美国和菲律宾在华盛顿特区举行了最近七年来的首次“2+2”部长级对话。在此次备受关注的会议期间，美国国防部长劳埃德·J·奥斯汀三世和国务卿安东尼·布林肯，与菲律宾代理国防部长卡利托·加尔维斯和外交部长恩里克·马纳洛进行了广泛讨论，以开启战略合作新时代。

与此同时，这两个盟国进行了有史以来最大规模的联合军演。今年的“肩并肩”演习多达17,000 名两国士兵，还有来自澳大利亚和日本的数百名士兵——这两个国家是美菲年度军演的观察员国。菲律宾正式宣布根据《加强防务合作协议》(EDCA) 向美军开放四个新基地后不久，出现了两项重大事件，即“2+2 ”对话和历史性的联合军演。

新开放基地的位置和类型很能说明问题。其中一个位于巴拉望省的巴拉巴克岛，靠近存在争议的南沙群岛；其它三个位于菲律宾北部，分别是卡加延省圣安娜的卡米洛·奥西亚斯海军基地、伊莎贝拉省加穆镇的梅尔乔·德拉·科鲁兹营地，以及和卡加延省的拉洛机场——它离台湾南部海岸不太远。菲律宾总统小费迪南德·马科斯坚称，这些基地不会用于进攻目的，尤其是在中美因台湾问题发生冲突的情况下。

然而，许多人仍然不相信，担心对美国的依赖和该地区出现不必要的地缘政治挑衅。菲律宾参议院外交事务委员会主席、小马科斯的姐姐艾米·马科斯，前总统杜特尔特，以及一个由省长、商业团体和进步民间社会组织组成的广泛联盟，都公开质疑 EDCA和深化菲美安全合作的合理性。事实上，由于卡加延省将出现多个 EDCA 基地，该省省长公开呼吁选民集会反对和抵制这一安全协议。

麻烦的联盟

菲美同盟历史悠久，可以追溯到20世纪初美国对这个东南亚国家的占领。二战结束后，菲律宾立即获得独立，但在冷战时期的大部分时间里，它事实上仍然是接受美国保护的国家。不仅历届菲律宾总统将国家外部安全外包给华盛顿，而且在北部吕宋岛的苏比克湾海军基地和克拉克空军基地，这个东南亚国家还设立了美国最大的海外基地。

然而，冷战结束，为重启这一严重不平衡的联盟关系提供了独特机会，尤其是在 90 年代初期美国的永久军事基地撤离之后。1995 年，因美济礁危机，马尼拉与北京陷入外交危机。之后，菲律宾开始根据《访问部队协议》(VFA) 邀请美国军队重归菲律宾。二十年后，南海的另一场危机，即 2012 年中菲在黄岩岛长达数月的对峙，促使菲律宾与美国谈判签订一份新的防御协定。

2014年，经过六轮以上的谈判，双方签署了 EDCA，距离时任美国总统奥巴马抵达马尼拉进行正式访问仅有数小时的时间。新的安全协定允许美国军队享有非永久性地“轮流”进入预先指定的菲律宾基地的权利。EDCA 的序言指出，双方“同意美国不在菲律宾境内保持永久性驻军或设立永久性军事基地”，并且“美国在受到菲方邀请且完全遵守菲律宾宪法和法律的前提下，获得进入和使用菲律宾军事设施和地区的所有权利。”

尽管如此，EDCA 赋予了五角大楼一系列特权，特别是美军可以进行“安全合作演习；联合军事培训活动；人道主义援助和救灾活动；以及双方商定的其他活动。” 五角大楼还保留对任何预置武器系统和关键基础设施的控制权，包括“不受阻碍地随时移除预置物资的权利”。此外，美国无需支付“租金或类似费用”，即可使用纳入EDCA 的军事设施，而马尼拉帮助承担美国军队在本国通行的费用。

作为交换，美国承诺通过帮助填补“短期能力差距，促进长期现代化，并协助维护和发展海上安全、海领感知，以及人道主义援助和救灾能力” ，从而推动菲律宾武装部队的现代化。然而，EDCA 在未来八年面临着两大挑战。首先，它的合法性受到菲律宾最高法院质疑，最终裁定该协定符合限制美国在该国建立“永久性”基地的措施。

更尖锐的挑战，来自前总统杜特尔特。由于和美国在人权和民主问题上的分歧越来越严重，他曾多次威胁结束菲美联盟。至关重要的是，这位前总统还优先考虑和中国和俄罗斯建立更紧密的战略关系，将西方排除在外。

阻止联盟升级

“如果你们美国人生我的气，我也会生你们的气。”美国批评其国内政策之后，杜特尔特上任几个月后做出这样的表态。 “现在最好三思而后行，因为我可能要求你们彻底撤出菲律宾”，并威胁拒绝批准任何“允许[美国人]在菲律宾进行军事演习的签名”。

随后几年，他抵制美国根据EDCA 在指定基地部署武器系统的计划，其中一些基地靠近黄岩岛（巴萨空军基地）和南沙群岛（包蒂斯塔空军基地）。

对于中国，小马科斯主要采用杜特尔特式的言辞，公开欢迎建立更紧密的战略关系。但在最近几个月，他稳步转向传统盟友。这位新任菲律宾总统不仅全面实施EDCA，而且还为其内容扩充大开绿灯，将几个靠近台湾和南海的基地纳入其中。

