从2017年“印太”愿景提出到2018年“印太战略”出台，再到军事、政治、经济、外交、科技等多层面的政策实践，美国“印太战略”在认知层面、政策层面以及战略层面取得了显著进展。

第一，美国“印太战略”的提出与推进不仅提升了国内对“印太”地区重要性的认识，还在国际层面促进了各主要国家（或国家集团）对“印太”地区的关注与政策跟进。一方面，美国战略界对“印太”地区重要性的认识明显提升，共和、民主两党在推进“印太战略”上形成高度一致。这种共识增强了美国推进该战略的意志、决心，有助于保持该战略推进的稳定性与持续性。另一方面，美国“印太战略”的推进还有效提升了国际社会对“印太”地区的关注。美国不是第一个使用“印太”概念的国家，也不是最早从政策层面关注“印太”地区的国家，但“印太”概念在国际层面的推广以及“印太”地区被国际社会所广泛关注，则与美国高调提出“印太战略”有直接关系。随着美国“印太战略”的逐步清晰与稳步推进，域内国家或地区组织纷纷提出各自关于“印太”地区的战略或构想。与之相对应，域外国家的关注度甚至更高，在政策层面更为高调，法国、德国、欧盟、加拿大等出台了各自的“印太”战略。一时间，“印太”地区不仅成为美国战略重心转移的方向，甚至成为世界主要战略力量集聚的中心。域内外国家或国家集团对“印太”地区的关注也在一定程度上配合或策应了美国的“印太战略”推进。

第二，美国“印太战略”的总体政策架构已经形成，并不断得以充实完善。这主要体现在“印太战略”具有清晰的战略目标、明确的战略针对对象、相对均衡的政策体系。特朗普政府基本构建了美国“印太战略”的“全政府、全社会、全领域”政策构架，拜登政府全盘吸收这一政策框架并进一步加以完善，最主要体现在政策系统性与平衡性得到明显加强：从政策上看，美国在保持对“印太”地区安全层面的战略投资与高调介入的同时，更加重视在其他领域的政策设计与实施，尤其是推出“印太经济框架”，搭建了推进“印太战略”的经济平台；从议题领域来看，美国不仅加强对传统安全领域的关注，还将气候变化、灾难救援、疫情防控等非传统安全领域问题纳入“印太战略”，一定程度上回应了部分域内国家的关切；从执政理念上看，拜登政府修正了特朗普政府的“美国第一”原则，重拾传统的多边主义路线，修复并发展了同盟与伙伴关系，如升级“美日印澳”四边对话机制、构建“美英澳三边安全伙伴关系”，重振了美国在国际组织与多边平台的主导权。

第三，美国“印太战略”对中国构成较大挑战。美国将中国界定为对其构成全方位挑战的战略竞争者，美国国防部则称中国为“步步紧逼的挑战”（pacing challenge）。这意味着相对收益已成为美国对华政策的首要考量因素，其结果是美国更难与中国合作，更倾向于迟滞、阻遏中国的发展。在此背景下，美国“印太战略”就是要通过地理上的抵近对中国形成直接压力，并通过塑造地区环境对中国的发展施加间接压力，最终目标显然是为其“竞赢中国”这一大战略服务。毫无疑问，美国“印太战略”对中国主权、安全利益造成了相当程度的压力（台湾问题是最集中、最明显的表现），给中国的发展环境带来更多复杂性与不确定性，同时迫使中国将更多精力与资源集中于亚太地区，从而在一定程度上减轻了美国在全球层面面对的中国竞争压力。从中美战略竞争角度说，美国“印太战略”一定程度上发挥了制衡中国发展战略与进程的功能。

但美国“印太战略”也存在诸多制约因素，最突出的体现是定位有严重缺陷。从本质上来说，美国“印太战略”是在把中国作为主要竞争对手这一前提下所确定的霸权护持战略，然而中国并没有所谓的“霸权战略”。中国政府屡次强调中国既不扩张也不谋求势力范围，更不会寻求所谓的霸权地位，因而不存在与美国争夺霸权的问题。实际上，国际关系民主化、法治化、合理化是当今国际社会的共同期待，也是发展趋势。“印太战略”作为一种霸权护持战略，其所寻求的是“一家独大”的优势地位，奉行的是“你赢我输”的零和思维，采取的是小圈子、小集团式的阵营对抗和“脱钩断链”、“长臂管辖”等强权政策，这显然与国际社会的期待以及时代发展的潮流相悖。可以说，美国“印太战略”是以20世纪的思维与方式来处理21世纪的国际关系，这就难免到处碰壁。就此而言，美国“印太战略”确定了不合时宜的战略目标，主观建构了一个想象中的“竞争对手”，开出了一味无效的、错误的“药方”。这种战略设计的缺陷已然成为美国“印太战略”的“阿喀琉斯之踵”。

Since the announcement by the United States of its Indo-Pacific vision in 2017 and the release of its Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2018 — as well as its implementation of military, political, economic, diplomatic, and technological policies — the U.S. strategy has made significant progress at the cognitive, policy and strategic levels.

