alleged overcapacity in China. Economic development and employment are central issues in the U.S. election. Since the final outcome of the election does not rely on the popular vote, and the candidates who wins a small majority in key swing states can capture the White House, the key lies in gaining the support of blue-collar workers in those states.

Not long ago, Treasury Secretary Yellen highlighted the problem of overcapacity during her visit to China, and now Blinken continues to apply pressure on China over this issue. These developments show that the Biden administration is trying to protect domestic industries so that the Democratic candidate can boost his appeal among blue-collar workers, secure the support of swing states in the industrial belt of the Midwest and avoid attacks from Trump on trade issues.

In conclusion, China-U.S. relations have shown some signs of stabilization following the San Francisco summit between the presidents in November. However, some vulnerabilities cannot be ignored. When the U.S. election kicks off in earnest in the second half of this year, candidates from both parties may be more inclined to play the China card. Blinken's visit epitomizes the ambivalence of the Biden administration, which seeks to stabilize its relations with China but also wants to flex its muscles. This poses a complex challenge for China's strategy toward the United States.