在他的领导下，两国在今年年初进行了规模最大的军事演习，并在 4 月份举行了有史以来最大规模的“肩并肩”军事演习。两次演习都出现了最先进的美国武器，包括“爱国者”导弹系统，以及模拟与邻近海域对手的战争。在华盛顿举行的“2+2”部长级会议旨在巩固战略合作，共同提升美菲同盟关系。

但是，双边安全合作的速度和范围让许多菲律宾人感到不安，包括小马科斯最亲密的亲属和盟友。今年早些时候，参议员艾米·马科斯抨击 EDCA，说：“我们和台湾发生冲突的意义是什么？”，同时指出这份安全协议的新基地的位置“表明, 在不久的将来,这是[任何因为台湾爆发的战争]的第一条战线”。她的兄弟小马科斯则坚持认为，“我们不会允许基地用于任何进攻行动。这只是在菲律宾需要帮助的时候帮助菲律宾。”很多人并不买账。

在总统姐姐公开批评的鼓舞下，反对 EDCA 、反对美菲安全合作新时代的联盟出现了。一方面，进步的立法者批评小马科斯要么自己“受到误导”，要么在误导公众。

众议院少数党副领袖法兰西·卡斯特罗抱怨说：“对于EDCA 的真实文本内容，总统似乎受到了误导，或者他在误导菲律宾人民。” 同时，“还必须指出，EDCA 并不禁止在菲律宾或者国外的秘密与公开军事行动里使用这些预置武器。”她说，强调了菲律宾被拖入中美冲突的风险。

这些评论发出的前几周，前总统杜特尔特在接受采访时发出警告, 称EDCA 将使菲律宾成为“[美国武器]的平台”，“使菲律宾容易受到”亚洲任何潜在大国冲突的影响。“这将是来自南海或者任何面向菲律宾的陆地基地的导弹。导弹将如雨点般落在我们身上。如果由我来决定，我宁愿不[推进 EDCA]。”他说。

然而，最激烈的反对来自当地官员，尤其是卡加延省省长曼努埃尔·曼巴。他重视与中国的良好关系和来自中国的投资，明确表示：“我个人反对这一点，我不同意 [EDCA] 。对我来说，这不利于我们各省和卡加延省人民的利益。” 因此，他呼吁 举行集会，反对在他的家乡建设新的 EDCA 基地。

目前，尚不清楚小马科斯近期内是否会重新考虑他最新的战略举措。但国内的反对声音日益高涨，可能会在未来几年重塑菲美联盟的方向。

For the first time in seven years, the United States and the Philippines conducted their first 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in Washington, DC. During the high-profile meeting, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Secretary of State Antony Blinken held extensive discussions with their Filipino counterparts, namely the Acting Secretary of National Defense Carlito Galvez, and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo, to usher in a new era of strategic cooperation.

At the same time, the two allies also conducted their largest-ever joint wargames. This year's Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder) exercises featured as many as 17,000 troops from both sides, as well as several hundred troops from Australia and Japan, which are observer nations in the annual wargames. The two major developments, namely the 2+2 dialogue and the historic wargames, came shortly after the Philippines officially announced the opening of four additional bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) to US troops.

The location and type of the new facilities is quite telling. One is Balabac Island in Palawan, which is close to the disputed Spratly group of islands, while three are in the northern portions of the Philippines, namely Naval Base Camilo Osias in Santa Ana, Cagayan; Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Gamu, Isabela; and Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan, which also happen to be not too far from Taiwan's southern shores. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has insisted that those bases won't be used for offensive purposes, particularly in an event of Sino-American conflict over neighboring Taiwan.

Many, however, remain unconvinced, fearing dependence on America and unwanted geopolitical provocation in the region. No less than presidential sister Maria Imelda “Imee” Marcos, who heads the foreign affairs committee at the Philippine Senate, as well as former President Rodrigo Duterte and a broad coalition of governors, business groups, and progressive civil society organizations are openly questioning the EDCA deal and the wisdom of deepening Philippine-U.S. security cooperation. In fact, the governor of Cagayan province, which is set to host multiple EDCA sites, is publicly calling on his constituency to rally against and resist the security pact.

A Troubled Alliance

The Philippine-U.S. alliance has a deep history, dating back to America's occupation of the Southeast Asian nation at the dawn of the 20th century. Despite gaining its independence right after the end of World War II, the Philippines remained a de facto U.S. protectorate throughout much of the Cold War period. Not only did successive Filipino presidents effectively outsource their external security prerogatives to Washington, but the Southeast Asian nation also hosted the largest overseas U.S. bases in the Subic naval facility and Clark airbase in the northern island of Luzon.

The end of the Cold War, however, provided a unique opportunity to reset the heavily-lopsided alliance, especially after the departure of permanent U.S. bases in the early-1990s. Following the 1995 Mischief Reef crisis, which triggered a diplomatic crisis between Manila and Beijing, the Philippines began inviting American troops back under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Two decades later, another crisis in the South China Sea, namely the months-long standoff over Scarborough Shoal in 2012, pushed the Philippines to negotiate a new defense pact with the US.