First, the Indo-Pacific Strategy has not only raised Americans' awareness of the importance of the Indo-Pacific region but has also gained attention and policy follow-ups from other major countries or groups of countries to that region. The U.S. strategic community's awareness of the importance of the Indo-Pacific region has increased significantly, and the Republican and Democratic parties have found a high degree of agreement. This strengthens the will and determination of the U.S. to promote the strategy and helps maintain its stability and continuity. In addition, the strategy has effectively focused the international community's attention on the region.The United States is not the first country to use the Indo-Pacific concept, nor is it the first to focus on the region at the policy level, but the promotion of the Indo-Pacific concept at the international level and the widespread attention of the international community to the region are directly related to the high-profile proposal of the United States.With the gradual clarification and steady progress of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, countries or regional organizations have put forward their own strategies or ideas. By contrast, the attention of non-Indo-Pacific countries is even greater and more high-profile at the policy level. France, Germany, the European Union and Canada have all introduced their own Indo-Pacific strategies. As a result, the region is not only the direction toward which the U.S. strategic focus has shifted but has even become the center — where the world's major strategic thinking is directed. The attention of countries or groups of countries inside and outside the region have, to a certain extent, coordinated with or responded to the United States as it implements its Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Second, the overall policy structure of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy has been formed and has been continuously enriched and improved. This is mainly reflected in the fact that the strategy has clear strategic objectives, clear strategic targets and a relatively balanced policy system. The Trump administration basically built a whole-of-government, whole-of-society, whole-of-field policy framework for it. The Biden administration has absorbed this policy framework in its entirety and further improved it, most notably in terms of systemic and balanced policies.From a policy perspective, while maintaining strategic investment and high-profile involvement in the security aspects of the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. has paid more attention to policy design and implementation in other areas. In particular, it launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity and built an economic platform to promote its strategy.From the perspective of topics, the U.S. has not only strengthened its focus on traditional security areas but also incorporated non-traditional security topics into the Indo-Pacific Strategy, such as climate change, disaster relief and epidemic prevention and control, in response to the concerns of some regional countries to a certain extent.From the perspective of governing philosophy, the Biden administration has revised the Trump administration's “America first” principle, revived traditional multilateralism, and repaired and developed alliances and partnerships — such as upgrading the U.S.-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and building the AUKUS trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States — to revive U.S. dominance in international organizations and multilateral platforms.

Third, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy poses a greater challenge to China. The U.S. defines China as a strategic competitor that poses an all-encompassing challenge to it. The U.S. Department of Defense calls China a pacing challenge. This means that relative gains have become a primary consideration in U.S. policy toward China, with the result that the United States is less likely to cooperate and is more inclined to delay and curb China's development.In this context, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy puts direct pressure on China by gaining geographical proximity, and it exerts indirect pressure on China's development by shaping the regional environment, with the ultimate goal, obviously, of serving its grand strategy of outcompeting China — in short, to “win.”There is no doubt that the Indo-Pacific Strategy has exerted considerable pressure on China's sovereignty and security interests (the Taiwan question is the most concentrated and obvious manifestation), bringing more complexity and uncertainty to China's development environment and forcing China to focus more energy and resources on the Asia-Pacific region. This will, to a certain extent, alleviate the competitive pressure that the United States faces from China at the global level. From the perspective of China-U.S. strategic competition, the Indo-Pacific Strategy has to some extent served as a counterweight to China's development strategy and process.

There are many constraints on the Indo-Pacific Strategy, most notably in its positioning, which has serious flaws. In essence, the strategy is designed to maintain U.S. dominance based on the premise that China is the main competitor of the U.S.However, China does not have a so-called hegemonic strategy. Beijing has repeatedly stressed that China neither expands nor seeks spheres of influence, nor does it seek so-called dominance, and thus there is no issue over competing with the United States for dominance.In fact, making international relations more democratic, law-based and rational is the common expectation of the international community today, and also the development trend. The Indo-Pacific Strategy, as a strategy to maintain U.S. dominance, pursues a zero-sum mindset and adopts a power policy of bloc politics, confrontation, decoupling and long-arm jurisdiction. This is obviously contrary to the expectations of the international community and the development trend of the times.The Indo-Pacific Strategy is supposed to deal with international relations in the 21st century, but it uses 20th century thinking and will therefore inevitably run into problems here and there. To be more specific, the strategy has improper strategic goals, an imaginary competitor and an ineffective and misguided way of doing things. This strategic design flaw has become its Achilles heel.