After more than half-a-dozen rounds of negotiations, the two sides signed the EDCA in 2014, just hours before then-U.S. President Barack Obama landed in Manila for an official visit. The new security pact allows American troops to enjoy non-permanent “rotational” access to pre-designated Philippine bases. As the Preamble to the EDCA points out, both sides “share an understanding for the United States not to establish a permanent military presence or base in the territory of the Philippines” and that “all United States access to and use of facilities and areas will be at the invitation of the Philippines and with full respect for the Philippines Constitution and Philippine laws.”

Nevertheless, the EDCA pact gave the Pentagon extensive prerogative, specifically that U.S. troops may undertake “security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities; and such other activities as may be agreed upon by the Parties.” The Pentagon also retains control over the dispositor of any prepositioned weapons systems and critical infrastructure, including “the unencumbered right to remove prepositioned materiel at any time.” Moreover, the facilities under EDCA will be available without “rental or similar costs,” with Manila helping shoulder the costs of facilitating the transit of American troops throughout the country.

In exchange, the U.S. promised to aid the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) by helping plug in “short-term capabilities gaps, promoting long-term modernization, and assisting with the maintenance and development of additional maritime security, maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities.” Over the next eight years, however, the EDCA faced two major challenges. First, its legality was questioned at the Philippine Supreme Court, which eventually ruled the pact as consistent with restrictions against 'permanent' U.S. bases establishment in the country.

A more strident challenge came from former President Rodrigo Duterte, who repeatedly threatened to end the Philippine-U.S. alliance amid growing disagreements over human rights and democracy issues. Crucially, the former president also prioritized warmer strategic ties with China and Russia to the exclusion of the West.

Resistance to Alliance Upgrade

“If you Americans are angry with me, then I am also angry with you,” he declared just months into office amid US criticism of his domestic policies. “Better think twice now because I would be asking you to leave the Philippines altogether,” threatening to withhold approval of any “signature bearing the permit [for Americans] to conduct war games” in the Philippines.

Over the succeeding years, he also resisted U.S. plans under EDCA to preposition weapons systems in pre-designated bases, a number of which are close to the Scarborough Shoal (Basa Airbase) and Spratly group of islands (Bautista Airbase).

Although largely adopting a Duterte-style rhetoric towards China, openly welcoming warmer strategic ties, Marcos Jr. has steadily pivoted back to traditional allies in recent months. Not only is the new Filipino president fully implementing EDCA, but he has also greenlighted its expansion to include several bases close to Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Under his watch, the two countries have conducted their largest army exercises earlier this year as well as their largest ever wargames under Balikatan in April. Both exercises have featured state-of-the-art American weaponries, including patriot missile systems, as well as simulation of potential war with adversaries in adjacent waters. The 2+2 ministerial meeting in Washington DC was meant to consolidate the new momentum in strategic cooperation and upgrade the U.S.-Philippine alliance altogether.

But the speed and breadth of bilateral security cooperation has troubled many in the Philippines, including Marcos Jr.'s closest kin and allies. Earlier this year, Senator Imee Marcos lambasted the EDCA deal by arguing, “What is our fight with Taiwan?”, pointing out how the location of new bases under the security pact “indicates that this is the first line in [any potential war over] Taiwan” in the near future. Her brother has insisted that “[w]e will not allow our bases to be used for any offensive action. This is only to help the Philippines when the Philippines needs help,” but many don't buy it.

Emboldened by the presidential sister's public criticism, a whole coalition has emerged against EDCA and a new era of security cooperation with the U.S. On one hand, progressive legislators have criticized Marcos Jr. for either being “misinformed” or even misleading the public.

“It seems that the President was misinformed on the true text of EDCA, or he is misleading the Filipino people,” complained House Deputy Minority Leader France Castro. “It must also be noted that the EDCA does not prohibit the use of these prepositioned armaments in covert or overt military operations in the Philippines or abroad,” she added, underscoring the risk of the Philippines getting dragged into a Sino-American conflict.

The comments came just weeks after former president Duterte warned, in an interview, how the EDCA would make the Philippines “a platform for [American weapons]” and this would “make the Philippines vulnerable” to any potential major power conflict in Asia. “It's going to be missiles coming in from the South China Sea or wherever from the land base facing the Philippines. Missiles will rain upon us. If it were up to me, I would have rather not [pressed ahead with the EDCA decision],” he added.

The most passionate opposition, however, is coming from officials on the ground, most especially Cagayan province governor Manuel Mamba, who values good ties with and investments from China and has made it clear: “I personally oppose this and I disagree with [EDCA]. For me, it is inimical to the interest of our provinces and the Cagayanons.” Accordingly, he has called on his people to stage rallies against the new EDCA sites to be built in his home province.

It's not clear whether Marcos Jr. will reconsider his latest strategic gambit anytime soon. But there is growing domestic opposition, which could reshape the direction of Philippine-U.S. alliance in the coming years.